By Abel Tesfaye Eyakem

Introduction

The conclusion of the Pretoria Agreement, signalling an end to the Tigray war in Ethiopia, has unleashed a series of complex political dynamics across the country. As key stakeholders navigate the aftermath of the agreement, power struggles and evolving alliances are reshaping Ethiopia’s political landscape.

Stalemate and Strategic Manoeuvring

Currently, the federal government and the TPLF find themselves in a stalemate, grappling with the consequences of the Pretoria Agreement. The federal government’s approach aims to isolate the TPLF and render it irrelevant through a range of tactics. By capitalizing on the provisions within the agreement, the federal government seeks to exploit gray areas, prolong the negotiation process, and gradually weaken the TPLF while exacerbating internal divisions among Tigray’s political elites. The end game appears to be to force the Interim Regional Authority (IRA) into making major concessions at the cost of Tigray’s political autonomy. Consequently, the federal government appears to hold the upper hand in the ongoing dynamics.

TPLF’s Internal Unity and Challenges

Despite maintaining a façade of internal unity, fault lines are emerging within the TPLF, primarily between progressive elements and the hardcore leadership led by Chairman Debretsion. However, as Tadesse Worede’s recent remarks has made clear, there is a determination on both sides to negotiate a compromise.

The National Election Board of Ethiopia’s refusal to grant TPLF its legal status, which was revoked at the beginning of the Tigray war, has caused controversy. However, as the IRA’s establishment, which is ratified by Pretoria, is conditional upon TPLF’s legitimacy, a political settlement is likely to allow the TPLF to regain its legal status, albeit with some costly concessions.

In the face of mounting challenges from various coalition interests aligned against Tigray, the TPLF aims to preserve internal cohesion and bide its time predicting that evolving political situation in the rest of Ethiopia would enable it to regain its leverage.

Pacifying Amhara resistance

The federal government’s commitment to restoring the situation to the status quo ante, as outlined in the Pretoria Agreement, poses a challenge to Amhara nationalism, which had militarily annexed Western and Southern Tigray with the consent of the federal government.

In what appears to be a plan to clear the way for the restoration of contested territories to Tigray, the federal government has embarked on dismantling Amhara paramilitaries and Special Force units. However, this has triggered resistance within the Amhara region, manifested through mass protests, media campaigns, and clashes between Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Amhara militias.

However, the dismantling of regional forces, of which the operation on Amhara forces is but a part, will put the regional states at the mercy of the federal government, which has previously shown an interest in eroding regional autonomy and enforcing centralization. The situation is further complicated by internal divisions within the Amhara region, particularly between Gojjam and Gondar elites, manifested by the formation of rival factions [Amhara Popular Front (APF) and Coalition of Amhara Fano] whose differing priorities may impede cohesive resistance.

Oromia and Fed’s operations on the OLA

Efforts by the federal government to achieve decisive military victories over the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) ahead of negotiations have been unsuccessful, resulting in a strengthened OLA and a shift in the balance of power between the center and the periphery.

The federalist coalition forged against Abiy’s government, of which the OLA and the TPLF were the key players, appears to have dissipated following the Pretoria Agreement and the constraints it imposed on the TPLF.

Recognizing the growing significance of the Oromia conflict, the federal government is likely to prioritize military efforts to subdue the OLA, considering the Amhara resistance as a less immediate threat.

As the success of OLA’s resistance hinges on the Amhara’s ability to effectively carry out an insurgency, it should not be disregarded that the two insurgencies might establish a tactical alliance to some extent, despite their ideological rivalry.

Eritrea’s Strategic Calculations

The Eritrean government has cautiously observed the consequences of the Pretoria Agreement, as it anticipates potentially unfavorable outcomes for its national interests. Seeking to counterbalance strained relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea has pursued regional and global alliances. While charm offensives toward Kenya and Somaliland have yielded limited results, Eritrea’s engagement with Russia and China aims to secure alternative alliances in case of conflicts of interest with its former ally, Ethiopia.

The progress made by the TPLF in disarming the heavy and group weapons that were in the possession of Tigrayan forces, along with the initiation of the reintegration process, will intensify the pressure on the federal government to compel the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Ethiopia’s sovereign territories that they currently occupy, aiming to restore them to their pre-war status.

Conclusion

Following the conclusion of the Pretoria Agreement, which marked the end of the Tigray war, political dynamics in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa are undergoing significant reconfigurations as stakeholders grapple with the agreement’s implications.

Both the federal government and the TPLF have made concessions, necessitating a re-evaluation and adjustment to the new realities. The TPLF-led Interim Administration (IRA) is currently focused on addressing the aftermath of the war and undertaking preparations for the rehabilitation of war-torn Tigray.

The federal government, conversely, will focus its efforts on pacifying the Amhara region, which it may use as a pretext to delay the restoration of Tigray’s territories and the subsequent repatriation of internally displaced persons (IDPs). It will rely on strategic foot-dragging in the territorial restoration process and the delayed allocation of resources, hoping to exert increasing control over the Interim Administration due to mounting pressure from a discontented Tigrayan public.

Meanwhile, the conflict between the Oromo Liberation Army and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces in Oromia emerges as a pivotal battleground in the struggle between the central government and the peripheral regions, carrying profound implications for ethno-nationalism and the constitutional framework. The outcome of this conflict will significantly shape the future trajectory of the region.