Source: UN Security Council – Report S/2024/65

The UN Security Council has published a report which gives an assessment of where the military equipment for both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces is coming from.

Below is their assessment

Martin

Weapons supply for the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur

35.   In the initial phase of the clashes in Darfur (April to July 2023), the advanced military equipment and weapons observed in Khartoum (Sukhoi 25, Mig 29 and Mig 24 aircraft, attack helicopters, man-portable air defence systems and combat drones) were not seen in Darfur. The various forces (SAF, RSF, Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan signatory groups and militias) used the easily available weapons and military equipment: 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns, as well as ZU23 anti‑aircraft guns, mounted on Landcruiser vehicles; rocket-propelled grenades; mortar guns; various types of rocket launchers; Soviet-era BTR 80 armoured personnel carriers; and various types of small and light weapons.[1]

36.   However, since August the renewed military campaign of RSF to take control of the main cities of Darfur resulted in an escalation of military means used by both sides. The RSF surge coincided with it securing new supply routes (see paras. 38–49 below).

             A.    Offensive military overflights

37.   Since August, SAF responded to the RSF surge in Darfur with offensive military overflights, an action prohibited by the sanctions regime. On several occasions, SAF conducted airstrikes on RSF positions, with aircraft flying from military airports outside Darfur. For example, SAF claimed responsibility for airstrikes on 28 and 29 August on the RSF base of Zuruk (North Darfur).[2] Since August, according to various witnesses, media reports and videos, SAF has also conducted several airstrikes on RSF forces in the Nyala, Ed Daein and El Fasher areas, sometimes using their Antonov An-32 fleet (see sect. VII below).

             B.    New supply lines

38.   Since the outbreak of the war, SAF garrisons in Darfur have not been able to be replenished with any meaningful military supplies, given that RSF took swift control of most portions of the road between Kusti and El Fasher, the main supply route of SAF from Khartoum and Port Sudan to Darfur. Early in September, some RSF members and sympathizers accused SAF of bringing military supplies to its El Fasher military base by using the humanitarian convoys coming from Port Sudan, in collusion with the armed movements escorting the convoys, SLA/MM in particular. While several Panel sources in the movements acknowledged that this was likely, the supplies were too few and limited to alter the conflict dynamics.

39.   On the other hand, since the beginning of the war, in particular since July, RSF was able to secure new supply lines to and through Darfur for weapons, vehicles and logistics. According to eyewitnesses and videos, in its increased military campaign in Darfur since August, RSF has used several types of heavy and/or sophisticated weapons that it was not using there before. This included unmanned combat aerial vehicles, howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers and anti-aircraft weapons such as man-portable air defence systems, observed in Nyala, El Fasher and El Geneina.

40.   This new RSF firepower had a massive impact on the balance of forces on the ground, both in Darfur and in other regions. New RSF heavy artillery items played a major role in its capture of Nyala and El Geneina (see sects. VI and VII below), according to various local sources, including in SAF, while new anti-aircraft devices helped RSF to counter the main asset of SAF, its air force. For example, in October, according to official statements, various local sources and videos, RSF shot down an SAF Antonov in the Nyala area. In a video of the RSF crew who shot down the aircraft, the Panel identified a man-portable air defence systems, likely a SA-7 type.[3]

             C.    New supply lines of the Rapid Support Forces

41.   The Panel identified three main routes, still active to date, for RSF supplies. The main one was through eastern Chad. Since June, various flight-tracking experts have observed a heavy rotation of cargo planes coming from Abu Dhabi International Airport to Am Djarass airport in eastern Chad, with stops in regional countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda.[4] Several media reports claimed that the aircraft were transporting weapons, ammunition and medical equipment for RSF.[5] On 28 November 2023, the SAF Lieutenant-General and Sovereignty Council member, Yasir al-Atta, made similar claims, accusing Chad and the United Arab Emirates of providing military support to RSF through Am Djarass.[6] The United Arab Emirates responded to those allegations by stating that the cargo planes had a humanitarian purpose, in particular to establish a field hospital in Am Djarass for Sudanese refugees.[7]

42.   According to information gathered by the Panel from sources in Chad and Darfur, the allegations were credible. Several sources in eastern Chad and Darfur, including among local native and administrative leaders and armed groups operating in those areas, reported to the Panel that, several times per week, weapons and ammunition shipments were unloaded from cargo planes arriving at Am Djarass airport,[8] then loaded on trucks. Small convoys, comprising one to three trucks escorted by an armed Landcruiser, left the airport through the western gate and reached the Darfur border, through Bao or Kariari, where shipments were handed over to RSF, which transported the shipments to its base in Zuruk (Umm Barru locality, North Darfur).[9] Some weapons were distributed to RSF positions in Darfur, while most of them were transported from Zuruk to Khartoum through desert roads in a north-east direction usually used by smugglers. The Panel wrote to the Permanent Representatives of Chad and of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations on 14 December 2023, sharing its findings. In its response, dated 21 December 2023, the United Arab Emirates denied any involvement in the shipment of arms and ammunition from the United Arab Emirates to RSF through Chad. It also noted that the flights from the United Arab Emirates transported humanitarian assistance (see annex 5 to the present report). As at 22 December 2023, the Panel had yet to receive a response from Chad.

43.   Several RSF field commanders, chosen for their knowledge of the border area and desert routes, oversaw the supervision of the transportation of the weapons into Darfur and the Sudan. They included a former SLA/MM field commander who joined RSF in 2014, Abdallah Chagab, now one of the RSF field commanders in Khartoum North, from the Zaghawa community. These large-scale and sustained supplies ranged from small and lights weapons to unmanned combat aerial vehicles, anti-aircraft missiles, mortars and various types of ammunition.[10]

44.   According to various sources, in particular among members of southern Libyan communities such as Tebu and Darfurian armed groups based in Libya, RSF used another supply route into Darfur, from southern Libya. RSF procured substantial quantities of fuel from there. Some elements of the Darfurian armed movements in Libya, who had facilities to buy fuel at cheaper rates thanks to their relations with the Libyan National Army (LNA), played a leading role in that smuggling. Tanker trucks belonging to the movements and escorted by some of their elements transported the fuel to RSF in North Darfur through the Libya-Chad-Sudan tri-border area, often through Am Djarass.

45.   RSF also purchased cars from Libya, in particular Landcruisers, which, such as fuel, were essential to their military tactics based on mobility and pace. For example, the Panel was aware of a case in September when RSF imported several dozen new cars from southern Libya. Cars were gathered in Sabba, then were brought in Darfur to Zuruk by drivers hired by RSF, through Kufra. In another case, when they returned from Libya to the Sudan through Darfur to join RSF in mid-2023, Hilal splinter groups came with several dozen new Landcruisers, purchased for them by RSF, according to members of those groups.

46.   RSF was also able to procure weapons through Libya. For example, the Panel was aware that, during the first weeks of the conflict, RSF asked for the cooperation of a Darfurian armed movement based in Libya in transporting artillery items and ammunition obtained in Libya to Darfur, proposing in return to give a share of the equipment to the movement. While the movement’s field commanders were in favour of that deal, it did not happen because the head of the movement vetoed it.

47.   In the operations from Libya, RSF benefited from coordination with several LNA brigades based in southern Libya. These included Subul al-Salam, a predominantly Zuwaya, Salafist brigade based in Kufra and controlling the border with the Sudan, with whom some RSF forces were already cooperating for smuggling activities before the war. According to various Libyan sources, Subul al-Salam was instrumental in facilitating the replenishment of RSF with fuel, cars and ammunition. The 128 Brigade, which had a presence in southern localities such as Sabba and was the main Libyan partner of Darfurian armed movements, was also involved.

48.   Lastly, RSF secured a supply route from South Sudan for fuel. Trucks carrying fuel moved from Juba to Wau on a weekly basis. From Wau, fuel was transported in civilian cars such as Landcruisers to Raja, then to RSF-controlled areas in South Darfur, through Kafia-Kingi. While local South Sudanese officers, such as some army officers in Wau, were involved in the smuggling, South Sudanese government authorities did not play any role.

49.   The Panel notes that the transfers of arms and ammunition into Darfur constituted violations of the arms embargo.

        [1] As observed by many eyewitnesses and confirmed by photo and video evidence.

        [2] See Sudan Tribune, “Sudanese army launches airstrikes on RSF base near Libyan border”, 2 September 2023.

        [3] See https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1711483757411103161?t=WO_Kdj7r6Acfw4_nuDpT8g&s=08.

        [4] See, for example, Gerjon, “A new mystery airlift between the UAE and Africa”, 30 June 2023.

        [5] See Declan Walsh, Christoph Koettl and Eric Schmitt, “Talking peace in Sudan, the U.A.E. secretly fuels the fight”, New York Times, 29 September 2023.and Nicholas Bariyo and Benoit Faucon, “A U.S. ally promised to send aid to Sudan. It sent weapons instead”, Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2023.

        [6] See Sudan Tribune, “Sudan’s Sovereign Council member condemns UAE for arming RSF”, 28 November 2023.

        [7] See, for example, Agenzia Nova, “Soudan. Les Émirats démentent les allégations d’envoi d’armes et de munitions aux Forces de soutien rapide”, 14 August 2023.

        [8] Several photos attributed to members of the Chadian security forces reportedly show some shipments, including boxes of weapons and ammunition such as Type 56 assault rifles. See, for example, www.facebook.com/100064727614082/posts/pfbid0cc6qSijfU75eAZii79yVc34oiNV7Nwk2cngA9Cswa46NNGVpaF9gfCBxkjRNVPkdl/?d=n&mibextid=WC7FNe and www.facebook.com/ 100004271381101/posts/pfbid02aUUW5K7ixfu5jTsUhuEsX8VA7PAS6YaVVpRdQ6z8gBUk9jiYQL4BwVFUnCyjYkSMl/?d=n&mibextid=WC7FNe.

        [9] Hemetti’s clan settled in Zuruk around 2017, under the leadership of his uncle Juma Dagolo. On Zuruk and the RSF establishment there, see Klass van Dijken, “Blood, sand and gold: victor’s city rises from ashes of Sudan’s civil war”, The Guardian, 29 February 2020.

      [10] Information triangulated from several military and intelligence sources, and local interlocutors in the Sudan and Chad.