Produced by the Red Sea TaskForce, an independent body created by the following Eritrean Scholars, listed in the order of their appearance in the text of the report:
Yohannes Haile, Gebre H. Tesfagiorgis, Mohamed Kheir Omar, Mebrahtu Ateweberhan, Paulos Tesfagiorgis, Teame Tewolde-Berhan, Kidane Mengisteab, Sengal Woldetensae, Mengsteab Tesfayohannes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Yohannes Haile
In addressing the Ethiopian Parliament on October 13, 2023, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister (PM), Abiy Ahmed, declared the Red Sea as “the natural border of Ethiopia” and described ownership of the Red Sea as an “existential issue.” The Ethiopian PM’s assertion of owning and/or accessing the Red Sea was based on history, geography, demography, ethnicity, law, and economic factors. Moreover, the PM asserted that, if not during his tenure in power or the current generation, the next generation should make ownership of the Red Sea a reality, which is tantamount to seeding a time bomb. Such a declaration goes against international law, and undermines the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Eritrea and the other coastal countries in the region. It also endangers the Horn of Africa’s peace, security, and integrity.
The Red Sea Task Force was established in response to such declarations with the purpose of conducting objective studies and performing in depth analyses on the different aspects of Ethiopia s claim of ownership and access to the Red Sea, and disseminating the outcomes through publications and other platforms.
The task force is comprised of nine independent Eritrean scholars with affiliation to any political entity. Its membership is based only on the individual scholar’s merit of possessing relevant expertise and interest, and/or having direct or indirect involvement in the subject matter. Corresponding to the bases of Ethiopia’s claim to the ownership of the Red Sea, the task force investigated four areas: (1) history, (2) geography, demography and ethnicity, (3) law of the sea, and (4) economy.
First, we investigated the historical basis of Ethiopia’s claim to ownership of the Red Sea. We explored ancient history, including the Aksumite Kingdom era, to establish the common heritage of the communities in the region. We continued to the more relevant modern history, especially the advent of European colonialism, which shaped the current state borders. Eritrea was established as an Italian colony in 1890 after accords with Afar chiefs and occupying other parts. A series of agreements between colonial Italy and Ethiopia established the currently recognized borders between Eritrea and Ethiopia. After the defeat of Italy in 1941 and the installation of the British Military Administration, Eritrean intellectuals formed political parties, some proponents of independence, others of unification with Ethiopia. The UN established federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia eventually led to the illegal annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia. Subsequently, Eritreans commenced an armed struggle in 1961, which resulted in de facto independence of Eritrea in 1991. A United Nations (UN)-supported referendum was held in 1993 that formalized Eritrea’s independence, becoming a member of the UN as a sovereign state on May 28, 1993.
Second, we examined the two interlinked issues of geography and demography as well as ethnicity arguments Ethiopia uses to support its claim for ownership of and/or access to the sea. Our analysis revealed that socio-political and socio-economic isolations exist within and between countries in the Horn of Africa in general and in Ethiopia in particular. Moreover, we showed three interrelated historical developments that aggravate the socio-natural isolation driven by the physical-climatic conditions: (1) the social distance triggered by the expansion of Islam in the lowlands and coastal areas of the region, forcing the central Abyssinian empire south and westwards, (2) the occupation of coastal areas by Europeans in the 19thCentury, creating new political entities
and borderlands and (3) misguided development policies followed during the post-colonial period, including recent interaction with globalization. On the ethnic Afar-based Ethiopia’s claim of ownership of the sea, our analysis unveiled the Afar population played crucial roles in the anti-colonial struggle and throughout Eritrea’s struggle for independence. Arguments claiming that Afar-inhabited lands in Eritrea should belong to Ethiopia, solely because the majority of the Afar people reside in Ethiopia, reflect selective convenience in a region where numerous ethnic groups transcend national borders. It also contravenes the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Eritrea and Djibouti, and contradicts with the African Union (AU) policy and international norms.
Third, in the legal area, the Law of the Sea, we establish that Ethiopia has the right of access to the sea, but not ownership. Any claim of ownership of the Eritrean Red Sea coast or its ports and/or a threat of using force is a direct affront to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Eritrea. It contravenes two established international laws: (1) the 1964 African uti possidetis, which declared “sovereignty and inviolability of colonially inherited boundaries…,” and (2) Article 4 of the UN Charter which prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” International Law, specifically Article 125 of the UN Law of the Sea provides landlocked Ethiopia the right of access to the sea through Eritrea and the other transit states in the Horn of Africa. But that right is not absolute. The landlocked state’s right is contingent on an agreement with the transit state. Thus, Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea should be implemented through a good-faith, bilateral agreement between the landlocked State of Ethiopia and the transit State of Eritrea in a way that does not violate Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Fourth, regarding economic and security considerations, our analytical investigation does not indicate that Ethiopia faces an existential threat due to its landlocked status. On the contrary, Ethiopia enjoyed double-digit economic growth from 1998 to 2018, without using Eritrean ports. Ethiopia benefits from relatively short distances to multiple ports in neighboring littoral states. For instance, the distance from Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti is slightly shorter than to Eritrea’s port of Assab. Unlike many other landlocked nations, Ethiopia’s proximity to these ports helps keep transit costs comparatively low.
Moreover, as stipulated in the international law of the sea, neighboring littoral states never denied Ethiopia it’s right to access the sea. Our findings further suggest that the absence of a naval base has not posed any security risk to Ethiopia’s maritime trade. Instead, Ethiopia’s current security threats stem more from internal rather than external forces. These domestic challenges far outweigh the strategic disadvantages of lacking direct coastal control. Among these internal hurdles, the complexities of Ethiopia’s ongoing nation-building stands tall, which entails perpetual chronic internal conflicts that threaten the country’s unity and integrity. Such fundamental problems warrant due attention and resolution for Ethiopia to achieve its long-term development ambitions.
Overall, our comprehensive analysis unveiled that the premises on which Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and other Ethiopian elites claimed ownership of the Red Sea are inaccurate and unsubstantiated.
Finally, we concluded our study with a few recommendations: (1) Ethiopians need to reconcile with Eritrea’s independence and sovereignty, (2) Eritrea and other concerned coastal states should acknowledge and uphold Ethiopia’s legitimate right to access the sea and transit, in accordance with international maritime law, (3) Eritrea and Ethiopia should engage in good-faith negotiations to establish a bilateral agreement that ensures mutually beneficial, win-win outcomes, (4) Ethiopia should refrain from posing military threats and playing the ethnic Afar card in its pursuit for ownership of the Red Sea, and (5) Regional states should explore possibilities for sustainable win-win solution such as negotiating multilateral agreements to foster regional economic integration and collective security arrangement. These recommendations are elucidated in the “Summary and Conclusion” section of the project. Our recommendations underscore peaceful bilateral and/or multilateral negotiations and cooperation amongst states in general and between Eritrea and Ethiopia in particular. We sincerely believe that implementing these recommendations would promote peace, stability and development in the Horn of Africa.
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Martin Plaut 