UK Parliamentary Committee names Eritrean government as among regimes using Transnational Repression against its diaspora

“A substantial number of submissions we received were personal accounts of TNR perpetrated by Eritrea…Transnational repression is a serious and under-recognised threat that requires urgent and coordinated international action. Its impacts extend far beyond those directly targeted, creating a broader ‘chilling effect’² on entire communities and undermining fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. We urge the Government to work with likeminded states to support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority issue on the UN agenda and to promote coordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes.”

Summary

People from countries around the world come to the UK as a place of safety from repression. However, transnational repression (TNR) risks undermining the UK’s ability to protect the human rights of its citizens and those who have sought safety within its borders.

It is deeply concerning to hear increasing reports of foreign governments moving beyond their own national borders to persecute people in the UK. The Committee received credible evidence that a number of states have engaged in acts of transnational repression on UK soil. These actions have a serious impact on those targeted, instilling fear, limiting their freedom of expression and movement, and undermining their sense of safety.

Despite the seriousness of the threat, the UK currently lacks a clear strategy to address TNR. There is no formal definition of transnational repression in the UK and the Government does not routinely collect data on TNR events. Understanding the scale and nature of the threat is essential to formulating effective and proportionate responses. We therefore recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of TNR and establish data collection and monitoring mechanisms.

Police officers often lack the training necessary to respond effectively to TNR, resulting in inconsistent and ineffective support for TNR victims. We call for specialised training for police officers on the early warning signs of TNR and for the creation of a dedicated reporting line for TNR victims.

We are deeply concerned by the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices¹ by certain member states. Refusal by the INTERPOL secretariat to acknowledge that there is a problem and to take remedial action poses a significant threat to the rights and freedoms of individuals targeted by authoritarian regimes and sends a message that this behaviour is acceptable. We call on the Government to put pressure on INTERPOL to reform procedures and call out serial abusers. We also propose that the Government consider introducing a formal mechanism by which the Home Office or the National Crime Agency could alert individuals to the existence of a Red Notice, where there is a strong basis to believe it has been politically motivated.

Transnational repression is a serious and under-recognised threat that requires urgent and coordinated international action. Its impacts extend far beyond those directly targeted, creating a broader ‘chilling effect’² on entire communities and undermining fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. We urge the Government to work with likeminded states to support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority issue on the UN agenda and to promote coordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes.

1 Introduction

Background

1. There is currently no universally accepted definition of transnational repression (TNR).³ TNR is generally understood to refer to certain state-directed crimes or actions against individuals that take place outside the territory of the perpetrating state.⁴ TNR can take many forms and could include harassment, online disinformation campaigns, surveillance, stalking, physical violence, threats to family members, attempts to force individuals to return to their country of origin and even assassination attempts.⁵ TNR risks undermining the UK’s ability to protect the human rights of its citizens and those who have sought safety within its borders.

2. TNR can violate numerous internationally recognised human rights, including the right to life, the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, the right not to be subjected to interference with private and family life, and the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Contracting Parties to the ECHR also have positive obligations to protect people within their jurisdiction, in particular in relation to the right to life under Article 2, as well as obligations not to deport or extradite people to States where there is a real risk that they will be subjected to treatment which is contrary to the Convention.⁶

3. The Government states that TNR is “specific and targeted” and does not affect “large numbers” of people.⁷ However, whilst the number of recorded cases may appear low, the impact of TNR extends far beyond recorded cases. TNR can also have a wider ‘chilling effect’⁸ on freedom of expression across entire communities.⁹ The fear of retaliation can discourage individuals and groups from engaging in political discourse, participating in public life, or expressing dissenting views.¹⁰ We were told that:

Perpetrating states are acutely aware of this fear, which can spread through communities, so they need not commit flagrant and widespread TNR to achieve their desired impact.¹¹

Moreover, the true scale of TNR is likely underestimated due to high amounts of underreporting of TNR-related crimes and the often-covert nature of TNR activities.¹² Framing TNR as a marginal issue may risk overlooking its serious and far-reaching human rights implications.

4. TNR can have a profound and lasting impact on those targeted. Individuals with personal experience described how TNR effects every aspect of their lives. One individual told us that “this kind of repression doesn’t just control people; it isolates them. It breaks apart communities”.¹³ Chloe Cheung, a 19-year-old activist, bravely gave evidence to the Committee about her firsthand experiences of TNR:

It has affected me mentally, emotionally and physically in profound ways that I never expected … The mental and emotional toll has been devastating. I now carry lots of self-protection devices with me. I am also extremely cautious of strangers approaching me. If someone suddenly tries to make friends with me or approaches me unexpectedly, my first thought is no longer trust but suspicion. I will ask myself, “Are they working for Chinese authorities, or are they trying to get intelligence or information about me?¹⁴

Our inquiry

5. The Committee launched its inquiry into Transnational Repression in the UK in response to increasing reports of foreign governments moving beyond their borders to persecute people in the UK. In the last year, the number of state-threat investigations run by MI5 jumped by 48%, and MI5 and CTP have dealt with more than 20 threat to life cases relating to Iran since the start of 2022.¹⁵ There have also been several recent high-profile TNR cases, including the issuance of bounties against Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and Iran’s intimidation of UK-based journalists.¹⁶ At the same time, the Government has set out, for the first time, a strategic framework to address TNR, following a review of the UK’s TNR approach by the Defending Democracy Taskforce.¹⁷

6. We received 181 written evidence submissions, 91 of which we were able to publish. Many submissions were from people with personal experience of transnational repression. Due to concerns about potential reprisals, many contributors requested that their evidence remain confidential. We were also unable to publish some submissions due to the sensitive nature of the evidence and the potential risks involved. We held four oral evidence sessions, where we heard from legal experts, academics, human rights advocates, journalists, and TNR victims. We also spoke privately with targeted individuals. We are deeply grateful to all those who contributed to this inquiry. We recognise that, for some, sharing their experiences involved considerable personal risk. We also acknowledge that there are many others who may have wished to come forward but did not feel safe to do so.

7. This report does not seek to provide a comprehensive account of every country’s TNR record, nor does it aim to catalogue all tactics used by states perpetrating TNR. Rather, the focus is on understanding the impact of TNR in the UK and evaluating the adequacy of legal and policy responses. The following section summarises key concerns related to specific countries that were repeatedly raised in evidence submissions. The remainder of the report concentrates on identifying practical steps that the Government can take to strengthen its response to TNR and to better protect those at risk, regardless of the country responsible.

Country-specific evidence: countries of concern

8. Our inquiry received evidence alleging that many states had conducted TNR activities on UK soil. Multiple evidence submissions accused Bahrain, China, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates of perpetrating TNR in the UK.¹⁸ A substantial number of submissions we received were personal accounts of TNR perpetrated by Eritrea.¹⁹ China, Russia and Iran were highlighted by witnesses as the three most flagrant TNR perpetrators in the UK.²⁰ Notably, all three of these countries have imposed sanctions on UK Parliamentarians, including two members of this Committee, in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to deter scrutiny and suppress criticism.

9. Witnesses described a broad range of tactics employed by China, including surveillance, online harassment, and threats to family members abroad.²¹ China has also placed ‘bounties’ on several individuals, including Chloe Cheung, offering  $HK1 million for information leading to their capture abroad.²² In some cases, threatening letters were reportedly sent to the neighbours of individuals who had bounties placed on them, in an apparent attempt to further isolate and intimidate them.²³ Concern was also raised about the operation of unofficial Chinese “police stations” in the UK, which were allegedly used to monitor and pressure members of the Chinese diaspora.²⁴ Similar concerns were expressed in relation to the proposed new Chinese embassy in London, with fears that it could serve as a base for further surveillance and intimidation activities.²⁵

10. In relation to Russia, the Committee received evidence related to the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices and Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation to intimidate and silence journalists, activists, and other critics.²⁶ Commentators also highlight that Russia has engaged in the most serious forms of transnational repression, including taking actions that pose a direct threat to life.²⁷ High-profile TNR incidents, such as the Salisbury nerve agent attack on Sergei and Yulia Skripal, can create a ‘chilling effect’ amongst critics of the Russian State.²⁸

11. Iran represents one of the highest kidnap and assassination state threats to the UK, with the Homeland Security Group describing the threat of physical attack on individuals in the UK as “the greatest level of threat we currently face from Iran”.²⁹ Tactics reportedly used by Iran include assassination plots, physical attacks, intimidation of family members, asset freezing, judicial proceedings, smear campaigns, online abuse, surveillance and digital attacks such as hacking, doxing³⁰ and impersonation.³¹ Both the Iranian Intelligence Services and proxy organisations conduct TNR on UK soil, with the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) warning that “the use of a wide range of organisations means physical threat can manifest from a much broader pool of suspects, adding a further layer of unpredictability”.³² Hossein Abedini, Deputy Director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, told the Committee that ‘cultural centres’ in the UK are used as fronts for surveillance operations targeting members of the Iranian diaspora.³³ The volume of transnational repression reports involving journalists covering Iran was also a particular cause for concern.³⁴ In addition to physical attacks on journalists, Reporters without Borders told us that:

Iranian women journalists have been subjected to gendered and sexualised abuse, including explicit threats of rape or sexual violence towards them or their families (including children), the circulation of fake stories designed to ruin their reputations and photoshopped pornographic images.³⁵

Recent increases in TNR activity by Iran, including a sharp rise in sophisticated and high-risk operations, have led the ISC to warn that the threat posed by Iran could “continue to increase rapidly if its intent or capability develops further”.³⁶

12. The Committee received a substantial number of submissions relating to Eritrea.³⁷ Martin Plaut, journalist and Visiting Senior Research Fellow at Kings College London, described how state-sponsored ‘festivals’ have been utilised as mechanisms to monitor, intimidate and exert control over members of the Eritrean diaspora.³⁸ We were also told that members of the Eritrean diaspora are subjected to coercion to force payment of a 2% ‘diaspora tax’ to the Eritrean government.³⁹ The UN Special Rapporteur on Eritrea said that “those who refuse to contribute are considered government opponents and face harassment, intimidation and ultimately social isolation”.⁴⁰

Read the full report here