By Eyob Tesfamichael Habtab | August 6, 2025

The Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s pursuit of naval access to Eritrea’s Red Sea port of Assab risks igniting a regional crisis. His inflammatory rhetoric and military mobilization not only violate international law but also serve as a distraction from Ethiopia’s deepening economic crisis, where 30 million people rely on food aid. This reckless agenda threatens to escalate internal conflicts and destabilize the Horn of Africa.

Abiy’s Dangerous Ambitions

Abiy’s push to control Eritrea’s port of Assab violates the UN Charter and African Union principles guaranteeing territorial integrity. Eritrea, with no political or economic stake in Ethiopia, is forced to defend its sovereignty against Abiy’s threats and support for opposition groups. His unilateral decisions—such as the failed Somaliland memorandum of understanding (MoU) and Assab occupation plans—bypass his own government, leaving ministers and military officials uninformed and exposing governance disarray.

In Tigray, Abiy’s backing of splinter groups and the Simret party, led by Getachew Reda, aims to undermine the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Combined with delays in implementing the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, these actions risk reigniting conflict. Meanwhile, insurgencies by the Amhara Fano Forces and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) signal a widespread and potential catastrophic civil war. An attack on Eritrea would have disastrous consequences, as warned by President Isaias Afwerki, potentially engulfing the region in chaos.

Military Buildup Amid Economic Ruin

Ethiopia’s economy is collapsing, with 28.7% inflation and a $14 billion trade deficit. Yet, Abiy has doubled defence spending from $1.03 billion in 2022 to $2 billion in 2025, prioritizing arms imports from the UAE, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Israel, alongside a reported secret visit by Prime Minister Abiy to Kazakhstan. This includes tanks, air defence systems, drones, and communication equipment.

Opaque financial dealings, including pseudo-private companies and cash-laden plane returns, conceal expenditures from international financiers. The IMF estimates that $10.7 billion in external financing from development partners and creditors is required to regain macroeconomic stability and close Ethiopia’s financing gap, but Ethiopia’s involvement in black-market dollar purchases in the U.S., Djibouti, and the UAE, as well as illegal gold trading in Sudan and the DRC for light arms, undermines these efforts. These actions align with external geopolitical agendas, notably the UAE’s, rather than Ethiopia’s interests, diverting resources from critical economic reforms.

Military Weakness Exposed

Despite massive spending, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) remains weakened after the Tigray war (2020–2022), which caused 4,000 ENDF deaths and up to 400,000 total casualties. Recent defeats by the Amhara Fano and OLA highlight this fragility. In July 2025, Fano forces captured military hardware in Gondar and Woldia, absorbing 1,000 deserters and 500 prisoners. In Oromia, counterinsurgency efforts against the OLA have faltered since 2019, with rising civilian casualties eroding government credibility.

Desperate measures—forced conscription of children as young as 14 and a 2023 state of emergency in Amhara with curfews and mass arrests—have failed to halt insurgent advances.

Regional Tensions Escalate

Ethiopia’s federal structure is unraveling. Disputes over resources and political power between the Somali and Oromia regions, and territorial conflicts between Afar and Somali regions, deepen instability. These internal conflicts threaten neighbors like Djibouti, which relies on $4 billion in port revenues, and Somalia and Kenya, which face potential refugee surges and cross-border security risks. Sudan is still struggling to gain stability, with its ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces exacerbating food insecurity for 25 million people and displacing over 10 million, further straining regional resources. The conflict in Yemen has continued and abated, but recent attacks on commercial ships by the Houthi militia, including a reported hijacking of an Israeli-linked vessel in July 2025, pose an imposing threat to Red Sea commercial activity, disrupting global trade through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and increasing costs for humanitarian aid to Sudan. In contrast, Eritrea remains the most stable country and an anchor of peace in the region, maintaining a neutral stance amid rising tensions and avoiding entanglement in regional conflicts.

Economic Crisis and Misplaced Priorities

With urban unemployment at 18.9% and youth unemployment at 23.1%, Ethiopia’s economy teeters on collapse. Abiy’s $15–18 billion palace project starkly contrasts with the 30 million citizens dependent on food aid. In July 2024, the IMF approved a $3.4 billion Extended Credit Facility (ECF) to support Ethiopia’s Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda, aimed at addressing macroeconomic imbalances and fostering private sector-led growth. This ECF is part of a broader $10.7 billion external financing package from the IMF, World Bank, and other partners, contingent on Ethiopia reducing its fiscal deficit through debt rescheduling and additional donor assistance. However, Ethiopia has secured only minimal debt restructuring compared to its substantial debt burden, and donor support is increasingly bleak, with foreign aid dropping from 12% of GDP a decade ago to under 4% today. The IMF recently warned that Ethiopia’s reform agenda faces risks from declining donor support, fragile security conditions, and a resurgent parallel foreign exchange market. Macroeconomic stability remains elusive in a country trapped in a massive debt crisis, widening internal conflicts, and a military spending spree that diverts resources from critical social and developmental needs.

Water Wars and Diplomatic Isolation

Ethiopia’s unilateral fillings of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) violate the 1902 Nile Waters Agreement and international water law, creating a 7 billion cubic meter water deficit for Egypt. Abiy’s July 3, 2025, announcement of GERD’s September inauguration, ignoring objections, escalates tensions. Egypt, with its 107 million people, is not opposing Ethiopia’s development but demands its fair share of Nile water to sustain its population and economy. Under President El-Sisi, Egypt has strengthened ties with African nations and signed defence pacts with Somalia, while Ethiopia’s failed Somaliland MoU and confrontational stance deepen its isolation.

Abiy’s portrayal of Egypt as a “historical enemy” fails to rally support and overlooks the potential benefits of cooperation. His alignment with the UAE’s geopolitical interests over Ethiopia’s own further erodes his credibility.

Legal Violations and Regional Risks

The Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s actions, including the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland and his inflammatory rhetoric regarding Eritrea’s Port of Assab, constitute clear violations of international and regional legal frameworks. The MoU with Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, disregards Somalia’s sovereignty and violates Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. By engaging with Somaliland without Somalia’s consent, Ethiopia undermines the African Union Constitutive Act, Article 4(a), which emphasizes respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. This act of recognizing a separatist entity sets a dangerous precedent and fuels regional tensions, particularly with Somalia, which has condemned the MoU as a violation of its sovereignty.

Abiy’s rhetoric and military posturing toward Eritrea’s Port of Assab further demonstrate a flagrant disregard for international law. His public statements justifying Ethiopia’s pursuit of Assab, including his baseless argument that Ethiopia’s large population of 120 million entitles it to control foreign territory, lack any legal or rational basis. No country in the world has successfully invoked population size to justify violating another nation’s sovereignty, and such logic contradicts the principles of Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, which affirms the sovereign equality of all states, regardless of size or population. Additionally, Abiy’s threats against Eritrea breach Article 3(f) of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes and prohibits interference in the internal affairs of member states. His support for Eritrean opposition groups and troop deployments near the Eritrean border, accompanied by heavy weaponry, signal potential aggression, risking a catastrophic conflict in violation of UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974), which defines acts of aggression, including the invasion or attack on another state’s territory.

These actions not only destabilize Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia and Eritrea but also threaten the broader Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s unilateral operations of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), ignoring the 1902 Nile Waters Agreement and international water law, further exacerbate its diplomatic isolation, compounding the legal and geopolitical risks of Abiy’s policies. An Ethiopian attack on Eritrea, as signaled by troop deployments and heavy weaponry near the border, could trigger a catastrophic conflict, destabilizing the Horn of Africa and disrupting the Red Sea’s $1 trillion trade corridor.

Leadership Crisis and Public Discontent

Abiy’s unilateral decision-making, bypassing his cabinet and military, fuels governance chaos. Public discontent grows over economic hardship and rising civilian casualties from conflicts with Fano and OLA forces, both strengthened by young recruits and defecting soldiers. Abiy is using the Red Sea agenda to serve the interests of the UAE and deflect and distract domestic opposition to his regime. In recent interviews, former top Oromo party officials have exposed his tactics of inciting violence among neighbouring regions and different ethnic groups to prolong his regime, further eroding his legitimacy and exacerbating internal divisions.

Urgent International Action Needed

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s July 22, 2025, call for diplomacy underscores the Red Sea’s $1 trillion trade corridor importance, but current Western engagement with Abiy risks enabling his policies. With internal conflicts spreading, human rights abuses intensifying, and opposition leaders, including the well-known Oromo politician Taye Dendea, who was imprisoned for the second time in recent months, languishing in notorious detention facilities like the Awash Arba military camp prison and unknown underground prisons, the international community must act decisively. Reports indicate that opposition figures such as Christian Tadele, Yohannes Buayalew, and Kassa Teshager, arrested in August 2023, endure harsh conditions at Awash Arba, including ethnic slurs, torture, and lack of access to family or legal counsel, with the camp’s extreme heat and unsanitary conditions exacerbating their suffering. Taye Dendea, a former State Minister of Peace and vocal critic of Abiy Ahmed, was rearrested in June 2025 on revived charges of inciting violence and supporting anti-peace forces, despite being released on bail in December 2024, highlighting the regime’s pattern of targeting dissenters. President Trump’s bold steps to stop the wars between Israel and Iran, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the recent Thailand-Cambodia conflict are incredible. The U.S., using its leadership and leverage, should now intervene to halt Abiy’s regime’s misguided ambitious acts in the region and stop the internal conflict that has the potential to disintegrate Ethiopia, preventing a regional catastrophe that could destabilize a critical global corridor and displace millions across the Horn of Africa.