By Prof. Kjetil Tronvoll, Oslo New University College

As I have warned about for close to two years, military confrontations between Tigray forces and Ethiopian federal forces have apparently erupted. Reportedly, clashes between military forces controlled by Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian federal army (ENDF), are taking place for three days running in western Tigray (Tselemt, areas still under control by ENDF/Amhara forces since the signing of the Pretoria agreement in 2022). This has inter alia led to Ethiopian Airlines suspending all flights to Tigray, and AU Chair issued a statement of concern and calls for show maximum restraint for not to escalate the situation.

There are no official statements by the Ethiopian government on the outbreak of hostilities, so far. However, Getachew Reda, in his capacity as chair of Simret, has issued statements of condemnation of TPLF’s actions. Furthermore, on his official X-account (where he is titled “Advisor Minister to the PM on Eastern African Affair”), Getachew has encouraged the people of Tigray to “rise up” and resist TPLF, and avoid being mobilized to a new war.

TPLF on its part, has for a long time publicly warned about what they claim is lack of willingness on behalf of the federal government to implement the Pretoria Agreement.

The geopolitical context of the Horn of Africa has shifted radically since the former war on Tigray during 2020-2022. At that time, Tigray was encircled by enemies and suffered through the combined onslaught of Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Amhara forces. An effective blockade of Tigrayan territory, preventing the influx of needed military supplies as well as humanitarian aid to a starving population, eventually led to the capitulation of the TPLF/Tigray Defence Forces by signing the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in Pretoria in November 2022.

This time around, however, TPLF has entered a politico-military alliance with Eritrea (tsimdi) and hence they no longer have their backs against the wall fighting forces all around. They have backing from and a supply route through Eritrea. Allegedly, Eritrea has provided military supplies to replenish military hardware and munitions to the TPLF forces.  

With Eritrea on their side, a potential full-scale war between Mekelle and Addis will possibly play out differently than what we saw in 2020-2022. However, there are a lot of uncertainties, of which the three key issues being:

  1. In 2020-2022 the massive onslaught on Tigray united the people for survival and forged a close unity between TPLF, TDF, and the masses. Today, after years of infighting in TPLF, widespread corruption, human rights abuse, and maladministration in Tigray since 2022, in combination with a disastrous humanitarian situation and war fatigue, Tigrayans are fed up with failed politicians and want PEACE. The question is thus: Will Tigrayan youth willingly be recruited in tens of thousands for a new war? And if so – to defend what? What is the stated objective of a new war – retake lost territories? Topple Abiy Ahmed?  Secession and independence of Tigray? All of the above?
  2. What will Fano do? Eritrea has allegedly been “aiding and abetting” the Amhara resistance since 2023, to undermine stability in Ethiopia to weaken the federal government. They have also been trying to create a broader alliance where Fano and TPLF forces may unite in a common front against Addis. This has so far not been materialising. So, if TPLF forces are recapturing West-Tigray, will the Fano join the ENDF to fight the Tigrayans once again?
  3. Will the war activate the new geopolitical alliances in the region? Eritrea, as TPLF’s backer, may get help from Egypt and Somalia (and possibly Saudi, Türkiye, and more), whereas Ethiopia is in an alliance with UAE (and more). A “civil war” in Ethiopia has the potential to include several stats in the sub-region in support for either one of the belligerents.   

AU, as the key observer of the CoHA (through the stipulated monitoring mechanism), has – as no surprise – utterly failed in its obligation to follow-up on the implementation of the agreed upon measures. The other observers to the Pretoria agreement, UN, IGAD, US and EU, have equally failed in their moral responsibilities to actively engage in preventive diplomacy from day one. Lately, it appears as US diplomats have tried to engage the parties in dialogue to de-escalate the tensions, but in vain. EU seems totally side-tracked. Few other bilateral engagements to try to reconcile the tensions between Mekelle and Addis have been known. (In parentheses, it can be mentioned that the Norwegian deputy foreign minister visited Addis last week to strengthen bilateral ties to Ethiopia, where he also supposedly discussed “supporting peace efforts” in all countries in the region but Ethiopia…).

What remains certain, however, is that a renewed war between the TPLF and the federal government would yield nothing but destruction and added suffering for an already weakened Tigrayan society.