“It’s a game of shifting alliances, where the enemy of your enemy quickly becomes your friend,” says Emeritus Professor Jan Nyssen, who lived and worked in Tigray for many years.

Source: Knack

In the Ethiopian region of Tigray, everyone is holding their breath. A new civil war or a border war with Eritrea? It’s far from unimaginable. “It’s a game of shifting alliances, where the enemy of your enemy quickly becomes your friend,” says Emeritus Professor Jan Nyssen, who lived and worked in Tigray for many years.

In early November 2020, a devastating civil war broke out in the Ethiopian region of Tigray. The local TPLF government’s army clashed head-on with the Ethiopian national army, which received active support from neighboring Eritrea and militias from the neighboring Amhara region. Over two years, the conflict claimed an estimated 300,000 lives, and two million Tigrayans were displaced. The so-called Pretoria Agreement ended large-scale bloodshed in November 2022. Decades of developmental setbacks left Tigray isolated, and it subsequently disappeared from the international media’s attention.

That could change quickly. Recently, the worst fighting in three years erupted in the southern edge of Tigray, involving heavy artillery and drones. Meanwhile, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been speaking in warlike terms against his former ally Eritrea. Both the African Union and the United Nations have expressed deep concern—not only about the resurgence of civil war. A confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which fought a brutal border war between 1998 and 2000, could further destabilize the fragile Horn of Africa.

A real hornet’s nest, and Jan Nyssen knows this firsthand. The emeritus professor of geography (UGent) lived and worked in Tigray for years. When the civil war broke out, he and a group of volunteers launched the platform Eyes in the Sky on Tigray. Their periodic reports, using satellite images and eyewitness accounts of massacres, mass graves, and burned villages, were picked up by international organizations and media who had no access to the hermetically sealed conflict zone.

After the Pretoria Agreement, the focus shifted. In collaboration with the University of Mekelle, the collective now works to map the war’s effects on the environment and agriculture. Nyssen thus keeps a close eye on Tigray.

Are you afraid of a new war?
Jan Nyssen: The situation is extremely tense; everyone is on edge. The civil war is far from digested, and the prospect of a new escalation terrifies people. The atmosphere is far gloomier than in 2020.

Back then, Addis Ababa launched a military punitive expedition against the TPLF government because it rejected the postponement of elections.
Nyssen: Exactly. The TPLF had always been the dominant force in Ethiopia’s federal constellation, including militarily. There was an optimistic atmosphere in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. People believed, our army, the Tigray Defence Force (TDF), is invincible.

That was a miscalculation. With support from Eritrean troops and Amhara militias, the TPLF was cornered and forced to accept the painful terms of the Pretoria Agreement. Is that peace agreement at risk?
Nyssen: The Pretoria Agreement was not a total surrender, as it is often portrayed. Tigray had to surrender its heavy weapons, but the TPLF-dominated government still holds power in Mekelle. The Ethiopian federal army has withdrawn all its soldiers; only the airport is controlled by Ethiopian Federal Police. You don’t see an Ethiopian flag anywhere. Compare it to Iraqi Kurdistan. Tigray is fairly autonomous but still uses Ethiopia’s banking system and currency. It’s a precarious situation, especially since an important part of the agreement—the return of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people—remains unfulfilled.

Is that the cause of the new violence?
Nyssen: Partly, yes. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people live around the cities in extreme poverty. Most are from Western Tigray, a region occupied by Amhara militias during the civil war. The TPLF hopes to reclaim these areas, which officially still belong to Tigray. Tampering with internal borders can destabilize all of Ethiopia. A major factor is Amhara ethno-nationalism, which is becoming increasingly fanatical. Fano, by far the largest militia, aims for a “Greater Amhara” that would include not only parts of Tigray but also Addis Ababa and surrounding Oromo territory. That’s a dangerous ambition. The capital has a special status but lies in Oromia, home to Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, where armed militias are also active.

Is that why Prime Minister Abiy now threatens war against his former ally Eritrea? A foreign enemy as a way to unite internal divisions?
Nyssen: That may play a role, but there’s also historical context. Ethiopia is landlocked. This has always been an obsession for Addis Ababa—Emperor Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea for a reason. Since Eritrea gained independence in 1993, Ethiopia has had no direct access to the Red Sea. We’ll have to see if Abiy sticks to verbal threats, but analysts suspect he cannot defeat Eritrea without Tigray’s support. That’s why he seems to have started a PR offensive. Abiy recently accused Eritrea of war crimes during the civil war, such as the Aksum massacre at the end of November 2020, when hundreds of civilians were slaughtered.

That massacre is indeed attributed to Eritrean troops.
Nyssen: Yes, but coming from Abiy, it sounds hypocritical, since he himself requested Eritrean support at the time. Moreover, the Ethiopian army also committed many massacres during the civil war.

Does his propaganda fall on deaf ears?
Nyssen: Not necessarily. Deep divisions persist in Tigray; the TPLF has even split. Getachew Reda, former spokesperson of the Tigray government and Pretoria negotiator, broke away and now aligns his own militia with Abiy. Recently, fighters from both sides even exchanged fire in southern Tigray—a sad first. The TPLF has also responded to the new alliance by seeking rapprochement with… Eritrea.

Despite that country’s bloody role in the civil war?
Nyssen: Hard to understand for outsiders, but remember that Tigray and Eritrea are historically closely linked. Before Italian colonization and the 1889 Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia, Tigray and Eritrea were one country. More than half of Eritreans also speak Tigrinya.

Could a new civil or border war engulf the entire region?
Nyssen: Everything is interconnected. The civil war displaced tens of thousands of Tigrayans to refugee camps in Sudan. They are still there, and the Tigray Defence Forces actively recruit new fighters. These fighters are now even clashing with the Sudanese army against the RSF rebels, the notorious Janjaweed, supported by both the UAE and Ethiopia. It’s a game of shifting alliances, where the enemy of your enemy quickly becomes your friend. There are suspicions that Egypt supports the TPLF, recently even with anti-drone weapons. Not out of love for Tigray, but because Egypt has long been in conflict with Addis Ababa over Nile water.