Death of a Philosopher - Rick Turner 1941-1978

- Radical social theory in the old/new South Africa

Frederik van Gelder



BECAUSE banned political science lecturer Dr. Rick Turner can only see one person at a time, this photograph was taken through the doorway from an adjoining room while someone else spoke to him.

Part I

Frederik van Gelder

Part II - Texts

Richard Turner
Kant Hegel Marx Sartre [unpublished manuscript]

... if Black power meets White power in headlong confrontation, and there are no Black liberals and White liberals around, then God help South Africa. Liberalism is more than politics. It is humanity, tolerance and love of justice. South Africa has no future without them ...[1]

... we have passed the threshold of a legitimacy crisis. The next level is ungovernability.[2]

"for the whole of Europe and Russia, this century became a time out of hell."[3]

"...the only effectively real reconciliation that could take place in South Africa would be to move towards greater social and economic justice."[4]

"The most mysterious political killing of the last two decades".[5]

'He who will not be a Christian henceforth must be without religion. *Primus in orbe Deum fecit timor.* Fear was the first in this world to make gods.'[6]

The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e. the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e. the standards of thought) no longer exist.[7]

Pieter-Dirk Uys: "... there'll be no one who will admit remembering what we left behind."[8]

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1 Alan Paton - cited in Heribert Adam: "The Failure of Political Liberalism" in Heribert Adam/Hermann Giliomee *The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power*, 1979, p. 258.
2 Michael Nupen (1988): "Philosophy and the Crisis in South Africa" (Richard Turner memorial lecture) in: *Transformation*, nr. 7, p. 38.
3 George Steiner *Grammars of Creation*, p.3.
4 "Breyten Breytenbach - Alex Boraine: Interview Lawrence Weschler, 1999."
5 Max du Preez, on Turner. from TRC film.
6 Eddy Roux, quoting Labriola. (*Rebel Pity*, p. 44.)
7 Hannah Arendt - cited in Antoine Garapon (2016): "Globalisierte Gewalt - Der Terror, die Krise des Territoriums and die Verletzlichkeit der Moderne" in: *Lettre international*, nr. 112, p. 32.
8 Pieter-Dirk Uys: *African Times*, 2010, p. 20.

Preface

Re: '*personally'*. The impulse for this book was fortuitous, namely a medical reunion, 2015, at my old alma mater, Wits University in Johannesburg. That was just prior to the 'feesmustfall' protests starting there, marking the beginning of a steadily escalating crisis in higher education that has shown no sign of abating since. That it is part of a much larger crisis affecting the very terms of the 'negotiated solution' of 1994 is a perception that is widely shared, both within the country and internationally. Since I am myself a product of the student movement of the sixties and seventies, in both Europe and Africa, that motivated me to start thinking about similarities and differences between Germany after 1945 (the year in which I was born) and 1994, South Africa's very own 'Stunde nul'.

What held for the Russian emigres in Paris after 1918 or German refugees after 1933 held just as much for many a South African anti-Apartheid white as well, from the seventies onwards: a half-conscious, half-subliminal, thoroughly conflicted struggle to understand the larger historical context that had shaped them/us, that they/we sought to comprehend, that demanded moral-ethical decisions that were - in the terminology of the time - 'existential'. All of that in a world in which the mass media, already back then, seemed to have no other purpose than to saturate the public sphere with what already in Huxley is called 'soma'.

Philosophy on the other hand strives after truth and universality, in the specific sense that it strives after the timeless and the eternally valid - tied neither to the 'here-and-now' of mere mortals, nor the chronological-narrative aspects of a life-form for which thought - 'Geist', Mind - seems only, nowadays, to be conceivable as - in some respect - 'embodied'. The claim to timeless universality, after the war, came from opposite ends of the European cultural spectrum: from the natural sciences, and from radicalised philosophy. What they had in common was a premiss as old as Descartes, according to which no *other* way than the *rational* one - was possible, or even conceivable.

Then again, SA was a place in which during those years *politics* - incomparably more so than in Europe and North America - was becoming ever-more polarised, threatening, violent, life-threatening, making a personal or philosophical-scientific 'search for meaning' seem whimsical, an 'ivory-tower' exercise without 'practical relevance', a 'Glasperlenspiel',

even - following Beckett - an exercise in self-abasement.[9] Personal integrity and objective meaning - those mainstays of the liberalism of the 19th Century - were the first casualties of war, in SA during the seventies no less than on the Continent after 1914. Politics, for those lucky enough to survive it, seems a realm that lies 'deeper' than either the personal or the philosophical.

The idea that these three (the personal, the philosophical, the political) are 'categorically distinct' is what distinguishes, to this day, the so-called 'continental' approach from that coming from the Anglo-Saxon countries. It in turn means a quite *different* approach to those three terms that are now beginning to polarise the world all over again, and not just in SA: 'race', 'class', 'gender'.

'Personally' tries to say something about the generation of white colonial intellectuals who came to adulthood sometime during the sixties - forced to register, step by step, what even today is difficult to name unequivocally. The historians speak of the 'Cold War', and that sounds preferable to a 'hot' one. But for many of those involved, especially in Africa and beyond, it seemed more like a Hobson's choice between two irreconcileable apocalyptic alternatives. Freedom against totalitarianism was the view coming from the West, resistance against fascism and dictatorship coming from the East. The McCarthyism coming the the US could be functionalised by the Apartheid regime to justify war accross its borders in Southern Africa, and to demonise the Anti-Apartheid movement; the 'armed propaganda' coming from Russia and the GDR on the other hand succeeded in doing the 'opposite': brand a conservative and backward-looking ex-colonial administration - proud of its *white* republicanism - as colonialists engaged in military occupation. The white universities reacted to all this with two types of *intellectual* resources (that was, after all, all that was on offer): those coming from British liberalism, and those coming from the Churches. The first said: academic freedom, human rights, scientific objectivity; the second appealed to the bible, to white conscience and whatever authority faith-based communities were still able to muster in a rapidly secularising world. (Though for a time, as Tutu showed, this was more substantial than many white intellectuals regarded as possible. It wasn't just Turner who was cited before the Schlebusch inquiry, but just as much Beyers Naudé and the Christian Institute.) Both resources, in the end, would show themselves woefully inadequate in the face of the McCarthyism coming from the West, the Stalinism coming from the East.

9 The 'Lucky-monologue' in *Waiting for Godot*.

Personally

I don‘t know if there‘s a record somewhere for delay in responding to a request for comments. Turner was murdered on 8th January 1978, in Durban, “killed by a member of BOSS or the SAP”, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[10] He died in his daughter‘s arms. I got the news from the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst in Bonn, the next day. Even now, almost forty years on, I cannot think back on it without distress. These notes I‘d picked up from him at his Bellair address, near Durban, the previous June or so, immediately prior to my own departure for Germany. Both of us had been awarded scholarships, Turner the prestigious Humboldt - the references in these notes to Dieter Henrich may have been a preparation for his planned study in Heidelberg, where I myself attended a number of Henrich‘s seminars - and I the DAAD, for Frankfurt and Habermas. I was expecting him in February, as I remember it, and the plan was to travel on to London, to the ANC office there, to join.
Then comes the news of his murder. Alan Paton‘s foreword to the 1978 edition of *The Eye of the Needle* is dated “New Year‘s Day 1978”, only days earlier. It is supplemented by this note:

> I cabled you yesterday to tell you that Richard Turner had been killed. He was shot dead by an assailant so far unknown. This happened on Sunday soon after midnight. Someone knocked on the door, and he asked “Who is there?” When there was no reply he went to the room where his two daughters were sleeping, looked through the curtain and was shot a by high-powered rifle. His thirteen-year-old daughter tried mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but he died almost immediately. It has come as a great shock to his many friends and admirers. It is a great loss to South Africa, though our rulers will not think so.[11]

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10 “The investigation into Turner‘s death was one of the most exhaustive carried out by the Commission.” *Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, vol. 3, chapter 3, “Regional Profile: Natal and KwaZulu”, p. 182.

11 I passed through that front door many times, as I‘d done when picking up this text from him. The two bed-room windows on either side each has a narrow balcony in front of it - not enough room to point a rife. It must have been a hand-gun. (I guess Paton was as shocked as we all were. I met him once, at Marriannhill hospital, outside of Durban, it must have been in 1973. My father had been admitted, and Alan Paton was in the adjoining ward. We shook hands. He‘d been mugged. It was a portend of things to come.)

With a wife and young child in Frankfurt I felt I could not fly back for his funeral - so there was no cathartic healing for me. It plunged me into a depression which eventually cost me my marriage.[12]

As I write these comments - I'm now close on twice as old as Turner was when he died - it strikes me that in those forty years, most of it spent at the *Institut für Sozialforschung* in Frankfurt, I've written on all kinds of things, but never on South Africa, let alone on that white student movement, of which I too had been a part, that would turn out to be so influential for the direction in which opposition politics within the country would be taking, in those decisive years. Well, a few lines, after all. There's this foreword to my Ph.D., with the dedication "Dem Angedenken eines mutigen Lehrers gewidmet: Richard Turner 1941-1978" (dedicated to the memory of a courageous teacher), a Ph.D. written - mostly - under Jürgen Habermas, on Marxism. The preface, written during the eighties, reads:

> Is there a 'Western' form of Marxism, one that has 'taken in' and 'worked through' the world wars and the catastrophes of the Twentieth Century? This question, which brought me to the Bundesrepublik and to the 'Frankfurters', needs be seen in the context of the rapid 'immiseration' of the so-called 'Third World', for me personally: the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa. Race and Class, Capitalism and immiseration, peaceful protest and armed struggle: those were the topoi of the Student movement in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town during the seventies. On our heels the South African Police, before us the tantalising vision of a 'theory' that seemed to promise everything at once: scientifically exact, politically programmatic, subjectively emancipatory. They were not few in number, those who paid the ultimate price for this. Was it, is it an *illusion*?[13]

But I never mentioned South Africa again, for nigh on forty years - the shock of Turner's murder sat too deep. Like so many other Europeans of my generation ('European' here meant literally, not in the South African

12 Jann Turner's films about her father, as well as Keniston's recent biography (*Choosing to be Free*), are testimonies to the anger and anguish sweeping through the ranks of anti-Apartheid critics after the assassination of this prominent university lecturer. For many, it was a turning point in their lives, convincing them that a negotiated solution with the powers that be was no longer conceivable. J.M. Coetzee's *The Master of Petersburg* deals with the grief and the despair of a father mourning for his son, who'd been killed in the revolutionary struggle - it captures well the atmosphere of those years. It's a far cry from the struggle-romanticism of later generations.

13 Frederik van Gelder (1990): *Habermas' Begriff des Historischen Materialismus*. [Habermas' Concept of Historical Materialism] "Preface." (All unattributed translations from the German are my own. In some cases, where the original texts are in French, the translations may be via the German version.)

sense of ‘white’) my attention shifted from the rather adolescent ambition to ‘change the world’ to the psychological consequences of trauma. In that respect it was, I suppose, a *reditus in se ipsum*, a ‘turn inward’, in a direction very much present in the *Continental* but not much in the *British* Marx debates of the time.[14]

My own role in that ‘Durban Moment’ in South African history, as it‘s now known, was modest, not really the stuff of ‘struggle credentials’. I was voted chairman of the NUSAS *Housing Commission* (allied to the Wages Commission) in 1973, as I remember it, but the sheer enormity of what it was that I‘d thereby claimed responsibility for intimidated me from the start. (I was intensely involved in actually trying to *understand* the economics, the sociology, the politics of the time, I had a talent for ‘theory’, but realised early on that activism and organisation can become an end in itself, can get in the way of serious study.[15]) Turner, Eddie Webster, Charles Nupen, Halton Cheadle, Fink Haysom, Pete Hudson, Karel Tip were doing the Wages Commission, Fatima Meer - one of my lecturers - was writing her Mandela biography[16], and I was trying to understand *Das Kapital*. I never did meet Steve Biko, though my wife Dorian had. Tony Morphet, Michael Nupen, Michael Kirkwook, Dunbar Moodie were teaching interesting courses, and I was trying hard to get my mind around that mixture of philosophy, science, economics and historiography that made up the Marxism of those years.[17] Housing wasn‘t really, like Trade Unions, something

14 Lacan gets a mention in this text - also Gadamer, Habermas - but it‘s all very formulaic, perfunctory. To try to come to terms with *that* - why that should be so -, is what I‘ve set myself the task of probing. We *all* thought that way, at the time. (Danger, death all around, focusses the mind, and the shared experience of having survived it - perhaps even more: of not having been *humiliated* by it - creates a bond which those who‘ve had the luck of living through more peaceful times find difficult to comprehend.)

15 This too - on-campus activism - has become a university/higher education issue globally, strengthening a hunch many South Africans formed during those years: that South Africa‘s problems are really *world* problems. Being an ‘activist’ or a radical implies, after all, that you *know* what‘s right/wrong, what it is that you‘re supposed to be fighting *for*. It‘s the obverse of what ‘university’ originally stood for: that those violent passions of adolescence, of the ‘street’, are subjected to a process of ‘rational reflection’, *sine ire et studio*. The exact opposite of what today‘s identity politics has come to stand for.

16 Fatima Meer (1988): *Higher than Hope - the Authorized Biography of Nelson Mandela*.

17 Heribert Adam had already left South Africa, but his Apartheid-critique *Modernizing Racial Domination* was required reading. Lawrence Schlemmer - with whom Turner was working closely at the time - was at one point my examiner. Habermas‘s *Knowledge and Human Interests* had come out in 1971, Jay‘s *The Dialectical Imagination* shortly after. A student friend found himself in court for the crime of possessing Marcuse‘s *Reason and Revolution*. There were cross-currents at the UND though that I did not appreciate until much later. Natal had been, historically, a British colony, with a

you could call a meeting on and hope for a decent turnout. You didn‘t have a strike weapon, or any obvious way of starting an organisation. After a few interviews with journalists I also had to concede that I didn‘t actually *know* anything about housing, the building industry, the legal or government or any side of it whatsoever. So the Housing Commission petered out after a couple of posters depicting the dire situation of the squatter camps in the Durban area. The last I remember, in that connection, was driving around Kwa Mashu and Umlazi with Alec Erwin.

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Turner was an intellectual, a teacher, a theorist. He had no political party to back him up, no pressure group, mass movement, wealthy patrons, twitter following, foreign embassasies. If he was a man of the Left, it was the Left of the Marxist Humanism that was being rediscovered in France during the sixties - itself an aspect of the destalinisation that had really got going in Europe after the Khruschow speech of 1956. Tony Morphet, in his preface to the 1972/2015 edition of *The Eye of the Needle*, puts his finger on it:

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country club, a Race Course, much Victorian architecture - a bastion of liberalism on the British model. I however bore an Afrikaans-sounding name, had spent five years at an Afrikaans school in Parys, spoke Dutch at home and made the transition to an English-medium school only late, after energetic lobbying by my parents. Before the age of ten I don‘t think I‘d heard a single word of English. I still have vivid memories of accompanying my father on his frequent cattle-buying trips to farms in the Parys area, many of them still run, back then, by Afrikaners with personal and bitter memories of the Boer War. (Which they had regarded, not without some justification, as a war of national liberation.) It made me constitutionally incapable of joining in the blanket denunciation of all things Afrikaans. I recognize a lot of my own sentiments in Gerhard Maré‘s recent *Declassified - Moving beyond the dead end of race in South Africa*, 2014. And at the same time, it must be said: we were utterly ignorant of what Ellis and Sechaba would document much later, in their *Comrades Against Apartheid*, or R.W. Johnson, in his depiction of ‘realpolitik’ in KZN. We really did take our cue from Martin Jay: ‘dialectics’ was an ‘imagination’, an *academic* pursuit, something still bound - as for that matter this text of mine is - by the rules of debate, the thesis/counterthesis cast of mind of formal dispute. One can call this ‘research’ or one can call this ‘Socratic’, as Nash (and De Kadt) do, but Turner embodied and then injected into SA politics a conception of Anti-Apartheid opposition based as much on the ‘New Left’ as it was on the rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In effect, more than a decade before the end of Apartheid, his writings anticipate the question around which post-Mandela politics in the newly ‘liberated’ South Africa would revolve: what freedom and democracy were going to mean ‘in practice’. “To reason is to commit oneself to belief in the importance of Reason, with all that follows from this.” (G. Lichtheim: “The Threat of History”, *The New York Review of Books*, 1964.) Turner died for that.

> Charisma and organising capacity he most certainly did have but he was entirely opposed, as every detail of his life makes clear, to the concept and practice of a small vanguard group. He was constitutionally incapable of following an orthodox Leninist or Stalinist line.[18]

If he was, in the terminology of the time a 'radical', then of a new type, somewhere between Martin Luther King and Daniel Cohn-Bendit - what in Germany was called a 'sponti', an 'undogmatic Leftist', a 'new' Left or even a 'Green', entirely at odds at any rate with the Russian and East European influences acting on the ANC at the time. Trained in Analytic Philosophy and political science, he was, in addition, very much a product of the student movement - which he had experienced in its early phases, in Paris, under the tutelage of no lesser a figure than Jean-Paul Sartre. (His own participation in those legendary 'May 68' days seem to have been a personal watershed. Student protest at UCT was triggered by the failure of the university to confirm the appointment of a lecturer - Archie Mafeje - on racial grounds. Protests in which Turner played a prominent part.[19]) And yet the problem remains: trying to pin down what that meant - 'radical' - is more difficult than it sounds. Glenn Moss calls his book *The New Radicals*, gives Turner a central role in it, emphasises above all the utopian aspect of his thinking.[20] Nelson Mandela - who saved us all from a fate we can now contemplate in Syria - honoured him as a source of inspiration and as an exem-

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18 Tony Morphet (1972/2015): "Richard Turner: A Biographical Introduction" in: *The Eye of the Needle*, p. xxxii.

19 Martin Plaut (2014): "Review of Glenn Moss, *A Generational Memoir*".) Add: xxxxxx search plaut, rick

20 Turner "emphasised the centrality of utopian thinking, by means of which the ability to imagine a world based on different social relations became a precondition for transformative politics." (Glenn Moss [2014]: *The New Radicals - a generational memoir of the 1970s*, p. 35.) For Eddie Webster too, in his review of Keniston's Turner biography, 'radical' is the semantic link between Turner's integration of BC (Black Consciousness) and the Labour Movement of the seventies on the one hand, and 'post-power radicals' like Chicane, Naidoo, Kasrils and Turok on the other, trying to figure out where it all went wrong. All are deeply critical of today's 'state capture', all are intent on "rediscovering their radical roots". (Eddie Webster [2014]: book review of Billy Keniston's *Choosing to be Free. The life story of Rick Turner*) The two 'roots' that Webster references here are non-violence and the critique of (neo-)liberalism, in economics and in thought: "In its [i.e. Turner's Trade Union conception] emphasis on gradualism, flexibility and compromise with employers and the state, the strategy stood in marked contrast to the armed struggle being waged by the African National Congress, which aimed at the state's overthrow. In place of a vanguard movement to smash the state, the unions sought to build a broad movement from below based on strong factory structures, held together through practices of democratic accountability." And at the same time: the imperative, now as in Turner's time, "to explore alternatives to neo-liberal capitalism".

plary critic of Apartheid, and that draws attention away from the text to the *con*text, to the man himself, and the times of which he was a product. The authors of the preface to the 1978 American edition of the *The Eye of the Needle* - published by the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America -, place him four-square in the American civil rights movement, compare him - a little incongruously - with both Plato and B.F. Skinner. 'Black lives matter' could almost have been a Turner title.

> Turner is a humanistically trained social philosopher who borrows heavily from Marxian insights in his interpretations of political and economic reality. If we wish on this basis to call him a Marxist, we should be aware that he has many fellows among reputable thinkers of non-Communist countries, and that the traditions of Christian socialism is already an honored one.[21]

So whatever that is - radical, New (or 'independent') Left, utopian, anti-dogmatic, anti-racist, Western Marxist, with elements of liberation theology, anti-colonialism and feminism[22] - a discussion of Turner the philosopher has a lot of ground to cover. Dialectics has always been more than 'just' philosophy. And at the same time: "I am always present to the world in a particular place, from a particular past, within a particular social and physical environment, which includes a certain available set of techniques, and also, of course, in the light of the certainty of my own death." (Below, p&. 171)

A few months after these eerily prophetic lines he'd be no more. On the one hand, one's finitude, mortality, contingency, on the other a world in which philosophy has long since become a 'message in a bottle', has stopped being an influence on how people think or behave. Michael Nupen was right to formulate it *rhetorically*:

> Can philosophy add to, make special sense of, these accounts of the ruptures and breakdowns in our society - these morbid symptoms of what Nadine Gordimer in a now famous lecture called ... the 'interregnum in which we live' - a time when 'the old is dying and the new cannot be born'?[23]

This text of Turner - the whole post-war Marxist (neo-Christian?) debate of the time - makes no sense if the balancing act it represents is not

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21 *The Eye of the Needle*, op. cit., "Preface" by Merrill Proudfoot and Ronald Christenson, p. xviii.

22 Fascinating about Glenn Moss's *The New Radicals* is his description of the difficulties the *State* was having in getting beyond that 'Moscow agents' narrative. There was nothing *conspiratorial* about this at all, nothing hidden from view.

23 Michael Nupen (1988): "Philosophy and the Crisis in South Africa" in: *Transformation*, 7, p. 38.

understood; we sought orientation, courage, inspiration, truth in the face of chaos, danger, war-talk pressing in from all sides, which is why an academic tone - as in this text - can go with an intense and immediately personal interpretation of conclusions reached. It‘s a tension that is palpable here, if one knows where to look. He writes this towards the end of his banning order - under virtual house-arrest -, under constant harassment by police and state security, in preparation for a philosophy semester in Heidelberg that he would never live to attend.[24] In effect, this document is his philosophical testament. Maintaining integrity in the face of danger and intimidation, only those who have gone through something comparably scarifying will be able to ‘read between the lines’, judge this text as much on its context than its content.

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If he‘d lived, if we‘d returned to South Africa, if the sheer ferocity of the conflict[25] (black and white, rich and poor, socalled first and third worlds, globalising capitalism versus erstwhile colonies) had left us any manoeuvre-room at all - a lot of ‘ifs’ - would the university system, during those years, have been able to offer, as it had in parts of Europe, the opportunity to study any of those issues? ‘With practical intent’, of course, but the word ‘philosophy’, all by itself, already indicated something that, at the time, was in very short supply: it was what Michael Nupen was getting at, it went considerably beyond development studies on the British and US model, and it was incompatible with a purely *instrumental* attitude to ‘the-

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24 c.f. Jann Turner: “Can somebody please just tell me who killed my father?” in: *Mail and Guardian*, Sept. 2, 1997. Neither his family nor the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ever succeeded in identifying either his murderer or the identity of those responsible. Few at the time - least of all Turner or his immediate surroundings - had an inkling of the murkey ‘securocrat’ world that had, in effect, come to rule large parts of the country. Donald Woods, who - with his family - flees the country only days before Turner‘s murder, describes in detail, in his *Asking for Trouble*, 1980, how they operated. Not inconceivable that the rage Woods’ escape must have caused in those circles had something to do wit Turner‘s murder.

25 “... conservatively estimate that nearly 12.000 people died between 1985 and 1996 in KwaZulu-Natal alone”: Jill E. Kelly (2012): “The New York Times reports on political violence in South Africa”. http://africasacountry.com/2012/12/the-new-york-times-reports-on-political-violence-in-south-africa/
For the years 1990-1994, i.e. during the run-up to the first democratic election, it was in excess of 14.000. (Stephen Ellis [1998]: “The Historical significance of South Africa‘s Third Force”, op. cit., p. 263.)

ory'. He wasn't much into what is nowadays called 'knowledge production'.

With Turner, philosophy becomes, for a brief moment in South Africa, what it had not been in the English-speaking world for a long time: *real*, with considerable influence on university discourse, and - one needs only let those words 'race', 'class', 'gender' trip across the tongue - considerably beyond.[26] He influenced a significant segment of the Anti-Apartheid movement and the Trade Unions.[27] With Beyers Naudé - with whom he was connected via the SPRO-CAS project that published his *Eye of the Needle* - he had in common the same dogged determination to follow his convictions, whereever they were to lead, the same moral intensity. Like Naudé, he's become a 'struggle icon', with commemorative lectures and streets named in his honour. (Though not on Constitution Hill, visible from the Constitutional Court, where he belongs next to Fatima Meer. The 'born free's' could use a reminder that suffering and sacrifice are not a black monopoly.) The ANC's code of ethics for Cadre-recruitment is called "Through the Eye of the Needle"[28] - his name is constantly invoked by the current government goverment figures.[29]

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26 "Turner's early death and the suppression of his posthumous manuscripts removed from the important theoretical debates which raged here in the mid-1970s what would have been a powerful voice defending the view of dialectical reason as critique. His work will have, I believe, to be reassimilated in the coming phases of the struggle. I hope that this lecture, which moves in the terrain of Turner's thought, will contribute to that reassimilation." Michael Nupen, op. cit.

27 "Turner was a central influence in the development of a body of socialist thought that rejected Soviet Marxism, drew on the varied traditions of Western Marxism and existentialism, and blended these into an analysis that addressed the specifics of South African conditions. This had a strong impact on students and other intellectuals who formed the Wages Commissions in 1971, and who took the first steps to establish the new trade union organisations of the early 1970s." (Glenn Moss, op. cit., p. 35.) How to assess this influence? The new ANC historiography has simply claimed Turner for its own, papering over all controversies concerning democracy versus 'democratic centralism'. ("... Turner's political legacy has been reinterpreted in such a way as to fit the needs of the negotiated settlement in South Africa, as the apostle of 'gradualism, flexibility and compromise' in the trade union movement. His first wife, now a British New Labour MP, has invented a new past for him as a 'key ANC leader'" Nash, op. cit., p. 184.)

28 *Provincial Executive Committee Bulletin*, March 2010, Paper 3.

29 "Hearing President Zuma announce how the ANC, as it enters the second phase of our transition, was committing itself to speed up the elimination of a racist legacy which resulted in poverty, inequality and unemployment, I recalled Turner's deep understanding of the dialectic of race and class in a society shaped by colonialism and apartheid..." Andries Nel (Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development): "Rick Turner: The Present as History" in: *ANC Today - Online Voice of the African National Congress*, vol. 13, no. 2, 25-31 January 2013. ANC treasurer general Mathews Phosa

Turner‘s forte was teaching, education, students, research, the university. There‘s no doubt that, had he lived, we would have tried to establish, in South Africa, Philosophy in the sense of Critical Theory. How easily would that have sat, after 1990, with the ANC? Was there a mental space in that organisation for a conception of the world that transcended race in the direction of a moral-ethical universalism that was, after all, *also* there, in the ANC? Another way of putting it: was there, within the ANC, respect for the kind of scholarship on which the Western, secular, university system of higher education is based? Freedom not just in the *Jacobin*, but in the *original* sense of ‘dialectics’? Of individual emancipation in the humanist, *universal* sense? Could this have contributed to an all-inclusive *citizenship* leaving all notions of race behind?

There‘s precious little evidence in favour, and overwhelming evidence *against* such a possibility. Even at the height of Mandela‘s and Tutu‘s popularity, in those early and enthusiastic ‘rainbow nation’ days, perhaps even during Mbeki‘s ‘African Renaissance’ days, perhaps with financial support[30], did ‘dialectical philosophy’ in South Africa ever stand a chance? Decolonisation, BRICS, global warming, globalised capitalism, peace missions, poverty-reduction, goverance. University chairs and departments devoted to the study of *that*, was it *conceivable*, even for a moment? A Princeton, a Starnberg, a Sipri on the Indian ocean? A space sufficiently removed from the ferociously polarising rhetoric to think dispassionately at all?[31] Giliomee, reflecting on ANC support for student tumult at UCT and SU, reminds of the ANC‘s long history on this, of the shut-down of universities during the Mao-instigated Cultural Revolution in China.[32]

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has published a book of poems with the title “Deur die oog van ‘n naald”. (Through the Eye of a Needle.)

30 Comparable, say, to what Max Horkheimer was able to garner from the US for the *Institut für Sozialforschung* in Frankfurt.

31 Respect for intellectuals and scholarship was highest in the Italian Communist Party - with its solid foundation in Croce - and lowest in China, where the cultural revolution decimated the universities. (The same fate now in store for universities in SA.)

32 “More than hundred thousand academics were jailed, dismissed or sent to rural labour camps. No one was allowed to express ideas on the public welfare that differed from that of the ruling party. Most universities were closed and those that remained open were nothing more than hollow shells. In the most extreme attack Mao called academics ‘the most despicable and lowest of all the stinking classes’ – lower than landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, enemy agents, capitalist roaders. The Chinese universities took several decades to recover from this onslaught. The academics I spoke to when I visited China in 1989 still shuddered at the memory of this savage repression.” Hermann Giliomee (2015): “Capitulation on Campus”. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/capitulation-on-campus accessed 20160122.

So, in the end, what would *we* have done? Post-Sharpeville, post-Soweto, 'revolution' - not just in the ANC, but far beyond that -, came to mean MK-type armed insurrection, allied to wars of national liberation all over the world, a Left-populism based on 'overthrowing the system', of making the country ungovernable, connected to a Biko-type Black Consciousness for which 'whiteness' came increasingly to stand for 'class enemy' - a demonised 'white capitalism'. Black Consciousness, with its basis in Garveyism and the US Civil Rights movement, was 'identity politics' avant la lettre. That this had only a passing resemblance to 'class consciousness' in the sense of Hegel or Marx was obvious to anyone capable of reading the texts. Trade Unionism then? (*Race*, after all, as a category, is nowhere to be found in the entire literature from Kant through to Marx and then to Sartre[33]; though 'gender' is already there in Feuerbach.[34]) 'Dialectics', also in Turner, describes a process of 'demythologisation', of 'overcoming' both positivist science and institutionalised economic exploitation, the '1%'. Does this mean disciplining and organising workers and peasants for the NDR (official SACP policy to this day), or does it mean - once formal 'bourgeois' democracy has been achieved - patriotism in defence of the Constitution? There's a third possibility, namely political mobilisation in the name of justice and *economic* freedom, *both at once*, with a degree of coercion and militarisation irreconcileable with constitutional democracy. That Turner's name would in the end be attached to a kind of Black Maoism is not the least of the political ironies of contemporary SA politics.[35]

'Contextualising' Turner is not an easy thing to do.[36] By background, social origins and disposition he's a liberal on the British, but also the

33 "Race, in the pre-Nazi Yearbooks, was a characteristic of stallions. The number of their registered services for the propagation of their respective races was faithfully recorded in the agricultural part of the book. Men, on the other hand, had religion. They were Christians of Protestant or Roman-Catholic confession, or they were Israelites. That took in most Germans; a handful of others were lumped together." Everett C. Hughes (1955): "The Gleichschaltung of the German Statistical Yearbook" in: *The American Statistician*, vol. 9, no. 5, p. 9.

34 Löwith, op. cit., p. 93.

35 c.f. "Politically", below.

36 It means trying to place him in the oppositional politics of the time, and what the ideas were from which he drew his inspiration. What British Trade Union Marxism and the ANC in exile had in common - especially after Morogoro - was the doctrine that everything is to be deduced from the 'fundamental contradiction between capital and labour'. (Joe Slovo [1976]: "South Africa - No Middle Road" in: *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*. Ed. Davidson, Basil, Joe Slovo, Anthony R. Wilkinson.)

Dutch-Afrikaans model, incensed by injustice and the race divide.[37] This would lead him, in his politics, to trade unionism, and then to French existentialism, but that's not the same as saying that in his *epistemology* he ever gets beyond a very British conviction that Hegel et al are a lot of nonsense.[38] In philosophical terms: his point of departure is *sense certainty and formal logic* (the classical British position), and not at all that both are, from a certain perspective, 'the products of history', 'mediated'. Via Heribert Adam and Michael Nupen he was familiar with Adorno and the Frankfurt School, Habermas gets a mention, even Lacan, but 'non-identity' or 'negative dialectic' must have been even more 'confused' to him (he's very British in his conviction that what he does not understand is 'by definition' 'confused', and 'incoherent') than Kant and Hegel were. (Without access to his library it's difficult to know how much of Coetzee, Gordimer, Breyten Breytenbach, the sestigers, Fugard, Brink, Krog he'd read - or for that matter, Afrikaans literature at all, or what his tastes in music were.) Sartre, after all, provided every incentive for the pursuit of epistemology in the direction of *aesthetics*. In this - 'Third World' crisis or no -, he stayed firmly in what is called the 'analytic' reading of Continental philosophy, which is as hegemonic as it's ever been. (The term itself - 'Continental philosophy' - is a purely *analytic* invention.) *Here* Turner most certainly did not follow Michael Nupen - or for that matter those who were probing, in France, existentialism's *own* epistemology.[39] It meant that a central aspect of 'Western Marxism' passed him by, its *self-problematisation*. What at the political level started, after 1956, with destalinisation, had an intense intellectual side to it: that painful and sobering process of 'working through' the consequences of both Nazi and Stalinist crimes, which forced especially French, German, and Italian - later: East European[40] - intellectuals to embark on a thorough examination of the premises and history of Marxism altogether.

Though it goes far beyond that, to a much 'deeper' history, a 'longue durée' if ever there was one. Analytic Philosophy has many roots, and men-

37 Material on this to be found in Ian Macqueen: *Re-imagining South Africa: Black Consciousness, Radical Christianity and the New Left, 1967-1977*. (Ph.D., U. Sussex, 2011.) It contains a chapter on Turner and his relationship to Biko.

38 Not much helped by endless Marxist-Leninist vitipuration against the same.

39 Lacan, Gusdorf, Godelier, Levinas. Above all: Kojève and Merleau-Ponty. The best guides here are Lichtheim and Judt. As usual, Adorno (e.g. in his *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*), was decades ahead of everyone else - which means that he remained unread.

40 Koestler, Luxembourg, Liebknecht, Institut für Sozialforschung umtrunk, Kentridge, Solzhenitsyn

tion of Popper's *Open Society* may suffice to remind of the way in which *philosophical* differences going back to Kant versus Newton and Bacon, had, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - i.e. in the course of increasing imperial rivalries, then of the world wars -, persuaded many in the English-speaking world that there was something dubious about 'speculation', about 'theory' *altogether*. Historians trace this back to the intellectual reaction, in Europe, to '1848', i.e. to the aftermath of the French revolution.[41] and grounded in facts or detailed observation easily attracted adjectives like 'teutonic', 'obscurantist', 'totalitarian', 'Prussian', and (in rhetoric geography takes second place to the emotive) 'Moscow'. Even in the sixties, the school of Talcott Parsons - which nobody at the time would have dreamt of calling radical - thought it prudent to emphasise that 'theories of the middle range' were perhaps less suspect than those of the 'grand' kind.[42] All of this leads - not just in Turner - to a kind of deeply rooted resistance - the psychoanalytic connotation of the term here is appropriate - to a level of meaning in Kant and Hegel which is, after all, as old as philosophy itself.[43] We are *mortal*, we live and die, and yet emotionally, mentally, we have great difficulty in even *imagining* this. In a word: 'negativity', 'transcendence'. Perhaps it's here that the Stellenbosch/Cape Town influence comes in: Afrikaner intellectuals, who'd not forgotten the Boer

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41 J.W. Burrow (2000): *The Crisis of Reason - European Thought, 1848-1914*, p. 265/266.41I> 'A priori', 'Idealism', everything not bracingly *empiricalI**41

42 I remember a heated discussion, with Hilston Watts, Sociology Professor in Durban, Turner's colleague: 'a door is a door is a flipping door'. The department's reaction to Habermas's *Knowledge and Human Interests* was a disarmingly frank "I haven't the foggiest".

43 He never reflects Analytic Philosophy's certitude about facts and logic, versus Sartre's very Cartesian certitude about the fixity of that ego doing the knowing. *That* would have required of him more concrete historiography: "Many of the insights which became central to nineteenth-century social theory were initially propounded as part of the reaction against the terrifying certainties of the Jacobins. Indeed, an insistence on the importance of historical and social conditioning, the consequent diversity of men and societies, and the extreme folly and danger of drastic interference with existing social and political arrangements in the name of a priori moral and psychological dogmas is still the hall-mark of a certain kind of sceptical conservatism. The conservative can rest here in comfort. But for men who share some of the aspirations of Jacobinism without its sociological naïveté, this is intolerable. The revival, in the nineteenth century, of intellectually formidable radical political theories came about not through a revival of a priorism but by a substantial acceptance of the sceptical arguments; for once it was the radicals who borrowed the conservatives' clothes. Marx standing Hegel on his head is the most obvious example. Marx's criticisms of the utopian socialists parallel in many respects Burke's attack on the National Assembly." (J.W. Burrows [2000]: *The Crisis of Reason - European Thought 1848-1914*, p. 265/266.)

War, were much more open to Continental philosophy and the older metaphysics than their English-speaking counterparts.

Personally, at the time, coming from Tobias and Wits Medical School, wholly preoccupied with the Anthropology and Functionalism I'd learnt there, too much of what Turner was really doing passed me by. *Objectively*, in view of a rapidly expanding urban workforce, the creation of Trade Unions, collective bargaining structures, the expansion and improvement of training, education and schooling was the way to go, and to this day his influence on the Trade Unions is palpable. From the Durban Wages Commission inspired by Turner to today's class action against multinationals, based on a labour legislation considerably more progressive than most places in the world, is a direct line. (But then, *objectively*, that's our problem, trying to nail down the ambiguities in that word, 'objectivity'.) It's the Trade Unions that are now coming out in opposition to the current government's manifest corruption crisis[44]

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"Materialist Dialectic". How powerful this promise was, and in many respects still is, can be seen from the title, as recently as 2014, of a congress organised in honour of my own teacher, Jürgen Habermas: *Habermas und der Historische Materialismus*.[45] Are the causes of the current crisis (how often has that term 'current crisis' been used in the last hundred years?) intelligible at all, can such an 'understanding' provide guidelines for 'practice'? Is that the same as regaining a sense of moral integrity? What *is* that, 'traditional' theory? It gripped Turner forty years ago, and it grips intellectuals today.

It was Habermas's view - it motivated a great deal of his academic work, his publications, his teaching, his attitude to the student movement of the sixties - that *denazification in Germany could only take the form of anti-anti-Communism.* That is: 'Marxism', in *this* context - in the face of both (neo)Nazi and McCarthyite demonisation - meant, above all, the patient demonstration that Marx is not to be understood without a German Idealism tradition that had, as it were, been buried by the world wars. For 'Hitler's children' - the generation raised, mostly, in dysfunctional families deeply conflicted about the past -, the rediscovery of a universalistic ethic,

44 "Vavi & Co: New union federation almost ready to launch." *Daily Maverick*, 30 December 2016.[44I>, in an uneasy alliance with the constitutional lawyers, and what's left of the independent media.44

45 ed. Smail Rapic, 2014.

an intellectual universe in which one could 'sublate' one's guilt, fear, aggression, humiliation - came as a revelation, offered a means of regaining dignity and individual autonomy.[46] But that covered only half of it, the post-war *West*-German side of things. The GDR, with its entirely different post-war history, was officially a Socialist State claiming to be at war with capitalism, fascism and colonialism. This *too* had a 'universalist' component of sorts, but didn't express itself in a - peaceful - *education* process, in which one 'learns' autonomy and integrity through a process of 'seeing-through' and *sublimating* (raising to consciousness) one's aggressive and libidinal drives (in short: via 'bildung'), but, rather, by *acting them out* against 'fascists', 'capitalists', 'racists', 'colonialists' etc. - and by supporting the Algerian, Palestinian, South American, Far East, African "wars of national liberation". For *this* group of (frequently ex-GDR) students, 'studying Marx' in the sense of the Frankfurt School required a different approach, namely the patient demonstration of the way in which 'dialectic' could be (and had been) hijacked by Leninist parties for ends that had little to do with democracy or human rights.

In SA, where the SACP during its early years was represented - to a considerable degree - by white Jewish immigrants[47], Marxism of the *second* kind, the GDR kind, could be idealised by intellectuals with no personal 'Gulag'-experience of their own, or based on East European memories pre-dating the Lenin-Luxemburg controversies over inner-party democracy. This held just as much for non-Jewish Marxists like Turner, Bram Fischer, Eddy Roux, who were disgusted by racism. They had neither the memories of Lithuanian Jews, the familial guilt of German students, nor the 'Gulag' experiences of Russian and East European dissidents. It was more a visceral dislike of racism, a 'Freedom Charter' advocacy that took this at face value, with input from a long liberal tradition of both the British and Dutch-Afrikaans kind, but with no historical experience of how to get from 'here' to 'there'. Andrew Nash shows that under 'dialectics' it was really *Socrates* that was associated with this - i.e. a long *debating* tradition - and not much of what was motivating European intellectuals trying to grasp the causes and consequences of two world wars.[48]

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46 Stefan Müller-Doohm (ed., 2007): *Adorno-Portraits - Erinnerungen von Zeitgenossen.*

47 Roux, *Rebel Pity*, op.cit., p. 126.

48 Andrew Nash (2009): *The Dialectical Tradition in South Africa*. "Raphael de Kadt describes Turner's method of discussion as 'truly Socratic - always questioning, doubting, analysing and forcing one to think again". (Nash, op. cit, p. 164.)

Turner's text ends with a return to the 'objective contradiction' between capital and labour. It's a distinction that was originally made as something *objective*[49] - in a sense not discernable without a long and intensive immersion in economics and historiography. A world in which large capital concentrations are invested for private interest rather than for the public good is a world in crisis. I still have my copy of Marcuse's *One-dimensional Man*, bought in Johannesburg in 1969. If one puts him next to Sartre, it becomes easier to specify just what it is that we understood by 'radical' and 'New' Left in those years. It wasn't just that we, the white students too young to have remembered the Defiance Campaign of the fifties, the Rivonia Trial of 1963[50], were no longer exposed to the *Old* Left, which had received its primary impulse from the Russian Revolution, and then again after WWII - when demobbed SADF soldiers started to enter the political arena. It wasn't that we, like the *European* post-war intellectuals, reacted to the aggressive vacuities of Marxism-Leninism by returning to the 'sources' - we lacked both the language- and the philosophical skills to make sense of

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49 As Turner's colleague at UND, Dickey-Clarke had pointed out: "There is one thing about the Communist Manifesto which must be said at once: in intention, if not always in practice, it abstains from moralising. It never occurred to the authors of the Communist Manifesto to bewail the wickedness and baseness of the world. .... they did not think that it was their task to point out what must be changed in the world. Instead, the Communist Manifesto is a prophetic document. ... the proletariat cannot free *itself* from servitude without making an end to *all* domination of man over man. That is the essential prophecy, the heart of the Manifesto without which it would never have been written. The masses of the workers, the Proletariat, will first of all get hold of political power through their leaders. But this is merely a passing phase which will lead to an 'Association of Individuals', as it is called, which is thus the final condition ... One can say only that this present society is doomed to destruction. It will perish in accordance with natural laws and will be followed by the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. ... What reasons are given for this inevitable downfall of present society in accordance with natural law? Because the second essential of this pathetic prophecy which led to the triumphant faith of the masses was that it would take its course strictly in conformity with natural laws. Engels once used the illustration that just as in due time the Earth will plunge into the Sun, even so is capitalist society condemned to destruction. What reasons are put forward in support of this belief?" (p. 25.) (Max Weber (1918): "Socialism". [Lecture "given before an audience of officers of the Imperial and Royal Army as a general introduction to a course of lectures on socialism."] Translation with an introduction by H.F. Dickie-Clark. Occasional Paper of the *Institute for Social Research*, University of Natal, Durban, 1967. p. 25.)

50 Let alone Left opposition to racism from before the war. My Botany professor - during my first year at Wits medical school - was Eddie Roux, who was barred from the university under Suppression of Communism legislation a year later. It would be decades before I would come to understand just what it was that he represented in the history of the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa, or how recognizable the Turner 'issues' were when compared to the Bunting 'issues' of the twenties.

either Hegel or Marx.[51] What we in fact did was to base a new 'radical' conception of the world on two negatives: we were *against* the dogmatism of the 'old' Left (which by then was widely associated with Stalinist oppression in Eastern Europe and elsewhere), and we were 'against capitalism'. From then onwards, 'radical' politics, to the extent that this had a home outside of the ANC at all, meant 'a position' vaguely between Marcuse, Althusser, and Black Nationalism - an eclecticism increasingly devoid of any scholarly or intellectual grounding whatsoever, and hence progressively oblivious to the irreconcileable tensions inherent in these terms. We never did learn to distinguish subjectivity from objectivity, never did learn the difference between 'reflection' as an emotional process that one 'goes through' as an adolescent, and 'reflection' in the sense of 'the present as history'. This latter term, in any case, carried with it too many associations coming from Phenomenology and Hermeneutics for it to be much use in trying to understand decolonisation going on all over the world, or how this

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51 The first Marx-translations had appeared only in the sixties, and even then only in fragmentary form. "The history of the reception of the 1857–8 manuscripts really begins with the major effort, following the crisis of 1956, to free Marxism from the straitjacket of Soviet orthodoxy, both within and outside the no longer monolithic Communist parties. Since they did not belong to the canonical corpus of 'the classics' but were unquestionably by Marx, both the 1844 writings and the 1857–8 manuscripts could, as several chapters of the third part of this collection show, be regarded inside Communist parties as the basis for a legitimate opening of hitherto closed positions. The almost simultaneous international discovery of Antonio Gramsci's writings – the first publication of his writings in the USSR was in 1957–9 – had the same function. The belief that the Grundrisse had the potential for heterodoxy is shown by the appearance of unofficial freelance translations such as those of the reformists of the French Editions Anthropos (1967–8) and, under the auspices of the New Left Review, Martin Nicolaus (Marx 1973). Outside the Communist parties the Grundrisse had the function of justifying a non-Communist, but unquestionable Marxism, but this did not become politically significant until the era of student rebellions in the 1960s, although their significance had already been recognized in the 1950s by scholarly Germans close to the Frankfurt tradition, but not in the milieu of political activism, like George Lichtheim and the young Jürgen Habermas. Student radicalization in rapidly expanding universities also provided a larger body of readers than could have been expected in the past for extremely difficult texts such as this." *Karls Marx's Grundrisse* (ed. M. Musto) Routledge, 2008, p. xxii. It's no accident that for all the different parts of the world listed, from which the editors could draw on for serious studies of the *Grundrisse* - ("Dissemination and reception of Grundrisse in the World") - the only part of the world *not* listed at all is Africa. There *was* no serious Marx-scholarship coming from Africa - least of all from those claiming to be acting in his name.

related to the Cold War policies of the great powers.[52] The ancient phenomenologies - that of Sartre included - still had a connection to an ethical universalism which was losing ground everywhere, not just to the new nationalisms in Africa. How did we get from an objective analysis of the economy - an exercise in realism if ever there was one - to the conviction that what 'really mattered' was what we subjectively *thought, felt, desired, emoted*?

We did it - like the Romantics of old - by retreating to the 'within' of things, the soul, the emotions, 'relationships', the 'Counter Culture'. Those bits of the Frankfurt School we were capable of comprehending seemed to promise that 'eros and civilization', the 'great refusal', emancipatory sensuality[53], mirabile viso, were at the focal point of cosmic events unfolding, at the very centre of the universe. Armed with *One-dimensional Man*, the Communist Manifesto and Abbie Hoffman's 'Steal This Book', the atmosphere in Durban seemed not to have differed very much from the one described by Sloterdijk in Frankfurt: we officiated, somehow, at least in the fondness of our imagination, as the Secretariat of the World Revolution.[54]

> The 'Old Left' criticised capitalism largely on the grounds that it leads to an unfair distribution of wealth and an inefficient use of productive resources. On the whole it accepted the capitalist human model of fulfilment through the consumption and possession of material goods, though the European Workers' movements had educational and cultural aims that went considerably beyond this. The 'New Left' shifts the emphasis: it accepts the 'redistribution' aspect, but increasingly focuses on the way the 'market' destroys important human potentialities.[55]

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52 There *were* voices back then warning us that we were in the midst of an East/West conflict only marginally less destructive than its manifestation in Vietnam and the Far East. (e.g. Robert Heilbroner's *Between Capitalism and Socialism*, [1970], which had a considerable influence on Turner.) But everything not braceingly optimistic was not well-regarded in philosophy - it counted as a powerful argument to 'prove' that your opponent was a 'pessimist', or even worse: 'self-contradictory'. Not even Habermas (who was afraid of a Nietzschean anti-constitutionalism taking hold at the universities) could refrain from accusing Horkheimer and Adorno of this. (Something I personally reproached him for.) 'Marx' - the term, the way it was used - meant this: giving 'voice' to popular anger, in such a way that its *expression* could at the same time claim for itself the practical realisation of socialism. At the same time that we were buying Che Guevara T-shirts, Cuba was gearing up to do what no colonial power had done since England during the Boer War: set sail for Africa with an expeditionary force. In the name of *anti*-colonialism. (Catching even the *Russians* by surprise, it later turned out.)

53 Alfred Schmidt (1977): *Emanzipatorische Sinnlichkeit - Ludwig Feuerbachs anthropologischer Materialismus*.[53I> somehow 'fitted together', and that *wel**53]

54 Peter Sloterdijk (1988): *Critique of Cynical Reason*.[54I> 54]

55 Turner: "The relevance of contemporary radical thought", in: *directions of change in s.african politicsI*>, (SproCas nr. 3), p. 76.*

What is that, a 'human model' fundamentally *different* from a capitalism that - according to the theory - determines everything we do and think within it? Duncan Innes had demonstrated that SA wasn't comprehensible without an understanding of the mining industry, of the history of diamonds and gold, of the emergence of Africa's first multinational from the Kimberley digger's democracy to De Beers and Oppenheimer, and then to post-war globalised capitalism.[56] The progressive integration of first the Afrikaans-speaking and then the African population into a market economy based in the first instance on the extractive industries - and the world market's demand for their products. Nobody doubted either the irreversibility or the inexorability of this process - or that the various forms of traditionalist protest (starting with that coming from the *Afrikaner* workforce) stood no chance in the face of something that was in effect a global process. What then does it mean to say that capitalism and the market imposes a 'human model' that the New Left 'criticises'? Turner had three options open to him: accept that part of the New Left which was treating 'race' 'class', 'gender' as *essentialisms* on the positivist model (wedded to the usual abstract moralisms), penetrate through the vulgarisations of the day to the origins of 'dialectics' in German Idealism[57], or capitulate to the Marxist-Leninists within the ANC from Morogoro onwards, treating constitutionalism and social democracy as a ruse for the gullible. What he opts for - invoking Sartre - is a valorisation of subjectivity that had a passing resemblance to Feuerbach, but at the same time close enough to the moral-ethical protest coming from SproCas[58] and the Churches for it to be able to pass muster as 'utopian'. To be 'authentic', 'radical', 'Marxist'[59] meant being 'critical of everything'[60], but at the same time emotionally attuned to the 'other' - though more in the sense of Woodstock than Hegel or Levinas. That this had nothing to do with political economy in the Marxist or any other sense did not - in the years of Althusser, Poulantzas, Mandel - go unnoticed. But it was something that was pushed into the background by an aspect of this whole debate that no-one seems to have had any control over. Kojève, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Levi-Strauss were all philosophers in the sense of the 19th Century: figures who came to prominence after a long and

56 c.f. below, Innes. p. xx

57 By no means an exclusively *European* affair, as Jaccoby, Steiner, Lichtheim, Judt and Jay indicated.

58 The Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society

59 c.f. my *Minima Moralia* review, http://www.amsterdam-adorno.net/fvg2013_twa_MM.html

60 The very 'abstract negation' which in *Hegel* is regarded as an an adolescent aberration which responsible adulthood will eventually - mercifully - 'sublate'.

rigorous career at the elite universities, 'formed' by what in both Germany and France were still mostly state education systems - two world wars notwithstanding. They owed their influence and prominence - before the age of 'public intellectuals' - to the institutions of tertiary education, and not to the media. By the time these things reach us in SA, this 'traditional' mechanism of the intergenerational transference of cultural knowledge - tertiary education, university training, the professions - was being replaced by something new, at least in its sheer massivity and intrusiveness. *Publicity*. The student movement of '68' - and this held just as much for the *Soweto* student cohort eight years later - would not have been conceivable without the mass media.[61] What Habermas called the 'public sphere' had aspects to it that were unknown to the university system that it was in the process of replacing and transforming: it's overwhelming and overpowering *massivity*, its commercialisation, its potential for propagandistic instrumentalisation, and its dissolution of all traditional notions of truth and objectivity. Taken together they would transform - not to say: gut - the Marx debates of those years, and they would be immeasurably strengthened by the internet revolution still to come.[62] 'Public intellectual' from now on refers to someone - like Habermas - who is capable of combining academic work with the popularisations necessary for its diffusion to a mass public. This populist necessity, combined with a 'public sphere' increasingly under the sway of vested commercial and political interests, marks the beginning of today's 'post-truth politics', with all which this implies.

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61 Though there were differences: '68' in Europe and the US was to a large extent a 'happening', a cultural event, a generation-specific youth rebellion with strong aesthetic-performative aspects. It was, despite some fringe phenomena, not the grim affair of professional revolutionaries and their 'armed propaganda', for whom war and insurrection were 'self-evident'. ("The scale of the punishment meted out to the citizens of the USSR and Eastern Europe in the decade following World War II was monumental — and, outside the Soviet Union itself, utterly unprecedented. Trials were but the visible tip of an archipelago of repression: prison, exile, forced labour battalions. In 1952, at the height of the second Stalinist terror, 1.7 million prisoners were held in Soviet labor camps, a further 800.000 in labour colonies, and 2.753.000 in 'special settlements'. The 'normal' Gulag sentence was 25 years, typically followed [in the case of survivors] by exile to Siberia or Soviet Central Asia. In Bulgaria, from an industrial workforce of just under half a million, two persons out of nine were slave labourers.") Judt, op. cit., p 191.)

62 Habermas would seek to thematise this with his 'public sphere' - it was something that Adorno had raised with his "Theorie der Halbbildung" - namely that the very word itself, 'education', was being transformed from what it had meant a century or two earlier.

Though none of that really explains why a serious study of *political economy* - the epitomy, after all, of something *objective* -, should lead, with such inevitability, to *abstract subjectivity*, or even its correlate: the new forms of digital collectivism. Something about that *political economy* seems to force its practitioners, once they get serious about it, into the role of either *commissar* or *yogi*.[63] With a fair number, like Koestler, Semprun, Borkenau (perhaps even Orwell) becoming, eventually, *penitent* commissars, i.e. people who would later come to see 'the error of their ways', switching roles between the two. Koestler, who'd coined that opposion, sought to explicate the dilemma in his figure of Rubaschow, in *Darkness at Noon*. which in turn would receive such a scathing reception at the hands of Merleau-Ponty[64]. Conceivable, that a fair number of MK reminiscences, of accounts by the ANC 'old guard', that have turned up in recent years can be seen in this light.[65]

It wasn't that '68' - like protest movements generally - have this self-centredness which then becomes the main impediment to unity of purpose. Horkheimer had already identified this in the Middle Ages[66], and in the history of the student movement in Europe and the US this has been a theme[67]. But it was a solipsism magnified to grosteske proportions by the new means of 'mechanical reproduction', i.e. by those aspects of the mass media that Habermas had analysed in his *Public Sphere*, and then again in his "Die Scheinrevolution und ihre Kinder"[68]. It turns up again in what Adam Habbib calls the 'politics of spectacle', meaning a form of pseudo-politics taking place in the social media, in which 'performance', theatricality, 'self-branding', 'acting out' come to replace education and 'evidence-based' debate in the traditional sense.

In short: the space Turner was trying to open up, in SA, was even narrower than it was in Europe: sandwiched as he was between an Anglo-US positivism wedded to the 'status quo', and a Marxist-Leninism dedicated to its destruction. Under surveillance by a security police that had long since equated critique and a lack of 'respect' with sedition.

Revolutions have strongly narcissistic elements. It is what makes the specifically *Frankfurt* combination of politics and psychoanalysis so unique -

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63 c.f. Arthur Koestler (1945): *The yogi and the commissar*.
64 In his *Humanism und Terror*, p. 66 ff.
65 The Scientist and the Beautiful Soul.
66 Horkheimer: "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung" in: *GS* 4, p. 9.
67 Ulrich Sonnemann (1998): "Das Ödipale an den Achtundsechzigern" in (ed. Kraushaar): *Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung*.
68 in: *Die Linke antwortet Jurgen Habermas*, 1968, pp. 5-15.

and so helpless in the face of its instrumentalist appropriation.[69] It's the bit the Leninists never grasp, the bit that causes deep and lasting enmity. It's also the bit that connect Critical Theory in the *Frankfurt* sense with the one coming from Mathew Arnold, so influential for e.g. George Steiner. The point of contact is *reflection* - not in the Engels/Leninist sense, but in the classicist/humanist sense.[70]

One could read, into what it is that motivates Analytic Philosophy - into much of what is called 'liberal' after the war -, a venerable reaction to what was seen, from the French Revolution onwards, as *rhetoric's fatal propensity for the rationalisation of terrorism*. It motivates Burke - as it had even earlier, Hobbes -, as much as it does Popper two centuries later. It's an impulse uniting his *Open Society* to Arendt's *Totalitarianism*, and post-war philosophy of science, with its deep antagonism to all 'speculation'. There's nothing worse, from this perspective, than invoking a 'totality' that is not 'evidence-based', that can't be defined, that can't be described with 'mere words'. Right throught to Parsons, Durkheim, Systems Theory, Comte, v.d. Berghe. The propensity for *reductionism*: biological, physical, logical. This 'positivism' is much older than the literature on the topic would suggest. It's not Parsons, Hempel, Popper, against Hegel and Adorno. Or rather: none of us really saw (and I'm not convinced that even Habermas saw) that it goes back to the origins of Western thought altogether: to the difference between mimesis and methexis.[71] Both concepts presuppose Plato's *idea*, an 'ego' that 'relativises the world'. It doesn't capture the deeper reasons for Plato's polemic against the Sophists, and why, in the hands of the Church, this could 'work' agaist Gnosticism.[72] The *mimesis* side[73].

The Fabian, the liberal, the Christian, the European position was: peacemeal reform, economic growth, domestically and internationally, would be the reality that brought social democracy in its wake. The impulse for this, on the subjective side, are ancient: the Church's incorporation of the Platonic 'idea', fused to a phenomenology capable of relativising the passions in relation to beatitude, the hereafter, 'transcendental' recom-

69 Zuckermann! Gunzelin: Adorno & psychoanalysis.

70 Horkheimer Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung Sonnemann: "Das Ödipale an den Achtundsechzigern". Zuckermann: Freud und Politik, Fromm, Marcuse, Schmidt, Lorenzer.

71 *Not* Arbeit und Interaktion. Habermas was afraid that the combination of Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt could translate, politically, into a new kind of radical conservatism. He probably thought: one Djinjic was enough.

72 Brumlik/Assmann ??

73 Nietzsche, the Dionysian

pense for earthly suffering and pain.[74] Right through to Martin Jay, 'experience' is as much the criterion by which 'totalitarianism' and 'prejudice' is to be identified, as the means for its detoxification. The trouble is, this post-war liberalism[75] valorised a subjective autonomy which in reality was being heavily assailed from all sides - even in Europe and the US, let alone the so-called Third World. The economic independence on which it had originally been based in Holland and England was under the incessant pressure from the very forces Marx and Engels had diagnosed in the English Midlands a century earlier, and that was even before the new tools of political propaganda kicked in and after WWI. After secularisation, commercialisation, the market and its 'forces', the new print media[76] two world wars, not much was left of the Protestant Ethic that Max Weber had regarded as the foundation of modernity - neither on Wall Street nor on Main Street.[77] This US aspect is of some significance, since the toxicity of today's identity politics in SA has something to do with whatever it was that was going on at US universities during the sixties, and perhaps much earlier.

That the combined Left, at Polokwane - radical, mostly White intellectuals, the SACP, the Trade Unions - should pave the way for the tribal cleptocracy to come is explicable only by recourse to something specifically South African. What called itself 'Left' had (politically, historically) nothing behind it except the 'seminar radicalism', nurtured at British and US universities. Everything is 'authenticity', good intentions, voluntarism, moralism.

The universities and the press came increasingly to compete with the *Church* as the educational 'media' within which the new - 'liberal' - identity was being formed. Turner may be doing his level best to come to terms with the Marxism of his time, but his intense individualism is that of the colonial liberal in revolt against racism - he must have viewed the tactical alliance that defined the ANC after Morogoro, between Black Nationalism and Marxist-Leninism, with deep unease.[78]

Turner's Marxism is still that of the pre-Leninist phase, of Luxembourg, Pannekoek and Plechanov, not a screen for terror, the autocratic ideology that it would later become.

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74 Hans Blumenberg.
75 Isiah Berlin xxx
76 *Structural Change of the Public Sphere*
77 Geert Mak: *Travels without Charly*.
78 c.f. Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba (1992): "The Party Triumphant 1969-1975" in (ibid.) *Comrades against Apartheid - The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile*, p. 53.

He's trying to navigate very different tendencies. *Intellectually* post-war mass education, increasingly under both commercial and political sway, was polarizing into at least two directions: 'unified science' theory *here*, (intent on integrating the social sciences on the model of the *natural* sciences) and that which would later be called identity politics *there*, treating university as a resource and recruiting grounds for political as well as simply individual power struggles in the wider society. *Politically* the pressures were coming from different directions: from a liberation movement that saw in 'academic freedom' (independence of thought, self-governing universities), a direct threat to its much-vaunted Gramski model of a 'cultural hegemony' - to be exercised by 'organic intellectuals' at the behest of the SG -; from a US Garveyism gaining in militancy as US politics fails to come to terms with its history of slavery; and from a university establishment trying to get rid of its 'radicals'. All were, in one sense 'foreign imports', but their collision, in SA, was more violent, in those final Apartheid years, than it was elsewhere.

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Hegel's 'unhappy consciousness' was gravitating, during those years, on the part of many whites, to a belated liberalism and constitutionalism - in the face of an ANC whose Marxist-Leninism was becoming ever more implacable, as it moved into armed insurrection mode. McCarthyism here, Marxism-Leninism there. The ignorence of many whites about the 'border wars' being fought in their name was mirrored in a no less shallow 'romantic anti-capitalism' from the Left, which in its turn could, for a long time, be persuaded that Quattro, the Natal civil war, could all be laid at the door of Apartheid, hence nothing to be ashamed of.

The SA legal system is based on the Constitution. The trouble is, it was *also* the result of a negotated 'deal' between two parties at daggers drawn, with entirely incompatible expectations of what this promised: for the one, it was the guarantee of individual rights - including property rights - against potential predations by the State, or other organised groups, with the power to impose the will of the collective upon the *individual*. Seen from this very venerable ('European') perspective, the Constitution is a bulwark as much against criminalisation as it is against collectivism and cultural hegemony by any particular group. It has an illustrious history in English common law going all the way back to habeas corpus and the English civil war, but also in Roman-Dutch law. The only acceptable form of coercion under *law* is the law itself.

The other side, the ANC and its Alliance Partners, saw it very differently. It was more a kind of windfall, a lull, a welcome if unexpected interlude in a revolutionary struggle that had hardly *begun*. Peaceful competition and the rule of law was the *beginning*, not the *culmination* of the revolutionary struggle. From this perspective the law *itself* is no more than an 'instrument', a means to an end, in the hands of the ruling party.

All of this really as preamble to a consideration of some of the levels of meaning in the use of the words 'race' and 'racism' in SA today. Given the history of SA, this collision of 'world-views', is, as usual, most palpable at the universities. (Just as, during the seventies and eighties, the prime controversy raged around the word 'Marxism'.) For the one, 'race' is a bit of ideological baggage from the past, of interest only to museum-directors and historians. For the other, the defeat of Apartheid is a myth, as evidenced by the persistent structures of priviledge, wealth and power, as undeniable as they've ever been. (Hence *just as much* at the university, to the extent that this is a 'reflection' of the wider society.)

When *Michael Nupen* spoke of a 'legitimation crisis' forty years ago, what he meant was *Apartheid's* legitimation crisis, and not that afflicting today's ANC after its electoral trouncing in August 2015. Nupen, who had studied under Adorno, had no difficulty in identifying the Marxism-Leninism's as an even greater danger than whatever it was that was threatening social integration - and hence democracy, the rule of law - in the West. Like the Frankfurt School in Germany, what Nupen feared was that the newly victorious ANC - not so different from Stalinism in the old Soviet Block - would in time reproduce the very socio-political conditions which had led to the original crisis in the first place. This fear was based on a very different set of assumptions from those that had guided the writers of the Freedom Charter. Bunting, Roux, Alan Paton, Naudé, the Churches, Luthuli, found common ground in the old enlightenment principles of human rights, equality before the law, and social justice. That this was incompatible with colonial privilege, wealth, education gap which was one of the largest in the world, went without saying, but in that they resembled dissidents and intellectuals of a type that had been common in Europe throughout the 19th Century: they confronted *reality* with an *ideal*. Not even all that different from the Dutch Protestants and Huegenots of the 17th and 18th Century.

Whatever else is to be said about the disasters that came close to destroying Europe (and much else) during the last century, the protagonists on each side claimed (and were able to mobilise millions on that basis) that their cause was just. Turner strode a tight-rope – like so many intellectuals after WWII – between a *Western* defence of individual rights and the rule

of law, and a *Soviet-Marxist* insistence that such individual rights remain the priviledge of the favoured few for as long as the economy has not been 'revolutionised'. He'd seen very well – perhaps better than most – that the post-war *positivist* (Anglo-US) conception of science was, in a world already seriously traumatised and deeply unjust, unable to engage the *moral-ethical* aspects of those self-same sciences. That 'science' (in the positivist sense) had little to offer in the face of the polarisations of 'bourgeois' society than some ancient stoicisms had after all been the basis of *Hegel's* concept of dialectics, more than a hundred years earlier. But Hegel's problems in Berlin would pale into insignificance compared with those of intellectuals trying to make sense of the ruins of empire and the ferocious – and now media-transported – passions aroused by the Cold War. (Passions that could now be inflamed by the new mechanisms available to the 'culture industry'.) Turner personified what post-1994 South Africa seriously lacked: a university-based (and politically protected) 'mediation' between Western liberalism (and the rule of law) on the one hand, the 'revolutionary activism' of the liberation movement on the other. Turner was, in this paper, on the threshold of a serious immersion in the Frankfurt School. The relevance of this lay in something that was specific to post-WWII Germany: the latter, just like South Africa fifty years later, had to pacify and 'normalise' a population and a country both impoverished and brutalised by a long war. Not unlike South Africa, the German education system after 1945 was torn apart by deeply ingrained and ferociously antagonistic values: the market liberalism of the West, the National Socialism of so much of the university faculty, and the Marxism-Leninism coming from the GDR and the Soviet Block. Within the universities, this caused a set of tensions the resolution of which would prove decisive for Germany's future and to that of the European Union. It also explains what it was about the Frankfurt School that the Anglo-Saxon world would have so much difficulty in appreciating, namely that it was always a battle on three fronts: against the mainstream ('positivist') Western university system whose conception of science lay in the *natural* sciences; against a 'traditionalist' ('idealist') conception of philosophy going back to Hegel, and a *Marxist-Leninism* actively supported and propagated by the Soviet Block. Against the *first* it would hold that 'positivism' suffered from a built-in blindness to what it was, about neo-liberalism, that was so destructive of every notion of communality and the civic virtues; against the 'idealists' that there was something seriously *voluntaristic* about every standpoint that 'explained' the world from a single 'ego' creating its own conception of past and future; and against the *third* that armed insurrection – elevated

to an ideology to ‘move the masses’ – must inevitably degenerate into a totalitarian ‘practice’ that makes a grim mockery of the ideals ostensibly motivating it. One can only guess at where Turner would have gone, in his work, after immersing himself in the Frankfurt School. He’d already determined that Sartre contained an ethics that „no Marxist would understand“.[79] It’s conceivable, when he wrote that, that he’d already read Marcuse’s *Soviet-Marxism*, the core of which dealt with the reasons for its appeal to what back then was still called, rather hopefully, the ‘Third World’. It was a book that, in those years, could not possibly have escaped his attention. It covers the same thing that had preoccupied Sartre: what *is* that, a ‘materialist ethics’? Where is the difference, *is* there a difference, to the (neo-)liberal ‘Western’ kind? It’s worth pursuing this for the insight it provides into today’s university crisis.

79 quote xxxxx

Epistemologically

'Idealists have a faulty conception of *reality*' - that's the thesis Turner defends in this text, first against Kant and Hegel, then - in an unexpected twist - *against* Marx, Engels and Lenin, before ending with Sartre. That's the point of those cups and pens: they're the first step in an argument meant to show that if 'idealism' is based on the premiss that 'all is in the mind', then idealism is untenable.[80] He could indeed claim, with some justification, that this had been the standard argument, in the English tradition, against Kant and Hegel for the better part of a century. (P&. , below.) But if this is 'given', how does one then go about distinguishing - this is the task he sets himself - between a *weak* and a *strong* definition of dialectics? One can see what it is that is so attractive about this way of tackling what seemed, from within Philosophy, the 'great divide' between Analytic and Continental. That everything is 'interconnected' isn't, after all, in the least bit problematic from an *empirical or rational* point of view[81]: objects 'in' the world stand to the concepts we use to describe them in a relationship of *correspondence*. Sense certainty, cups and pens. If one recalls that this correspondence of 'A' = A is at the same time thought of as a *logical* relationship (there's *one* cup there and not *two*) that lays the basis for a second type of argumentation: the axiomatic-deductive kind, this time treating that 'cup' not as a 'thing' but as a *rule*.[82] This is Turner's petitio principii, the 'thesis' he sets out to make plausible: that Kant and Hegel can be refuted in two different ways, by appeal to *sense certainty* (cups and pens) and through a reasoning of the *axiomatic-deductive* kind: idealists are said to slip up on their *logic* somewhere, are hence 'confused' and 'obscure', they get their 'methodology' all wrong. But the problem he's grappling with is this (and it stands in stark contrast to the idea that *definitions* in this area are possible at

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80 This was a widely held approach to Marx's epistemology after the war: "... an adequate theory of knowledge must respect the reality of the external world. ... Any theory of knowledge which gives to thought a wholly interpretive role must compromise the reality of the external world by maintaining that an *essential* relation exists between any known object and thought." (David-Hillel Ruben [1977]: *Marxism and Materialism - A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 145.) There were not many English-speaking authors at the time - Collingwood, Hobsbawm, then Jonathan Israel being some of the exceptions -, who were prepared to take the confrontation between epistemology and *history* seriously - i.e. by rejecting the usual *Cartesian* premisses.

81 That's what General Systems Theory was saying at the time, From Bertallanffey and Parsons in the Anglo world, to Luhmann in the German one. Turner - in his "The Relevance of Contemporary Radical Thought" - cites Buckley's *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory*. (*Spro-Cas publication* nr. 3, 1971.)

all): in the discussion of what that could mean, 'history as a whole' (his *strong* definition of dialectics, the totality of history, moving and progressing through a 'unity of opposites' over time), there's not so much as a glimmer of an axiomatic truth to be found anywhere, nor of the highly controlled experimental situations of which, in one of the scientific disciplines, it could then be said that there's *experimental evidence* for a specific hypothesis. It's this that explains a very characteristic form of argumentation of the sixties and seventies, that Turner here follows and never quite manages to shake off: *formally* one stays at the level of the 'hypothetico-deductive' logic of the natural sciences, but *in fact* what one does is discuss select quotes taken from one's reading list - selected in turn on the basis of one's personal conception of the issues as hand. It's a circularity, a 'hermeneutic circle', that Turner doesn't notice and hence cannot address - the Gadamer quote notwithstanding -, since for him, following here the social sciences of the time, *truth is method*. (The very Cartesianism which the 'critical' in 'critical theory' had originally been meant to overcome.) It's for this reason that there's just as much a *Socratic* as a 'systematic' tone to this text: each author is quoted, the arguments examined, the inconsistencies noted, before moving on to the next.[82] The goal is *also*, as it were, 'Cartesian': it's *clarity* that is sought, clara et distincta perceptio, as much in the moral-ethical as in the logical sense, 'this is how it is, this is what I've decided to do', 'I have to make up my mind'.[83] This also explains a peculiarity of this text: it's *about* 'dialectics' - which is unintelligible without German Idealism -, but it will have no truck with the latter's most salient feature: its 'pantheism', its 'systematic' character, the way it expresses itself in monograph-length studies in - say - law, religion, history, economics, anthropology, logic, mythology, language, culture. His first priority is moral integrity - a search for self-respect 'in dark times' - rather than epistemology as

82 If one recalls the politics of the time, this is anything other than conventional. It's not just a 'fall-back' position from the dogmatic *empiricism* he's trying to get away from, but just as much a self-assertiveness, a reclaiming of the *individual's* right to be able to make judgements on these things, in the face of an aggressive *denial* of individual autonomy coming as much from Marxism-Leninism as it came from MK revolutionaries. It was no mean feat: insisting on the universality of truth in the teeth of both dogmatic empiricism and totalitarian Marxism. It was part of the madness of the time that the government should have seen him as a threat, rather than a builder of bridges across ideological divides that were tearing the country apart - and are doing so once again.

83 His words to Dan O'Meara - according to Keniston -: "Look, Dan, if you live in a fascist country like we do, you have two options: you can be cowed and you can internalise the rules of fascism and live by them, so you become a fascist to some extent, or you can choose to be free. I've chosen to be free and I accept the consequences". (Keniston, op. cit., p. 75.)

this was being taught at English-language philosophy departments, which in those years was synonymous with 'methodology' in the sense of philosophy of science.[84]

It's the imperative of regaining an *ethical* dimension that turns this 'search for clarity in reality' into something very different from what the empiricist framing of the question may lead one to suspect. The investigation may start off with innocuous-sounding cups and clocks and pens and rabbits, but its terminus ad quem is those "'social wholes' that urgently need to be investigated dialectically." (p&. 164.) Since the petitio principii here is that reality is 'outside of the mind' - 'independent of the knowing subject', as the expression went -, the question then arises (a question as old as *Hume*), of how the *knowledge* of such a 'social whole' relates to the *reality* of that self-same 'social whole'. For this he turns to Sartre, after having concluded that the 'idealist' discussion of the 'object/concept' dialectic is flawed - or rather: that it is too heavily prejudiced in favour of the 'concept' side (as opposed to the *object* side) of the dualism to be of any use in *practice*. This explains why the Sartre section of this text - "Sartre's materialist dialectic", which concludes these deliberations -, returns to the point of departure in Kant: what does that mean, 'reality'. He starts off with a Sartre sentence in which the latter says he's spent his entire life "giving a philosophical foundation to realism"[85], before going on, in the very next sentence, to make clear that providing such a 'foundation' cannot *itself* consist in an axiomatic-deductive type of thinking: "... how to give man both his autonomy and his reality among real objects..." (p&. 164.) The cups, clocks, pens and all the rest are 'not in the mind' but *real*, and this holds just as well for the "class struggle" as it does for "capitalist exploitation", with or without the quotation marks. In what sense are these, when we're talking

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84 These were the years in which the standard objection to dialectics was that it stood for the chaos of 'relativism', years in which J.M. Coetzee was documenting, in South Africa (but not only *there*) the profound sense of a loss of moral bearings, years in which Habermas was writing *Legitimation Crisis*. (*Last days in Cloud Cuckooland - Dispatches from White Africa*, was a title of the time.) In today's terminology: he's concerned with *identity*, with 'who I am' kinds of questions.

85 P&. , below. From other passages it's clear however, that *Sartre*, in his reconceptualisation of consciousness and "transphenomenality" (p. 59) is focussed not on Hume, Kant, Newton (or Descartes and Spinoza) but on the aggressive and vulgarised Marxism coming from Russia and Eastern Europe - it's not the 'materialism' of the 17th and 18th Century that Sartre is concerned with, but a post-war Communism that has turned the 'dialectic' into a totalitarian dogma in which subjectivity has been reduced to propaganda and 'ideology-production'. (Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* is above all - and this no doubt exercises a strong fascination on someone like Turner, trying to get away from the 'mechanical' Marxism of the Trade Union type - a recovery of *agency*.)

about them, *not* 'in the mind'? "... when I look at the cup, I see the cup; that which 'appears' to me is not distinct from the actual cup." (p&.164.) But if the difference between the cup *as it appears to me* and the cup 'in itself' dissolves, what then remains of the difference between dialectics (which starts off, after all, by positing an ego reflecting on 'the world' or on 'the universe') from ordinary empiricism? Since - in his quest for a 'strong definition' of materialist dialectics - he's already rejected Kant, Hegel, Marx, Lenin, it's to the Sartre section of this paper that one must turn for an understanding of the conclusions reached.

There follow twenty pages of dense and concentrated reflection. If one has an eye for these things, then just about every major philosophical position of the last millenia or two passes by. If the appearance of an object is indistinguishable from its reality or its essence then one could think as much of Spinoza's "deus sive natura" as one could of a Heideggerian Being that exists 'before' mere 'being-in-the-world'; if by 'pre-reflective' consciousness is meant that which is prior to and independent of conceptual knowledge, that could be pursued just as much *phenomenologically* (Husserl) as *psychoanalytically* (Freud). Since this sentence comes after a discussion of *counting* (which has long been recognized as an odd kind of behaviour that fits into neither the empiricist nor the rationalist scheme of things) one could take it in the direction of Ryle and Searle's 'speech act theory', which would later become so important in Habermas's critique of Analytic Philosophy. If "... Being accompanies all the appearances of an object" and if it is not different in each of these appearances (in the Sartre quote provided), that can have both a Thomistic and a Heideggerian meaning, which is, at the very least, a decidedly *anti*-empiricist position. If "the alternative hypothesis is that the 'being' of the appearance is nothing but the appearing; that is that to be is be perceived" then he may be thinking of G.E. Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism", that classical text on which Analytic Philosophy was once founded[86], or the pre-Socratics, whose notion of timeless Being lay so close to some aspects of logical Positivism a millenium or two later. It is at any rate an intense search for a way of 'grounding' objective knowledge that is determined to avoid and get beyond what it sees as something 'egoistical' or 'subjective' about German Idealism's 'subject/object dialectic'. It's an anti-Cartesianism that can turn

86 G.E. Moore (1903): "The Refutation of Idealism". reprinted in Morris Weitz: *20th-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition*.

as easily into dogmatic empiricism as it can into an authoritarianism of the political or faith-based kind.

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If one focusses on the strictly logical aspect of the discussion - which is after all Turner‘s intention here -, it‘s the debate about the tertium non datur, the ‘law of the excluded middle’ (i.e. the core of dialectics itself, and the question whether Hegel‘s *Logik* is a legitimate *critique* thereof) or the old intentio recta/obliqua debate. (Is there a fundamental - ‘categorical’ - difference between *positive* and *reflexive* knowledge?) Can that ‘A’=A (the way that it‘s meant in Kant and Hegel) be discussed on Aristotelian (or even Newtonian) premisses *at all*, or is it the ‘adaequatio’ *altogether* that is challeged by ‘dialectics’?[87] (For Positivism, ‘A’=A is a banality; for the *Dialektik der Aufklärung* and the *Negative Dialektik* it is quite the opposite: A (notequal) A).

What Turner regards as the core of a materialist dialectics can be read off from the four points in which he summarises, as he sees it, the differences between Sartre and Hegel. It amounts to a defence of individual agency, or what he calls “my projects” (p&.170) or ‘my situation’. “This situation includes my place, my past, my environment, my fellows and my death”. (p&. 65.) This is the project of the ‘for itself’, and what in some circles was called ‘situationism’.

> ... my project is a free project; rather than one which is the result of my ‘essence’, understood as a set of necessary behaviour patterns. Ontologically, free is an absolute; consciousness is a necessarily autonomous and transparent. (p&. 171)[88]

How does this differ from that Fichtean Idealism criticised by Hegel for its solipsism? He doesn‘t say. He‘s a South Africa abroad, an English-speaker projecting onto Continental concerns those bits of the *English* Marx discussion of the time that is trying to get away from the economic reductionism of the Trade Union movement.

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87 That would become Adorno‘s celebrated ‘anti’-thesis eleven in the *Negative Dialektik*.

88 How that‘s supposed to square with the notion of the universal *mediation* of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’, subject and object - without which nothing in German Idealism is intelligible, without which the difference between Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy collapses - he doesn‘t say. He‘s aware though that he‘s come a long way from the base/superstructure, capital/labour catechism of his time: “*Being and Nothingness* was not written to contribute to a debate within a ‘Marxist’ framework, and perhaps this is why very few ‘Marxists’ have unterstood it.” (p&..)

What he in fact does is to project *onto* Sartre two themes that dominated post-war English-language philosophical and methodological debates, but are not really *in* Sartre: that 'research into research' (i.e. Mannheim-type 'sociology of knowledge') leads to an infinite regress ("If we say that 'to know is to know that one knows .....'" p&. 165) and that the empiricism/rationalism relationship is as unresolved as it's ever been. (Ryle's 'knowing how' versus 'knowing that' distinction.[89] I've learnt the *rules* of counting, I know *how* to count, I've learnt how useful this can be *in practice*, but know just as well that numbers are not empirical entities in time and space.)

It is for this reason that, concerning the three central points of difference between the *British* and the *Continental* Marx debates of the time (the meaning of 'base' and 'superstructure', the notion of a 'contradiction' between the two, what it means to turn Hegel 'on his feet', and what it means to be studying the 'transition from Feudalism to Capitalism'), one reaches quite *different* conclusions, depending on one's attitude to those cups and pens. For the fact is, in *Kapital* the relationship to 'sense certainty' - i.e. to those cups and pens - is ambiguous: as *commodities* it's their market value and the amount of labour that's gone into their production that's at issue, not their physical properties, which are left to the natural sciences to investigate in the usual *analytic* way.[90] The result of this ambiguity in *Kapital* is, however, that the 'laws of history', 'base/superstructure', 'head/feet', objective contradictions, master/slave are all antinomic, depending on whether one regards them as 'in' the world of objects, or - on the other hand - in *my* or (*our*) world of scholarly research, taking place in *culture*, here taken in the widest meaning of the term.[91] Since for Marx the natural sciences are subsumed under the *forces* of production - something *objective* - one could argue, as Engels had done, that 'dialectics' takes place *in* the world, that 'base' has nothing to do with humanity living in a world of symbols and language (nowadays: the mass- and social media), that 'head/feet' is nothing more than a *spacial* metaphor, that Feudalism/Capitalism was simply an *economic* event, that the 'capital/labour contradiction' is the only possible way of conceptualising today's world. All of which is implied by that 'copy' theory of truth. Since the Bolsheviks had raised this 'reflection'

89 p. &165.

90 I dealt extensively with this in my Ph.D. - it marked the point, during the sixties and seventies, at which the collision between Analytic Philosophy and Marxism - the whole 'Continental' approach to philosophy altogether - was most obvious.

91 Hegel: 'objective spirit'. Even Popper feels it necessary, towards the end of his career, to introduce a 'world III'. (c.f. Karl Popper/John Eccles [1977]: *The Self and its Brain*, p. 16.)

theory to the status of an objective and obligatory proof of the CP‘s ‘vanguard role’ in the fate of humanity, ‘critiquing’ that objectivism had the fascinating and disconcerting effect of enraging positivists and CP-ideologues alike, the one because that would be, they claimed, tantamount to ‘denying the real world’, the other because, in doing so, you’ve outed yourself as an (‘idealist’) apologist for the (‘capitalist-fascist-racist’) status quo. Cups and pens and rabbits, like transsubstantiation at the Council of Trent, were capable of tearing the world apart - had become shibboleths in a new religious war - for many an old-style Communist, quite literally a matter of life and death. (For Europeans with institutional memories long enough to recall what a relief Erasmus and Spinoza had once been from Loyola and the Spanish Inquisition, this was one *sacrificium intellectus* too far - no doubt a strong impulse in Sartre.)

What‘s the step from sense certainty at the level of ordinary objects (cups, pens, rocks) to sense certainty at the ‘macro’ level? For a South African Apartheid-era academic and political activist, this was, as the saying went, a ‘no-brainer’, namely the looming (race/class) war, which only the most benighted of souls could possibly have denied. There was nothing ‘philosophical’ about it, no possibility of ‘explaining it away’. Institutionalised racism seemed as obvious as economic exploitation, with inequality levels amongst the highest in the world. Here again one can see why for Turner - the political scientist and academic -, ‘materialist dialectics’ is so attractive, for it offers three things the social sciences of those years almost entirely lacked: it‘s ‘anti-idealism’ (in its insistence on a world beyond the merely ‘theoretical’), it‘s ‘anti-positivism’ (in its insistence on the reality of a historical crisis that can‘t be conceptualised from within the formal logic of the natural sciences, hence demanding of us a *practical-ethical* commitment), and it‘s ‘anti-psychologism’ (its insistence on a notion of consciousness and ‘mind’ that can‘t be reduced to academic psychology).[92]

92 Martin Jay would later thematise these same issues in his “For Gouldner: Reflections on an Outlaw Marxist”: “‘The American Ideology’, as we have seen Therborn characterise it, lacks two things: a belief in theory as scientific and a focus on society as the central object of that theory.” (*Postwar American Critical Thought* [vol. 2] ed. Peter Beilharz, 2005, p. 174.) Here again Lichtheim, in my view, gets closer to what it is that we were struggling with: “The current fashion in sociology ... has made it impossible to discuss the one without bringing in the other. [i.e. class analysis here, transitory political and ideological phenomena there - fvg] If the term ‘ruling class’ is employed to describe the political elite of any given society, the discussion will revolve around the sort of topic rendered familiar in sociological literature by the work of Weber, Schumpeter, Parsons, and Pareto. If the argument concerns the polarization of social classes in *bourgeois* society, one had better stick to the Marxian apparatus, which is expressly designed to deal with the particular subject. If one intends to investigate the twentieth-century phenome-

Is that the same as saying that 'class' and 'class struggle', 'capitalism', can be *observed* or perceived in just as obviously as cups, pens, rabbits, waiters?

> To speak of class *struggle* is to speak not of a process but of praxis rooted in some way in a consciousness of class and of class interests. It involves treating a class as in some sense a totality, rather than as having the merely external and additive unity of a collection of things. In order to do this one must be able to show that there is a praxis of oppression on the part of the dominant class, and that this praxis is rooted in an understanding of class interest. This praxis of oppression would in turn be the basis for the intelligibility of praxis of resistance to oppression embodying an understanding of the relation between the praxis of oppression and the process of exploitation.[93]

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non of totalitarianism, it is useful to bear in mind what Ossowski has to say about the built-in limitations of liberal and Marxian theorizing alike. Alternatively one may confine the debate to the theme of workers' control in industry, in which case one is bound to stay within the socialist terminology, and one will then be brought back to the issues already at stake in the controversies started before and after 1914 by the Webbs, Bernard Shaw, William Morris, Tawney, Cole and their associates." ("Contemporary Problems of Socialism" in: *A Short History of Socialism*, 1970, p. 310. The Ossowsky reference refers to the following danger: "... that ownership and/or control of the collectivized means of production is vested in an irremovable bureacracy which monopolizes both political and economic power, employing the Communist Party as its chosen instrument. A ruling stratum of this kind, if equipped with powers to perpetuate itself, would resemble the ancient nobility rather than the bourgeoisie, for it would combine military, political, economic, social, and cultural functions - something the European middle class never managed to do on a national scale ..." p. 309.)

93 P. &. Who is it that is doing the *understanding* here? The "praxis of oppression" and the "praxis of resistance" is intelligible to whoever is capable of encompassing the 'class struggle' as a 'totality', but the awareness thereof seems confined to the economic historian, not to the individual worker or capitalist living only within his or her 'ideological' bubble and interests. Turner believes he's sidestepped the complex debate on 'mediation' and the 'subject' of history - which was the topic of intense debate in Habermas' seminars during the eighties - by his Sartrean voluntarism, and by what in effect is a 'fall-back' position to that of the autonomy of the researcher and historian. But academic freedom is one thing, concrete Trade Union organisation another. Workers are not post-grad students mulling over issues of epistemology and historiography, and the latter do not gain their reputation as scholars through a bit of on-campus 'revolutionary violence'. The current crisis of higher education in SA has many causes, but Turner's elision of research, scholarship, university teaching on the one hand, Trade Union activism in the name of 'the working classes and the poor' on the other (with or without the quotation marks) would have consequences far beyond anything he could have anticipated. An "understanding of class interest" - as will be shown in greater detail below - had, in those years, three entirely different meanings, depending on whether it's approached from the sociological or *scientific* Marxist perspective, from the *reflexion* Marxist perspective, or from the Russian/Chinese 'wars of national liberation' perspective.

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For the 'Marxist humanism' debates on the Continent, these very British concerns with cups and pens, cats and mats seemed a distraction - based on an ignorance both of the sources and of the political realities. 'Ignorance of the sources': the endless fuss about 'putting Hegel back on his feet', an article of faith for all Marxists of the time, backed up by the usual invocation of 'thesis eleven' and 'emancipatory sensuality', dissolves as soon as one does a bit of what philosophers are supposed to know something about: the history of philosophy. If nature is God and God is nature - natura naturata and natura naturans are 'one' (Spinoza) -, does this not mean, if I confine myself only to the 'world of appearances', as Galileo had done, that I'm standing the world 'on its head'? (In the sense of: ignoring what is most important in life: ethics, a moral code, freedom, an inner life, the right to a 'private sphere'?) That's one of the oldest arguments against empiricism ever made, argued by Jacobi against Spinoza long before the French Revolution - setting in motion a pantheism controversy that would spread throughout Europe and then far beyond.[94] That 'form' is more important than 'content' had after all been canonic since Plato and Aristotle, for Philosophy no less than for Theology, and had - and still has - all the prestige of Euclid and mathematics to back it up. If one takes the view that it's 'mind over matter', 'character' over venality, then that's what one says to one's opponent: you're putting the world 'on its head'. (Also in the sense of: 'you're pursuing narrowly partisan or venal ends, rather than the 'common wheal''.) 'The controversy this unleashed is co-extensive with 'German Idealism'[95], or rather: the attempt at resolving the dualism contained therein: faith and reason, mind and matter. For the generation of Lessing, Kant, Goethe, Mendelssohn, this is indeed how it was understood: the crux of the controversy over Spinoza, and hence over secularisation and 'enlightenment' altogether. (Not to forget the little matter of *democracy*.) Can that which 'really matters' be made dependent on reason, on abstract principles (i.e. 'groundable' by the *axiomatic-deductive method*) or is this, as Goethe had glumly intuited (on contemplating the French Revolution and the Jaco-

94 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: *The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill*, ed. trans. George di Giovanni, McGill-Queen's UP, 1994. Cited in Dieter Henrich, op. cit. c.f. also Hans Blumenberg "Zündkraut einer Explosion" in (ibid.) *Arbeit am Mythos*, p. 438 ff.

95 In quotes, since it was neither confined to Germany nor was it 'idealist' in the meaning later ascribed to the term by Analytic Philosophers.

bins), a regression to Promethean hubris?[96] We're in 'Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes' territory here.

> Jacobi underscored the absurdity of Spinoza's position when he said, 'but, unfortunately, he who has once fallen in love with certain explanations will accept, like the blind, any conclusion whatsoever that follows from a proof he cannot refute, even if it means that he will be walking on his head.' In response, Hegel quipped that this was the great event of the French Revolution: that man started to turn himself upside down, actually to walk on his head, that is, to construct human society and thus human life rationally. Without quoting Jacobi, Hegel echoes him: 'Since the sun has risen and the stars are shining in the skies, no one noticed,' says Hegel, 'that man started to walk on his head.' In a later rejoinder, Karl Marx added, 'What I had to do was turn Hegel from his head back to his feet, so that we can start walking again'. 'Walking' here means advancing to philosophy's real goal, not just interpreting the world, and although Marx did not know it, he echoes Jacobi's criticism. For Marxism also implies that there is something that cannot be constructed and explicated in the sense in which the idealists tried to construct and explain everything.[97]

From the 'Continental' perspective, anyone who knows his or her philosophy, knows that this can be argued both ways: from the 'mind' side or the 'matter' side of things - as the word 'dialectics' indicates.

Politically. Post-war intellectuals in Europe were not so much concerned with a defence of 'agency' and 'voice' - i.e. with voluntarism and essentialism in the Anglo-US sense - but rather with the way in which the empiricist position, in Engels, had later been turned - by the Bolsheviks and then by the East European countries under their control - into a 'diamat' catechism for the simpleminded, dispensing with subjectivity (and the rights of the individual vis a vis the collectivity) altogether.[98] Coupled to the demand that this 'subjectless' dialectic required, of the 'masses' and of ordinary members, servility and unquestioned loyalty towards the 'democratic centralism' of the leadership. (Not to mention acceptance of Jacobin-type agi-

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96 Rolf Tiedemann (2014): *Abenteuer anschauender Vernunft*, p. 18.

97 Dieter Henrich (2003): "Jacobi and the Philosophy of Immediacy" in: *Between Kant and Hegel - Lectures on German Idealism*, p. 109 f.

98 Not to mention their 'physical liquidation', to put it delicately. For Sartre and Merleau-Ponty - also Hobsbawm in England - it was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, its bloody suppression, that made it impossible to take 'Marxist-Leninism' seriously as 'theory'. Merleau-Ponty (1964): "On De-Stalinisation", in: *Signs*, p. 293. It was not something the SACP ever did - that some of their own members had been 'purged', i.e. died in a Russian 'Gulag', was not admitted until decades later. (c.f. Trewhela, Paul [1988]: "The Death of Albert Nzula and the silence of George Padmore" in: *Searchlight South Africa*, 1, nr. 1.) Slovo simply reverts, in his 1989 "Has Socialism Failed", to liberal platitudes - the entire communist disaster is denied, as if it had never happened.

tation and ‘mass action’ as a permanent way of life, Trotzky‘s ‘permanent revolution’.) If a title like Lichtheim‘s *From Marx to Hegel* sounded, in Britain, like an arcane spat between philosophers who had not yet discovered the virtues of logic, science, and common sense,[99] it was, on the Continent, seen as a pretty accurate description of the struggle going on for the soul of the Communist Parties, their relationship to Social Democracy, parliamentarianism, and the re-attainment of a level of debate that had been buried under the rubble of the war.

The book just mentioned, Lichtheim‘s *From Marx to Hegel*, I‘d bought on the Spui in Amsterdam, on my first trip to Europe. It was the first book - really a collection of essays and papers - on what only later would be called The Frankfurt School or ‘critical theory’.[100] I brought it back to Durban, pretty sure that no-one in South Africa had yet read it. I quoted it in a paper for Turner (shortly before his banning, so it must have been about 1973), but he crossed it out: “That‘s a typo, it should read: From Hegel to Marx”.

It‘s worth dwelling for a moment on his reasoning here. What he meant is the following: that steeping oneself in Marxism leads to a *positive* result, in the sense of theoretical/moral certitude, like ‘learning a formula’ or accepting a moral precept - Western positivism‘s tradition of ‘truth is method’. (*Against* which was lined up everything that went under phenomenology, hermeneutics, German Idealism, aesthetics, history of Philosophy, Positivist Dispute, Negative Dialectics, or ‘critical theory’.)

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99 “Now, to confirm the worst fears of American pragmatists and British empiricists, there is a new *Methodenstreit*, or methodological dispute, at an intellectual altitude so elevated as to make structuralism or neo-Cartesian linguistics seem positively commonsensical. Just what one might have expected from the Germans; and to make matters worse, some of the participants are in the tradition of the Frankfurt school of sociology: in plain language, they are Marxists steeped in Hegelian logic. It is enough to make any decent empiricist despair ... The roots of course go back to Weimar days, and indeed to the first *Methodenstreit* around the turn of the century, when Max Weber‘s sociology was taking shape as part of an attempt to overcome the cleavage between scientific rationalism and romantic intuitionism.” (Lichtheim: “Marx or Weber: Dialectical Methodology” in: *From Marx to Hegel*, op. cit., p. 200 f.)

100 It was a reprint of papers that predated Jay‘s *Dialectical Imagination*, and may have encouraged *New Left Books* to start publishing Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno. Via the New York based *Commentary*, of which Lichtheim was in those years the editor, it may also have influenced Jameson, the *Telos* group, the *New German Critique*. (A *Commentary* whose New York office was located in the same building, on the same floor, after the war, as Max Horkheimer’s *Institute for Social Research.* c.f. Wheatland: xxxxxxx p. xxxx.)

But what Lichtheim was signalling was that this 'back to Hegel' summarised the intense problematisation of everything to do with Marxism going on in Europe, and especially everything to do with a 'logic' that was supposed to lead, *with necessity*, from Engel's *Dialectic of Nature* to 'objective contradictions in history'.[101] It's an argument that revolves around the 'Fetish-character' chapter of *Capital*, and whether Marx there concatenates 'reflection' in the sense of what we do as *individuals*, and 'reflection' in the sense of 'real' or 'objective' history, with its revolutions, wars, its 3m year timespan.[102] There certainly was, in that "fetish-chapter", a critique of mainstream economics - of the 'logic' of the social sciences altogether - and the Popper-Adorno dispute of 1969 showed that this had lost none of the virulence it had had before WWI. Two world wars later, in the midst of a student revolt in both Europe and the US, with Vietnam and the Shah of Iran in the news (not to mention South Africa itself) what hinged on that arcane 'Fetish-chapter' was the question whether war - and all which this implied, including the socalled 'vanguard' role of the CP - was ineluctable *fate*, a 'conditio humana' that you couldn't argue with, or whether *non-violent, peaceful*, *parliamentary* forms of struggle *were conceivable at all.* The argument *for* the ineluctability of (class) war - and following from this: the necessity of party- and coalition discipline - came from the Engels-Lenin-Deborin direction, with its doctrine of the universality of 'dialectics' in nature and history.[103] This was CP orthodoxy all over the world. If I'm unemployed, hungry, poor, threatened, or for any other reason in dire straits, this was supposed to *prove*, with a logic no different from that of the *natu-*

101 The sixties were "a time when the relationship of Marxism to its Hegelian origins was once more discussed at an intellectual level proper to the subject. During the preceding decade, all concerned had become obsessed with what was known as the Cold War. As a by-product of this concentration upon purely political issues, it was commonly supposed that Marx was of interest as a thinker mainly in so far as he prefigured the Russian Revolution and the rise of Communism or Marxism-Leninism. During the 1960s these certitudes gave way to the discovery that what was really of lasting importance in Marx's thought had more to do with the German intellectual tradition than with the use made of his ideas by Russian revolutionaries." (Lichtheim, op. cit, p. vii.) This was the crux of the difference between 'Marx' in Europe and South Africa: at issue was not where one stood on (or what one *under*stood of) this or that particular issue, what one had read or not, but where one stood on MK and armed insurrection ... In South Africa the Cold War wasn't easing at all - we were in the thick of it. Turner could have said to Habermas: 'reflexive' Marxism and Methodenstreit are all very well, but *we're* bearing the brunt of the East-West conflict. There's a proxy war going on, I understand your concerns, but the war is 'cold' only in *your* neck of the woods, not where *we* are.

102 Sartre quote: two senses of 'objective' xxxxxxxx

103 Oskar Negt (1969): *Abram Deborin/Nikolai Bucharin. Kontroversen über dialektischen und mechanischen Materialismus*.

ral sciences, that my only hope for survival - or even for simple self-respect and dignity - lies with the CP and the liberation struggle. A logical alternative is supposed to be inconceivable, no more than I could imagine a 'different' physics or astronomy. For anti-colonial movements all over the world, Russian or East European (later: Chinese) financial, diplomatic, military aid was tied to the acceptance of *this* interpretation of that 'Fetish-chapter'. The rich get richer, the poor poorer. This was as obvious to Chinese peasants as it was to South African township youth or to Nicaraguan Sandinistas - to anyone not patently blind. It was that 'fetish-chapter' that provided, in the eyes of the *scientific* Marxists, empirical proof that a revolutionary transformation (and state capture) was as inevitable as it was desireable, and that this was synonymous with *democratisation*. Since this was disputed by both the *reflexion* Marxists and the liberals, it meant that the ideological battle lines of those years came increasingly to take the form of a controversy between those who championed the *history of philosophy* versus those who opted for the *theory of science*, depending on whether that fetish we call money is pursued in the 'alienation' or in the 'objective history of the species' direction. (Once again depending, like so much in those years, on which of the 'two cultures' one had been trained in - the humanities or the natural sciences.[104])

If an *alternative* interpretation could be made plausible at all - coming from the Lukács direction, from the Weimar Left Hegelians, or even the Bucharin direction (those who had seen in the *Critique of Political Economy* a version of what in the US was called systems theory or functionalism), this threatened CP authority, and hence state legitimacy altogether.[105] The whole ideological edifice could come crashing down, as was already happening in Eastern Europe at the very time Turner was writing this text.[106] Even in the groves of academy, far removed from anything ordinary

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104 Bram Fischer, Cox. xxxxx !!!!

105 Which is probably a much too 'idealistic' way of formulating it. None of us had realized what Adorno was already noting with an eery clairvoyance on the US West Coast during the war: that we've entered an age in which truth, science, objectivity, morality were being threatened as much by the 'armed propaganda' coming from the East as the 'culture industry' from the West.

106 According to Stefan Heym's fictionalised account, this is exactly what Karl Radek had warned about at the sixth Moscow Comintern congress of 1928, i.e. a generation earlier - based on an analysis of the aborted German uprising of 1923. (Stefan Heym [1995]: *Radek*, p. 382.) He could just as well have based it on the experiences of the SACP - represented at the next congress, in 1928, by Sidney Bunting, Rebecca Bunting, and Eddie Roux. "These functionaries did not resemble in any way those people of the future of whom we socialists often entertain such exalted ideas nor were they at all like

party members were schooled to follow, a non-orthodox opinion on that fetish-chapter could cost you your head.[107]

As far as the *epistemology* is concerned, there were two powerfully persuasive arguments coming from the Anglo world that seemed to back up that Engels reading: Russell and Moore's positivism, and academic economics. The first was regarded as support for the argument that Hegel represented an 'everything-is-in-the-mind' kind of solipsism, for which it sufficed, in *refutation*, to point to the 'here-and-now-ness' of those cats, mats, dogs, rabbits and the rest of the menagery. (As if objectivity in the 'there's-a-world-outside-of-my-mind' sense has *ever* been contested, from Kant onwards. The endless vulgarisation of German Idealism at so many English-speaking universities - going back to Russell - was itself an impediment of the first order to an understanding of Marx.[108]) The second came from what today is called neo-liberalism: markets, left to their own devices, are supposed to lead to 'equilibrium'. Why does the State not simply withdraw from the economy - so runs this supposedly common-sense argument -, and let supply and demand 'find their natural level'?[109] Everyone has to earn a living, beat the competition, build up capital, or go under. The economy is a rat-race from which only the rich can escape, and if 'alienation' means the process whereby the rich get richer and the poor poorer, that *also* is hard to deny. (That *too* would lead to the 'trade union' argument, though

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the eager enthusiasts whom Rebecca [Bunting] had met at the Fourth Congress in 1922." (Roux, *Rebel Pity*, p. 75.)

107 c.f. Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the Bucharin showtrial: "Die Ambiguität der Geschichte bei Bucharin", in: *Humanität und Terror*, p. 68. A material that in later years would crop up in a William Kentridge film.

108 Tony Judt on this: "British (and especially English) commentators stood a little aside; as though the problems of Europe and of Britain, while recognisably related, were nevertheless different in crucial respects. With certain notable exceptions, British intellectuals did not play an influential part in the Great debates of continental Europe, but observed them from the sidelines. Broadly speaking, affairs that are urgently political in Europe aroused only intellectual interest in Britain; while topics of Intellectual concern on the continent were usually confined to academic circles in the UK, if indeed they were noticed at all." (*Postwar*, op.cit., p. 206.) One could call this Anglo-centrism, or parochialism, or something else - it extended deep into academic philosophy. John Passmore, in his influential *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* seems not to have considered whether his criterion for inclusion under that rather all-encompassing title would have had much sympathy on the other side of the Channel: "Would the reader of *Mind* or *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* be likely to encounter his name?" (Preface, p. 7.)

109 Cartoon, *New York Times*, of Alan Greenspan being led in a tumbril to the guillotine. (Clutching his copy of Ayn Rand.) "I was against regulations yes. But I had no idea those greedy Wall Street pigs would behave like greedy Wall Street pigs! I was shocked! Shocked!" Paul Krugman.
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/for-jerry/

this time based not on a 'conditio humana' premiss, but on simple observation. The Gini-coefficient, what Stiglitz, Piketty, are publishing about nowadays,[110] are after all not *Marxist* inventions.) So if someone publishes a book with the title *From Marx to Hegel*, the first association, for those socialised in all of the above, is to say, this is simply *illogical*. It marks a return to 'bourgeois idealism'. 'Petty-bourgeois intellectuals, ivory-tower elitist obscurantists, renegades and traitors to the working-class' - the vulgarity of the rhetoric hasn't much changed over the years.[111] This was not *Turner's* way in the least. But very much *this*: that there's a *logic* to all of this, in the axiomatic-deductive sense of the word, and that to deny this is like Cardinal Bellarmine denying the moons of Jupiter.

From a specifically *South African* point of view, epistemology in the above - university-based - sense of analysing the difference between science and philosophy was overlaid by Cold War realities that seemed much more urgent and pressing, that played out very differently in Europe than they did in the former colonies. US McCarthyism had been enthusiastically implemented by SA securocrats only too willing to portray every *anti-Apartheid* protest as a communist plot - which in turn was ably abetted by Russian and East European willingness to train, equip and finance Umkhonto we Sizwe for a 'war of national liberation'.[112] Since Apartheid legislation seemed based, in the end, on *racial* rather than class discrimination, it meant that a *second* US fault-line could *also* be imported, as a kind of 'push-back' and 'mirror opposite' to the first: Black Consciousness, and the long-simmering *US* race divide.[113] Between a 'Security State' increasingly reliant on *anti-communist* paranoia for its racist practice, Biko and Black Consciousness made it inevitable that *race* (rather than class) would from now onwards become an ominously potent potential for mass mobili-

110 It's very possible that Turner's empiricism/voluntarism dualism goes back to Russell, whose *History of Western Philosophy* was popular and widely used in the Philosophy Departments. "... the ultimate source of moral authority is never clarified. It cannot be religious, since Russell has no use for religion. It cannot be simply utilitarian, for there are occasional references to absolutes - love, beauty, 'the good life' - which seem to reflect a hierarchy of values not reducible to subjective estimation. Yet the principle governing his moral assumptions is never stated. Is it then purely arbitrary?" (Lichtheim, 1973, *Thoughts amongst the Ruins*, p. 109.) To this day the Turner/Biko controversy is being conducted as if the search for agreement on moral/ethical principles somewhere is a 'colonialist/capitalist plot', an insult to the 'working classes and the poor'.

111 Roux breaks with the SACP over the way the Russians treat Bunting. xxxxxxx xxxxxx

112 "Without your support we would not be where we are now." Nelson Mandela, at an official reception for Soviet delegates, Durban, 3 July 1991. Cited in: Vladimir Shubin (2008): *ANC - A view from Moscow*, p. 309.

113 If fits with this that recent editions of Turner's *The Eye of the Needle* present him on a line somewhere between Martin Luther King and Che Guevara.

sation - both within South Africa and internationally. (Something that is now beginning to paralyse higher education - and a great deal else besides.) In combination with the revolutionary rhetoric coming from Algeria, South America, Russia and Asia, this created an incendiary mix unknown to a Europe already well on its way (as it seemed during those years) towards a Welfare State capable of absorbing the very 'contradictions' that are now tearing (not just) South Africa apart. It was this, one could surmise, these immediately political and strategic considerations, that moved Turner to turn his attention from epistemology to trade unions. It was a feat of both intellectual courage and political acumen for him to have seen that Trade Unions had it within them to transcend both race and gender - even if he will have been under no illusion about the opposition he would be facing.[114]

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Sartre's 'Marxist humanism' - more indebted to Kierkegaad, Husserl and Heidegger than to Hegel - was aimed, in the first instance, at countering Stalinist doctrine emanating from the USSR and Eastern Europe, including the former GDR. In this it was part of a common post-war European project to put the 'diamat ontology'[115] coming from the East behind it. How to go about this? The dilemma *all* intellectuals faced was that - rapidly expanding post-war higher education or no -, the circles in which a serious discussion of these things was even possible was itself shrinking.[116] The universities may have been expanding, but they were at the same time being retooled to service the needs of the rapidly growing multinationals - the very capitalist economy the intellectuals were criticising. With the mass media increasingly becoming gate-keepers to fame and fortune - and increasingly invading the universities -, the very notion of 'truth' and 'objectivity' dissolves, 'all that is solid melts into air'.

But that's to measure the debates of those years by today's cynicism. The conclusion Turner reaches, by the end of the deliberations in this text, can be presented almost as a syllogism: *the world is in crisis*. Since, factually, this can't be denied, it is reference to *this* reality that makes up the superior-

114 Was he aware of just how implacable SACP and ANC opposition to this 'participatory democracy' initiative of his would be? Johnny Copelyn: quote Keniston. xxxxxx

115 Alfred Schmidt's term: "Zum Verhältnis von Geschichte und Natur im dialektischen Materialismus" in: *Existentialismus und Marxismus. Eine Kontroverse zwischen Sartre, Garaudy, Hyppolite, Vigier und Orcel* (1962). (Frankfurt, 1965, p. 103-155.)

116 Gouldner chapter: xxxxx (Let alone *acting* on these realities.)

ity of all post- or neo-Hegelian theories positing an *objective contradiction* (and not some 'subjective theory') as a basis for all further analysis.[117] It's what marks the unparalleled explanatory power of Hegel/Marx type theories - when compared to liberal and neo-liberal ones that never manage to shake off prestabilised harmonies of the Leibniz and Adam Smith kind. And at the same time: all *vanguarism* is bogus. In short, where does one go, what is the next step in the debate, when CP vanguardism is rejected but the reality of objective contradictions can't be denied. (i.e. Marxist-Leninism and [neo]liberalisms are *equally* unconvincing, *equally*, 'idealistic'?) If he'd ever got to Germany, that would have been the core of the debate: an objective 'theory' of history (for lack of a less misleading term), linked to a deep scepticism concerning all CP claims (and all comparable claims from the 'identity politics' direction) to be 'speaking in its name'.[118]

What Turner missed in the Sartre debates is what constituted its core: the attempted emancipation (in this sense: 'enlightenment') from a philosophical principle that had become the emotional-motivational anchor of Stalinism: the 'copy' theory of truth. But at the same time he missed a *second* major theme: the one concerning Existentialism's proximity to Heideggerian 'authenticity'. It's the necessity of that break with what Merleau-Ponty called 'Ultra-Bolshewism'[119] that results in the *Hegel*-renaissance of the period, the attempt to free Marx from its Stalinist and East European accretions, recovering the 'subjective' and 'humanist' side of the 'dialectics of nature' - something that was playing an even greater role in the East Euro-

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117 For all the polemics that once came from Popper and Albert, there is no great mystery about the meaning of 'objective contradiction' in Hegel and Marx. That we are biological (even: 'gendered') beings, detracts not a jot from the impulse that motivated Christianity and the 'Adamitic' faiths over the millenia: that we live and die, that our time on this 'mortal coil' is finite, that our days are numbered, and that *this* knowledge cannot fail but to have an influence on how we 'see the world' and those around us.

118 No doubt we would have pondered that question (there seems to be no English equivalent for 'Gretchenfrage') which Habermas poses to Marcuse, and which marks the difference between 'materialist dialectics' as Turner understands it here, and Critical Theory: what's happened to the 'historical subject'? What does 'vanguard' mean if the troops have all deserted or rebelled? What happens if they form a trade union and decide to dispense with your services? Already in the GDR of those years the 'leading role' had become the butt of corrosive satire. (c.f. Habermas, Bovenschen et al. *Gespräche mit Herbert Marcuse*, p. 55/56.) In the Trade Union movement which Turner helped to shape, this manifested itself in endless disputes over just who had control over education. "Maree shows ... how disputes about union control over education 'boiled down to whether intellectuals outside the unions or organically linked with the unions' should exercise that control." (Nash, op. cit, p. 172.)

119 xxxx

pean countries.[120] Only in this way could subjectivity, the autonomy and integrity of the individual, be reclaimed. But running counter to this rejection of the *old* radicals for their 'natural laws of history' (and the odd non sequitur they deduced from this, namely unquestioned obedience to orders from above), was another controversy, revolving around the attempt to pin down just what it was, about Existentialism, that put it in such close and complicitous proximity to Heideggerian *authenticity*. 'Being and Nothingness' was not so far removed, after all, even in the title, from 'Sein und Zeit'.[121] How does *Heidegger* manage to end up as a *nationalist ideologue*? Could a fundamentalist and untrammelled *subjectivity* - what Lash was calling the 'culture of narcissism'[122] - one day be instrumentalised for *nationalist* (not to say: *tribalist*) ends? *Both* of these themes were demonstrably there in the Sartre debates, both pass Turner by. The 'Durban moment' in South African history, marking the ascendency of Marxism in mainstream (post-Apartheid) SA discourse, was singularly lacking in the solid economic analyses, the 'universal history' analyses, so characteristic of the *European* Marxism that it professed to be following.[123]

From Heidegger's penchant for *German*, via Sartre, to Turner's valorisation of Biko's *Black* nationalism? I have no doubt that, had he lived, the difference between Sartre and Habermas, which had already started in our correspondence, would have become the focus of our discussions. With at its core: the meaning of the terms objectivity, science, subjectivity, reality. One that would have focussed directly on this text, and what it means, in Kant, to 'problematise sense experience'. Henrich, in Heidelberg[124], would have forced Turner to confront the baselessness of the idea that anything whatsoever in Marxism-Leninism was capable of 'refuting' Kant or Hegel. If we ever had ended up pressing that ANC doorbell in London, I can't imagine disillusionment being very far behind, for both of us. Trewhela's

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120 The specifically philosophical aspect to this - not to be confused with the practical consequences Turner derives from this for Third World liberation movements - is the confrontation between Cartesianism and the *historicisation* of epistemology represented by Dilthey and the *Geisteswissenschaften* in Germany (also by Croce in Italy), and embodied, in interbellum France, above all by Kojève. In England and the US on the other hand, Darwinism and Evolution blocked this necessary confrontation for the best part of a century, before re-emerging - in a form however that had largely shed the epistemology - in post-war Feminism.

121 Adorno Jargon of authenticity. Lichtheim: the cloven hoof.

122 lash: title xxxx

123 Duncan Innes: xxxxx notes

124 Not Theunissen, as Keniston maintains. In the bibliography, below, Henrich comes up three times, Theunissen not at all.

description of the ANC in exile,[125] Thabo Mbeki‘s Sussex Marxism, none of that would have sat easily with Turner for very long. He really *was* able to read those texts (we had both started studying German under Elizabeth de Kadt at UND), his robust resistence to *Apartheid* intimidation wouldn‘t have evaporated in the face of an *ANC* that had abandoned Gandhi and Luthuli for MK, ‘armed propaganda’, and cadre deployment.[126] Not in a climate in which, in the rest of Europe, the very Marxist *orthodoxy* the ANC was espousing was under examination for the Stalinist and oppressive elements it contained.[127] The confrontation with Cronin and Slovo - eventually: Nzimande - would have been inevitable.[128]

The possibility that the very *notion* of a ‘vanguard’ party on the Russian and East German model could be bogus is, for a South African academic caught between a failing Apartheid state and a SACP claiming exactly this status, is troubling enough to make it the focus of the final pages of this manuscript. Freedom, Turner had concluded by this point, didn‘t really have much to do with dialectics in the sense of Kant and Hegel, but was a matter of personal choice: “freedom is chosen, rather than produced by a historical dialectic” (p&. 79.) Freedom is *decision*. If the situation has become “unbearable”, “revolt inevitably occurs”. (p&. 79.) It‘s above all a *moral* choice, an individual *decision*. But does such an abandonment of historical, political studies not mean one has give up all independent

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125 http://mbokodo-quatro-uncensored.co.nr/ c.f. Stanley Manong (2015): *If we must die - An autobiography of a former commander of Mkonto we Sizwe*.

126 c.f. Andrew Feinstein (2009): *After the Party*. Stephen Ellis (2012): *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990*. Former SACP member and Mbeki-era intelligence minister Ronnie Kasrils, warns “If we do nothing we may find ourselves in a police state”. (*Politicsweb*, 12 April 2016.) R.W. Johnson: “Very often, you’ll find that people will peel off and say ‘look, I‘m sorry. I cannot stand to see this, that, or the other principle flouted’ and that was how I felt. When I went over to England in the sixties, I assumed I would be with the ANC guys. I went to London and mixed with them but to be quite frank, I found them authoritarian, racist, and very illiberal and that offended my feelings about free speech and free association. I realised that if I were to carry on in that movement, I would have to kowtow to people whom I really didn‘t respect at all. I realised that some of them might do anything at all.” (Interview, *Biznews*, November 13, 2015.) In the old ‘in’-joke on British Marxists (‘they’re a lot more British than Marxist’) there’s a core that’s not very humourous, and it would in time undermine post-Mandela SA: the incompatibility, for the new ‘civil religion’ still to come, of ‘revolution’ with good governance, constitutionalism, rule of law. c.f. also Raymond Suttner: xxxxxx

127 Leftwitch, Leftwing-deviationism. xxxx

128 ‘Back from Syracuse, Dr. Turner?’ c.f. Paul Trewhela (2008): “The Problem of Communism in southern Africa” http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-problem-of-communism-in-southern-africa (accessed 20160130) and the material to be found there on the Russian journey of Bram Fischer and Geoffrey Cox in 1932.

thought in favour of the very "voluntarist or jacobin activities" which Hegel had warned against in the *Phenomenology of Mind*? (p&. 80.)

Sartre, though a supporter of the post-war French CP, in time repudiated the Leninist claim of the 'vanguard' party being the "real representative of the proletariat" (p&. 80). It's a startling thought from which Turner - fully aware of the specifically *South African* implications of all of this - shies away immediately: "Of course, all these remarks require detailed elaboration." (p&. 81). Better, perhaps, to return to the standpoint that, according to dialectics, everything is contradictory: "human meaning systems are mediated by matter" and "matter is at the same time mediated by human meaning systems". (p&. 82) We're back at the point of departure: the capitalist crisis is "rooted in the separation of the mutually dependent elements commodity and money" (p&. 82.) We're back with 'objective contradictions', and the point at which philosophy is said to turn into politics.

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What Turner is struggling with here are three incommensurate meanings of that term 'objective contradictions' - those held by the 'scientific' Marxists, the 'reflection' Marxists, and the Marxist-Leninists respectively.[129]

i) What the *scientific* Marxists of those years understood under 'objective contradictions' can be studied in Innes.[130] It meant interpreting the history of Southern Africa (Angola, Mocambique, Namibia, the Rhodesias, the whole East/West confrontation going on after decolonisation) as an exer-

129 This classification comes from Gouldner (c.f. A. Gouldner, 1980: *The Two Marxisms*), and then became part of a discourse on whether there was such a thing as an 'American ideology'. (c.f. Martin Jay, 2005: "For Gouldner: Reflections on an Outlaw Marxist" in: *Postwar American Critical Thought* [Vol2], ed. Peter Beilharz.) It can be regarded as a reaction, during the sixties, to the disarray, within the Social Science establishment, caused by a widening gap opening up between those who championed a 'unified science' (or a 'History and Philosophy of Science') movement, and those - the 'Continentals' - insisting that epistemology and historiography are 'one'. In *this* use of Gouldner's classification, the difference between 'scientific' and 'reflexion' Marxism characterises the difference between those who work on the premiss that the objective world is 'independent of subjectivity', and those who insist that there is a 'mediation' (or a 'mediating factor') between the two. That is: Gouldner and then Jay use the distinction as a way of naming different 'approaches' towards historiography, in the *methodological* sense, and not *in themselves* (these categories) as representing a specific historical *reality*. In the 'Present as history', below it will be shown that it was here that the Frankfurt School *differed*. (It was even a bone of contention between the two directors of the Starnberg institute - C.F. von Weiszäcker and Habermas - serious enough to cause the latter's resignation.)

130 Duncan Innes (1984): *Anglo - Anglo-American and the rise of modern South Africa.*

cise in the *critique of political economy* - as this was understood in the UK and the US. His exhaustive monograph on Africa's oldest multinational was published after Turner's death, but its theoretical premisses were being widely discussed in Durban at the time.[131] Innes operates with a mix of concepts - some empirical, some a priori, some historical - while insisting all the while that all of this is *really* empirical. He does an exhaustive study of Anglo-American, maintaining all the while that the concepts used - 'capitalist mode of production', 'class conflict', the relationship between economics and politics, the falling rate of profit - are all 'really' *empirical*. It leaves him in the awkward fix of having to defend the sentence: 'history is the history of classes and class antagonisms' both as an apriori premiss and the empirical result of a study treating that very same sentence as a thesis as yet unconfirmed - an obvious paradox. It's an old one: it's the same ambivalence between *evidence* and *experience* that has dogged the entire 'science is method' movement from Descartes onwards, going back to the un-resolved tension between the natural sciences and the humanities.[132] At the level of scholarship and debate this was, compared to Marxism-Leninism, a veritable paragon of reason, scholarship, and probity, but as a piece of political economy it never regains the epistemological and historical depth this discipline once had in the hands of authors like Carl Grünberg and Rudolf Hilferding.[133]

ii) For the *reflexion* Marxists on the other hand, those 'objective contradictions' are not *in* space and time at all - like cups and pens -, but involves sorting out (as Habermas and Apel were doing in Germany[134]), 'contradictory' habits of thought from the 'two cultures' permeating everything in the West since before the French Revolution - natural sciences here, humanities there.[135] 'Objective contradictions' in *this* context means puncturing the illusions of a purely *technocratic* approach to the problems of social in-

131 Dan O'Meara, Legassick.

132 In the history of the Frankfurt School these same issues had been thrashed out a generation earlier - though not appreciated in their significance until much later. c.f. my translation of Horkheimer's critique of Grossmann: http://amsterdam-adorno.net/fvg2014_T_mh_grossmann_letter.html It's no accident that it was *this* - the incompatible epistemologies of the natural and social sciences - that would become the core of the controversy between Critical Theory and Functionalism. (c.f. Jürgen Habermas/Niklas Luhmann [1971]: *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie*.)

133 Grünberg, Hilferding, Baran and Zweezy, Polyani, in the US, Althusser in France, were fully aware that academic economics, as this was being taught at the prestigious US universities, had an aspect to it that was thoroughly *abstract*. xxxx

134 Not to mention the French: Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Gusdorf, Levi-Strauss.

135 c.f. Jonathan Israel: xxxx ref.

tegration or - say - an understanding of post-war US foreign policy. The 'Critique of Instrumental Reason' (Horkheimer) says: the social sciences - as they were taught at universities in the West after the war - are the institutionalised embodiments of *contradictory cognitive interests*: the *technical* versus the *practical*. The hope for peace and a non-catastrophic future (in Habermas' somewhat Aesopian formulation of those years: the 'problem of modernity') hinges on the prospect of the Social Science establishment realizing that in that 'Science' there's something 'one-dimensional', something that is thoroughly 'contradictory' - too many areas of our lives can't be treated as if we're *natural scientists* (or technicians) merely observing and recording *things*. (As opposed to sentient beings equiped with a psychology that functions on the basis of an intersubjectivity with *others*, through the mediation of *symbols*.[136])

iii) The *Marxism-Leninism* meaning of the term 'contradiction' is represented, in this Turner text, by those passages in which the 'class struggle', 'the praxis of oppression', 'the praxis of resistance' are treated as slogans crafted by the Propaganda Department for the purpose of 'mobilising the masses' - in that case questioning them would be as ludicrous as questioning the reality of everyday objects. He's fully aware that defending *this* meaning will drive him into the arms of those demanding that the only 'answer' to Apartheid is armed insurrection, 'state capture', civil war - that's why he shies away from it. It's not so much an *argument* as the replacement of argumentation *itself* by obedience to Party directives - and the unquestioned acceptance of class war and MK as the hegemonic narrative to come. You gave up your soul to the Party (and the Commander in Chief) - or you resigned yourself to life in the wilderness, penury, or worse.[137]

Now that class war and MK have indeed become the ruling State narrative (with Turner's *Eye of the Needle* turned into a codex for cadre selection[138]), it's worth looking back on those years that were so decisive for the way in which Apartheid ended, above all: how the transition to the 'new South Africa' would come to be sedimented into (a very dissociated) collective memory. Turner's text is a sustained attempt at coming to terms with the central controversies dominating the social sciences after WWII:

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136 Robinson Cruseo. xxxxx

137 At an *academic* level it's obvious enough that only meanings i) and ii) can be *discussed* - as was the case in Europe the the US - but the point about *SA* was that here, and here *only*, this was a debate that was taking place, as it were, 'under fire', in a country in the throes of what was in effect a steadily intensifying (though not publically conceded) civil and regional war.

138 xxxxx

what is truth, what is objectivity, what are these social sciences 'for'. That is: the 'relevance' jof Turner's argumentation in those years was felt not by the Marxist-Leninists in exile but by the academic sociologists *inside* the country. These had been trained in empirical and comparative methods, in the principles of the natural sciences, in the Functionalism of Parsons and Merton, and - to the extent that *real* economics came into it at all - by Samuelson and Milton Friedman. It meant that - in a country sliding towards civil war - 'race', 'class', 'gender' could be debated, investigated, measured, their influence on the stability of the polity or otherwise recognized, but the concepts themselves were treated as if the purpose of it all was some 'grand synthesis' at the level of *theory*. An author like Pierre van den Berghe[139], who was much too knowledgeable not to have a very acute and prescient understanding of the social dynamics he was investigating, nevertheless feels duty-bound to defend the Parsonian functionalism in which he had been trained. *This* functionalism (other than the *Marxist* kind) was 'nominalist' in the specific sense that the categories available to the social scientist are entirely abstract, entirely divorced from any kind of *historical* grounding. Parsons' *Structure of Social Action*, with its managerial and biological foundations, holds for all societies at all times, and from its general principles 'the world' (say: a seriously polarised polity) can be 'deduced' and explained, a more or less convincing 'model' constructed, but that then marks the limit of the social scientist's remit: *to point this out*. *Here*, with the functionalists, the problem is not so much that Innes-type studies (which prided themselves on their historical dimension) resist *empirical proof*, but that what is empirically evident and beyond doubt is formulated from the outset in such a way that it cannot be acted upon. (In Marxist terminology: it's 'idealistic', divorced from 'praxis'.) Van den Berghe registers very well that, in SA, this 'total social system' perspective forces him to choose between two unpalatable professional roles: either be prepared to side with the 'modernisers of racial domination', or resign himself to the role of passive witness, paralised, to a historical disaster unfolding. It was in this situation (with *Marxist* functionalists unable to account for their *concepts*, and Parsonian functionalists unable to conceptualise their relationship to *practice*), that Turner's arguments (perhaps one should say: his ability to mediate between 'opposites', make their premisses explicit) were so persuasive. What the two versions of functionalism had in common was the conviction that the point of departure must be *reality*, the 'real world'. Or rather: that *something* in this reality was going to have to

139 1965: *South Africa, A Study in Conflict*.

change. Progressive industrialisation, with first the Afrikaners and then the Black population being increasingly drawn into a market and then a global economy: that was the point of departure upon which all sides agreed. 'Change' was the common denominator, though this was interpreted in quite antithetical ways. The Parsonians and the academic economists could associate with this term the unstated premiss that the abolition of Apartheid legislation would by itself be sufficient for a return to the 'normal' functioning of democracy and pluralism - as this was understood in the US[140]. The *Marxist* functionalists, with their connection to a specifically British (Trade Union-allied) radicalism - wanted a return to *political economy*, economic policies relevant for a rapidly industrialising former colony, and something resembling Social Democracy. Policies at any rate that would be egalitarian in their effects. Functionalism *here* assumed (quite at odds with what the Parsonians believed) that 'revolution', the 'overthrow of the status quo' would be synonymous with *democratisation*. This was a bit of teleology that Marx had taken over from Hegel, and one could read into that 'empiricist turn' of Turner a rejection thereof, a thorough-going scepticism concerning the idea that all that was necessary was to 'trust in history'.[141] Turner was as uneasy with the one as he was with the other, and one can read his text as an attempt at getting beyond both. If one believed, as the Parsonians and mainstream economics maintained, that 'science is method' meant the study of law-like regularities that were themselves time-less and 'ahistorical', then the study of 'change' meant literally this: *studying the situation*, as an end in itself. If one assumed - with Legassick, Webster, Innes - that 'change' was synonymous with 'revolution' in the sense of welfare legislation, service delivery and poverty reduction, then here too was a notion of 'history' that saw no great need to delve into constitutional law, into the question of what 'change', 'transformation', 'tran-

140 Gouldner makes the point that what Parsons really represented was the *internationalisation* of Sociology in a way that it had never been before, and that it did this on the basis of a widespread sense of crisis in the period after the Russian revolution and then the Great Depression. *The Structure of Social Action* is suffused by a much deeper sense of the fragility of modern institutions than liberal critics - who stayed at the level of conventional *morality* - ever gave him credit for. (Hence the pre-occupation with the 'problem of order'.) But it was a conceptualisation of 'order' that was inspired by Darwin and biology, and not in the least by historiography or philosophy. (Not so different from *Popper*, who subtitles his *Objectivie Knowledge* with "An evolutionary approach".) Parsons is convinced that biology's structure/function opposition can be made congruent with the object/subject 'dialectic' of post-Cartesian philosophy, and that this 'solves' the science/humanities conundrum. Habermas would become famous with the proof that this is illusory.

141 Benjamin quote!!!

sition' were going to mean in constitutional terms. Another way of putting it: 'radical' came increasingly to mean a set of concerns entirely *divorced* from what, with hindsight, would turn out to be formative for post-1994 South Africa: *constitutionality*, and how this related to democracy and material welfare.[142] That 'CCT', 'change', 'transition', 'transformation', could be in time be turned into rationalisations for a 'politics of rage'[143] re-igniting the fuse most parties had considered mercifully doused in 1994, must be laid squarely at the door of the *Marxist-Leninists*, who could see no dissernable difference between theory and 'armed propaganda', but today's realities could sharpens one's sensibilities for what it was that was being debated in Durban during those Turner years. Even now, a generation on, when one examines the penumbra of associations cast by CCT, it seems to presuppose a notion of progress that was/is specifically European, with a 'means-ends' rationality that is voluntarist, secular, admitting of no *limitations* of what is achievable *politically*. Irrespective of the circumstances of their formulation, once a polity (say: the 'structures' of the governing party) makes a *decision*, the *implementation* thereof is regarded as merely a matter of straightforward governance. Whatever their distance from the Wanzi[144] rhetoric of post-Polokwane ruling party ideology, in *one* respect the 'means/ends' rationality of the Parsonians and the Marxist functionalists was an anticipation of what was to come. In the later Habermas terminology: they shared a *technocratic* conception of how to get from 'here' to 'there'. Neither 'reflected' a world in which moral-ethical-practical considerations were being progressively replaced by scientific-technical-financial-manipulative ones.[145] It was here that Turner exerted perhaps his greatest influence. With Sartre and the European debate on the 'young' Marx under his belt, Turner brought back to SA something of the intense moral-ethical ferment that had swept Europe after the disaster of two world wars.

What the two functionalisms - the Parsonian and the Marxist - had in common was a concept of 'totality', or 'history as a whole' which regarded this as something unproblematically *real*, in the ordinary empiricist sense - hence Turner's 'cups and pens'. The Parsonians operated on more or less

142 Fink Haysom, Halton Cheadle, Charles Nupen, they *too* were deeply influenced by Turner. In that respect Codesa and the SA Constitution, one of the finest in Africa, could *also* be said to have been influenced by Turner.

143 Habib xxxx

144 bring me my machine-gun

145 A blindness from which those schooled in Gramsci and the notion of 'hegemonic' control over cultural institutions and the media at any rate did not suffer.

Darwinian premisses (with a half-hearted assimilation of Max Weber), the Marxist Functionalists with a notion of an 'objective contradiction' preceding 'all' of history, but both conceived 'totality' as something *real*, in the specific sense that this notion of reality was regarded as immune to any kind of *a priori* analysis. Both functionalisms - though differing on how they argued this through - were 'at one', at least tacitly, in the conviction that the Kantian demonstration according to which time, space, causality were not *in* the objects of experience but 'transcendent' to them, had been refuted. The empiricists went for 'sense experience', the scientific Marxists for 'objective contradictions', but neither saw any need to take philosophy seriously - whether post-Wittgensteinian or neo-Hegelian. In the face of a political disaster that really did threaten to be of 'historical' dimensions, it meant that the social science establishment claiming to 'research' it, was in fact premissed on an epistemology of illusion. One that not only crippled a great deal of 'social science' in SA, but had roots going back to the origins of the social sciences in Europe.[146]

re 'Change'. *One* set of connotations: that urbanisation, globalisation, population growth, increasing integration into the market economy, that this would *all by itself* force the end of Apartheid, or at the very least its 'modernisation', hence transformation in a more democratic direction. The most influential advocates of this entirely *formal* notion of the process involved were the economists, for whom 'growth' was the panacea for all conceivable ills, and 'politics' a residual category dealing at the most with subjective proclivities and 'values'. The only thing constraining the predominantly black population from becoming 'rational actors' in an expanding economy - in this view - were superfluous race laws, a skewed education system, and a lack of democracy.[147]

At issue, between the functionalists and the 'scientific' Marxists was the attitude to be taken to the rapid urbanisation of the black population, and what it was that was to be expected from this. 'Change' meant, depending on whether it was invoked from within *sociological* or *Marxist-Leninist* functionalism, a movement towards democracy and the rule of law, or a movement towards a socialism no longer constrained by 'mere' bourgeois parliamentarianism and the constitution.

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146 "... it must be remembered" .... p. 30 Heilbroner.
147 Jill Nattress quote xxxx Heribert: Oppenheimer text!!!! O'Dowd.

Hegel‘s *Logik* - in Turner‘s reading - starts with a distinction between what is *meant* and what can be *said*. And to accept *this* distinction - between ‘meinen’ and ‘werden’, between *meaning* something and *saying* something. This is the classical ‘Russell’-reading of the *Logik*, a long-since refuted cliché which Turner here simply repeats:

> The implication ... seems to be that we can exhaustively determine the concept ‘Becoming’, and thereby enter a purely conceptual world, in which no reference need be made to what is not conceptual. (p. 134)

The basis for Turner‘s reading - according to which ‘Becoming’ in Hegel is *purely conceptual* - is the doctrine that formal logic is ‘objective’, everything else ‘subjective’ - in the sense of ‘purely impressionistic’, unproven, unscientific. Since a distinction between concept and object is disallowed (the two are identical: ‘A’=A) the law of the excluded middle (tertium datur) can then be invoked to declare everything in Kant and Hegel that focusses on the *interrelationship* of ‘A’ and A to be meaningless: either there *is*, or *there is not* a difference between ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’. But if they both *exist*, as *concepts*, then we should be able either to point to a difference between the two - a differentia specifica -, or, if that is not the case, then they are *identical*: ‘Being’ and ‘Nothingness’ are then ‘one’. But if they *are* ‘one’, then they can‘t exit as separate entities. Quod erat demonstrandum. Turner is convinced - taking his cue from Russell here - that Hegel is being *self-contradictory*, that there‘s a logical flaw in the argument somewhere, that the fault of the *Logik* lies in its ‘denial of reality’. That ‘A’=A is a highly condensed formula for a debate about three different conceptions of ‘identity’: i) in the sense of that which accompanies me as an individual over time (which makes it possible for me to make the I/me distinction at all); ii) identity in the sense of formal logic A=A, the tertium non datur; iii) identity at the ‘macro’, at the ‘species’-level, at the ‘totality of history’ level. Whatever is to be said about the reasons underlying British empiricism’s dislike of Hegel’s ‘idealism’, and however justified the suspicion of a kind of ‘transcendental egoism’ in the entire tradition from Kant through to Hegel may have been (which the empiricists after all *shared* with the ‘critical theorists’), empiricism’s recourse to *object constancy* (cups, pens), was just about the worst of all possible strategies if the point was to try to give substance to these suspicions. It wasn’t just that any half-way competent reading of Hegel’s *Logik* had long since shown that what *he* called idealism went a lot further and was a lot more coherent than that of the empiricists themselves. Object constancy had not only been dissolved by the Physicists, who had replaced perception - at the micro- and

macro-levels - with instruments that vastly out-performed the merely 'human' sensory apparatus; something similar was coming from the neurophysiologists, the evolutionary epistemologists, the cognitive psychologists, the ethologists.[148] What in the end vitiated empiricism's defence of the deictic was the growing realisation that Kant was neither an empiricist nor a rationalist, but the beginning of a European debate about the 'mediation' of the two, what would later be called *projection*, in both its phylo- and ontogenetic aspects. Turner was trying to defend two incompatible positions at once: a sceptical rejection of the Kantian a priori - with its roots in Montaigne and the Dutch 'mijnheers' - and a defence of timelessness and the eternal verities in the sense of Aristotle, with its valiant defenders at Oxbridge and the Church.

When Turner argues that 'the thing in itself' can't possibly be conceived of as a formless chaos of 'impressions', what he's contesting is that the notion that time, space, causation could possibly be conceived of as *subjective* categories, merely 'in the mind', an act of will. (Something on which he was - unwittingly - in complete agreement with Horkheimer und Adorno.) But that was a repetition of the influential confusion Russell had put into the world by equating 'idealism' in the sense of Hegel with with empiricism's notion of 'subjectivity' as something 'merely in the mind'. By the sixties - in part also as a consequence of greater interest, on the part English-speaking philosophy departments, for the French and German sources, in part a result of Wittgenstein, von Wright, Austin, Searle (also - in historiography: Collingwood), this simpleminded 'copy theory of truth' was disintegrating.[149] When it collapsed however - as it did during the sixties - what it brought down with it in its fall was not just the *natural* sciences's monopoly concerning the methodology of the *social* sciences, but just as much the Marxist-Leninist dogma of 'materialism' as a simple 'reflection' of 'base' and 'superstructure'.[150] The question then becomes, for Turner, if our intuitions concerning the 'this-ness' of those cups and pens make it very difficult to think of e.g. causation (time, space) as being merely something *thought*, what then. As a better understanding of Continental Philosophy make a simpleminded 'A'=A ('philosophy of identity') impossible from the *philosophical* side, there was something very similar going on in the natural sciences, making the usual Aristotelian fall-back position ('cups and pens', or at the very least their *qualities* have something eternal about

148 Lorenz: Gestalwahrnehmung. xxxx

149 schools of metascience: XXXXX

150 Materialism book: turns out it was the rejection of the *a priori* that had impressed the British Marxists most of all: QUOTE XXXXXX

them) *equally* untenable.[151] Just as the Newtonian universe did not survive physics from Heisenberg to Einstein, just so did the post-Darwinian biologists begin to understand that the physiology of our sense organs makes it impossible for us to trust our *senses*, when it comes to trying to understand what 'things in themselves' means. If Lichtheim and a better understanding of 'Continental Philosophy' made 'positivism' an ever-more difficult position to defend, so did advances in cognitive psychology, evolutionary epistemology, neurophysiology[152] and linguistics.

Having convinced himself that the *Logik* begins with the difference between "that which can be meant but not said" (p. 29) this can be equated, in the next step, with an insistence upon the primacy of "verbal conceptual knowledge" (op. cit.) and then brushed aside with the standard empiricist argument:

> It is the primacy of conceptual knowledge which permits Hegel to ignore the purely meant at the beginning of his system, and then, at the end, to show that otherness itself, as purely conceptual, is absorbed back into the knowing subject, as merely one element in what is purely a system of concepts. The finite has no self-subsistent being of its own because the empiricists and Kant have dissolved the thing into a rhapsody of sense-data. (p.& 136.)

On the one hand Turner here is 'reading' Hegel through the Sartrean version of phenomenology, which - via Husserl and Heidegger - seeks to overcome the Cartesian dualism by returning to the deictic aspects of perception. Whether we do this through a 'transcendental deduction' of the categories we must of necessity use to describe what it is that we experience (Husserl), or by thematising those aspects of 'Being' that cannot be verbalised directly (Heidegger), both types of reflection have roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition quite incompatible with the purely *inner*worldly interpretation of *empiricism*. For Sartre and post-war French philosophy, this had both an epistemological and a political aspect: *epistemologically* it enabled the historicisation of what would otherwise remain a purely *abstract* opposition between 'object' and 'subject'; *politically* it enable a defense of individual subjectivity and autonomy in the face of Marxist-Leninist dogma. But whatever it is that we mean when we say that the 'hic et nunc' is unique, ineffable, demanding of us an existential decision in which 'everything is put on the line' - it has nothing to do with a quite *separate* set of associations coming to us from classical (Epicurian, Stoic) sources: that nature is eternal, and that the 'things in it' have - like this (cyclical) nature

151 c.f. k-o. apel: erklären-verstehen Kontroverse.
152 Konrad Lorenz: Gestaltwahrnehmung xxxxxxxx

thus conceived - attributes that are themselves timeless. Regarded from that *first* perspective, the 'hic et nunc' forces us into a reflection about personal and collective *identity*; regarded from the *second* perspective, that selfsame 'hic et nunc' is there for us to be treated as facts and causal processes in need of *scientific research*. Approaching those cups and pens from the *Sartrean* perspective means - with Heidegger - to use them as a reminder of the sheer ineluctability (fatefulness, mortality) of our existence; to approach from an *analytic* perspective means putting them under the microscope, describing their attributes, qualities, origins, and how they are manufactured.

It means that Turner invests in those cups and pens two very different sets of associations: a *phenomenological* one (inconceivable without a half-forgotten Judeo-Christian heritage) dealing with *identity* (forcing us to confront our mortality, 'geworfenheit', a world we did not choose to 'enter', which we 'witness' during that remarkably short span between our birth and death); and a *scientific* ('analytic') one, which leaves the conventional (Cartesian) subject/object distinction intact.[153] The *first* can be invoked against Marxist-Leninists demanding - through the barrel of a gun - political obedience, the *second* against 'idealists' reducing politics and civil war to a quietistic 'vita contemplativa'. *My* subjectivity, *my* 'project' on the one hand, empirical reality on the other. It's the palpable political utility of this argumentation - under the specific conditions of the by no means very cold 'Cold War' - that's at the same time the impediment to an understanding of 'dialectic' in both Hegel and Marx.

Both are purely 'in the mind', hence this is 'idealism' in the Anglo sense, as something supposedly divorced from 'the real world'. It's on these grounds that Turner abandons Kant and Hegel for Sartre. 'Radical', in SA, would never get beyond abstract (increasingly fundamentalist) *subjectivity* here, abstract *objectivity* there. A dualism represented by Sartre and Althusser.[154]

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It's the imputation of the *meaninglessness* of all metaphysics - including everything to do with the Arts, with 'Bildung' and culture, right up to and including Philosophy itself - that's contained in that sentence of Russell

153 'Processing' them under the 'quasi-transcendental' perspective of teir potential *manipulability*, in the Habermasian terminology.

154 Mearleau-Ponty: rigid opposition between objectivity and subjectivity.

that would not, but for this connotation, have enjoyed the lavish attention it has enjoyed ever since: "the cat sat on the mat." It's a pointer to an attitude as imbedded in the British Positivism of a century ago, as it was in the Leninism of the same period: if you're not talking about the *real* world, then you're an *idealist*, a thaumaturge, a believer in fairies. It's the same robust realism that's already there in *Engels*, which is the reason why, from Lukács onwards, it's the relationship *between* Marx and Engels, the whole question of the relationship of Marx to Hegel, that becomes so pivotal in the controversy over the meaning of 'dialectic'. In the English-speaking world, empiricism led to the denunciation of everything not 'evidence-based' or 'grounded in experience', to a serious vulgarisation in Psychology and Anthropology (extending to a great deal of the same in the social sciences generally), but this had nothing on the *Marxist* debates of the thirties. The 'Positivist Dispute' of the sixties showed how sensitive these issues still were, a generation later, but in the West, at least, what you risked was 'merely' the loss of research funding, not your life. The DSM[155] killed Psychology, the reputation of Psychoanalysis, but it left the psychoanalysts themselves in peace. Once 'reality' means the Leninist 'reflection of base and superstructure' - everything 'innerworldly' being tied, *by definition*, to the 'historical mission' of the proletariat and its CP vanguard - every *critique* of this was 'proof' of treason and hence 'objectively' a capital offence.[156] (The South African version of this is the now seriously divisive campaign against 'white capitalists' and 'genocidal colonialists'.) The same Lukács we were reading so avidly in Durban had just barely escaped the purges that swallowed most of the Bolshevik old guard, exemplified by Bucharin[157], before in the end reaching Trotsky himself.[158]

'Contradiction', in the entire Kant to Hegel tradition, concentrates on the discrepancy between my individual life-span on the one hand, eternity on the other - the 'discovery' of which, adumbrated as much in the 'Adamitic' faiths as in the Greek classics, was one of the great advances of civilization. To have a 'soul' is to be aware of the fragility and contingency of life, part of the realisation that what we do 'in' it is judged and determined by a legislative authority we can try to understand, assuage, propitiate, defy, chal-

155 *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, put out by the American Psychiatric Association.

156 Kentridge: Bucharin!!!!

157 Radek, Negt, Left-wing deviationism, Grundrisse.

158 Merleau-Ponty: at the end of his life Trotsky xxxxxxxx There's an 'old guard' in the ANC, the 'struggle stalwarts', many of whose members will no doubt be reading up on Russia during the show trials, wondering about where SA in now heading.

lenge, obey, flee, 'presuppose' - but never control. To be aware of the 'dialectic', in *this* tradition, is to take into account the 'facts of life': which is that it is always precarious, lived in the face of uncertainty, danger, the fear of dissolution and the bodily frailties. *Such* an understanding of ourselves, 'translating' this into our daily lives and practices, being *conscious* of this, has long been regarded as the highest aspiration that humanity can aspire to, and that it is at same time a necessary precondition for a pacified polity. It's the basis for Kant's *Zum Ewige Frieden*. The Western intellectual ideal, at least since Descartes and Spinoza, has been such a 'transparency' towards the Self and its own 'ultimate grounds', culminating in a 'Subject' capable, at the highest level of consciousness, of 'living' a dialectic of freedom and necessity that it can 'recognise' but never *escape*. Since Descartes' *semel in vita funditus denuo*[159], the 'self' becomes intransitive: it dispenses with the 'other', replacing 'transcendental grounding' with reflection on one's personal *biology*.

But Hans Blumenberg, invoking that same tradition, focusses on an entirely different aspect of this, the difference between *doing* something and *understanding* something. *Like* German Idealism, the starting point is the discrepancy between eternity, as a collective 'project', 'sub species aeternitatis', and the necessity of organising knowledge, in the widest sense, in such a way that the constraints imposed by the 'gap' between an individual life-span and the 'totality' - between 'subject' and 'object' -, can be 'factored in' so that the intergenerational *transmission* of knowledge becomes possible; 'willed' by no-one, yet embodied by a material culture that precedes our birth and persists after our death. But artefacts, those 'cups and pens', are 'obvious' not so much in their *existence* - what Empiricism has always held up as 'proof' of its doctrine of metaphysical *realism* - as our ability to *use* them without knowing anything of their *production*. After Marx this would become the starting point for a classification of knowledge-systems, historically, 'species-wide', according to the relationship of social groups towards the productive process, analysed in the first instance from the point of view of the *institutionalised injustice* built into such 'class systems'. We focus our attention on the *commodity-character* of those cups and pens because of our interest in naming (and shaming) what it is that is *unjust* about the patterns according to which those commodities are selectively 'consumed' - and in doing so we presuppose the Marxist attitude towards science and technology, which is to regard them as inherently *neutral*. The 'forces of production', according to Marx, are there for the exploi-

159 Hans Blumenberg: *Wirklichkeiten*, p. 41.

tation of nature, are 'God-given', and that's a human right from which all benefit. Is that the last word on science and technology?[160] It's the basis for the insistence, from Marx onwards, that *studying economics* is both *managerial knowledge* and a study of the necessity/inevitability of the revolution; the basis for the doctrine that it's an analysis of 'work' - production, the history and current practice of how we manipulate things and processes for our collective benefit - that is the key to an understanding of 'life on this planet'. 'Historical materialism' (Engels' term) is both a study of the class system and a politics of 'transforming' society in the direction of justice for all.

But there's an aspect to those cups and pens that we overlook. In using these words we've long since forgotten the context in which, long ago, we originally learnt them. This is not the same as learning what they 'denote', since there's always a gap between personal associations and dictionary definitions - a difference which Wittgenstein later regarded as essential enough for him to renounce his own *Tractatus* as 'positivism'. But this insistence on the *genetic* aspect of knowledge, concentrating on either the phylo- or ontogenetic part of our process of 'learning' something, is itself too much fixated on the subjective side of things. The element of *habituation* in our use of words doesn't only involve that aspect of *cliché*-formation, of fixed formulas and pat phrases which has so occupied the psychologists probing the origins of *prejudices*; it also covers the aspect of taking their *existence for granted*. Like in a still-life, they've become 'part of the furniture'. As *objects*, there's nothing about them that reminds of either the mental or material effort involved in their production. Marx would call this their 'fetish'-character, and would turn the 'consciousness-raising' process whereby we remind ourselves of the intellectual and material resources that had once gone into their creation into a political movement for social justice. But 'fetish' is a term from Frazer's anthropology, it doesn't really cover that aspect which Hans Blumenberg, following Husserl, calls the "pathology of technology". *Once created, we take their use and their existence for granted*, we fit them unquestioningly into what we want and what we do. *This* aspect of those cups and pens has little to do with the way Empiricism invokes them to 'prove' metaphysical Realism - and everything to do with the way in which it's become impossible to 'uncreate' them, let alone 'forget' the skills that went into their creation.

It's comparable to Max Weber's concern in the *Protestant Ethic*: trade and industry are collective enterprises, they depend on elements of trust, le-

160 Habermas: *Arbeit und Interaktion*.

gality, public governance coming from a morality and and ethics - a 'symbolic universe' - which in *itself* is foreign to trade and industry, cannot - as later generations have had to learn to their cost - be *derived* from the latter. What metaphysical Realism created was a lattice on which all subsequent generations could build ever more sophisticated (and desireable) products - which could be *used* or invoked while dispensing with the mental and material preconditions for their creation. Is a world in which everything can be subjected to a 'methodology', in which a universalised 'means-ends' logic replaces everything that once 'gave meaning' to our existence, a world that can still be *pacified*? If this is the question that preoccupied the Austrian school of economics[161], it was the question of 'colonialism' - ie. the integration of the colonies of the European powers into their respective domestic economies -, what the socio-political consequences of this would be, that of course preoccupied the intellectuals of the Third World, and nowhere less intensely than in South Africa. If socio-political stability was already an issue in *Capitalist* countries, as the Weimar intellectuals were beginning to appreciate, then this held 'a fortiori' for the colonies - which had known that 'Protestant Ethic' of Max Weber's only from its most intolerant and repressive aspects.

The import of hi-tech consumer and other goods (the production of which presuppose material and educational conditions far beyond anything the government is capable of providing), results in an ever-widening gap between 'life-world' and 'system' (to use Habermas's terminology), between an 'ideology' of material equality and 'transformation' on the one hand, a system of governance incapable of actually *delivering* on any of the promises that keep it in power on the other. Since few in government seem able even to understand this, it's a 'gap' that expresses itself first in trade-, then in currency imbalances, then in increasing social tensions - as demographic pressures, refugee streams, unemployment, rising crime levels, ever-fiercer competition amongst 'cadres', deteriorating service delivery, leads to an ever-fiercer and ever more violent demagogy at the level of public discourse - to today's 'fallism' -, which in turn undermines the real economy as much from the 'life-world' side as the lack of governance does at the 'systems' side.

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161 Leading directly to Horkheimer's *Critique of Instrumental Reason* xxxx

'a' causes 'b'. It's implied in those cups and pens and clocks: objects *in* time and space; if the cup falls it breaks, if the pen is empty it doesn't write. Transfer this epistemic attitude - this 'cause-effect' thinking - (replete with its 300-year Anglo rejection of all 'transcendental' arguments, all 'a priori'), to the next type of objects: 'capitalism causes poverty'. Nothing simpler: abolish it, and poverty transforms into plenitude, peace, eternal bliss. Add 'white', and one has the demonology now beginning to get its grip on South African politics.

Cups and pens. The point about this 'sense perception' approach to *objects* is: how does one get from here to *moral judgements*,[162] to practical decisions in the 'here and now', to our reactions to injustice, violence. Turner, in the end opts for Sartre and Marcuse, i.e. for the utopian, the voluntaristic option, even if this involves a line of reasoning that gets him further and further away from those cups and pens. But his reasons for constantly returning to this *empirical* base-line may also be sought elsewhere: the 'class theory' being taught at English universities.

What was so *difficult*, in Europe during the sixties, to appreciate that the core of the *Marx* debates consisted in the *anti-dogmatic*, anti-*totalitarian* aspect, the recovery of autonomy, moral integrity, an unequivocal rejection of terror and those who trivialised it? A 'remoralisation' after so much war and destruction? There's no doubt that that is what the South African Marxists from Bram Fischer to Cronin, Turner, Slovo and First also believed that it was what they'd found, what they were striving for. Turner's capitulation in the face of Kant and Hegel - for that is what it is - has something of the somnambulistic about it. "Consciousness is not what it is and is what it is not." He repeats this several times, he's intrigued by the anti-empiricist aspect to it: those cups and pens have something about them that is *illusory*, deeply paradoxical. The injustice, exploitation, anger, structural violence - that clearly was *not* illusory. But perhaps it's the very 'logic' that claims simply solutions that's illusory? (He cannot, he does not do the necessary - if one wants to understand Philosophy: abandon that 'cogito'.[163])

This notion of truth and objectivity - the natural science or causal-analytic or nominalist view of the world - has been in collision with a much older one that was never entirely replaced: the one that conceives the world as a battle between good and evil, between 'us' and 'them', between victims and perpetrators, heroes and devils. ('We' the victims, 'they' the per-

162 history of 'theoria', Husserl, Habermas's postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interests*!!!!

163 Herrschaft des Subjekts. (Schmidt.)

petrators.) The student movement that swept the West during the sixties (whatever its *self*-conception) was, for all that, the expression of a Manicheanism going back to pre-modern times, and like this it had a relationship to violence marked by narcissistic denial, grandiosity, and the cult of the 'struggle hero'. One gleans something of the sheer ancienty of this attitude by reading up what Max Weber had to say about the mentality of the ancient *prophets*.[164]

In many ways Turner is here on the dividing-line between two major streams of Western thought, and if the circumstances had been different this will not have escaped his attention. Freedom and autonomy can mean the autonomy gained by freedom *from* the passions (Freud: freedom from *id*-forces) or freedom *to choose* one's own 'ends', also, and particularly, *politically*. That the two are not mutually exclusive (one can't be an autonomous agent in the second sense without presupposing the *first*) doesn't mean one can't keep them analytically distinct. What is 'radical' about Kant here is that - following Spinoza and Jacobi - freedom *from* the passions can be achieved by the exercise of reason - 'enlightenment' in the sense of registering, in a process of *subjective* reflection, how the psyche 'mirrors and shapes' the world.

In *this* text, Turner's point of departure is *empiricism*, or, if one prefers: the natural sciences. It's what makes the *dialectic of nature* the most incisive part of this text, that part which probes what it is about the *natural sciences altogether* that make their epistemology so problematic. (Not of course their real-world *effects*.) In this respect Turner gets rather close to what, within Analytic Philosophy, marks the point at which the *later* Wittgenstein shifts his attention away from the 'ontology of the factual' to the *new* awareness that our language-use *itself* already presupposes those selfsame 'a priori' structures which in Kant and Hegel had been analysed phenomenologically rather than linguistically. (In *The Eye of the Needle*, on the other hand, the framework is explicitly *utopian*, perhaps even, as some have read him: *faith-based*.)

Had he lived, we would have argued about what in Habermas are called 'stances', and how these relate back to the real world of politics. (For that's the crux of Turner's 'critique of idealism': philosophy is not an end in itself.)

The point about those *economic* analyses which Turner (and so many of the intellectuals of those years) regards as so essential for an objective understanding of the 'present as history' is that *in* them, in this economic ma-

164 "Der Teufel der ist alt, werde alt ihn zu verstehen."

terial, there were themes that remain unintelligible for as long as that empiricism/voluntarism duo that's projected into it remains as something *abstract*, not *itself* reflected.[165] The fact/value 'dichotomy' - standard fare in every *Economics I* and *Philosophy I* - remains a cliché for as long as that dimension in Hegel and Marx which is dismissive of 'mere subjectity' is neither noticed nor taken seriously. Turner ends his deliberations at that point at which a serious discussion of 'dialectics' in the sense of Hegel and Marx would *start*: cups and pens *here*, my subjective ability to comprehend their 'meaning' *there*. 'A'=A.

Considering the chasm that opened up between Continental and Anglo-saxon intellectuals on this issue after the war, it's worth simply naming what it was - from the *Continental* view - that was at stake. At the *theoretical* level it wasn't just that Existentialism and Phenomenology were reactions to established CPs in France and Italy that made obedience and acceptance of innerparty mechanisms and procedures the condition for membership. For far beyond that, it set the parameters for what it was that was to be understood under 'objectivity', 'science' and 'truth'. For what it was, in other words, that was to be understood under 'scientific research' *at all*. In France and Italy (perhaps also in South America), this had an aspect of *democratising* the Marxist-Leninist parties, and doubtlessly played a role in the increasingly independent stance (starting with Tito in Yugoslavia) displayed by the Eurocommunists with regard to the USSR. In what was then the Federal Republic of Germany the situation was quite different: the problem was not so much - as it was in France - the democratisation of the CP (which in any case was illegal in the FRG), as the democratisation of a population that had been (mis)shaped by twelve years of Nazi tyranny. Since this was taking place in a European heartland that had once nurtured the Reformation and the Enlightenment, the *historical* associations led to a much 'deeper' history than it did in France: German Idealism, going back to Goethe, Hegel and Humboldt, was after all still present in the *libraries* - if not in the (thoroughly demoralised) spirit of the post-war generation.[166] It brought with it an invocation of 'deep time' reaching back much further than the rationalism of the (neo)Jacobins, and their peremptory (dictatorial) demand for 'practice' (and revolutionary transformation) *now*. It meant releasing, upon those cups and pens, a 'philosophy of reflection' that hadn't been purged of its Christian, Greek and Jewish origins, and wasn't as tightly strapped into the empiricist/positivist straightjacket as were the An-

165 Kojève: xxxx quote

166 c.f. my "Adorno - Werk und Wirkung. Zum 100. Geburtstag" link:xxxxxxxx

glo-Saxon countries. (Though Cartesianism in France - from Comte and Durkheim through to Althusser - was real enough, and in many ways no less 'dogmatic' than its Anglo counterpart.) In Germany at any rate pointed reminders of the erstwhile seducibility of organised labour to Nazi overtures during Weimar[167] helped marginalise that part of the Student body susceptible to revolutionary rhetoric coming from both East Berlin and Paris. '68' in Frankfurt was a very different affair from the events on the Rive Gauche, that would subsequently be discussed under the same label.[168] And by the same token: Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas are not intelligible from within an epistemology that understands under 'practice' something very different from what *Marcuse* was making of it at Berkeley and then later at Brandeis. What is it, in those cups and pens, that's the 'other' of empiricism?[169] That part of the 'concept' that is, as it were, 'anti'-conceptual, 'pre-predicative', a world of 'paleo'-symbols that *precedes* our everyday logic and 'rationalisations'?

To understand the log-jam he never managed to break, it's necessary to retrace some of the steps that led from 17th Century *natural law* to empiricism's cult of *the laws of nature* two centuries later. It leads, like so much else in the history of Europe - via Descartes and Spinoza - to what the French Revolution came to make of doctrines that had originally been fêted as the liberation of of individual autonomy from clerical tutelage and 'feudalism'. (And then the British reaction to *that*, in the course of the 19th Century.) In effect, this means retracing the changing attitude, over the centuries, towards the relationship between *values* and *realities*.[170] The initial attitude to the 'hic et nunc', which since Plato had after all been dismissed as mere 'doxa' (before we even start, consciously, to try to make sense of our 'experiences') has nothing to do with what would - millenia later - be called 'realism'.[171] Spinoza, who was writing his *Ethics* at about the time Jan van Riebeeck set out - for the good burghers of Amsterdam - to establish a victualing station at the Cape of Storms, combines Greek ideas concerning the timeless validity of 'objective laws' with Christian and Hebrew notions of a 'vita contemplativa' capable of creating tranquility and

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167 Löwenthal - Dubiel - it saved our lives

168 Though its rhetoric was sufficient to destroy the tentative commonalities being established between German and Israeli students. (Diner, Brumlik.)

169 K.H. Haag: the unique, the ineffable, the 'concrete'?

170 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, p. 226.

171 Martin Jay seems to me xxxxxx in his xxxx to miss this central point about Horkheimer and Adorno.

peace of mind 'within'.[172] One can emphasise, in Spinoza, either the stoic[173] or the liberal elements[174] (which would come to have such a global impact via the French Revolution and then the American War of Independence), but what earned him the undying enmity of his contemporaries (and the eternal gratitude of liberals ever since), was that *both* doctrines dispensed with ecclesiastic authority. Spinoza, with Hamlet, has been called the 'first individual' not because he would subsume 'values' under 'realities' - as the Darwinists in England would be doing from Huxley onward - but because of a 'Jacobs-ladder' going the other way: the 'ens realissimum' is not *in* those cups and pens but derived in a series of steps that only *start* in that 'experience'.

'Class'. The term could be used *empirically* - as main-stream sociology was doing - and then semantically linked to 'change'. Since no-one could seriously question that industrialisation was affecting large parts of the population - even large parts of the continent -, one could hone this line of argumentation *against* the two schools of thought that had taken hold of European and US academic discourse: that racism was something 'psychological' (a matter of irrational *prejudice*), and that the usual 'stage' theory of economics (according to which trade and growth, 'market forces', would *automatically* herald democratisation) was short-sighted. This is what Webster and Erwin mean when they argue that liberalism is an *ideology*.[175] This argument did not abandon the 'change' orientation of Rostow, McDowd in the least - what the 'critique of liberalism' meant *here*, in Erwin and Webster, is a still *higher* form of empiricism and 'change', namely that of the economy or the world 'as a whole'. This 'higher' form of empiricism treats industrialisation as a global 'phenomenon' - as the terminology goes -, and then takes over the Comintern classification of the twenties:

> Barrington Moore ... suggests that it is possible to identify three different paths to industrialisation: the 'bourgeois democratic' path of England, France and the United States; the 'fascist' path of Germany and Japan; and the 'socialist' path of Russia and China. We would like to suggest a fourth, the path of peripheral capi-

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172 Horkheimer on Thomasius and Acquinas: gaining inner composure - Spinoza's Stoicism! - in the face of the passions. Deus absconditus. The Plague, the Mongol invasions, the fall of Byzantium, the Lisbon earthquake.

173 Through to Nietzsche, Freud, Ebeling, Blumenberg

174 As Jonathan Israel has done.

175 Alec Erwin, Eddie Webster (1977): *Change reform and Economic Growth in South Africa* (ed. Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster), p. 91.

> talism, with its form being determined by the settler origins of South Africa's development.'[176]

Then comes the *left* functionalism so typical of those years. It's not just *possible* to study history 'as a whole' from the economic history perspective, but there's no reason why this approach should not *replace historiography altogether*; i.e. there's no reason why one *shouldn't* collapse historiography into economic history. Science, reason, economic history *are one*, and taken together they point ineluctably to 'change' and a better future. It's clear that once the above classification is accepted the value-judgements contained in the labels - premisses that are no-where examined or justified - become the unseen stowaways. 'Fascist' industrialisation is 'obviously' bad, 'socialist' dito obviously good, 'bourgeois democratic' obviously dicey.

What is it an ideology *of*?

* * * *

Innes[177]: what was it about 'Manchester capitalism' two hundred years ago that to this day makes *one* meaning of 'objective contradiction' *so* incontrovertible that the 'method' underlying it has remained valid? An analysis of the 'forces of production' (*one* side of that 'objective contradiction') is after all just another way of saying that the economy of a country - or some larger geographic unit, all the way to today's *global* economy - is to be analysed with the methods of what are usually called 'scientific'. That's what 'political economy' in Ricardo was meant to express: where does the wealth of nations come from, how is this created and distributed. No doubt 'industrial revolution' has in the intervening centuries become too clichéd for the modern ear to really hear any longer - in that term - what it was about

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176 Erwin/Webster, op. cit., p. 91.

177 The difference between an ordinary logical contradiction and an *objective* one can only be identified, in Innes-type studies, if there's something *in* that material being studied that can be show to 'transcend' it, as something *non*-empirical, *non*-factual. Since for empiricism *everything* can be treated as a 'fact', that seems to leave, as the only possibility, *values*. But since the copy theory of truth, in its (orthodox) Marxist version, dismisses of all moral and theological considerations as a rationalisation for domination and colonialism - mere 'ideology' - Innes is forced to do what according to his own notion of materialism is anathema: justifying it with *a priori* arguments. Alfred Schmidt would formulate it thus: that what the 'scientific' Marxists - starting with Engels - had taken over from British empiricism was that something *in* the world gets turned into a *causa finalis*. (Post/Schmidt: *Was ist Materialismus?*, p. 51.) It would be on this point that the *reflexion* Marxists - starting with Lichtheim - would rebel.

the way in which the mechanical augmentation of the merely 'human' muscle- and brain-power of the artisan of the late Middle Ages that was so 'revolutionary' - from the point of view of those contemplating the Spinning Jenny or the first 'locomotives'.[178] To this day the windmills of the 'Zaanstreek' north of Amsterdam are a reminder of what it had been about the *mechanical augmentation* of the muscle- and horse-power that led to undisputed European and then world domination in the period 1599 (Dutch war of independence - victory of 'Orange' over Spain) to 1914, when it all self-destructs. One merely has to see, in action, a wind-driven saw-mill, flour-mill, water-pump, tannery, forge, in action to appreciate that neither human muscle- nor horse-power would ever again be able to compete with what the unprecedented effects of technological innovation on the 'forces of production' from this point onwards. What makes this single term 'Produktivkräfte' so incontrovertible is that it describes a 'species'-event with planetary and then irreversible consequences: mass production for a market. Driven by science, technology, innovation - and the profit motive. 'Objective contradiction' *here* means, becoming *aware*, simply at the level of ordinary historiography, that there's no society, country, continent or political class anywhere capable of resisting what had started in a few very localised areas of Europe (Lisbon, Amsterdam, then London) and has not stopped 'globalising' ever since. Mass production, trade, wage-labour, and *money*, permeating everything. It's a dynamic which Marx and Engels first analyse in Manchester, Liverpool the English Midlands, before spreading to the rest of Europe, then the rest of the world.

Scientific Marxism has in common with the 'objective science' movement in the US its elision of the functionalist and the constitutive meanings of the word 'contradiction' in Hegel and Marx. At the epistemological level it means jettisoning all those aspects of 'theory' that are *non*-instrumental, and that are hostile to all the *reflection* aspects that have been contained in this term since Kant. *Politically* this hence runs parallel to those aspects of '68' which understands - under 'radical' or 'critical' - a neo-romantic (irrationalist) rejection of theory in favour of 'experience in the here and now', of the 'hic et nunc'. (Now stripped of all *transcendental* aspects.)[179]

What the functionalism of both the right (FR) and the left (FL) have in common is the most ubiquitous thing of all: the straightforward, unproblematic, unquestioned notion of *causation*. At the highest level of

178 Needham, Witfogel.
179 Woodstock, Steal this book, Personality cult, Culture of Narcissism.

abstraction it's Parson's (in the SA context: v.d. Berghe's) integration of causation in the sense of the biological sciences. A system can become destabilised, a society or even a world can slide towards breakup and disintegration, empires can fall, the atmosphere of a planet can burn up or evaporate, but there's still a 'viewer' or an 'observer' or an 'agency' there capable of 'taking it all in', of describing the process and perhaps learn something from it for the benefit of posterity. Parsons had integrated a great deal from Max Weber, his 'pattern of action' - as he called it -, integrated the *subjective* side into the equation, but it was not something that at any stage could undermine this notion that *scientific objectivity* is capable of registering it all with Olympian equanimity. 'Independent of all subjectivity'. This was 'apolitical' in the specific sense that 'society' or 'politics' was not a proper area of endeavour for the social scientist thus defined. RF is *bureacratic*, no state can possibly function without some personel and theories capable of representing a 'whole' - of organisations, institutions, in such a way that impediments to its proper functioning can be identified and remedied - from hospitals, armies, economies. From psychiatrists treating trauma-patients to police on an anti-crime campaign to 'Psyop'-operatives trying to win 'hearts and minds', a straightforward, 'ahistorical', notion of *causation* is the prerequisite. 'Because'-type statements have this "character of implicit generality"[180], and it's a generality that does not require any *moral* commitment - let alone *practical solidarity* - on the part of the scientist.

That can't be said of the *other* type of 'causation'-thinking that would start with Lenin and spread through Africa - and most other places - after WWII. 'Colonialism', like - 'capitalism' - is an identifiable *entity*, but the notion of causation *here* implies (explicitly presupposes) that *in* or associated with that objective entity there are *states of consciousness* that are themselves in a process of change. This startling reversal of a dualism of Western thought that since Descartes has been the basis of everything we regard as the triumphs of modernity - science, technology, medicine - has a very specific historical moment, and it is not at all well-understood in the West. Rage - like the rest of what in psychoanalysis is called 'primary process thinking' - is not easy to talk about, since 'talking' already presupposes an 'ego' capable of *sublimating* them. *Talking* about rage, lust, fear, horror, degredation, humiliation, cruelty, murder is an activity - obviously a very old one -, that stands in a peculiarly 'un-empirical' relationship to what it is that the dialogue is *about*: our 'amour propre', our 'composure',

180 Singer, quoted in Wellmer: "Eine Kantische Exposition" in: *Ethik und Dialog* p. 15.

depends on our ability not *depict* but to *sublimate*, i.e. to 'deny' what it is that's just been touched upon. [181] This 'sublimatory' aspect of language has been the central characteristic of what was called civilization or culture or 'character' right through to the 20th Century[182], and one can still admire those practicing this dying art in the work of e.g. Mathew Arnold, right through to George Steiner, many contemporary writers. A 'real presence', for Steiner,l is not a cup or a pen - so beloved of the positivists of a century ago - but the palpable realisation of something that is not 'real' in the post-Cartesian notion of the word at all, but in a much older meaning. An 'Other' still indicates - through to Levinas and that part of the 'dialectical' tradition managing to resist romantic vulgarisation - something, carrying with it attributes of agency, that *transcends* our individual lives, that provides us with our sense of 'transpersonal' eternity. As anyone who has studied Lacan knows, this is both 'rationally explicable' and yet at the same time not something that it impossible to 'shake off' or 'objectify': every 'ego' depends - for its inner sense of 'balance', composure, its 'poise', 'equilibrium', its ability to navigate social space, its 'everyday life' with other people -, on that symbiotic, 'pre-logical', pre-rational, pre-conscious phase we all went through and then subsequently 'repressed'. That symbiotic phase of 'one-ness' with our mothers or 'significant others'. It's the *lack* of what the Lacanians call the 'mirror phase' - some terrible event during childhood that once got in the way of that 'one-ness' with the mother -, that's been identified as the cause of what nowadays is called trauma.

What the Leninists 'achieved' - if that's the right word for it - is to learn the 'methods' of *social rage* production, i.e. to 'turn around' that civilisational aspect, that *cultural* aspect of language.[183] It's one possible explanation for what it is about thuggery (nowadays: terrorism) that is so

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181 Steiner: *Death of Tragedy*. Dresden xxxx

182 Horkheimer has the fascinating notion that we don't really understand the central dogmas of Christianity if we don't understand *this* aspect thereof: that Christianity is a methodology for detoxifying the *passions*: xxxxxxx

183 That's one reason why political demagogy has been called 'reverse' psychoanalysis. Where the latter aims at a stoic acceptance of past injuries suffered, a 'bringing into consciousness' of the fragmented 'split-off' relics of a long-distant outrage, the demagogue does the opposite: hell-fire and damnation are preached as directly ahead, about to overwhelm and destroy us. The 'fragmentation' of the psyche which results from this turns the hearer into a childlike worshipper of aggression - what Anna Freud once terms 'identification with the agressor'. Studies of professional agitators, Communist or Nazi, have all emphasised this aspect of 'infantilisation' combined with hatred and aggression. One of the studies of the SS: they were mostly young men from rural backgrounds, bucolic, unlettered.

'stupid' - a criminal, says Adorno somewhere, is an 'ego without an ego', someone who lacks poise, some 'one' for whom the collective superego, the collectivity, acts directly upon the 'id', lacking all 'mediation'. Those 'milk-faces' staring at us from the crime and terrorism websites all over the world are 'all the same', the 'embodiment' of what Golding saw coming in *Lord of the Flies* - that the 'barbarians' we've been waiting for, when they're at the gates, will bear the faces of lost and angry children. Our *own*, before we lost our innocence and self-righteousness.[184]. 'Acting out' their rage at whatever target-group currently *en vogue*, each encapsulated in his/her narrow self-righteousness, unable to shake off the old tribal loyalities. I.e. long before, in the *South African* context, we can even begin to examine the specific meanings of 'colonialism of a special type', it's necessary to deal with this very new type of 'discourse', so utterly different from everything that had gone before, this new type of culture based not on the *sublimation* but rather on the *arousal* of instinct. A 'levelling' of an ago-old 'non-identity', going back to Greek and Christian origins, between subject and object.

'Objectivity' during those years meant two things running parallel to one another: a faithful and painstaking documentation of the socio-political-economic forces spelling out the end of (white) democracy and the rule of law, and a last defence of the 'Open Society' against its enemies. If one understands under 'class war' what it had originally been meant to designate, conflicting 'ideologies' put at loggerhead to one another as a result of wealth disparaties, is the way it's increasingly being fought out not at the level of *economics*, as one would expect, from parties on the Left, but at the level of *race*. The ideal, during the sixties and seventies, in the social sciences, was scientific objectivity, and to achieve this, it was widely recommended that the *natural sciences* should act as model. Science is measurement, observation, documentation, hypothesis-testing, and progress was held to be a matter of integrating all the varioius areas of study into an overarching 'unified field' - the way Physics and mathematics had been integrated. One result of this was the considerable attention paid to *methodology*, and to methodological controversies - often to the real detriment of substance. In Sociology (but also in Anthropology, parts of Psychology) it was above all functionalism that held sway.

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184 RWJ: White self-righteousness. Reemtsma: that strange realisation, akin to the meaning of 'Nachträglichkeit' in Freud, that we did was *wrong*. Albie Sachs: "I heard he went home and wept for a week."

But in this functionalism there were two aspects, and they were already manifest during those years; or perhaps out should say: they were already in the process of going their separate ways. The functionalism of a Comte or a Durkheim could regard the objective world as something with which they were fully 'identified' as *scientists*, engaged with themes that were of general and even universal import. Not so social science during the sixties and seventies. Social scientists were increasingly confronted with with societies (even: 'the world altogether') that had become dysfunctional altogether, that were collapsing before their eyes. The specifically *Marxist* trick was to declare collapse and decay as *progress*, as an *opportunity*.)

systems/life-world

In the *methodology* debates, Habermas associates 'life-world' with an *evolutionary* perspective, going back to the *origins of the species*. He does this in the context Analytic Philosophy, in the wake of Wittgenstein, Searle (also: Chomsky), speech-act theory, examining the *universal* aspects of speech and interaction. 'Objectivity' *here* means confronting Functionalism, Rationalism, 'reality' in the sense of the 'lived aprioris' we must perforce presuppose in uttering a 'p' that is acceptable to any alter-ego whatsoever as a basis for a *shared consensus*. There are profound differenfes between Habermas, Hans Blumenberg, Horkheimer und Adorno, many others, but they seldom articulate themselves outside of the philosophical literature, or even outside of the *German* philosophical literature. The *integrative* perspective advanced here can however be followed in a host of individual fields, starting with Anthropology, Psychology, Primate Communication studies, Climate Change, even: potentially, Physics.[185] An *integrative* perspective that becomes manifest, if we consider the differrence between 'objectivity' as a *stance*[186], and as respect for a *reality* 'outside' and in contradistinction to our subjective perception of it.

systems/life-world

That's a very different set of associations from the one invoked when systems/life-world is used *politically*. In *this* case, adopting the 'systems'-approach takes on the connotations of *acting strategically* against opponents who must be defeated, rather than as colleagues who could be persuaded. 'Life-world' *now* is used in a very *positive* sense, as the emotional-intellectual home of those combatting right-wing and authoritarian populism - by those speaking in the name of Social Democracy and the 'Left'. In the 'validity-claims' that we must of necessity invoke for speech-acts to be suc-

185 Hans Blumenberg xxxx
186 Grundeinstellung zur Welt

cessful *at all* - i.e. convince one or more alter-egos - Habermas sees the foundations for a critique of 'capitalism' - now understood as a system of 'systematically distorted communication' blocking our ability to understand the political process at all - in our ability to understand 'how it works'. One may object that this is a *politicisation* of Analytic Philosophy that is very far removed from its original *intent*, which had been to erect an intellectual-psychological barrier against Jacobinism (regarded with s much alarm by the early liberals), and especially its tendency to ground political judgement not in reason but in *affect*. But whatever the merits of the argument, what is clear is that 'foundation' in the sense of *personal insight* into those validity claims ('reflection' in the *personal* sense) and 'foundation' in the sense of the objective causes of the Brexit/Trump/four-degree-world now heading our way, invoke two quite *different* senses of 'reflection.'

Here's the point: 'decolonising the university', if one examines what is understood by this *in practice*, differs from what the Nazis called 'Gleichschaltung' only in the sense that what is meant by 'race' is a synonym for 'white', not for 'semitic'.

Turning Hegel 'on his head'

One could ask: what was it, about that 'Thesis Eleven', that 'putting Hegel on his head', or whatever it was the metaphor recommended, that made it, for so many subsequent generations basing their 'radicality' on it, so plausible? If one follows Löwith on this, it's not explicable without an account of the reasons why *Hegel's* 'system' had been deemed, by his contemporaries, so irrefutable that it could only be opposed 'in practice', and not at all 'in theory'. If today's radicals would the very last to accept the central terms of this literature - Christianity, then secularisaton - what one could do is ask after the origins of the ideas now collapsing higher education in SA aflame, quite literally. That the touch-stone of all moral and political wisdom - the fons et origo of 'practice' and policy - should lie with the working classes, with the poor, the unemployed, the colonized, the exploited and the oppressed, with the slighted and the aggrieved. In short: with those 'without a voice'. Rather obviously, what we're dealing with here is not just a *reality* - in the old sense that, as human beings, we have no choice but to 'relate to the world' in a way somewhere between the 'real' and the 'ideal' - but just as much the motivations of those claiming to be acting 'in the name' of that reality. 'Dialectic', in Hegel, is a lot easier to account for than it would later become for those who would claim that they had 'overcome' him and put him back on his feet. The dialectic of the real and the ideal had after all a pedigree as old as the 'Adamitic' monotheisms.

Where ‘pedigree’ already indicates something which the later, secularised versions of the dialectic would find much more difficult to make plausible: the dimension of *time*. Not in the chronological, the abstract sense, but in the sense that ‘being human’ means ‘living one’s life’ in the irrefutable knowledge of one’s own mortality. That ‘the world’ preceded our birth and will persist after our death. If by ‘freedom’ we mean a state of mind that has fully ‘taken onboard’ this reality, including the knowledge about ‘what it takes’ - in terms of our responsibilities towards the polity, the group, the collectivity - to make this ‘sojourn’ even halfway tolerable, then it becomes possible to write a *history* of freedom that understands itself as a *history of the consciousness of freedom*.[187] Before one demonises this in the name of the Eleventh Feuerbach-thesis, it’s worth casting a glance back at just what it was, about this supposedly ‘merely contemplative’ approach to history and historiography, that made it so plausible, in post-Napoleonic Europe, that it gave ‘dialectic’ the specific meaning it acquired in Hegel.

Cups and pens. ‘Urstiftung’.

Turner’s decision to invoke *sense perception* - in the midst of a crisis that was assuming *global*, and no longer just *European* dimensions -, had a double aspect to it. Sartre, following both Husserl and Heidegger, had sought in that ‘sense perception’ a key to what at the beginning of the century still presented itself as a *crisis of science and scholarship*, which is how it had been perceived on Continental Europe from the French Revolution onwards. In this context, invoking ‘sense experience’ is very different from the insistence, as both Russel and Popper had argued, that science is matter for experience, observation, falsifiability, and methodology. Something about that ‘theoretical stance’ *altogether* was losing its plausibility, leading to a ‘legitimation crisis’ that presented itself, to the neo-Kantians at the turn of the century (as it would again, sixty years later, in Habermas’s work) as a crisis in the *logic of the natural and social sciences*.

The foundational premisses of Parsons and the ‘unified science’ movement went back to Comte - modern society had replaced feudal absolutism, and if historiography had an residual purpose left at all, then this consisted in documenting the way in which science and technology had come to embody and represent the spirit of the age. Max Weber’s insistence that ‘history as a whole’ could not be studied without taking ‘subjetivity’ and ‘verstehen’ into account was duely noted, but Parsons opted for an anthropological *invariant* - the ‘structure of social action’ - so that at least in this one sense he was following the ‘positivists’. Was this a ‘theory’ in the ordi-

187 In Blumenberg’s terminology: “A history of immortality”.

nary sense, hence subject to arguments that sought *historical contextualisation*, or was 'functionalism' immune to this?[188] Scientific and systematic, 'objective', meant, in the South African situation, analysing the polity in terms of general sociological and economic realities - nothing *more*.

The foundational premisses of Marx (here leaving out of account the later controversies between 'scientific' and 'reflection' Marxists) were antithetical to such a 'logic of subsumption': *it* held that industrial society was an 'antagonistic unity of opposites', an 'objective contradiction', containing within it both the causes of its own chronic instability - both objective and subjective - with immiserisation, economic collapse as the inevitable result. On just what the *objective evidence* was (or even what this term could mean) there was serious disagreement from Engels onwards, but not that industrial societies raised issues of wealth and poverty that were not easily containable within 'democracy' traditionally conceived. The version of this which Turner brought back with him to SA was the one that roiled French intellectual circles after the war: are the 'dialectic' of nature and history *one*, or are they *different*? Few in the Anglo world - which took its philosophy from the natural sciences - appreciated just how much epistemology and politics were, in those years, interconnected vessels.

The crisis of the sciences is, at the same time, a crisis of the unversities, of public morals, and a crisis of politics. However obvious this now is for SA, however obvious this was at the time of the Turner/Biko discussions forty years ago, that's not the same as *understanding* what it is that we regard as 'obvious'. Turner returned to SA with a philosophy that had been 'radicalised' in (and from) two different directions. Sartre assimilated two distinctly different streams of German Idealism, and then integrated those in turn with his war-time experiences. The line going from Max Weber to Lukács was the result of a further *historicisation* of what had been, in Max Weber, in the first instance, a codification of *methodological principles* to be used in historical/sociological studies. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* already signalled in the title the problematic relationship between the empirical/theoretical and the historical, and that this was a 'problematic' that had become urgent in the need to find a response to *Marx*. But Lukács, with his background in literature and the *Geisteswissenschaften* (not to mention: the crisis of WWI) went back to a notion of 'dialectic' that no longer favoured the 'real' over the 'ideal', initiating what two world wars later would be called the 'humanistic' Marx, or the 'return to Hegel', or the 'critique of

188 Albert would resist vehemently the 'historical contextualisation' argument: xxxx Myth of total reason.

Marxist positivism'. It did at any rate operate with a notion of 'dialectic' that had two aspects to it that were new: it could find no convincing reason why the 'base' should be more substantial than the 'superstructure' (here *returning* to Hegel), and it had become *politicised*, which is what it *hadn't* been in Hegel. From now onwards epistemology, history of science, a study of the 'paradigm-shifts' accross the millenia, the 'archaeology of knowledge', 'reflection', the 'dialectic of base and superstructure', the 'history of the species', all this would be invested with two convictions: i) that everything is immediately *political*, and ii) that this expresses itself in *direct power-struggles*. (That is: Lukács had returned to Ruge and the 'Left Hegelians' of the 1830's[189]). This 'politicisation of epistemology' was something specifically 'Continental', in the sense that one would be hard put to name the British and then the US equivalents to figures like Lukács, Benjamin, or the Frankfurt School.[190] In many ways SA had followed the British model: public morality, the civic virtues, were a matter for the *Churches*, not for the *universities*. It meant that Turner, in university discourse, could tie into a 'narrative' that had little basis in *reality*: that Apartheid was 'the same' as the Holocaust, and that studying epistemology was a preparation for armed resistance againstd racism and fascism. It was in those years that a fateful alliance started to make its influence felt: US

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189 "Hegel glaubt nicht an die Majorität und haßt alle Wahl. Daran nicht glauben bedeutet aber für Ruge: nicht an den Geist (nämlich der Zeit) glauben! Stupid sei der Einwand, die Masse sei dumm und 'nur im Zuschlagen respektabel'. 'In wessen Namen schlägt sie denn zu, und wie geht es zu, daß sie nur im Namen des welthistorischen Geistes siegt? Wie geht es zu, daß das Zuschlagen der Massen sich weder 1789 noch 1813 als geistlos und die Majorität keineswegs als im Unrecht erwiesen haben? - Es ist ein totales Mißverständnis des Geistes und seines Prozesses, wenn man bei dem Satze stehen bleibt, philosophia paucis contenta es judicibus: im Gegenteil, die Wahrheit unterwirft die Welt in Masse ... De Wissenden werden mit ihrer Weisheit auf die Dauer nie von der Majoritität verlassen, und wenn die Verkündiger eines neuen Geistes anfangs in der Minorität sind und allenfalls .... untergehen, so ist ihnen der Beifall, ja die Überhebung ihrer Verdienste bei der Nachwelt nur um so gewisser ... Die Wahrheit der Majorität ist nicht die absolute, aber ist im Großen und Ganzen die Bestimmtheit des Zeitgeistes, die politische oder die historische Wahrheit; und wenn nur *ein* Individuum in einer Nationalversammlung das Wort des Zeitgeistes auszusprechen weiß (und darain wird es nie fehlen), so bleibt sicher allemal nur der Egoismus und die böswillige Caprice in der Minorität. Den relativen Irrtum teilt die Majorität mit dem historischen Geist und seiner Bestimmtheit überhaupt, die freilich von der Zukunft wiederum negiert zu werden sich nicht wehren kann.'" Löwith: *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, p. 101.

190 Whatever the virtues of Russell and Wittgenstein, it seems that in the Anglo world there never was - right upto Habermas's work - a concentrated effort to confront 'history of science' with *real* history, and hence give the terms 'evolution' *more* than just its *objective* meaning.

Garveyism's abstract moralism, reinforcing the 'Continental' strain of Left-Hegelianism. The two together cemented something into place that is now threatening governance not just in SA: 'identity politics's' contempt for constitutionalism, rule of law, due process.

This was a very different train of thought from the *other* tradition that Sartre assimilated no less assiduously, the one coming from phenomenology and especially from *Husserl*. This took its departure neither from the methodological travails of sociologists, economists, historians, nor from Marxist activism, nor from the crisis of WWI, but from a question that in about those same years expressed itself in Great Britain in the Russell/Wittgenstein debates about the *foundations of mathematics*. What do we mean when we say that '2+2=4' is *true*? It's easy enough to see how close this is to those cups and pens, and what it is that we 'really experience' when thinking about objects and numbers, and what it is that we mean when we say that we 'perceive' or 'understand' them. (Or how close all of this is to the topics discussed in Hegel's *Logik*.) There's both a *phenomenology* there and the question of where/how these 'acts of consciousness' *originate*, 'where they come from'.

In *Hegel*, 'dialectic' can be read as a sustained analysis of just what it is - in societies in which the private accumulation of capital remains unchecked - that will turn the 'rule of law' into its 'opposite', into a tyranny by the rich so complete that it's not just legality that turns into 'lawfare', but the very idea of 'theory' or 'truth' or 'objectivity' disappears, regressing to a more primitive mode of social integration, a return to ancient 'gnostical' hatreds, altogether. (To a 'new paganism', as Habermas once called it.) Just how, why, on the basis of what kind of information and dissemination technologies, was it possible for the Nazi's, after WWI, to *undermine the rule of law*? It's possible to read the 'revisionism' controversies of Weimar under this heading, since what was at issue was just what it is that we mean by 'law', starting off with: what's the basis for 'law-like' regularities of the empirical kind *altogether*. cups and pens.

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Politically (The Present as History)

As South Africa enters a post-Mandela, post-revolutionary 'politics of cold turkey' - with a failing economy, escalating racial tensions and an atmosphere beginning to smack of Weimar Germany - the question is, once again, 'how long will South Africa survive?' Whether the government will eventually be forced to accede to the dictates of the IMF, as some commentators expect, or - probably with much more dire consequences - have to take up Chinese or Russian bail-out loans, the present ANC-SACP-Cosatu Alliance is disintegrating. Inflation, tax rises, the end of US quantitative easing, junk status government bonds, a precipitous collapse of the Rand are all on the cards - with consequences that are not containable only to those currently *outside* of the Zuma patronage system. All this in a country with very little of the social security safety-net of more advanced economies. The metaphor R.W. Johnson uses is that of an enthusiastically cheering crowd, surging forward towards a line of soldiers: only those in the front line - the leadership - can see what's ahead, are pushing back for all they're worth, but are borne forward by a wildly cheering mass of humanity, oblivious and blind. It's the metaphor he uses to describe Gordhan's place in the current government: the latter knows full well that only sharp reductions in government spending is going to keep the rating agencies from turning South Africa into the next 'Greece', while knowing *just* as well that Zuma's strangle-hold on KZN - the 'Zulufication/Zanufication' of a great deal of the ruling party, public service, judiciary, army, police, parastatals -, is floating along on expenditures that have now become unsustainable. With no way of knowing just what form the inevitable push-back is going to take. Besides exchange rate, government debt, capital flight (typical 'Greece' indices) the barometers to watch are the EFF and the ANCYL - the first for the way in which the 60% (!) youth unemployment of the country expresses itself politically, the second for the level of inner-ANC support for Zuma. 'Transformation', 'white capitalists', 'Africa for Africans', 'Apartheid was genocide' 'cosmopolitans' provides the semantics along which a great deal of populist mobilisation in the country is taking place. The white minority, visibly more prosperous and skilled than the rest, is politically powerless - a situation reminiscent of the Jews a hundred years ago and similar situations in East Africa, Indonesia and elsewhere since. One doesn't really have to go back further than the Zulu-Indian Durban riots of 1949, or the de facto Inkatha/ANC civil war in the same province a generation later, to realize that in South African politics

not a lot of holds are barred. The toyi-toying going on in Senate House during the ‘feesmustfall’ campaign at Wits beginning 2016 seems to have gone off without overt violence, but the groundswell of anger and frustration is already searching, lava-like, for political expression. (The crime rate[191], service-delivery protests, farm murders, corruption scandals, xenophobia are all a measure of the national pulse.) The docility marking the last ANCYL annual conference - now entirely ‘White-’ and ‘Indian-free’ - suggests a mostly rural (Zulu?) constituency kept quiescent by the promise implied by the ‘transformation’ bit, while the receding mirage of middle-class security via state-funded education disappears. When that happens, it will not be the first time that history in South Africa is shaped by Zulu impis on the war-path, armed this time around with more than photogenic knobkieries and assegais. (Which they‘ve always been - the photogenic bit - only when viewed from afar.)[192] Seasoned South Africa hands like Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley point to the danger of anarchic breakdown of state institutions altogether.[193]

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191 “One reason the if-you-teach-them-they’ll-be-good school of behaviour modification has come to dominate policy thinking on this may be that many of our policy-makers began their public lives as believers in one or another version of Marxism. This is a doctrine that holds that moral prescripts have no independent validity. Instead, they are deemed to come from, and reflect, the ruling ideology, one that works primarily to obscure the injustices of the social order. This is not a helpful premise if one is seeking to understand how behaviour might be shaped by changes in moral sentiment, or how to effect those changes. But, if values are not learnt like this and emerge, instead, from the lessons people draw from their experience of the world around them, the institution-building tasks that we confront are both more difficult and more subtle than has generally been recognised.” (Antony Altbeker [2007]: *A Country at War with itself - South Africa‘s crisis of Crime*, p. 161.)

192 The call at the ANCYL annual conference - muted, definitely audible, for the time being without much echo - was: “kill EFF!” The ANC Mangaung conference of 2012/13 was shaped, it seems, to no small extent, by fears of just how much damage a very angry block of Zulu delegates could potentially inflict on ANC unity and Mandela-era non-racialism. That the departmental head of one of the most important professional training facilities in the country - the Wits Medical Sciences Department -, in her inaugural address, feels it necessary to promise ‘revolutionary’ change seems to suggest that a great deal is being politicised that shouldn‘t be.

193 “Rather than being threatened by a potential dictatorship, South Africa faces the opposite danger: anarchy. If the ANC hegemony is broken and the political class fragments further, particularly in the context of a declining growth rate and accelerating inequality, this could well happen. The political analyst Moeletsi Mbeki has warned that the government could face a Tunisia-style revolt around 2020 ... Mbeki argues that by this time, Chinese mineral-based industrialisation will ebb, leaving South Africa unable to sustain the welfare programmes ‘it uses to placate the black poor and get their votes.’ At present, only 3 million taxpayers finance the social grants of 15 million recipients. Given the increasing number of public service protests every year and their often violent suppression by police, the upheaval envisaged by Mbeki could occur much earlier.”

Whether White hopes pinned on the EFF are justified is questionable. The effect of the fundamentalist rhetoric coming from that direction can be seen in the 'rhodesmustfall', the Kruger monument campaign in Pretoria, the increasingly 'anti-rainbow' implications of the 'Apartheid was genocide' line, and perhaps some kind of globalised activism along 'black-lives-matter' and 'decolonize your mind' lines.[194] 'Black consciousness' is on the march, has become self-confident, is beginning to manifest Middle-East type fundamentalisms compared to which the identity-politics of the eighties and nineties may one day seem, in retrospect, to have been harmlessly benign.

Just as it was during the seventies and eighties, the economy is once again in crisis. R.W. Johnson[195] has shown in detail why the SA economy forty years on is in a state no less parlous than it was when Turner was writing this text. This time around not because of an investment stop and a bloated security and Bantustan apparatus, but because of an investment stop and a bloated public service sector, the new 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. (Though in a country that spends more on VIP protection than it does on education, it can hardly be said that the security-state side of it has disappeared.) What has changed fundamentally - to put a rather obvious point in Marxist terminology -, is the 'superstructure'. But let's stay for a moment with that 'base', the economy. This is uniformly grim. Commercial agriculture, food security, the mining and minerals industry, manufacturing, the State-owned enterprises, are all in crisis or broke - and this at a time when the effects of the drought, draw-down of Chinese demand for mineral exports, US quantitative easing, an impending collapse of the Rand haven't even started to factor into the polity. Public services, utilities, education, law enforce-

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(Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley (2015): *Imagined Liberation - Xenophobia, Citizenship, and Identity in South Africa, Germany, and Canada*, p. 108.)

194 We're told now, by a South African academic who claims that his insight derives from the Frankfurt School, that merit as a criterion for university admission *is racism*. In the name of "Critical race theory", we are told that "concepts of merit continue to obfuscate the reality of privilege and power in favour of those who determine the very meaning of 'merit'." ... "This serves to disorganise the entire working class..." "The concepts of 'voice' and 'naming one's own reality' are central to critical race theory ... Class analysis implies the importance of listening to the voices of the most oppressed social classes, as it is through these voices that greater clarity might be obtained about the challenges of development." It seems to be counter-revolutionary if "a school's admission requirements ... include compliance with age norms and evidence of academic achievement." (R. Chetty [2014]: "Class dismissed? Youth resistance and the politics of race and class in South African education" in: *Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies*, 28, nr. 1, p. 88-102.)

195 Also Cilliers: SAIRR xxxx

ment - the ‘core business’ of government -, without which everything else will simply wind down. Measured by indices publicly available, education, youth unemployment, corruption, governance, democratic accountability, crime, SA scores are amongst the worst in the world.[196] This can by no means all be laid at the door of the ANC government. The 2008 global financial crisis, the current fall in - especially Chinese - demand for mineral exports, global warming, the environmental crisis, the end of quantitative easing and hence the inevitable foreign investment downturn, all of this is and was beyond the control of the ANC. Parts of the corruption-debate also are just a tiny bit disengenuous.[197] For all that, the speed with which the ANC managed to squander the global popularity it enjoyed during the Mandela/Tutu ‘rainbow nation’ days surprised very many even within the ANC itself, let alone its sympathisers all over the world. Was there something in those ‘Left’ analyses of back then, right through to that Turner text here being examined, that could offer a clue as to what it is that has gone so seriously wrong? The aestheticisation of violence, war-lordism ....

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What was it about Turner‘s ‘The Present as History’[198] that had such a powerful effect on so many of its readers? *Globalisation* as the *real* engine of ‘change’. The first is true to this day, including its internal crisis-tendency, in every aspect of our daily lives; the second was/is true to the extent that trade union organisation and agitation could form the basis for better wages and conditions, while trade union *education* the basis for the skill improvement of both workers and their families. In the South Africa of the seventies, a time of rising state repression and racial polarisation[199] it had, in addition to the above, the inestimable value of providing a *non-racial* basis for a collective mobilisation against Apartheid; since a good part of this

196 c.f. R.W. Johnson on UN Development goals - and how miserably SA measures up against them. “The straightforward fact is that ANC rule has been an awful failure not just in terms of this measure, the HDI index, which the ANC previously embraced, but when judged on any objective terms at all.” (Source xxxxx) The one exception is labour legislation, which is noticeably more progressive than in GB, US, or China.

197 Smuts Nongoma‘s ‘I didn‘t join the revolution to remain poor’ resonated powerfully with a population that believed, after 1994, that ‘democracy’ meant that they too could aspire to the levels of comfort depicted on their newly acquired TV-screens, and immediately palpable in the white suburbs. The EFF may be part cargo cult, part polit-theatre, part urban guerilla, part peasants and workers movement, but on a ‘delusion index’ they can‘t be far behind the Tea Party.

198 in *The Eye of the Needle* xxx edition

199 Woods: Biko: this was an undeclared civil war. xxxx

was taking place mostly at elite white universities. It was, in addition to everything else, much more difficult - from the government point of view - to shut this down than had been been the case with the black opposition parties of the sixties. It even carried within it the potential for building a bridge towards the ultimate bastion of of government legitimacy: Afrikaner intellectuals, the *Afrikaner* philosophers and theologians.[200] At the same time, concentrating on the *objective* side of things - i.e. the *economy* - has, in Turner's "The Present as History", something *formulaic* about it, a correlate to his Sartrean voluntarism. It has to do with a certain parochialism concerning just what it is that deserves such an 'objective analysis' - in Kant, Hegel, Marx, it is after all *humanity as a whole* that is being discussed, and not just *South Africa*. In Turner this reduces to "relationship between investment and employment" *in South Africa*. (p. 160.)

> ... the dilemma facing investment is roughly as follows: On the one hand an increase of investment involves an increase in black employment and hence perhaps an increase in potential black bargaining power. On the other hand, the whites benefit disproportionately from investments as they benefit disproportionately from everything else in South Africa...

This has next to nothing to do with 'contradiction' in the sense of Hegel or Marx, and was, as far as the actual analysis of the economic crisis facing the country was concerned, not very well-researched.[201] In fact, any economic analysis worth the name would have revealed, and did, that the SA economy, based in the first instance on mining and minerals, was as dependent as it's ever been on direct foreign investment - then as now. This certainly could be - and eventually was - influenced by an international boycott and disinvestment movement, but that had nothing to do with a 'contradition' between capital and labour. Turner's "The Present as History", on close reading, shows that he resolves the paradox between 'dialectics' as 'everything connects with everything else' and a notion of subjective/objective in the sense of Hegel by confining himself to the *educational/subjective* side, i.e. to his role as educator: its salutory effect on white opinion:

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200 Degenaar, Van Zijl Slabbert, Beyers Naudé, Breyten Breytenbach.

201 He need merely have consulted R.W. Johnson's *How long will South Africa survive?*, which had come out in 1977, to have realized what was *really* going on economically. South Africa's economy has never been, *ever*, in the situation of being able to generate, *domestically*, the savings levels necessary for investment. There was no basis in fact for him to write, in "The Present as History", that "South Africa has already long since passed the take-off stage, and now generates most of its own surplus for capital investment." (p. 159.)

> ... withdrawals on a significant scale would undoubtedly produce a powerful psychological shock for the whites, and would illustrate far more sharply than the sport boycott the increasing hostility of the world to apartheid. It would be made clear to them that they do not have a friendly power that would intervene to protect them in the last resort, thereby making clear to them the necessity of reaching compromises with growing powerful black groups in South Africa before it is too late. (p. 158.)

The point here is not the absolute necessity - as he'd seen very well - of bringing white attitudes in line with a more democratic dispensation and the end of Apartheid[202], but his conviction that the SA of the time resembled in any way a 'revolutionary situation' in the Leninist meaning of the term. (On this he was himself not so convinced either: "... it may be that groups using the rhetoric of revolution and organizing doomed attempts at insurrection actually play a counterproductive role." p. 167.) His problem is that he can't get beyond that impasse he'd ended up in in his discussion of what Marx meant with 'objectivity'. With *Sartre*, he'd concluded that Soviet dogma left no room for subjectivity and spontaneity[203], but - unlike the Frankfurt School - he believed that this could be salvaged while leaving the rest of Marxism intact. This was still powerful enough - in its moral commitment, in the sheer existentialist-utopian appeal to a non-racial future - to form an intellectual basis for the Trade Union movement. But it also paves the way for an 'identity politics' essentialism that treats every reference to the 'totality of history' ('macro-'problems altogether) as superfluous baggage.[204]

> ...in the South African context of the 1970s and 80s, the interaction between at least two different conceptions of dialectic within Marxism - broadly associated with Soviet Marxism and Western Marxism respectively - has been decisive for the relationship of dialectical thinking to Marxism. Turner played a central role in the formation of a generation defined in considerable part by their rejection of Soviet Marxism, and their assimilation - often tentative and incomplete - of the ideas of Western Marxism.[205]

The crux of the matter was: how is the relationship of *class* and *race* to be conceptualised. 'Race' after all, was a concept from National Socialism, not Marx.

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202 *That* had already been obvious to *Smuts*. (Giliommee: p. xxxxxxxx)

203 Henri Lefebvre's *Dialectical Materialism* (1970), was one of the books he prescribed - I gather had studied under him.

204 An essentialism that in time would come to hollow out Critical Theory itself.

205 Nash, op. cit., p. 165.

> The term 'racial capitalism' was probably only coined towards the end of the 1970s. But it summed up the thrust of an analysis of apartheid which was crucial for this generation. The fundamental premise of this analysis was that apartheid was not simply a survival from pre-modern times 'a museum piece in our time, a hangover from the dark past of mankind' as Luthuli called it in his Nobel Prize speech - but was integral to capitalist modernisaztion in South Africa. Apartheid was not simply an external defence of capitalism in South Africa; it was the distinctive form taken by capitalism in that context. There was no 'normal' self or society waiting to be freed from the abnormalities of the racial order, for that order had itself reconstituted all social norms and identities.[206]

Turner's voluntarist reading of Sartre and Marxism meant that he interpreted, in the first instance (as Nash has pointed out), the South African situation as a matter of subjectivity and *identity*.[207]

> ... Turner's treatment of identity as the product of ethical choice ... was explicitly transposed to the context of the trade union movement in a powerful critique of the idea of economic growth developed by Erwin, or at least published under his name: 'Economic growth measured in monetary terms says remarkablely little about society's evaluation of the goods produced'; instead it 'reflects the wants of a particular social structure, a structure within which the rich are relatively powerful and the poor weak'.

As Nash emphasises here,

> The choice between affirming that social structure through the pursuit of economic growth as an end in itself, or contesting it through the building of an independent identity for the working class, is cast in essentially ethical terms here.[208]

(Economic growth as an end in itself, versus political mobilisation around the issues of race and class: these are the issues that define post-1994 SA

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206 Nash, op.cit. p. 166. I have personal memories of that debate. Oliver C. Cox (1948): *Caste Class & Race*; W. J. Cash (1941): *The Mind of the South*.

207 Dickey-Clark xxxxxxx This notion of identity, on the US model, was undergoing, during these decades under consideration, a shift that moved it not only out of the ambit of Marxist epistemology, but out of the ambit of serious academic debate altogether. The economic analysis, in *The Eye of the Needle*, was rudimentary. *Choice*, as something decisionistic, entirely personal. Ahistorical.

208 Nash, op. cit, p. 170. I can 'freely' choose my identity, and this is an *ethical* act, a moral-practical *choice*, open to every citizen in a democracy - a right covered by the Constitution and the UN Declaration of Human Rigths. Nash is saying this: I can *choose* to be free, and - in any case - 'reality is a social construct'. It's an argument Erwin, Cronin and Webster would use to attack Mbeki's and Trevor Manuel's GEAR - based as this was on the premiss that only *economic growth* offered a chance of poverty- and unemployment reduction.

politics, leading up to the dramatic deposition of Mbeki as ANC President in favour of Zuma.)

One issue Nash is getting at here is that a trade union movement thus conceived is rather quixotic when the forces it seeks to oppose are taken into account - consisting as these do in every-more powerful multinationals, confronting an ever-more powerful African nationalism, and a SACP with Marxist-Leninist leanings and military/economic/diplomatic support from Russia and China. Could these two ever fuse, a 'StaMoKap' on the Chinese model?[209] Another issue is the efficacy altogether, in the specific SA context, of neo-liberal economic policies.

Both the feminist and the Civil Rights movement of the time placed heavy emphasis on *identity politics*. Both were influenced by the popularised phenomenology of the sixties, which treated reality as a 'social construct' that can be sculpted and and formed as an matter of individual and collective will - as if objectivity and reality can be made into a matter of *choice*.[210] It's based on a utilitarianism that assumes that every 'this is true' sentence can be replaced by a 'why did he/she say that' one - i.e. replaced by an investigation into the *psychology of the speaker* - the classical ad hominem.[211]

No doubt, as R.W. Johnson has argued, the SACP's initial attitude - already foreshadowed by Bram Fischer in the fifties - was benevolently autocratic;[212] the Party *knows*.[213]

What the Western Marxism of the time represented - before the university system that sustained it capitulated to commerce, identity politics and the media - was a concept of ethical and cognitive universalism, that for a short time at least held out the hope for a peaceful and democratic future. And that meant: identifying, in that post-war world, what it was that was capable 'overcoming' the obviously powerful forces for polarisation and future wars, already well on their way to becoming manifest and obvious.

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209 intellectuals 'organically linked' with the unions is Gramsky-speak.

210 Berger and Luckmann, Schutz, US mis-appropriation of Husserl and Kierkegaard. The question of *objectivity*, the question of *violence*.

211 If all claims are 'equal' (and equally *democratic*) then one 'brand' is as good as any another. Once the ANC 'structures' and 'mechanisms' got going, no mere intellectual stood (and stands) a chance of opposing it, let alone the poor and the unemployed. The politics of popular rage in the name of 'revolutionary transformation' had started its fateful course.

212 quote r.w. johson xxxxxx

213 Sloterdijk's characterisation: xxxx the philosophy department as the world secretariat of the working classes. Lukács: reason within capitalism had collapsed into advertising, hedonism, consumerism.

The student unrest that started at my old alma mater, Wits U. in Johannesburg - initially on the issue of university fees - rapidly spread to the rest of the country, and as rapidly escalated. What was initially a protest over fees and admissions (educationists had been warning for years about inadequate government funding for the education system[214]), rapidly turned into mass rallies for 'transformation', the end of 'white capitalism', and the right of the poor and the working classes for free education. The government, which since Polokwane had after all been saying exactly this, immediately complied. 'Down with racism, inequality, sexism, poverty, white capitalism, discrimination, colonialism, exploitation.' Some of the commentators found themselves reminded of their own younger years, nostalgic references to Marcuse and Adorno abounded. The EFF rapidly came out for 'revolutionary transformation' at the universities, and the fraternisation between Luthuli-house notables (starting with de facto prime minister Mantashe) with the SRC leaders from just up the road was a joy to behold. Behind this entirely surreal spectacle[215] this drama unfolding before our eyes, with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy, is a reality entirely analysable with the instruments the SACP now in the cabinet once claimed to be able to wield.

A quarter-century on from the first democratic election the economy is now in crisis. The confidence and competence that Finance Minister Gordhan displayed at Davos recently could not hide that he had no answers to the questions from the audience, regarding public sector wages, unemployment, mines and agriculture. Nor that his very presence at Davos signalled what the rest of his government was strenuously denying: that the South African economy has always been crucially dependent on FDI.[216] The progressive ruin of the three pillars on which this economy rests - mining, agriculture, manufacturing - has been exhaustively documented in R.W. Johnson's recent *How long will South Africa survive?*, and can in any case be read off from South African economic indicators freely available on the internet. For anyone able to read them, they spell the end of a unique experiment: African Nationalism's command of Africa's most advanced economy. For anyone interested in probing the obvious question: why did South Africa not - like the 'Asian tigers' - invest massively in education, infrastructure, IT, job skills? It's a question that leads to the nature of the alliance that brought the ANC to power in 1994. To understand the current cri-

214 Bellinda Bozzoli xxxxx
215 Breytenback: Debord! xxxx
216 Foreign Direct Investment.

sis it‘s necessary to understand both the weaknesses of the Mbeki government‘s economic policies and the Left‘s curious optimism in believing that an alliance with Zulu traditionalism was going to lead to Social Democracy. Mandela and then Mbeki inherited Africa‘s most advanced economy, but also one of the world‘s most unequal ones. The word ‘Apartheid’ maps of course onto issues of decolonisation, inequality, and post-war revulsion against what National Socialism had done in the name of ‘race’. But Trevor Manuel and the economists trying to figure out a viable economic policy after 1994 were fully aware of South Africa‘s integration and dependence on the rapidly globalising economy, and especially on direct foreign investment. GEAR was later attacked, by the SACP, as a ‘betrayal of the working classes’, but it‘s not so obvious what else the govt. was supposed to have done.[217]

One obvious thing they *did* do was implement some very US ideas on affirmative action: from these years stem the BEE legislation that would eventually morph into today‘s transformania.[218]

But it‘s the ‘history of ideas’ - if that‘s the proper word for it - within the SACP since 1994, that provides an explanation for the government‘s current paralysis in the face of a populism that brought it to power but which it can now longer control.

The long march from Paris to Empangeni starts with a peculiarity of the South African Left that goes back a long way: its liberalism and its provincialism. The ‘old’ radicals had their roots in East European Judaism, British Liberalism and the Russian Revolution, whereas the ‘new’ ones - post-Rivonia -, in the Paris of Sartre and Althusser, the Berkeley of Marcuse, and British syndicalism. None of these were forced to confront, in any serious way, Marxism-Leninism‘s inability to co-exist with - let alone *inspire* - democracy and human rights. At the bottom of a continent far removed from Gulags and Cultural Revolutions, few on the South African Left confronted the relationship of Marxism and democracy. The number of those on the Left, in SA, to whom it occurred that what they should *really* be looking for was the causes of the disaster that had engulfed the *German* Left after 1918 - as a way of avoiding the same mistakes - could

217 empty coffers. Sparks.

218 The trouble with affirmative action, if it involves national legislation - rather than at a more local level, e.g. university admission policy - is that it has to *re*-introduce, in *law*, the very categories that it ostensibly opposes. It would create, in time, a whole generation of ‘entitlement’ enrages, whose only knowledge of Marxism consisted in their ‘conviction’ that they were all victims of ‘white capitalists’, ‘colonialists’ and ‘racists’, and that adolescent rage was the proper way of expressing a Black African identity.

probably be counted on the fingers of one hand.[219] Conceivably, also, a proclivity, on the part of Calvinism, for 'absolute' answers in the face of disaster played a part.[220] But whatever its origins, the South African Left had a decidedly cavalier attitude to revolution and the 'armed struggle'. It had something *academic* about it, and that indeed is part of the explanation: for European and North American Marxists, 'revolution' was an entirely abstract idea, of which they had no personal experience. It stood in some contrast to the attitude prevailing within the pre-1963 ANC, whose traditions emphasised consensus and unity across internal divisions. It throws light on a recent spat between Mbeki and Cronin.[221] The latter was welcome as a proponent of equality and non-racialism, but not as a proponent of race war. It endears one to Mbeki, makes one realise that Cronin never stopped being that species of modern academic that enjoys adopting 'radical stances', without much thought to what the practical consequences could be once that which has just been airily asserted be put into *practice*.[222]

The Apartheid SA of which Turner was becoming such an effective (and feared) critic at the time of his murder owed its political instability[223] (at the *ideological* level) to the inability of the electorate to come to a clear understanding of what it was that was threatening it in *reality*. This was not so much the threat from Communism and terrorism - as government propaganda had it at the time -, as economic sanctions combined with the rising cost of the 'security state' and the border wars.[224] To which was added the crucial factor of Afrikaaner intellectual disaffection. Beyers Naudé, Van Zyl Slabbert, Breyten Breytenbach, the 'sestigers', Jonker, Degenaar, the Stellenbosch philosophers. The values of the South African *Republic*, which the Verwoerd Nationalists had proclaimed with such pride in 1960, were based, as they claimed, on Christian and National principles, but these were no match for a security state that came to influence more and more aspects of day-to-day existence under P.W. Botha.[225]

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219 The only ones that spring to mind are Michael Nupen, Breyten Breytenbach, J.M. Coetzee. Doubtlessly there have been others.

220 Bram Fischer, Cox, Slovo in New York.

221 Cronin: 'I was for the revolution!'

222 Cronin's and the SACP's fantasies of an ANC and NDR 'above' and 'beyond' the constitution fitted pretty well with a Zulu-tribalist element that seems to have regarded 1994 as a strategic compromise with white power and priviledge - to be tolerated only for as long as they were powerless to reverse it.

223 Adam: seemed perfect for revolution xxxx quote

224 Adam: the common recognition, on both sides, that they could not win an all-out war. xxxx

225 The Press and the opposition parties depicting the 'Boers' as antediluvian Calvinists from a bye-gone age, tended to overlook this ...

In short, the legitimation crisis of the *seventies* was marked by the way neither the Afrikaaner Churches nor English liberalism were able to convince the (white) electorate to scrap race legislation. When the NP under De Klerk finally saw the writing on the wall in 1990, it was under circumstances which many whites could interpret - as long as they were still under the spell of 'Mandela magic' - as a step towards democratisation and the rule of law, whereas the Alliance newly ensconced at Tuynhuis and the Union Buildings saw it very differently, as only the first step towards socialism. From this point onwards the question would be whether state-led re-distribution of wealth and opportunities - unprecedented, on this scale, in Africa -, was going to be compatible with the self-same institutions that too many *whites* had regarded as a guarantee for the continuation of the status quo.[226] A generation on, what does *today's* legitimation crisis look like?

Are there points of comparision between Afrikaner Nationalism's relation to the Dutch Reformed Churches of half a century ago with *today's* relationship between the emerging Zulu patronage system and the SACP? Both, after all, are Nationalisms, shored up by a value system that is everything other than convincing in the eyes of its own electorate - let alone the intellectuals.

Beyers Naudé, Turner, van Zyl Slabbert, all appealed to nonracialism, equality and the rule of law - in effect, as Sweden and most European countries saw it - as a move towards *social democracy*.[227]

If Africa's only attempt at social democracy fails, the repercussions could come to resemble what now is unfolding in the Middle East. The Washington Consensus[228], the pax Americana on which the Marshall Plan, the EU, post-war reconstruction were based, can be summarised in three words: trade, development, markets. During the Cold War, for the erstwhile colonies and the Third World, a fourth term must be added which - depending on one's proclivities -, spelled 'anti-communism', 'revolution', or 'US foreign policy'. To say that all of these terms deal with different areas, relate to different kinds of 'facts', which all need to be studied in turn, is no doubt justified in the face of today's once again one-dimensional and reductive moralisms.

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226 c.f. John Matisonn: *God, Spies and Lies - Finding South Africa's Future through its Past*. xxxxxxxx

227 Dene Smuts (2016): *Patriots and Parasites - South Africa and the struggle to evade history.*

228 Bretton Woods, IMF, WTO, World Bank. What's the 'solution' to poverty? Gin-coefficent, poverty, literacy, demographics. The shift from 'class analysis' to the claim that we are 'speaking for the poor'.

Since Polokwane, the ANC and many on the Left have presented its economic program - the NDR - as a necessary mechanism for addressing what was, and is to this day, levels of unequality that are amongst the highest in the world. The Mandela, and then the Mbeki government - most surprised, at coming to power, at the emptiness of the state coffers[229] - adopted a neo-liberal set of policies, GEAR, on the unexceptional argument that welfare funds have to be created before they can be distributed. That Polokwane had all kinds of reasons - Mbeki's aids denialism, his studied non-perception of Mugabi's misrule in Zimbabwe[230], his sidelining of the unions, the SACP - are by now well-known, but the point is that it was greeted, perhaps for the last time in South African history, by a coalition of Left and African Nationalist (popular) opinion. Habib's *South Africa's suspended Revolution* expresses the hope of the time: that the revolution is back on course, that it's only been temporarily *suspended*.[231] The trouble is, Cronin's re-alignment of SACP theory[232], starting off with what initially had seemed a belated incorporation of *Western* Marxism into what was obviously an antiquated doctrine, ended up with the marvelously convenient result that Marxist theory and populism were 'one'.[233] Poverty was as obvious as it was omnipresent, revolutionary transformation was obviously necessary, white capitalists were 'obviously' the enemy, so who needs theory? Affirmative action, BEE, the post-Foucaultian idea that there *is* no such thing as 'theory' (only *power*), entitlement thinking, no doubt all played a part.

Turner-inspired Trade Unionism had after all a basis in *reality*, namely the economy, and could argue that this transcended black nationalism.[234]

229 Allister Sparks: xxxx

230 US diplomat: could have been prevented xxxxxxx

231 Habbib's problem is this: he is himself an advocate of the 'transformation' destroying his university, perhaps demolishing higher education in the country altogether. The SRC, the Nazi-sympathies amongst his students, the 'kill all whites'-brigade, can all quote his book, after all, according to which SA must now get on with a 'revolution' that the Mbeki administration and the GEAR policies of those years had merely "suspended". (*South Africa's suspended Revolution*, 2013.) If the University Vice-Chancellor praises his own activism, proclaims his admiration for Marx and Trotzky on his website, does nothing to contradict the mainstream mantra of student/worker class solidarity, the necessity of a 'class war' against 'white capitalists' and "genocidal colonialists who murdered our parents", then no amount of tut-tutting on his part can hide the Vice-Principle's confusion between education and revolution. For that's what the book-burners and petrol-bombers amongst his students claim they're doing: 'revolution'.

232 Nash xxxx

233 Nash xxxx

234 Fosatu xx

There were elements in this that could have led to Social Democracy on the European model. But this presupposed an ‘Asian tiger’ type of development based on infrastructure investment and education as national policy-priorities,[235] and on educating a work-force (and an electorate) capable of holding its own internationally. A combination of factors seems to have blocked this route. Zuma‘s support base was rural and increasingly tribal; the ANC after Morogoro had ‘people‘s liberation war’ written all over it, for the ANC-alligned teacher‘s union, merit, schooling, academic excellence were discredited ‘capitalist’ notions. Schooling and university degrees were seen as the means towards middle class status and security. The transformation of the school system, universities, higher education was turned into government policy, but ‘transformation’ - the term itself - never seriously disconnected from the clichés of an earlier generation. Students could claim - just as they had in May 1968 in Paris - that they represented the vanguard of the working classes, the poor and the oppressed - but these were delusions (other than in Gaullist France) resonated with an ANC whose only common denominator, holding the Alliance together, was the self-same populism that was making the country increasingly ungovernable.

Populism‘s collision with reality has long since commenced, and can be observed during university admissions. Not just in the sense that without doctors, engineers, IT specialists, accountants, lawyers - not to mention competent nurses and police -, the economy collapses. If you want a house, a car, a family, a telephone and a road sans potholes that‘s what it takes: trained specialists in fields that can take years of study and experience to master. Reality in *this* sense - ‘objectivity’ in the sense of the natural sciences - is modern: it presupposes, at the motivational-individual level, the ability to ‘think theoretically’, while at the same time learning to integrate this ‘theory-world’ with the practice of whatever field is under consideration. It‘s also quite lonely: historically it emerged during the 16th and 17th centuries, a time of widespread political turmoil[236], in which anxiety about one‘s soul and fear for the future are powerful stimuli towards pietism and the eternal verities. That may be no longer the case for a modern doctor or engineer, but if your patient dies or your bridge collapses the question of *culpability* is never far behind - for the family, the public, the professional ethics committee, for litigation law. There‘s another sense in which the ability to ‘think theoretically’ is modern: the notion of cause and effect.

235 Cronin: Haupsache, man ist mit von der Partie.
236 deus absconditus

Most of the literature on the philosophy of science of the last century has insisted that an understanding of causal relationships is a matter of *experience*. (In the empirical sense.) Recent advances in epistemology have shown this to be erroneous. Children‘s ‘experience’ cannot be divorced from their family situation, from the nature of the bond between mother and child - or other prime carers. The ability to learn, the child‘s conception of ‘reality’, his or her linguistic ‘environment’, are all dependent on the quality of early nurturing. Without the serenity and intensity of that early mother/child bond there *is* no ‘theoretical’ thinking, no university scholarship, no doctors and engineers.

‘The Present as History.’ In Sweezy, Lukács, in Hobsbawm, the premiss is: *start* with the *Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*. Polyani‘s remark, that in Sweezy there was a sophistication and an awareness of the sheer interdisciplinarity of these problems that had not really survived the emigration from Central Europe to the Anglo world. It could focus one‘s attention on the question: if the *Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* becomes so *formulaic*, in the course of its journey westward, what were *then* the functions of these formulas? (Something that held just as much for Freud and psychoanalysis.) In the case of British Marxism, so dominant in ‘Left’ discourse in SA during the Turner years, this is not difficult to name: these formulas represented - ‘objectivistic’ or not - a *moral* judgement: *racism must go*. This moral condemnation was not - as was the case with the Churches, the Liberal Party, many Afrikaaner intellectuals - justified by an appeal to Christian values or universal ethics, but by a very British (positivist) propensity to insist on the principled distinction between *facts* and *values*.[237] Facts are *objective*, cannot be disputed, whereas *values* are impossibly difficult to shield from the usual ad hominem reductions: ‘that‘s just *your* opinion, in *my* view it‘s ....’ Facts cannot be denied - in this view - values *can*.

What must make post-Polokwane SA so galling for the SACP is that it is neither able to mount a credible defense of constitutionalism and the rule of law (since that would be at odds with its ‘two-stage’ theory of history, the necessity of ‘transformation’), nor is it able to do what has been, in the view of Marxism-Leninism to this day, its one redeeming feature: forced industrialisation, a rapid expansion of the economy, and international prestige. (Which, ‘deconstructed’, means the ability to mount a credible military challenge to the US and the West.) Blinded by their own millenarianism,

237 Which had its corresponding literature in Germany, above all in the work of Max Weber.

they failed to heed the warnings even of their *Russian* advisors[238] - let alone the SA liberals they'd held in the same contempt as had the Apartheid-ideologues. (Even if *that's* exactly where they'd themselves originally come from, Bunting and Roux's liberalism.) Warnings to the effect that centralised planning and a command economy were failing everywhere, and was in any case enforceable only with police-state methods that would put paid to all 'rainbowism' and democracy. Their situation is somewhere between that of the German KP during the twenties, and the French CF during the sixties.

The SACP starts off as a liberal rejection of racism and colonialism, and - via Slovo and Moscow - turns into a new form of racism and colonialism.

There's something about SA that is *world* history, *planetary* history, and not just in the sense that in the Sterkfontein hominids we can study the beginning of our species altogether, 'hominisation'. Holland, the first nation-state in the modern sense, was also the country in which that mentality first formed which Marxists (and not just they) take for granted: the *secular* mentality, a world of facts and processes. Marx is not conceivable without Descartes and Spinoza, without the conception of an *objective* world independent of our perceptions of it. Turner's insistence that it's the *facticity* of those cups and pens that provides us with an Ariadne's thread to follow through the maze of German Idealism is a pointer as much to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as it is to that of Spinoza and the good burghers of Amsterdam. *In* that certitude about 'facts' there is every bit as much the self-confident burgher asserting his independence against church and state. It's a 'forma mentis' - the 'scientific atttude' - that can be directed backwards, towards the australopithecines, as much as to the present, to the end of colonialism and whatever it is that is about to take its place.

That my perception of those cups and pens *presupposes* time, space, causality (not to mention a whole Darwinian evolution of my perceptual and neurological apparatus, opposable thumb, all the rest) was the insight that led directly from Kant to Hegel, then to Marx - at least in the sense that henceforth, at least at this level in which it's something as general as 'capitalism' or 'modernity' or 'history of the last 100 years' that we're talking about, it's not possible to make a hard and fast distinction between 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity'.[239] Those cups and pens must be *historically* contextualised, the empiricism that they stand for understood as a specific British reaction to the Jacobins and the terror. The Brits weren't reacting so

238 Filatova xxxx
239 Jonathan Israel.

much to *Hegel* - which they were, but then at a later stage, after Bismarck and the Flottenbaupolitik - as against the Jacobins and the 'holy' terror of the guillotine. 'Holy' here as metaphor, is a reminder that, historically, this was a turning point: from here onwards it's no longer the *Church* that's the arbiter of absolute morality and absolute justice but whoever possessed the argumentative skills (and required paranoid/narcissistic character structure) to muscle his (her) way onto the Wohlfahrtsausschuß, gaining access to the levers of power. Right through to Russell what mattered most was that what today is called identity politics - with its destruction of truth in both the scientific and moral sense - be shown for what it was: the return to myth, to gnosticism and holy war. Horkheimer and Russell were closer allies than they realised.[240] The insistence that those cups and pens exist *outside of me*, that there's an objective world of which I'm (and everything else around me is) the *product*, that my 'subjectivity' is neither here nor there, that ethical principles and community are no less 'objective' than things and processes, was a late version of what the Church had been trying to inculcate into its flock from Augustine to Cusanus. Blumenberg writes the history of the last three millenia - in geological terms not even so impressive any more - as the Western world's only very *incomplete* repression of the old gnostic and chiliastic conflicts that roiled the early years of Christianity, forced it into what it eventually became.[241]

Analysing reality 1.0

There's the R.W. Johnson narrative: economic and political stability is conceivable only on the basis of Foreign Direct Investment, infrastructure investment, schooling and education at all levels, social justice policies, labour market liberalisation, service delivery - flanked by a mining, manufacturing and agriculture-driven export drive. But this is built, in the end, on a *functionalist* premiss which it shares with the older political economy: at some point 'reality' is going to re-assert itself, the new parasitic bourgeoisie is busy destroying the economy, the ANC is going to be faced at some point with a 'Zimbabwe'-type choice: either an IMF-bailout (based on conditionalities incompatible with the Alliance in its present form), or a failed state of some kind, with 'Ellis-'type (or 'Adam'-type) scenarios entirely plausible.[242]

Analysing reality 2.0

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240 Horkheimer polemic against xxxxx. Schlick? this estrangement was *unintendend.*.

241 Blumenberg: Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung.

242 Ellis! xxxxxx Adam! xxxxx

And then there's the ANC narrative, if one can call it that: the 'NDR', conceived not in *accordance* with but as *replacement* of the constitution. This too, ostensibly, is based on an 'analysis of the market', just like that of R.W. Johnson, but this time 'market' means not a moral lack to be overcome but a foe to be defeated in battle.

Analyzing reality, the way the *ANC* sees it, means defending the revolution against the 'total onslaught' of *white capitalism*.

It's obvious enough clear the difference lies in what's to be understood by 'market'. R.W. Johnson analyses the economy under functionalist perspectives: 'Market' is shorthand for the regulation of production and consumption from a utilitarian point of view - the greatest good for the greatest number. Although he himself comes from a 'left' background, he doesn't focus much on that aspect of destabilisation which the market is *not* capable of addressing - Stiglitz/Piketty type wealth differentials. Zuma and his allies claim to see under 'market' a plot to reverse the hard-won democratic gains of 1994. They see in it, they claim, above all, a system of institutionalised *injustice*. That's the aspect of his labour theory of value speech (given on the same day that he fires his finance minister Nene for blocking unrestricted Party access to the Treasury.n) in December 2015. The 'market' *here* is not treated *functionalistically* - as a mechanism to match supply and demand - but because it's an affront to *morality*. (Which, after all, is hard to quibble with.) The market is *unjust*, Zuma analyses the economy under *moral* perspectives. So what do these two perspectives have in common? The notion of *causation*, or rather: in the double meaning it has had in the West since Aristotle: methexis and mimesis.[243] Causation, in the sense of *methexis*, 'objectifies' nature, 'eudaemonistically', - the cosmos being 'one' with eternity, and 'rightness', irrespective of the fate of the individual.[244]

What R.W. Johnson represents is political economy of the classical type: there's a crisis ahead, and he's analysing the causes. Without DFI sufficient to off-set demography, without infrastructure spending (including education), without stimulation of mining, aggriculture and manufacturing, the country is heading straight for a cliff - and an IMF-bailout. The ruling alliance, on the other hand, is incapable of gaining electoral support on any other platform than one guaranteed to ruin the economy. It's caught in a classic liberation movement cocoon that makes anything other than a police-state response to the social unrest to come - presaged by Marikana, the

243 With Hegel being the last to be able to *integrate* them.
244 Cusanus, through to Spinoza.

2014 xenophobic riots, the crisis at the universities, the chronic service-delivery protests - impossible. It's looking to Ethiopia and China for how to respond, and the most liberal constitution in Africa is going to be the first casualty. RWJ is himself sanguine enough though to play through the various scenarios for a successful IMF-bailout - though he concedes that the price is going to be high.

With Turner's murder, what dies in SA is what is now seriously threatening the body politic: a 'mediating' position between those who see the democratic gains of 1994 threatened by a new tyranny ('state-capture' on the Chinese or Nigerian, or simply corruption model), and those who see the ANC's loss of control of the metros (all except Durban, in the last election) as the devillish machinations of 'the' international white-capitalist, neo-colonial 'counter-revolution'. For the one, democracy is the defense of individual rights in the face of a breakdown in law and order, a crime wave, the threat of communist and state-sanctioned appropriation of private property; for the other, democracy is the right to education, income, security and dignity for millions who have seen little to no benefit from having the vote. Is it possible for both to be right and both to be wrong? The 'anti-'thesis to each position is easy enough to formulate. If 'democracy' means individual rights, private property, and a civil society built on the principle of non-violent public debate, this has long since been hollowed out by a 'capitalist system' in the sense of Marx and the Frankfurt School: a population that has been 'dumbed-down' (by 'bottom-line'-driven commercialised media) can no longer tell the difference between a collective - non-violent - formulation of political will, and entertainment. (Which in its turn has been subject to unrelenting 'pop' pressure in the direction of violence and 'sex' for most of the last century.) It's a moot point whether the countless millions world-wide, whose only source of information is their mobile phones, have a basis at all for forming non-trivial political opinions, as this is presupposed enshrined in the constitutions of their respective countries. *This* is basically what 'radical' meant for a good portion of the 20th Century, including for the Turner group in Durban.

The 'anti'-thesis to what is a steadily-growing tenor within the ANC on the other hand - that anti-racism, anti-colonialism, 'transformation' and socialism is only achievable by *extra*-parliamentary 'revolutionary' means (is only conceivable in *military*, in 'struggle', in *il*-legal terms), is equally easy to formulate.[245] (George Orwell was publishing, after all - after some

245 Lichtheim: xxxxx quote

personal experiences with Marxist-Leninists in the Spanish Civil War - almost a century ago.) George Lichtheim, seems to me to have formulated it best: that it was Lenin who, for all subsequent generations, had transformed what until then had been a 'post-Hegelian' attempt at understanding the 'whole' of history - from the point of view of the *present*, looking *back* in time - to a forward-looking 'socialist project' that was supposedly as easy as 'putting Hegel back on his feet'. What this comfortably familiar (and familial) metaphor hid from view was an ambiguity in Hegel's system that was no less than the central question of *secularisation* altogether: whether the 'totality of things' was meant in *transcendental* (other-) or in *this*-worldly terms. If one considers that this question lay at the heart of a two-millenia old Christian (civitas dei/terrana) tradition, then it also becomes clear that 'contradiction' stands for a type of investigation that little to do with a simply *formal-logical* discussion.

Postscript

Personally, epistemologically, politically.

These three adjectives are meant to invoke the world of the seventies and eighties, as they reflect themselves in the generation of Turner - those born during or soon after the war, whose world is now increasingly becoming 'history'. It was a world - the past tense seems appropriate - torn in the three different directions indicated, by these adjectives. The 'personal' still manifested some aspects of the liberal era in which it had been formed and of which it was a product, in the sense that freedom, equality, the rule of law were still touchstones for public debate. 'Epistemologically' indicated that the realm in which this was being defended was no longer that of the Church, though very much still in terms of a universalistic *ethics*. The Philosophy Turner brought back with him from Paris was politicised, but it still moved within an intellectual framework that presupposed knowledge of the philosophical canon - it had nothing in common with today's routinised outrage-production on demand, operating on a budget provided by 'stakeholders'. There was a *difference* between 'personally' and 'epistemologically', also in the sense that universities still provided nichés that could be shielded from the organised manipulation of affect, whether for commercial or political ends. 'Objectivity' had not yet been replaced by the public-political articulation of personal and group interests 'against all comers'. 'Politically' could still be shielded from open war - at least in Europe and the US, where substantial effort was still being channelled into maintaining an informed electorate. But not in SA, where the border wars

and ‘total onslaught’ ideology had created a paranoia that would cost Turner his life, besides bankrupting what was left of the Dutch and British legacy - at least as far as the ANC and the opposition parties were concerned. Today’s dark clouds, with their odd shades of Leninism and Zulu ethnicity, are not explicable without that collapse.

This book is an attempted ‘synthesis’ of three very different genres: the (auto)biographical, the philosophical, and the political/historical. Whether this is even possible must be left to the judgement of the reader. Turner‘s assassination - carried out by organs of state - marked the point at which university-based white intellectuals were confronted with something the *black* Anti-Apartheid organisations had realised a full generation earlier, during the fifties. Namely that critique of the ruling ideology could cost you your head. For white intellectuals centered on the former colonial powers and the newly emergent US, this was unprecedented. There had been Bram Fischer, Ingrid Jonker, Ruth First, and very many within the group of *Black* Apartheid opponents.[246] Beyers Naudé had been cast into the wilderness by his Kerk, but *murder*? By the organs of the *state*? A white university lecturer?[247] Later there would be many more[248], but in the minds of the mostly white circle of colleagues and students in Durban at the time this was a watershed. To subsume all this under ‘Apartheid’ and the liberation struggle is today‘s perspective, not that of forty years ago. *White* attitudes during those years had taken little cognizance of what was becoming obvious to at least some intellectuals and journalists: Afrikaner nationalism had declared war on the dis-enfranchised majority. From the *white* perspective of the sixties, SA was not so very different from Canada, Australia or New Zealand - with a colonial history that was as old, after all, as that of North or South America. MacMillan‘s ‘winds of change’ would dispense with such notions soon enough, but in that Sartrean radicalism of Turner there was also something of a realization that there was *next to nothing* in the entire English-language, university-based social science establishment, to which one could turn for guidance. Students of Parsons and Merton, of Samuelson and Milton Friedman, of Evans-Pritchard or B.F. Skinner, of Hempel and Nagel, could be excused for a feeling of ‘dissociation’ - so well-described in Coetzee‘s *Disgrace* - when trying to comprehend the present ‘as history’. ‘Social science’ meant, in those years, exactly what it said: explaining what one observed in terms of abstract, timeless categories - and *that*

246 Luthuli banned, Gandhi, Timol, Nat Nakasa.
247 Du Preez. quote unprecedented.
248 David Webster, the Mxenges, so many others.

meant taking one‘s cue from the *natural* sciences.[249] The social sciences of the time were next to useless for anyone trying to understand the decolonisation wars sweeping Africa, Asia and South America.[250] It was indicative of this situation that one of the few scholar to have studied them - Ruth First - was murdered, just like Turner, by South African socalled ‘security’ services. (A misnomer, if ever there was one.) It‘s possible, in my view, to make the case that Turner, with his priviledged white background, was insufficiently attuned to the dangers of [Goulder, Jay quote on left-wing radicalism], but that‘s a perspective from our own point in time, surveying the swathe of ruin a Zuma administration is drawing accross the perfectly viable state institutions it inherited from its predecessor. If Turner had been perhaps too sanguine about that Sartrean radicalism, it was *also* a reaction to the studied ‘value-neutrality’ displayed by visiting faculty from abroad. To this day no-one seems to have taken exception to the idea that *US anthropology* is the adequate perspective for a judgement on Turner‘s *Eye of the Needle*.[251]

The events leading up to the first democratic election in SA are now ‘history’. Which is not the same as saying they‘re well-understood, or that their implications for *today‘s* world are unequivocal. ‘History’ in any case is a slippery notion, with most of us - those who experienced those years at first hand - knowing full well that individual biography, theoretical/practical/political considerations, the ‘ex post factum’ constructs of the historian are very different things. No-one writing on Rick Turner could come to any other conclusion, but that‘s not the same as knowing how to do justice to these very different genres. The (auto)biographical has a *narrative* structure, with dramatis personae appearing on stage and then exiting -, a reflection of the simple fact that individual perspectives, in their full particularity, *can* only be told as a series of events, actions, decisions of named persons and groups. Philosophical *universals* on the other hand make a claim that is unconstrained by time or chronology - in this their origins in the ‘Adamitic’ religions becomes apparent. Truth, whether of the factual or the

249 The following revealing annecdote is told by the historian R.W. Hobsbawm. A student stands up after a lecture and asks: “Professor, does the expression ‘second world war’ mean there‘s been a ‘first’ one?”.

250 The point is not that we, in Durban, had better motives than most to be studying Sociology and the various Marxisms on offer in Europe and the rest of the World. But rather that this wasn‘t an academic debate at all, and hence were getting no help at all from either Sociology or Critical Theory. What we lacked was not greater expertiese in research methods, or a more thorough grounding in epistemology. What we lacked was guidance on what to do in a situation heading for civil war.

251 us anthropologist XXXXXXXX

moral/ethical kind, is not bound by the 'here-and-now'. *Historiography* - the third genre - straddles both of the above - it deals with *selected* individuals because they provide insight into a particular epoch, where these insights at the same time abstract from particulars without abandoning chronology in favour of timeless universals.

This Turner text is a case in point. It's a *philosophical* text, unintelligible without a knowledge of *Philosophy*. But to limit the discussion to only *this* aspect thereof would be to leave out the *historical* side of things, which was the role of white Anti-Apartheid activists, during the seventies, caught between State repression and MK insurgency. Resolute in the face of both Apartheid repression and Black Nationalism, insisting on the necessity of reason, research, and historical reflection, he was one of the very few at the time who could bridge race and class divides. He paid the ultimate price for this. Hence one cannot approach his biography without respect - and a fascination for his person. Which in turn brings one back to the way in which the Cold War - 'cold' because based on a nuclear pat, a 'mutually assured' destruction for the principals - tended to transfer to indubitably hot ones in Asia, Africa, and South America. Which in turn could be treated - by intellectuals lucky enough to be in Europe and the US, to use a Dutch expression - as 'far away from my bedstead'. SA was very much a cockpit in which intense controversies between intellectual fashions - and interests - raged, coming from outside its borders. This author has no better answer than anyone else to the vexing question of how one is supposed to merge these genres - they make incommensurable claims, let alone presupposing different skill-sets. He's a philosopher by trade, though he'd never have become one without the events analysed and related here. The owl of Minerva rises at dusk, and so on. English-speaking white South Africans have gone through an experience which for the rest of the 'West' is still to come - keeping afloat in a 'post-colonial' world, at a time when the post-war hopes of a pax Americana are fading. (I'm keeping *Afrikaans*-speakers out of this category, since *they* have very different historical memories.) First-world economic comfort is confronting 'developing' world poverty and desperation *in a single country* - and not in the form of dismal news from distant places. A bit like tourists on the Lesbos beaches, but with the difference that *they* can just fly home. Not inconceivable that socalled 'white' capital (less and less so after twenty years of BEE) is going to accept some responsiblity for the state of the nation - not just blame it on the ANC. George Lichtheim said this of the British after WWII: new realism has prevailed, "John Bull has lost a lot of fat but acquired bigger brains in the pro-

cess."[252] I wish this on my erstwhile compatriots. The very first essay I ever wrote, as a school-boy, was on Talleyrand - it's taken me a lifetime to understand what it means to 'survive' a revolution. Another way of saying the same thing: philosophy is about 'everything', isn't a 'discipline' in any ordinary sense, can't be conflated with science and logic. (Though it can't dispense with them either.)

When I grew up 'the war' had a fixed meaning: it meant WWII, and it lay in the *past*. Judt could give his important Europe book the title *Post-War*[253], because that was the spirit of the time: it was a horror that lay *behind* us. The pax Americana, the Washington Consensus, Bretton Woods, the UN and the institutions regulating trade and economic growth were all, as it were, a kind of institutional guarantee that it would *stay* that way: a matter for *historians*, no more. To a large extent, that's still the case today - Buruma's *1945* is inspired more by a spirit of 'look how far we've come' than a warning in the sense of 'it's all gone off the rails, once again'.[254] That's not to say that writers and intellectuals from Kafka to Adorno have not been ringing the storm bells since long before WWI, but both academia and the mass media have been most successful in denouncing such 'pessimism' as unconstructive and positively unhealthy, detrimental to self-esteem and career-prospects. Nowadays these authors come with trigger warnings and an ever stricter policing of just what is acceptable at the level of academic debate. For white South Africans like myself, the liberal consensus of which we considered ourselves a part - that of Europe and North America during the sixties -, was flanked by the themes of the student movement. If there was a lot more 'Woodstock' than 'storm of the Winter Palace' in that 'different world', that such utopian notions could be entertained by priviledged white students, ensconced in their colonial bubble, had an aspect to it that the growing international Anti-Apartheid movement obscured. Bram Fischer, Turner, Breyten Breytenbach, Eddie Roux, Van Zyl Slabbert were formed by Dutch and then British colonial history, and that meant, in the first instance, by the collision of Enlightenment with Colonialism. Democratic freedoms, modern constitutions entrenched rights of the individual as a counter to arbitrary state power, freedom of opinion and association, minority rights - in short: representative government and majority rule -, were the product of 17th and 18th Century *Europe*. That is: the liberal and social democratic ideas that in *Europe* seemd to many - after the

252 *Thoughts among the Ruins*, p. xxi.
253 title xxxx
254 Ian Buruma (2013): *Year Zero - A History of 1945*.

world wars, as the only possible basis for a peaceful future, were themselves implicated in the long history of colonial wars - of wars *altogether*.

Richard Turner

Kant Hegel Marx Sartre [unpublished manuscript]

In the first three sections of these notes I try to establish the following points:

1) Hegel‘s dialectics is inseparable from his account of the nature of the subject, and his dialectics of nature therefore only makes sense on the basis of the identification of substance with subject.

2) If the dialectic is to be used within a materialist framework it cannot merely be “overturned”; it requires a wholly new philosophical foundation, and this Marx Engels and Lenin fail to give it.

3) Hegel‘s dialectic is offered as a solution to genuine philosophical problems concerning the nature of the knowing subject, and any attempt at a materialist dialectic must begin by taking these problems seriously.

In the last two sections I have attempted to sketch out an approach to this problem by interpreting Sartre as a materialist critic of Hegel.

Section 1 gives what I hope is an uncontroversial account of the nature and limits of Kant‘s criticism of empiricism, and of those elements in Kant‘s alternative to empiricism which are important for an understanding of the genesis of absolute idealism. In the second section, dealing with Hegel, I have concentrated on trying to uncover the steps which lead Hegel to identify substance with subject: in particular, his insistence on the theoretical primacy of conceptual knowledge and his consequent rejection of what can be merely meant but not said; and his definition of being as “identity with self”. I have then tried to show very briefly how the mechanisms of the dialectical logic are linked to the notion of a subject as self-identical. In the third section I deal with the attempts by Engels and Lenin to give an account of the theory of the dialectic, rather than with any possible use of dialectical reason by Marx. I try to show that they are almost entirely dependent on Hegel for their concepts, and offer no serious attempt to rethink the dialectic in a materialist context. In the fourth section I suggest one

possible way of doing this by looking at the work of Sartre. This section is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment either of Sartre or of the problems of a materialist dialectic. It is merely intended to suggest a perspective for viewing both Sartre‘s earlier and his later writings, and to [2] use this perspective, in turn, to illuminate some of the problems of a materialist dialectic. In the last section I refer briefly, and simply on the basis of my own present interests, to a number of problems which arise from the preceding discussion.

These notes obviously deal very selectively with the work of the various philosophers discussed, and in general assume a prior knowledge of the books referred to. One very important point which is not discussed at all is the question of philosophic method. While I point out that Engels has no philosophic method, I do not give an adequate account of the relation between the methods of Kant, Hegel and Sartre, and hence I do not formulate the method which I implicitly use.

These notes are not written as a “defence” of materialism and dialectics. Both terms by now carry so much excess baggage and accreted myth that I would be perfectly happy if they dropped out of circulation. Nevertheless, since they are not likely to do this, it seems useful to attempt to remove some of the accretions by reexamining the philosophical problems associated with the idea of dialectics.[3]

Kant and Empiricism

Hegel‘s dialectical logic and method were developed within the context of a specifically “idealist” philosophy. Marx and Engels use a number of spatial metaphors to describe the process of situating the dialectic within a “materialist” philosophy: the dialectic has to be turned upside down, or placed on its feet, or turned inside out. In order to understand these metaphors, and to judge what happens to the dialectic in being thus metamorphosed, we need to understand the relation between dialectics and idealism in Hegel‘s work, and we need to understand the relation between what Hegel meant by “idealism” and what Marx and Engels meant by “materialism”.

Why, and in what sense, was Hegel an idealist? It seems to me that this question can only be answered by tracing out Hegel‘s relation to the set of philosophical problems bequeathed by Kant; in particular, by trying to understand Kant‘s complex and ambiguous relation to empiricism. At one level Kant unquestioningly accepts an “empiricist” account of the nature of human reality. He accepts that, insofar as human beings are part of the sen-

sible world, they must be understood as part of the causal network that makes up that world. He thereby accepts, a) that perception has to be understood through a causal "sense-data" model of sensation; and b) that human behaviour must be interpreted in terms of a broadly sensualistic notion of desire, pleasure as the satisfaction of desire, and happiness as enduring pleasure (see CPracR 9-24). But he also shows the drastic limitations of such an account of human reality. However, [4] instead of rejecting it and beginning from the beginning again, he attempts to supplement it, by arguing that while it is valid for the empirical subject and the sensible world, these can themselves only be comprehended if we postulate in addition the existence of a transcendental subject and a supersensible world. The result is finally incoherent, but it is such as to lay the foundation for "absolute Idealism", which attempts to disentangle the theory from its empiricist roots, and thereby also cuts out any reference to the "materialist" idea of the fundamental independence of "being" from "thought" which was still contained in Kant's empiricist presuppositions. I do not want to try to give a complete summary of Kant's position here, but I do believe that it is important to remind oneself of the how and the why of Kant's argument before attempting to interpret Hegel's defence of idealism.

Kant takes a "sense-datum" model of perception so much for granted that he does not argue it or even formulate it in any detail. Intuition

> ... is only possible to man at least insofar as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled sensibility. (CPR 65)

Scattered references throughout the text give us some idea of how Kant conceived this sensibility. Sensation is "the sequence of one impression upon another", each being a unity "contained in a single moment" (CPR 131). Each sense-datum is discrete: "Different perceptions occur in the mind separately and singly" (144) Sensation involves a succession of such discrete data. Any actual manifold of intuition is a collection of sense data, [5] rather than only a single datum. In this collection the data are conjoined or related to one another in some way, but the conjunction itself is not an additional datum of the senses. In themselves the data are a mere "rhapsody of perception" (193):

> In experience, however, perceptions come together only in an accidental order, so that no necessity determining their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves. For apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition; and we can find in it no representation of any necessity which

> determines the appearances thus combined to have connected existence in space and time. (CPR 209)

There is nothing in any of the discrete sense-data which requires us to order them in any specific way. The manner in which they are to be put together to make a "picture" is apparently undetermined. This applies even to the fundamental forms of our experience, space and time.

> In order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly not only as different but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. The representation of space cannot therefore be obtained from the relation of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only öthrough this representation. (CPR 68).

Sense data can only be put together to form a spatial picture if we already have some idea of space, for each sensation, as an impression in my mind, is what it is and contains no reference to an outer. [sic] The same argument applies to the idea of a temporal order of sense-data, since each datum is in itself atemporal.

This sense-datum model is not, of course, an immediate description of our experience of perception; looking around me I perceive not a rhapsody of discrete data, but a tidy world of stable objects. Rather, it seems to be constructed from a physiological account of perception in terms of external stimulus and bodily reaction transmitted to the "mind" by the nervous system. It assumes a "realist" account of the [6] body and the world outside the body, but, pushed to its logical conclusion, undermines the possibility of such an account. Kant, however, accepts its accuracy and only wishes to show that it is incomplete.

His problem is this. Sensation itself gives only discrete data, but no relations between the data. Nevertheless we do combine them to make "pictures". How do we do this, and in what way are we entitled to do this? Is the process arbitrary, as in a kaleidoscope, in which any way of combining the elements is both permissible and interesting, or is it rule-bound, as in a jig-saw puzzle, in which there is only one legitimate pattern? We do distinguish between, on the one hand "judgements of perception", subjectively valid 'it seems to me' statements, in which no necessity of connection is claimed, and, on the other hand, "judgements of experience" in which we refer the judgement "to an object, and want the judgement to be valid for us at all times and equally for everybody". In such a judgement,

> I demand that this connection (between sensations) shall stand under a condition which makes it universally valid. I require that I and everybody must necessarily conjoin the same perceptions under the same circumstances ("Prolegomenon" pp. 56-64).

The fact is that we do make such judgements of experience, although we are not entitled to do so purely on the basis of sensation. In order to legitimise this procedure we have to ask "whether there is any knowledge that is ... independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses?" (CPR42-3). The criteria for recognising items which might qualify must be their claim to necessity and universality, neither of which can be given merely by sensation. Kant sets out to identify such items and then to see if they really constitute knowledge, that is, whether their use is legitimate.

In the case of the ideas of space and time they are necessary forms for the ordering of our sensible experience, but cannot themselves be derived from sensation, and hence are a priori. [7] They are also necessary in the sense that we cannot imagine the nonexistence of either space or time. Space and time are forms of intuition. Apart from intuition, we also think objects by means of concepts. Each concept is an ordering principle which brings together, classifies and relates various aspects of experience. The concept "dog" is used to classify a number of distinct objects of experience, and to relate them to one another and to various other objects.[255] This relating function is made explicit in the judgement:

> In every judgement there is a concept which holds of very many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. (CPR 43)

A judgement is a way of unifying objects of experience by means of concepts, and each form of judgement represents a particular way in which different bits of experience, different representations, can be brought together. Kant therefore argued that in the table of judgements established by logicians we can find an exhaustive list of the possible ways of relating aspects of experience. Leaving aside the question of the adequacy of this table, we can accept the point that judgements do unify aspects of experience, and that the categories for bringing about this unity are not given by and in the sense-data. Insofar as no organisation of our experience can occur without the use of these categories, they are universal and necessary.

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255 The odd disinterest in psychoanalysis - even in Sartre, c.f. the exchange with Pontalis - is as old, in its Anglo manifestations, as a specific British distaste for emotionality, for 'belief'.

Without these categories there can be no experience of "objects", for to postulate an object of experience is to claim that there is a rule-governed connection between certain sense-date:

> Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object. (CPR 134-5)

When I add up certain sense-data and end up with a dog, I am applying a rule for the assemblage of particular kinds of sense-data presented [8] in a particular order by the forms of intuition. The rule may be seen as a blue-print for the manufacture of the experience of a dog. A dog is a very complex animal existing in a number of sensory "dimensions". Yet I glance briefly at the object in the garden and immediately identify it as a dog. In so identifying it I am making predictions about it. I am predicting that it would he a certain appearance if looked at from other perspectives, that it would bleed if cut, and so on. In particular instances I might be wrong, and it might turn out not to be a dog. But it is only possible to even try to verify my initial judgement insofar as an object is always defined in terms of a rule for the assemblage of possible intuitions. It is only in terms of the rule that I can go beyond the limited experience of it that I have had to make predictions as to other possible experiences of it, and then to use these predictions to verify that it actually is a dog. Without the rule, the possibility of verification would not arise, and so they could be no ordered experience whatsoever.

But without an ordered experience of objects there can be no experience of the subject.

> Only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of representations in one consciousness do I call them one and all *mine*. For otherwise I should have as many-sided and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself. Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all *my* determinate thoughts (CPR 154.)

In order to talk about myself as having a particular experience of a sensedatum, it must be possible to distinguish between myself and the particular experience. If there is no identical I (in some sense of the term "identical") linking the experiences, then we are left with a "many-coloured and diverse self", which is in effect nothing other than the sequence of

appearances; it is a sequence of selves each of which is in fact identical with the experience which is supposed to be *its* experience.[256] But the necessary condition for distinguishing the I from the [9] sequence of experiences is precisely that there should be a "synthetic unity of the manifold generated apriori". Only if there is a certain objective necessity in the relation of at least some of the bits of my experience to one another is it possible for me to distinguish between myself and my experience, and hence to have a concept of myself as a subject identical through time. It must be possible to distinguish, in the temporal sequence of actual and possible experiences, between the order of appearances for the subject and some other possible order experienced by the subject as being outside its control. Since this experience of objectivity is only possible in virtue of the application of the relational categories, it follows that we are in fact justified in using them.

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256 What is it that stops Turner from saying here "Kant here already anticipates today's collective narcissism, which is the same thing Hegel would later call *idealism*, and in Sartre is called 'positivism'"? It's the entirely *different* meanings of the word 'idealism' in Russell - in Analytic Philosophy altogether -, compared to the 'Continent'. For the Empiricism from which Turner is trying to extricate himself here, 'idealism' is that caricature Russell makes of it: an 'idealist' is someone who *denies reality*, for whom 'everything is in the mind'. "There is an emphasis upon mind as opposed to matter, which leads in the end to the assertion that only mind exists." (Russell [1961]: *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 677.) Neither in Russell nor in the Analytic Philosophy he inspired is there any discussion of the way, in Kant, the meaning of the word 'critique' is *entirely new*, with regard to the entire post-Aristotelian conception of 'truth', 'logic' and 'authority', and what this *new* conception of critique has to do with that relationship which *Turner* here conceives of something *static*: the relationship of the 'I' and the 'sensedatum'. This 'self-objectification' in which Russell engages here is characteristic of Analytic Philosophy right through to the eighties: "According to Kant, the outer world causes only the matter of sensation, but our own mental apparatus orders this matter in space and time, and supplies the concepts by means of which we understand experience". (Russell, op. cit., p. 680.) To call what in Kant is termed the awareness of the antinomies 'an argument' - in the ordinary sense -, is already pretty weak, though in Ameriks the word 'critical' does at least get a mention: "The 'critical' solution to this contradiction is to observe that the whole argument rests on a dogmatic premise ..." (Karl Ameriks [1999]: "Immanuel Kant" in: *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy*, p. 499.) Turner will later use the shorthand 'A=A' for exactly *this* dogma, the so-called 'identity' of subject and object, without realising that his own empiricist presuppositions are keeping him from understanding how this is used in the entire tradition from Hegel onwards. It's this empiricism (or 'naturalism', as Henrich prefers to call it) that's the common denominator between Analytic Philosophy and the Leninists, and is explicitly rejected in Sartre - this is why the charge of 'positivism' covers both Analytic Philosophy *and* what in Sartre is called dogmatic materialism. Turner doesn't notice that the entire discussion about what he calls the 'knowing subject' doesn't start - as *he* thinks it does - with 'dialectical materialism' (i.e. *post*-Marx) but right here: in Kant, in the notion of critique *itself*.

However, Kant now has to elaborate on the basic sense datum model in order to give some account of the mechanism of synthesis through the application of the categories. Roughly, this synthesis involves:

a) a number of discrete elements, brought together by the synthesis of apprehension in intuition:

> Each representation, insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold ... it must first be run through and held together. (CPR 131).

b) each of these representations must not only be preserved as a "now" in a sequence of nows, it must also be reproduced in the present:

> If I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations ... and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained (CPR 133).

This is the synthesis of reproduction in imagination.

c) the reproduced representations must be organised into a whole, according to a pattern or rule. This is the synthesis of recognition in a concept:

> If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now hover before me, have been added to one another in succession, I should never know that a total is being produced through this successive addition of unit to unit, and so would remain ignorant of the number. For the concept of the number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis. (CPR 134). [10]

The synthesis of apprehension in intuition occurs through the application of the pure forms of intuition, space and time. The intermediary between this and the application of the category is what Kant calls a 'schema', which is a "representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept" (KS 182). A schema is a rule of temporal order, and each category coincides with a specific rule of temporal order of representations. Thus the representations received by the subject are first organised into spatial and temporal order by the pure forms of sensibility, and then this order functions as the basis for a further ordering into rule-bound sequences of possible and actual experiences by the imagination and by the understanding which as it were crystallises and identifies the experience by the application of the a priori categories.

Much of this is very obscure, and in particular Kant does not give a clear account of the nature and function of the schemata. But what is important here is the contrast between Kant's account and the simple empiricist sense-datum model. In the latter, the subject is simply a receiver; purely

sensible intuition is nothing but receptivity. It cannot go beyond one representation to relate it to others. Its history would be rather like an unused movie, in which a series of pictures sit impotently next to one another. By showing that such a model makes it impossible even to conceive of a subject, Kant has shown that it is necessary to understand the subject as being in some way spontaneous as well as receptive. The subject synthesises experience, not only in making judgements, but, more fundamentally, in our very experience of objects. This experience is always of whole which go beyond what is immediately given in perception, towards what is already past perception and also towards continuous rule-based prediction of possible future perceptions. We therefore have to understand the subject not simply as a present consciousness of a present representation, but as what Strawson calls "a temporally extended point of view on the world" (Strawson 104).[11]

This is connected with the view of a concept as being a *rule*, rather than a special kind of *image* or representation. For Hume,

> Abstract ideas are ... in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representations. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning be the same as if it were universal. (*Treatise*, p. 28).

Here an abstract idea is a special kind of image, or, rather, an ordinary image with a special use. Disputes among the empiricists concerned the nature of this image, but all accepted that the abstract idea was fundamentally an image. A rule, on the other hand, is constructed and articulated in quite a different way from an image. Very roughly, one may say that a rule is a proposition or a set of propositions, while an image is a picture. The rule is expressed in words, which are in turn expressed in other words, insofar as each word is itself a (conceptual) rule. If we think of a concept as being a picture, its meaning is in some sense immediately all present in the picture as we "look" at it. But if we think of it as a set of proposition, each of which extends into other propositions, then we have to try to understand thought itself in quite a different way. It can no longer be in any sense a mere passive "looking at pictures". Consequently the thinking subject also must be articulated in a different way, insofar as it has to somehow hold together and synthesise this set of rules.

A "realist" or a "materialist" view will have to be able to find room within its own parameters for an account of this [12] spontaneous and synthesising role of the subject. Kant, however, develops his own account in the direc-

tion of idealism, as a direct consequence of the sense-datum model from which he begins.[257]

> That in which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form cannot itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all experience is given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation. (CPR 66).

But if these forms lie in the mind, they may be constitutive of our experience of the object, but they can tell us nothing of the thing as it is in itself, independent of our experience of it. This has the paradoxical result that not even the category of causality can be applied to the thing in itself,[258] although the theory of perception which has lead Kant to postulate a thing in

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257 Turner is encumbered here by two contrary assumptions of the time:
a) by the positivist misconception that 'idealism' - in Kant through to Hegel - leads to a type of solipsism in which the "spontaneous and synthesising role of the subject" loses its 'foundation' in the 'real world', and is hence dependent upon a later generation of 'realists' and 'materialists' to put it right;
b) by the French 'existentialist' reading of Marx going in the diametrically opposite direction: rescuing individuality and autonomy, as they see it, from the dogmatic Marxism of the Communist countries. On the first assumption Kant has lost his grip on the 'real' world; on the second that an account of the 'knowing subject' had to wait for Sartre and the existentialists before 'subjectivity' could be understood. In fact, both the 'materialism' and the 'dialectics' is already right there in Kant. The 'picture'/'rule' distinction, which Turner here regards as a problem that can only be solved independently of 'idealism', then turns out to be indistinguishable from what, within this self-same 'idealism', is thematised by a formula Turner himself uses: "A=A". (The one 'A' standing for the word or concept or symbol, the other for what it is that is being referred to or perceived or 'denoted'.) The purported loss of realism in Kant evaporates once the baselessness of the *naturalist* assumptions presupposed by such a reading become evident. The idea that Kant's point of departure is a 'sense-datum model' is pure fiction, based on a confusion with *Hume*.

258 The 'thing-in-itself' is not based on a 'theory of perception', but on a bit of history of philosophy that Turner - on positivist premisses - feels can be ignored. Or rather: the notion that epistemology and the history of philosophy is collapsible into a 'theory of perception' (of either empiricist or Leninist kind) *is* positivism. (Habermas definition: that we deny reflection *is* positivism.) The form/content distinction Kant here invokes as a response to Humean scepticism is a bit of 'radical Enlightenment' based on Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolf, a consequence of the insight that neither causes, nor time, nor space can be *observed* - in the sense in which empiricists use 'experience'. Since we can neither observe nor ignore them, we're forced into a reflection on the way we use them - a reflection not possible in that self-objectifying 'stance' in which we treat ourselves as *objects*. Turner is here on a watershed between two major streams in Western thought, though he is by no means aware of it. Freedom and autonomy can mean either the autonomy gained by freedom *from* the passions (Freud: freedom from 'id'-forces, from dissociation, fear, primary process thinking), or freedom *to* choose one's own 'ends', also, and in particular, *politically*.

itself assumes its causal action in sensation. Furthermore, in my attempts to understand myself as subject I am faced with the same limitations. I can have no knowledge of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself through the form of time, as the inner sense, and by the mediation of the categories. Beyond this I can only know that, for my experience to be mine, it has to be possible for the "I think" to accompany it[259], and this

> I think expresses the identity of the transcendental subject through the changing series of perceptions. We can affirm that it is, but we can say nothing about what it is. We cannot even apply the category of substance to it; it has a purely logical significance (see CPR 334).

This faces us with a similar paradox to that concerning the thing in itself. The account of sensation starts from a "natural scientific" causal account, but we have now reached a position from which this is impossible:

> The reason for this is that it is not given to us to observe our own mind with any other intuition than that of the inner sense; and that it is yet precisely in the mind that the secret of the source of our sensibility is located. (CPR 287). [13]

Kant has settled the problem of the I as a temporally extended point of view on the world by placing the transcendental I outside them. This also has consequences for his moral theory. Here again he accepts a "sensualist" account of human behaviour and motivation as being at least a partly correct description, but, through the distinction between the transcendental I and the empirical I he wishes to supplement it with an account of the relation between morality and reason. The crucial point in his argument is the link established between freedom and reason. He makes the distinction between a heteronomous will, which is subject to determination from inclinations imposing themselves on it from outside, and an autonomous will which gives itself its own principles of action. The heteronomous will has its ends given to it; it may or may not succeed in achieving those ends, but what Kant is concerned with is not the freedom to realise an end, but the question of the freedom to choose ends themselves. Once it is acccepted that a particular kind of being can choose its own ends, once it is established that ends are problematic, the question arises as to what ends ought to be chosen.

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259 Seeing that Turner himself mentions Lacan, it is again puzzling to explain why he falls back on a Cartesian argument here, isn't at all interested in the idea - despite the huge interest in this at the time in Europe - that, in Kant, this is an adumbration of what would now be called *projection* - in both the individual and collective sense. Somehow Turner misses the entire psychoanalysis debate, from Fromm through to Marcuse and the Frankfurt School.

That is, ends are no longer simply accepted, but reasons are required for them. But in an important sense one demonstrates freedom by the simple action of oneself placing ends in question by demanding reasons for them. Thus Kant can assert

> "that every being who cannot act except *under the idea of freedom* is by this alone - from a practical point of view - really free,"

since to act on the assumption that one is free is to be faced with ought questions. Rational beings necessarily act under the idea of freedom, since

> We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements; for in that case the subject would attribute the determination of his power of judgement, not to his reason, but to an impulsion. Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences. (ML 116).

A rational being will only accept conclusions which have been arrived at by a process of reasoning which at least appears to be autonomous, in the sense that [14] each step in the argument is both necessary to it and is validated within the argument, rather than relying on some unanalysed prejudice which is, as it were, imposed upon the argument from outside, Thus a rational being is autonomous, and so is faced with the question of ends.

This question is itself resolved by showing that the rational being is in fact an end in itself. From this Kant develops the following formulation of the Categorical Imperative:

> All maxims as proceeding from our own making of law ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature (ML 100),

where a "kingdom" is "a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws" (ML 100). To ask for reasons is to recognise reason, and one's own rationality as an end in itself. In acting rationally the will makes universal law, by turning a rational principle into a maxim of conduct. The law as maxim has no hold over the will other than the will's own affirmation of it as law, and this affirmation comes from the will's awareness of its own status as a rational being. Both the form of the law and its matter are given in one and the same movement.

However, for Kant the relation between the idea of freedom and the idea of causal determinism in the natural world can only be thought by placing the subject qua free and rational outside time, in the supersensible. The free subject is the transcendental not the empirical ego. This mean that it is not possible to give any account of the relation between the two. In particular

no account can be given of the development of morality as the move from heteronomy of the will to autonomy of the will. Neither is it possible to give a unified account of human fulfillment. A dichotomy is maintained between happiness as sensuous contentment and that intellectual contentment which comes from the awareness of oneself as being free in obeying the moral law (see e.g. C Prac R 123). Associated with this is a problem concerning my relation to other people. On the one hand, although the idea of a Kingdom of Ends implies that [15] reason is, in an important sense, social, Kant cannot clearly articulate the relation between reason as lodged in the atemporal transcendental ego and reason as social intersubjectivity. On the other hand, since he makes happiness dependent purely on an internal feeling, and since there can be no guarantee that what produces such a feeling in me will at the same time produce it in others, it follows for him that if my happiness does coincide with that of other people this can only be accidental. Duty, as the principle of my relation to others, cannot be derived from happiness, as the principle of my relation to myself, which is determined by "my finite nature as a being of needs" (CPrac R 24). The idea of the Kingdom of Ends lays the basis for an account of human motivation which shows the extent to which fundamental human needs, far from being mutually incompatible, actually require the other's satisfaction for their own satisfaction. But he cannot develop this fully, because of the fundamental dichotomy between the transcendental and the empirical.

Kant attempts to resolve some of these problems by two "postulates of pure practical reason": the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The postulate of immortality allows us to conceive of a long process in which virtue, as the complete rational control of self in obedience to the moral law, may finally be achieved. God overcomes the apparent divergence of virtue and happiness by guaranteeing that they will in fact coincide in a Kingdom of God "in which nature and morality come into harmony" (see CPracR 129-30). This however only further confuses the problem of the relation between history and the atemporal, while at the same time legitimating a political quietism in terms of which citizens must obey even unjust laws of an unjust government.

Looked at as a whole, Kant's model contains four elements, concisely summarised in the following passage from the *Critique of Judgement*:

> The causality of freedom itself (of pure and practical reason) is the causality of a natural cause subordinated to nature (i.e. of the subject considered as man and therefore as phenomenon). The intelligible, which is [16] thought under freedom, contains the ground of the determination of this natural cause in a further inexpli-

> cable way (just as that intelligible does which constitutes the supersensible substrate of nature). (CJ 32-3 note 2).

In the Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason Kant has tried to give an account of the relation between the transcendental ego, on the one hand, and both the empirical ego and the natural world of experience on the other hand. In the *Critique of Judgement* he attempts to complete the system by giving an account of the relation between the supersensible substrate of nature, nature itself, and the subject.

He approaches the problem by way of the difficulties faced by us when we attempt to understand how nature works.

> The forms of nature are so manifold, and there are so many modifications of the universal transcendental natural concepts left undetermined by the laws given a priori by the understanding - because these only concern the possibility of nature in general (as an object of sense) - that there must be laws for these also. These, as empirical, may be contingent from the point of view of our understanding; and yet, if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature requires) they must be regarded as necessary in virtue of a principle of the unity of the manifold, though it be unknown to us. The reflective judgement, which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires on that account a principle which it cannot borrow from experience, because its function is to establish the unity of all empirical principles under higher ones, and hence to establish the possibility of their systematic subordination. (CJ 15-16, KU 88)

There are two distinct questions involved here. One involves the procedure to be adopted by judgement in attempting to give a unified account of nature. But the second concerns the foundation of the unity of nature itself. Phenomenal nature is nothing but a mass of discrete sense data, organised into objects by the categories of the mind. It has no intrinsic unity, not even that of space:

> If we were justified in regarding material beings as beings in themselves, then the unity that constitutes the ground of the possibility of [17] natural formations would simply be the unity of space. But space is no real ground of the products, but only their formal condition ... (CJ 257).

On the other hand, the constitutive role of the understanding is also not sufficient to account for the unity of nature, since it only provides very general categories which leave actual behaviour undetermined. The category of cause says that A must have a cause, but not that its cause should be B. But B on its own is finally a mere manifold of sense-data and therefore does not have that solid being on the basis of which we would feel comfortable saying that A simply contingently is caused by B. If B is going to cause A next

time around - and in order even to attempt to understand nature we must assume that it is going to do so - then the ground for this must lie somewhere other than in B itself.

Since for Kant the unity of the object, as necessary connection according to a rule, is guaranteed by the understanding, the only way in which he can actually conceptualise the unity of nature is in terms of imposition on a manifold by an understanding. Thus he concludes that

> Particular empirical laws, in respect of what is in them left undetermined by these universal laws (the categories), must be considered in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an understanding (although not our understanding) had furnished them to our cognitive faculties (zum Behuf unserer Erkenntnisvermögen ... gegeben hatte), so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature. (CJ 16, KU 89).

This then accounts for the unity of nature, and at the same time it provides the clue to the ordering principle which we need in attempting to understand nature as a unified system. Kant argues that something which has its ground in an understanding is purposed, and so we may take the notion of the purposiveness (zweckmässigkeit) of nature as our ordering principle. Assuming that nature is a purposively ordered whole, we can attempt to understand the ways in which the various parts complement one another.[18] This argument permits the conflation of two different meanings of "necessity". We may accept that there is a certain necessity in the way in which sense-data are to be combined: a jig-saw puzzle rather than a kaleidoscope. The objects in the world have a certain structure independent of our will, and this structure imposes a certain organisation of the sense-data. From a "realist" position this has no implications for the structure itself: whether the structure could be otherwise, or whether it is necessarily as it is remains open. The imposition of a necessary pattern for organising the sense-data is a function of the independent "thereness" of the world, and this independent thereness still remains to be investigated and interpreted. But for Kant there is no independent thereness of the natural world of experience. It can only be understood as deriving its necessity from an understanding. Hence the pattern of the world is finally to be understood as being "necessary" in the same sense as is the pattern in which sense-data are combined; it has to be thus and no other way. It must thus be rational, and hence have the form of being purposed.

Kant's own development of this remains confused, since the actual structure of the human understanding remains contingent. He fails to give any account of why there should be just these categories and forms, although

such an account would be required in order to establish a rational necessity, as opposed to a "contingent necessity". Thus he also retains an ambiguity concerning the sense in which something has its origin in the understanding. In an ordinary sense, something is purposed insofar as it results from a prior idea (or intention) in the understanding. But the categories are not "in the understanding" in this sense, and so we cannot say that the organisation of our experience in terms of the categories is purposed by us. But Kant nevertheless wishes to say that nature as a whole is purposive insofar as it derives its unity from the categories of an understanding other than our own. Kant never explicates this problem, but it is evident that, unless one can in some sense interpret the categories of our understanding themselves, as other than contingently given, the concept of purposiveness is at least misleading. This is brought out by Hegel in his criticism of the failure to deduce the categories. For the moment, though, I wish only to point to the concepts function in the system. [19]

From Kant's point of view, the central problem in the system concerns the relation between freedom as the characteristic of the transcendental subject, and determinism, as the characteristic of nature.

> Nature must be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity of law to its forms it at least harmonises with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom. (CJ 14)

The idea of purposiveness enables him to establish such a harmony in two different ways, in relation to two different types of judgement. The first is the aesthetic judgement of the beautiful or of the sublime; in particular, the judgement of beauty.

There are certain peculiarities about such a judgement. We both accept that the judgement that a certain object is beautiful concerns our interaction with the object, and in that sense is subjective, but also insist that the judgement is universally valid for all observers. This can only be the case if the content of the judgement can be universally communicated, which is not the case with judgements of physical pleasure. It can only be the case if it refers to some experience available to all individuals. In so far as it is subjective, it cannot involve my subjective peculiarities, but must be connected with that in my subjectivity which is common to the subjectivity of all other individuals. Since all we have in common is the possession of the same cognitive faculties, the experience must concern the relation between these faculties. Sensation, imagination and understanding are all involved in the experience of an object, but the experience of beauty involves mere

form, rather than pleasurable sensation. It thus involves imagination and understanding, not sensation as such. [20]

In experience, the function of the imagination is to schematise the discrete sense-data. It acts freely when it does this without concepts, but it becomes rule-bound when operating in conjunction with the understanding and its categories. There are two possible ways in which the two faculties can relate here. Either understanding imposes its rule (forcefully, as it were), or the synthesis of the imagination is such as virtually already to exhibit and conform to the rule, in which case the imagination "in its freedom harmonises with the understanding in its conformity to law" (CJ 129). This is the experience of beauty: a harmony between imagination and understanding, which is subjective but also universal, because it applies to the form or nature of the understanding and the imagination, and not to the particular imagination & understanding of one or more individuals. The representation which is given us has the form of zweckmässigkeit (suitability, fitness, purposiveness); it fits in with the nature of the cognitive faculties. The pleasure in the beautiful object is "the subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation between the cognitive faculties in the act of judging a sensible object in general." (CJ 132).

The antinomy of taste involves the mutually contradictory but demonstrable arguments that "everyone has his own taste", but "There may be a dispute about taste". This contradiction is only resolvable if we make the concept of taste indeterminable, by accepting a) that the experience of beauty is the experience of the subjective purposiveness of nature for the judgement, but that b) this concept cannot be used in proof, to conclusively settle any argument about the beauty of an object, because it refers to the supersensible, insofar as "the determining ground lies perhaps in the concept of that which may be the supersensible strata of humanity" (CJ 185). Thus we can only comprehend the peculiarities of the judgement of beauty if we postulate, as a regulative principle, that nature is purposive for the perceiving subject, in the sense of being coordinated with the nature of the subject by a noumenal understanding. [21]

An analogous argument applies to the second aesthetic judgement, the judgement of the sublime. While the beautiful is an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime is an indeterminate concept of reason, that faculty which seeks always for totality. The experience of the sublime is connected with "a representation of *limitlessness*, yet with a superadded thought of its totality." (CJ 90). That is, it involves a sense of size or force so great that our imagination cannot compass it, yet we are aware, precisely insofar as we recognise that our imagination has failed to encompass it, that

we have a further supersensible faculty that transcends the limits of the sense-bound imagination. Yet because we ourselves also remain bound by the categorial limits of the phenomenal world we cannot turn the idea of totality given by reason into an intuition of the totality. The tension between imagination and reason remains, and the sublime is "a pleasure which is only possible through the mediation of a displeasure" (CJ 109). Yet the relation remains purposive, in that the imagination here harmonises directly with the reason in its search for totality.

The second type of judgement which can be used to establish a possible harmony between law and freedom is the teleological judgement. Kant contends that we are justified in using such judgements because the behaviour of organised natural wholes cannot be explained in terms of mere mechanical motion. In such wholes the parts not only fit purposively together but actually reciprocally produce one another in an interaction between whole and part in which the whole may be said to function as end and the parts as means. Such wholes are

> objective material purposes which afford objective reality to the concept of purpose in nature ... and so they give to the science of nature the basis for a teleology, i.e. a mode of judgement about natural objects according to a special principle which otherwise we should be by no means justified in introducing (because we cannot see a priori the possibility of this kind of causality.) (CJ 222).

But once we admit some natural purposes, we are "justified, nay called upon" (CJ. 226) to treat nature as a whole as naturally purposive; to assume as a guiding principle for the reflective judgement that nothing in nature is contingent, and that each thing may be understood in terms of its relation to other things and to the whole. [22]

In relation to our ordinary mode of reasoning this gives rise to an antinomy: "All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to mere mechanical laws" versus "Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws." Unless we can somehow reduce organised wholes to mechanical principles of nature, which Kant flatly states cannot be done (CJ 248), this antinomy can only be resolved by treating the whole of nature as designed by a noumenal understanding which we can postulate but not comprehend. We must "seek the supreme ground of these purposive combinations in an original understanding as the cause of the world " (CJ 298). Although we cannot comprehend this understanding, we can at least contrast it with our own. Our understanding is discursive, in the sense that particulars in the world are not determined by the a priori universals of

our understanding. Instead, on the basis of each particular we have to seek the universal law which would determine it. A supersensible understanding which determined the whole system of nature, on the other hand, would be able to proceed directly from its own universals to each particular; to be more precise, it would "move from the synthetic universal, or intuition of a whole as a whole, to the particular, that is to say, from the whole to the parts" (CJ255) Such a directly intuitive understanding Kant calls an intellectus archetypus. This intellectus archetypus can proceed intuitively from whole to part because it is the principles of its own understanding which give the laws to the whole. It is both intuitive comprehension and cause of the world.

Its actual purpose must remain a secret to us, but we can nevertheless, by seeking to understand the ways in which things in the world are purposive for one another, look to see whether there appears to be some ultimate purpose towards which all others point. Kant's answer here is that Man

> is the ultimate purpose of creation here on earth, because he is the only being upon it who can furnish a concept of purpose and who can, by his reason, make out of an aggregate of purposively formal things a system of purposes. (CJ276)

To investigate nature thus is to investigate from the point of view of [23] man as a choosing being. Man develops his capacity for choice through culture as the freeing of the will from the despotism of desire. The crucial element in this process is the development of a civil community in which "lawful authority in a whole ... is opposed to the abuse of their conflicting freedom" (282). We are thus entitled to conceive of the Kingdom of Ends as the ultimate purpose of nature, and hence to interpret nature as being in harmony with reason, for which the Kingdom of Ends is also the ultimate purpose.

The idea of an historical development of reason is discussed in greater detail in the "Idea for a Human History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", where Kant is investigating the possibility that there may be some hidden purpose beneath the apparent surface chaos of history. He connects this with man's capacity for reason, which neither works instinctively nor develops instinctively, but "requires trial, practice and instruction to enable it to progress gradually from one stage of insight to the next" (PW47). Reason can thus only be fully developed in the species. The method chosen by nature for this is the

> unsocial-sociability of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continued resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up. (PW 44)

Human capacities are developed in this struggle, so that eventually "a pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole" (PW 45). We are still far from that endstate, but the increasing interdependence of states and of individuals brought about by trade and industry is moving us in the right direction. In order better to understand what is required for further development we should examine the history of past states to find out

> how their defects lead to their overthrow, but in such a way that a germ of enlightenment always survived, developing further with each revolution, and prepared the way for a subsequent higher level of improvement. (PW 52)

In the *Critique of Judgement*, then, Kant introduces three new concepts to try to give a more coherent account of his basic phenomenon-noumenen model. The aesthetic judgement leads to an appreciation of the harmony between nature and human cognitive faculties. The necessary regulative principle of [24] the purposiveness of nature gives us the idea of an intellectus archetypus whose understanding would be intuitive and constitutive, rather than discursive, and who is effectively the ground of nature. The idea of purpose leads us to recognise the full development of the rational capacities of the human species as the ultimate purpose of nature, and hence to recognise an historical process working towards this result.

This final synthesis is not intended by Kant to give actual (metaphysical) knowledge of the noumenal world and its relation to our phenomenal experience. He insists throughout that these are only regulative principles, which we need to employ in the necessary task of trying to make sense of the world of experience. But this prohibition itself rests on the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. Kant's regulative principles were available to be applied as factual descriptions once the continuing incoherence of the system as a whole led to the rejection of this distinction.

For his final synthesis does not of course work, and the relation between phenomenon and noumenon does remain fundamentally incoherent. We may not think of the relation as causal, since causality is a phenomenal category, but it is not clear how a supersensible ground, which operates "in a further inexplicable way" (CJ 32 note) is to be distinguished from a cause. The sense-datum theory continues to rest on the presupposition of an external cause. Moreover, the relation between the historical development of reason and the atemporal rational transcendental ego is inexplicable, whether in the case of the moral history of the individual subject attempting to move from heteronomy to autonomy, or in the historical process as a whole. If rational behaviour is the endstate in human history, fully-devel-

oped human reason does not occur before this point is reached. But this would seem to imply that the Categorical Imperative, as the rational affirmation of the rational actor as an end-in-itself, can only be understood by human beings at or at least near the end of the historical process. In this case the arguments for immortality and the existence of God fall away, insofar as they are both dependent [25] on the empirical impossibility of the Kingdom of Ends, in which there is some correspondence between virtue and happiness. In any event the tension between sensible happiness and moral contentment remains unresolved. While human reality remains split in two human motivation necessarily also is split in two. [26]

Kant and Hegel

Hegel accepts Kant‘s criticism of empiricism and the key role which he gives to the notion of synthesis, but attempts to develop the theory in such a way as to remove some of the contradictions and inconsistencies to which I have pointed. His criticism and development of Kant‘s theory is to a considerable extent mediated through the early writings of Fichte and Schelling, but I shall largely ignore their work in this summary.

If a concept is a rule, or a propositional structure, rather than an image or picture, then the question arises as to the nature of the unity of the concept. For Hegel, the importance of Kant‘s work lies in the fact that in it “the unity which constitutes the essence of the concept is recognised to be the original and synthetic unity of apperception”. (SL 11. 218) In perception, it is through the unity of the concept that the object is an object, and not a mere subjective combination of sensation. The Ego thus penetrates the object and reduces it to its own form, universality. The concept is simultaneously universality and individuality, or what Hegel terms negativity and determination, and it is the synthetic unity of these two features which characterises the Ego:

> Now Ego is this unity which, first, is pure and self-relating, and is so not immediately but abstracting from every determinateness and content and passing back into the freedom of boundless self-equality. It is thus *universality*: unity which is self-unity only by virtue of this negative attitude which appears as abstraction and therefore contains dissolved within itself all determinateness. Secondly and equally immediately Ego as self-relating negativity is *individuality*, or absolute determinedness which opposes itself to and excludes Other: it is individual personality (S L 11.217/8)

While revealing this fundamental structure of both the concept and the subject, Kant however failed to develop it in any coherent way. The various elements of his model: the categories, the forms of intuition, the different faculties, are collected purely empirically, without any attempt to develop them out of the fundamental unity, and as a consequence the unity of the 'I think' is obscured by the heterogenous collection which makes up the knowing subject as a whole. So Hegel tries to remedy this by investigating the unity of the subject, and arguing that the various aspects of the subject can be understood only in and through this unity. His philosophy is a description of the necessary structure of the subject. [27]

But this account of the nature of the subject is given within the context of the identification of subject with substance or, more broadly, the identity of thought and being. In the *History of Philosophy* Hegel argues that the task which faced "modern German philosophy" was that of "taking as its object the unity of thought and being ... and comprehending it, that is, laying hold of the inmost significance of necessity, the Notion" (Vol.111. p.409) Kant carried out the 'formal aspect' of this task by grasping thought itself as the ultimate - that is, as constitutive of the object but he understood the whole process as subjective, so that "the capacity of knowing the absolute is denied to it" (111.425), and at the same time Kant "can supply no reality to this essence of self-consciousness" (111. 426) That is, Kant leaves the being-in-itself as unknowable. This is because for Kant the criterion for truth must finally include something which is externally given to the subject, but the in-itself cannot be so given. Hegel, however, rejects both elements in this argument.

Kant's argument concerning the criterion for truth is this:

> If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all others, for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the cognition to which it relates, although it contains something which may be affirmed of other objects. Now a universal criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their object.(CPR 67)

Thus, with respect to the matter of the object, as that which specifies and distinguishes it, there can be no universal criterion. To attempt to abstract from the content is for Kant equivalent to abstracting from all relation to the object. He wishes to say, I think, that the criterion for the truth of the proposition "This desk is brown" in some sense includes the desk, so that if we ask for a universal criterion, this would mean abstracting from the desk; we

would be asking for a criterion which would not refer at all to the mere unconceptualised givenness of the desk.

For Hegel, on the other hand, what is entirely specific to the desk cannot be conceptualised, or expressed in universal form, and therefore cannot be either true or false. He writes

> It would be absurd, we are told, to ask for a criterion of the truth of the content of cognition; - but, according to the definition, it is not the content which constitutes truth, but its correspondence with the Notion. A content such as is spoken of here, that is, without Notion, is notionless and therefore essenceless; of course it is impossible to ask for the criterion of the truth of such an entity, [28] but for the opposite reason, namely because, lacking notion, it is not the requisite correspondence and cannot be anything but what belongs to truthless opinion (wahrheitslose Meinung). (SL 11.228 WL.11.267)

Thus Hegel wishes to leave "the sense-material, the manifold of intuition", which is mere wahrheitslose Meinung, and instead engage in "a consideration of the Notion and of the categories in and for themselves", which involves "a speculative method in philosophy" (SL 11.228) This speculative method involves the acceptance that what Kant describes as the purely formal element in fact has its own special content, which it is the task of philosophy to make explicit. In doing this philosophy is uncovering the structure of the objective in the subject. It is not merely asserting, as did Schelling, that it is possible to have an "intellectual intuition" of the nature of the object, but it is offering a rational method, not limited to the privileged few gifted with intellectual intuition, and available for universal rational application:

> Philosophy is in its own nature capable of being universal, for its groundwork is thought and it is through thought that man is man. (*History of Philosophy* Vol. 111 p. 520)

"Meinen" and the Primacy of Knowledge

It seems to me to be important to distinguish two claims made by Hegel in the above discussion. The first claim is that it is possible to develop a rational philosophical method which will help us to understand the structure of a knowing subject by investigating the preconditions for the possibility of conceptual thought. The second claim concerns the possibility of thereby also in some sense grasping the nature of 'being', or of the object. That is, it is possible to distinguish between the claim to be able to offer a universal criterion of knowledge, and the claim to be able to give a rational account

of the ego as synthetic unity of apperception. There are, I think, two steps in the process which leads Hegel to identify these two claims. The first has its roots in Kant‘s acceptance of the empirical dissolution of the sensuous world. (see EL 86’90). Like Kant, Hegel tends to accept rather than to argue this, as in the above reference to wahrheitslose Meinung and as in this passage:

> But if the given material of intuition and the manifold of ideation are taken as the real in opposition to that which is thought and to the Notion, then this is a view the renunciation of which is not only a condition of philosophy, but is assumed even by religion; for how can these be needed and have [29] significance if the fugitive and superficial appearance of the sensuous and the individual are taken for truth? (SL 11. 222)

Because the sensuous is ‘fugitive and superficial appearance’ it can have no independent being of its own. At the same time it is not conceptualisable and hence has a vanishing significance within the speculative philosophy. This emerges at two crucial points in Hegel‘s philosophy: the discussion of sense-certainty at the beginning of the *Phenomenology*, and the discussion of Being and Nothingness at the beginning of the *Logic*.

In his discussion of the idea that sense-certainty gives the real truth, and the essential reality, Hegel points out that in whatever way we attempt to describe the object of sense-certainty we necessarily use universal terms which refer to more than what is directly present, so that our description of what is directly present is necessarily mediated by what is not present. This applies even to terms such as This, Here, Now, insofar as, for example, the Here and the Now are defined by their relation to the not-here and the not-now. and so to assert that something is here and now is to place it within a certain relation to other heres and other nows. Thus, we do not present it to ourselves as universal, but we *utter* what is universal; in other words we do not actually and absolutely say what in this sense-certainty we really mean ... it is not possible at all for us even to express in words any sensuous existence which we “mean” (PhM 152. PhG 85). We can, that is, mean the immediate, but we cannot say it. When we try to say it we are left not with the concrete object which sense-certainty claims but with the most abstract of universal, pure ‘being’. Now the distinction between what we can only mean and what we can actually say, in the sense of expressing in words, is important and interesting. Faced with an object, we can say many things about it, but each predicate that we attribute to it has the form of a universal: blue, hard etc; it is shared with other objects and so fails to specify the particularity of this object.

No combination of universals can exhaustively specify this particularity. Finally, then, the particularity can only be *meant*; it can never be *said*. Conceptual knowledge cannot grasp the object in its immediacy.

The question is, what is to be made of this distinction? Referring to those who speak of the existence of external objects as absolute certainty and truth, Hegel writes:

> They 'mean', then, doubtless this bit of paper here, which is quite different from that bit over there: but they speak of actual things, external or sensible objects, absolutely individual, real and so on; that is, [30] they say about them what is simply universal. Consequently what is called unspeakable is nothing else than what is untrue, irrational, something barely and simply 'meant'. (PHM 160 PH-G 92)

And, immediately before this he has written that somebody attempting to describe this piece of paper would finally have to admit "von einem Dinge zu sprechen, das nicht ist" (PhG 92 PhMl60). Thus what cannot be said is untrue and irrational, is not, or does not hold out or exist ("nicht bestehen bleibt oder ist" (PhG 87).

The rejection of sense-certainty is made easier by the account of perception as transient, but it also involves more than this, as becomes evident in the analogous argument at the beginning of the *Logic*. It involves the assumption of the primacy of knowledge, in the sense that, to count as real, something must be capable of being expressed in concepts. What cannot be conceptually expressed may simply be expelled from the domain of philosophy. This manifests itself in the treatment of the relation between Being and Nothingness in the *Logic*. The *Logic* begins with the decision "to consider thought as such which requires a pure, presuppositionless, unmediated beginning":

> It must, therefore, first be something immediate or, rather, the immediate itself. As it cannot have any determination relatively to Other, so also it cannot hold in itself any determination or content; for this would be differentiation and mutual relation of distincts, and thus mediation. - The beginning therefore is Pure Being (SL 1.82 EL 142, 158)

But, argues Hegel, this mere Being, as mere abstraction, is absolutely negative, or Nothing. Nothing, in turn, as "complete emptiness, without determination or content ... is the same empty intuition or thought (Anschauen oder Denken) as pure Being" (SL 94. WL 83). The concepts Being and Nothingness each pass over into the other. Yet, each at the same time retains its identity.

> But equally the truth is not their lack of distinction, but that they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct; and yet unseparated and inseparable, each disappearing immediately in its opposite. (SL 95)

This transition Hegel calls Becoming. It is only possible because the two terms are conceptually identical, but at the same time, distinct. The nature of this distinction is, therefore, of crucial importance. Hegel discusses it in the same terms in both EL and SL. In ED he writes of Being that

> Only in and by nature of this mere generality (dieser reinen Unbestimmtheit) is it Nothing, something inexpressibel, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention or meaning (eine blosse Meinung) (EL 161-2 German 186, [31] Hegel‘s emphasis).

The same point about a purely “gemeinte” distinction is made in the Zusatz, and also in the following paragraph (88). In S.L. Hegel writes:[260]

> In the result (Becoming) therefore, the distinction between Being and Nothing is equally asserted, but is asserted as a distinction that is merely intended. It is *intended* (meint) to take Being, rather, as that which is simply other than Nothing; nothing is clearer than their absolute distinctness, and nothing seems easier than to be able to describe it. But it is equally easy to prove the impossibility of this, and that the distinction *cannot be expressed*. *... Those who insist on remaining at this standpoint of the distinction of Being and Nothing should set themselves the*

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260 So ist das ganze, wahre Resultat, das sich hier ergeben hat, das *Werden*, welches nicht bloß die einseitige oder abstrakte Einheit des Seins und Nichts ist. Sondern es besteht in dieser Bewegung, daß das reine Sein unmittelbar und einfach ist, daß es darum ebensosehr das reine Nichts ist, daß der Unterschied derselben *ist*, aber ebensosehr *sich aufhebt* und *nicht ist*. Das Resultat behauptet also den Unterschied des Seins und des Nichts ebensosehr, aber als einen nur *gemeinten*. Man *meint*, das Sein sei vielmehr das schlechthin Andere, als das Nichts ist, und es ist nichts klarer als ihr absoluter Unterschied, und es scheint nichts leichter, als ihn angeben zu können. Es ist aber ebenso leicht, sich zu überzeugen, daß dies unmöglich, daß er *unsagbar* ist. *Die, welche auf dem Unterschiede von Sein und Nichts beharren wollen, mögen sich auffordern, anzugeben, worin er besteht.* Hätte Sein und Nichts irgendeine Bestimmtheit, wodurch sie sich unterschieden, so wären sie, wie erinnert worden, bestimmtes Sein und bestimmtes Nichts, nicht das reine Sein und das reine Nichts, wie sie es hier noch sind. Ihr Unterschied ist daher völlig leer, jedes der beiden ist auf gleiche Weise das Unbestimmte; er besteht daher nicht an ihnen selbst, sondern nur in einem Dritten, im *Meinen*. Aber das Meinen ist eine Form des Subjektiven, das nicht in diese Reihe der Darstellung gehört. Das Dritte aber, worin Sein und Nichts ihr Bestehen haben, muß auch hier vorkommen; und es ist auch hier vorgekommen; es ist das *Werden*. In ihm sind sie als Unterschiedene; Werden ist nur, insofern sie unterschieden sind. Dies Dritte ist ein Anderes als sie; - sie bestehen nur in einem Anderen, dies heißt gleichfalls, sie bestehen nicht für sich. Das Werden ist das Bestehen des Seins sosehr als des Nichtseins; oder ihr Bestehen ist nur ihr Sein in *Einem*; gerade dies ihr Bestehen ist es, was ihren Unterschied ebensosehr aufhebt.

> *task of indicating in what it consists.* If Being and Nothing had any determinateness to distinguish one from the other, they would be determinate Being and determinate Nothing, as has been recalled, and not pure Being and pure Nothing, as they are at this stage. The distinction between them is therefore completely void; each is the indeterminate itself, and is so in the same manner; the distinction therefore, does not lie in themselves but in a third being, namely our intention (im Meinen). This, however, is a form of the subjective which does not belong to this stage of the exposition. (SL 104 WL 95, Hegel‘s emphasis not given in SL.)

The fundamental distinction from which the *Logic* begins is thus a distinction which can be meant, but not said. This would seem to require a serious analysis of Meinen, but Hegel sidesteps the problem by dismissing it as a form of the subjective which is out of place at this stage of the argument. Of the commentators on the Logic of Being whom I have read (Bloch, Clark, Gadamer, Hyppolit, Henrich, Kröner, Lenin and Taylor) only Gadamer pays attention to the question of Meinen. He tries to avoid the problem by arguing that Becoming is the real starting point of the *Logic*, that Being and Nothingness appear in thought only from the perspective of Becoming, and that within the context of the concept Becoming they can be conceptually distinguished, as opposed to being meant differently (see Gadamer 59_61.).

The implication of Gadamer‘s approach seems to be that we can exhaustively determine the concept “Becoming”, and thereby enter a purely conceptual world, in which no reference need be made to what is not conceptual. On the contrary, it seems to me that Becoming can only be defined in terms of B. and N. insofar as they are meant differently, since insofar as they are conceptually identical, the assertion of their unity adds nothing.[261] But insofar [32] they are meant differently we can say that they have conceptual meaning in relation to one another: we can conceptualise the fact that they are different, although we cannot conceptualise the difference it self. Within this relation of difference they can be used to give a genuine

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261 The idea that the relationship between Becoming Being and Nothingness are ‘purely conceptual’, that dealing with them is a matter of *definition* - clara et distincta - is *Descartes*, via Russell. (*And*: Lenin, c.f. Negt on this.) “Meinen”, in Hegel - this is now Turner‘s reading - the point of departure for the *Logik*, is a discussion about what “can be meant but not said”. If I *say* ‘dog’, that‘s an abstraction with only the most tenuous relationship to the smelly mut at my feet, lazily thumping its tail on the floor. I *mean* the latter, *say* the former, since - before the age of smartphones - that‘s the only way I have of *communicating* what I‘m experiencing, namely by means of *words*. It‘s Russell/Strawson here - Analytic Philosophy altogether -, that keeps Turner from registering the *Luther* in Hegel; *science* as something *non*-realistic, as an emancipation *from* the here-and-now, *from* what is so *intolerable* about the ‘real world’. There‘s this odd thing in Turner: he doesn‘t see - Spro-Cas or no Spro-Cas - the *Christianity* in Hegel.

conceptual content to a new category. But this category, and all the others built upon it, retains the reference to a fundamental meant difference; it never becomes purely conceptual.

In terms of his own method, Hegel should be obliged to preserve the specificity of that which can be meant but not said as a moment within his developing system. But this is not done, because to do so would be incompatible with the primary which he accords to verbal conceptual knowledge. In E L he writes:

> Now language is the work of thought, and hence all that is expressed in language must be universal. What I only *mean or suppose is mine* (was ich nur meine ist mein) it belongs to me, - this particular individual. But language expresses nothing but universality, and so I cannot say what I merely mean. And the *unutterable* - feeling or sensation - far from being the highest truth, is the most unimportant and untrue. (EL 38 German 74)

In the *Phenomenology* Hegel makes the following distinction between *consciousness* which "(knows) about objective things as opposed to itself, and about itself as opposed to them" and *science* which "in knowing keeps within itself, and never goes beyond itself" (PhM 87 PhG 30) Using this definition of consciousness, we may say that for Hegel knowledge in the sense of 'science' or organised conceptual knowledge) has primacy over consciousness; consciousness has finally to be shown to be a 'primitive stage', an 'unscientific standpoint' (PhM 88,89) Whereas consciousness is faced with an other, knowledge takes its other back into itself, or is infinite. Particular things are finite, in that they are both limited and determined by other beings: "The sun is a finite entity, for it cannot be thought without other entities, since the reality of its Notion comprises not merely the sun itself but the entire solar system" (Phil Mind 23) The finite is "a reality which is not adequate to its notion", in that the identity of each finite thing lies in its relation to other finite things. This relation does not exist for the thing but only for us as we compare it with other things. Mind[262], on the other hand, recognises that its identity lies in its relation to its other - and thereby overcomes its finitude by integrating its other, its limitations, into itself: [33]

> We make ourselves finite by receiving an Other into our consciousness; but in the very fact of our knowing this Other we have transcended this limitation. (Phil Mind 24).

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262 Check the German here... xxxxxxx

A known limit is no longer a limit, because to know it is to go beyond it and to dissolve it.

The mind, as infinite, as containing its own other within itself, is thus contrasted with the thing which is not complete in itself but ideal (das Ideelle) as "a determination or content, which though distinct does not exist independently, but only as moment" (SL I 63).

> The proposition that the finite is of ideal nature constitutes Idealism. In philosophy idealism consists of nothing else than the recognition that the finite has no veritable being (SL I 168, cf EL 178).

It is the primacy of conceptual knowledge which permits Hegel to ignore the purely meant at the beginning of his system, and then, at the end, to show that otherness itself, as purely conceptual, is absorbed back into the knowing subject, as merely one element in what is purely a system of concepts. The finite has no self-subsistent being of its own[263] because the empiricists and Kant have dissolved the thing into a rhapsody of sense-data; hence its specificity can only come from its position within the total system of concepts, which means that finitude is necessarily equated with ideality, and that only the total system has "veritable being".

Yet the fact of the apparent otherness of being to thought still has to be overcome. This is achieved by showing that being itself has the structure of thought. This, however, can only be done because Hegel builds an element characteristic of the subject into his initial definition of being. This is the second step in the argument to show that the method for investigating the structure of a knowing subject can also enable him to grasp the nature of being.

Being as selfrelation

The starting point of the *Logic* is "the decision to consider Thought as such" (SL 1 82); it is pure knowledge, which is thought thinking itself. This pure knowledge has no relation to an other: it has "shrunk into this unity" in which all reference to an other and to mediation are transcended (see SL I 81). It is this thought thinking itself which is the immediate, or pure being. Being thus has that immediate relation to self which is characteristic of thought thinking itself. Being is "similar to itself alone" (sich selbst gleich),

263 Hegel can't be *realistic*, because, following Kant, our ordinary 'life-world' notion of objects has been dissolved into a 'rhapsody of sense data'. There's this equivocation in Turner: 'Being' is both empirical reality *and* knowing subject.

just as nothingness is “simple equality with itself” (einfache Gleichheit mit sich selbst) (SL 1 76, WL 83).

In EL this characteristic of being equal or identical to itself is used to establish the identity of thought and being: “If we understand Being as it is defined by reflection, all that we can say [34] of it is that it is what is wholly identical and affirmative. And if we then look at thought, it cannot escape us that thought also is at least what is absolutely identical with itself. Both, therefore, Being as well as Thought, have the same attribute” (TM,., 168). The same point is made in the opposite direction in the preface to the *Phenomenology*: “The subsistence or substance of anything that exists is its self-identity; for its want of identity, or oneness with itself, would be its dissolution. But self-identity is pure abstraction; and this is just thinking.” (PH M 113)

In his discussion of Hegel‘s relation to Fichte and Hegel Kröner brings out some of the ideas underlying this notion of self-identity. He points out that Fichte, in beginning from the proposition A=A, fails to notice the dialectic hidden therein. It in fact begins by making a distinction between A as subject and A as object, and then asserts a relation between the two. The identifying of the two As is a synthesis which goes beyond each of the A‘s to relate it to the other. Kröner links this with the structure of the I: “Er ist synthetisch, weil sich das Ich=Ich in ihm verbirgt” (It is synthetic because the I=I is concealed within it) (Kröner 314).- For Kröner, this is because

> Das selbst ist nur, indem es aus der Entselbstung, aus der Entäusserung zu sich zurückkehrt; in der Bewegung, die es beschreibt, verleugnet es zugleich die Bewegung, es bewegt sich und bleibt doch unbewegt dasselbe (The Self is only insofar as it returns to itself from its “outselfing” or externalisation; in the movement which it carries out it at the same time denies movement; it moves itself yet remains unmovedly the same.. (Kröner 11 315).

The possibility of A=A depends on the possibility of the I going beyond itself from the first enunciation of A to the second (‘from A ‘ to A") while at the same time remaining identical with itself in order to retain A ’ in its passage to A “, and so to be able to identify the two. Kröner goes on to conclude from this, with Hegel, that everything which is thinkable is “itself”, as identical with itself, in the sense of containing within itself this movement, so that “Being is Self, or Substance is Subject” (Kröner 11 317).

Hegel thus argues that the so-called Law of Identity adopts the propositional form but in fact contradicts the nature of a proposition:

> The form of the proposition which expresses Identity contains more, then, than Identity simple and abstract; it contains this pure movement of Reflection, in

> which the Other figures only as Show and as immediate disappearance. A *is* a beginning which imagines a different term that is to be reached; but this term never is reached; A is - A; the difference is only a disappearance and the movement withdraws into itself (SL 11 42, WL 11 44).

That is, [35] the propositional form has a synthetic function, and the proposition A=A derives its meaning from the background of ordinary synthetic propositions in the context of which it is formulated. The ordinary proposition contains both the assertion and the overcoming of otherness: it is "Identity as the disappearance of otherness" (SL 11 43). The Law of Identity, by separating the two A's in the process of making them identical itself shows its synthetic nature. Identity cannot be thought without thinking difference. In the context of the identity of thought and being, this means that any thing must be a "relation to self" in this synthetic sense.

By deriving his initial concept of Being from thought thinking itself, and by building this synthetic notion of self-identity into his definition of Being, Hegel lays the foundation for an absolute idealism which develops a mediated and complex notion of the self-identical subject out of the immediate self-identity of being. But the question as to whether in fact this desk is "identical with itself" in the same sense as is thought thinking itself is never asked. This is at least partly because the sense-datum theory has dissolved this desk into discrete data which have to be held together in some way.

Subject and Dialectic

For Hegel, then, "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as substance but as subject as well" (PhM 80). I would like now to look at his account of the nature of the subject as subject, leaving aside the question of its identity with substance. Hegel's criticism of Kant is that he, like Fichte and Schelling, enumerates various aspects of the subject empirically, rather than developing these aspects coherently from the fundamental idea of the subject as synthesis. In contrast with this, Hegel's own work, more particularly the *Logic*, may be read as always operating simultaneously on two planes. He is unpacking concepts in such a way as to show the systematic dependence of each concept on other concepts, thereby making explicit of each concept that it is not an image but a rule. And at the same time he is showing what the structure of the knowing subject must be in order for it to be able to hold together each of these chains of concepts in the unity of a single concept. What interests me here is not the

actual details of the relation between the concepts, but the account of the subject which must be presupposed in order for such relations to be possible. Hegel‘s guiding thread is the idea of unity or identity as self-relation. Using this thread, he wishes to show that the unity of the concept, and the unity of the conceptual system as a whole, both have the same structure as the unity of the subject. By starting with the most abstract one can show that this concept [36] unpacks itself in a certain way into a system of concepts which reveals the necessary structure of the subject as the synthetic unity of the system. Since identity, as relation to self, also involves difference from self, the structure of the argument involves making explicit the element of difference contained in any given concept postulated as relation to self, and then revealing a third term which restores the unity of the concept. That is, starting with any given concept we discover that it can only be understood in and through its relation to at least one other concept, and the relation between these two concepts, once made explicit, has to be in its turn grasped by means of a further concept which takes this relation as explicit, rather than as implicit. It is this demonstration of the interdependence of concepts which Hegel describes as dialectic:

> We term dialectic that higher movement of Reason where terms appearing absolutely distinct pass into one another because they are what they are, where the assumption of their separation cancels itself. (SL 117 (WL 111))

In his discussion of the Logic of Being, Taylor interprets this in terms of the idea that a descriptive concept can only be understood contrastively - that is, in relation to another concept with which it is contrasted (see Taylor 234). In relation to my earlier discussion of Kant, this can also be formulated in terms of the distinction between ‘image’ and ‘rule’. Knowledge is not ‘immediate’ in the sense of occurring in the form of a single intuition of a single unambiguously clear idea. Every concept contains within it a network of relationships, of interconnected secondary concepts. Hegel describes this as a ‘negative unity’ in order to emphasise that the concepts which it contains are held apart and maintain their individuality in it, while the concept is itself nevertheless the synthesis of these elements.

The differences contained within the concept are described by Hegel as ‘contradictions’. His exposition of the concept is not entirely clear and is sometimes confused rather than clarified by the examples he uses. Contradiction: here is a function not of mere external comparison (Pens are unlike camels) but, rather of specific differences. In the relation of like and unlike in specific difference, they “do not fall on different aspects or points of view in the thing, without any mutual affinity but one throws light into the

other" (EL 215) The relation between the 'unlikes' here is what Hegel calls *opposition* (EL218 cf.SL 11 50). It involves the contrasting of the differences of similar things. In the relation of opposition

> the different is not confronted by any other, but by its other. That is, either of these two ... is stamped with a [37] characteristic of its own only in its relation to the other: the one is only reflected into itself as it is reflected into the other. And so with the other. Either in this way is the other's own other (EL 220)

What is involved is not, e.g. the 'opposition' between blue and not-blue, but rather that between blue and yellow. Both are colours and as distinct colours they may be defined e.g. by their position in the spectrum, that is, by their relation to other colours. Most of Hegel's examples in EL at this point involve polar opposition, e.g. positive and negative, north and south. But the definition does not require this polar opposition.

In SL the complementarity of opposition is brought out even more clearly in the assertion that

> each is self-mediated by its Other and contains it. But it is also self-mediated by the Not-Being of the Other: it is, therefore, self-existant unity and excludes the Other. (SL II 58) (see also the discussion of the law of excluded middle (SL II 65-6)

where Hegel rejects the idea of opposition as mere 'deficiency' or 'indeterminateness')

In the opposition, then, each defines itself against the other in terms of the other. This Hegel describes as *contradiction*. Each term both includes and excludes the other. But this relationship is not one in which the two terms cancel each other out (as blue would cancel not-blue). It is a contradiction which is necessarily resolved: "very determination, every concrete, every concept is essentially a union of distinguished and distinguishable moments which pass over through determinate and essential difference into contradictory moments. It is true that this contradictory concretion resolves itself into nothing - it passes back into its negative unity. Now the thing, the subject, or the concept is just this negative unity: it is contradictory in itself, but also it is resolved contradiction; it is the ground which contains and supports its determinations" (SL II 70).

The way in which these ideas of contradiction and negative unity are linked to Hegel's overall conception is clearly illustrated by the way in which he deals with the problem of perception in Ph G. Having argued, in the discussion of sense-certainty, that any attempt to conceptualise the object of sense-certainty results in a universal, Hegel goes on to discuss per-

ception as that which "takes what exists for itself to be a universal" (PhM162) that is, as taking the sense-element as a property of an object. Here the object is "the thing with many properties" (PhM163) A property is a universal, in the sense that to say "this is blue" is t to go beyond the this and to relate it to other blue objects. But [38] the problem is, how are these various properties related? Each is itself a universal as a negative unity or determinate character. The lump of salt is a simple Here; but it is also white, cubic and pungent. Each property, as a universal, is related negatively to the others. But at the same time, as properties of this thing, they have to be held together in the One, which is "an excluding repelling unity" (PhM165) The reason that this is problematic is that, if one assumes a Humean view of mind, one can have before one only a succession of discrete "impressions" - white, cubical, pungent, etc. but not all of them at once. The problem is that they have to be there *at once and as distinct*. It is this which is the 'contradictory' demand. In his discussion of perception, therefore, Hegel deals with the various ways in which consciousness tries to avoid this 'contradiction', and concludes that "we see that consciousness alternately makes itself, as well as the thing, into a pure atomic 'one', and an 'also' resolved into independent constituent elements (materials or matters). Consciousness thus finds through this comparison that not only its way of taking the truth contains the diverse moments of apprehension and return upon itself, but that the truth itself, the thing, manifests itself in this two-fold manner" (PhMl72) Thus consciousness has to find a way of grasping this two-fold manner of manifestation of the thing as existing in a single unity. This is achieved through the concept of law. The argument is expressed with great concision in paragraphs 422 and 423 of the Encyclopaedia. He writes that "the essence of law, whether this relates to external Nature or the ethical world order, consists in an inseparable unity, a necessary inner connection, of distinct determinations" (EncIII 163) This is also the transition to the I as self-consciousness "just as law is something differentiated within itself and not merely relative to an Other, an identity with itself in its difference, so, too, is the 'I' that has itself for object, that is aware of itself" (Enc III. 164) (This, it seems to me, is a further development of Kant's idea that a universal is a rule, not an image, and that the structure of the I has to be understood in terms of this.)

In perception, the problem is to hold together the distinct, negatively related properties in one whole. In the *Logic* the analagous problem is that the concept is defined by its other. This problem first arises in the *Logic* with the transition from Becoming to Determinate Being (Dasein) as Quality, that is, as limited, determined and so possessing a specific, distinguishable

[39] characteristic. We began from the definition of Being as identity with itself. This identity as a relation has to be preserved in each further determination of Being. But determination is negation, in the form of relation to an other, and so the preservation of identity in the face of this otherness is a negation of the otherness. "Therefore, the truth which we have, is, Determinate Being in general distinction in it, and the transcendence of this distinction; Determinate Being is not merely undifferentiated, as at the beginning; it is once more identical with itself through the transcendence of the distinction, and the simple nature of Determinate Being is mediated through this transcendence ... it is Being-in-itself, that which is a determinate, or Something (Etwas). Something is the first negation of negation as simple existent self-relation." (SL 127; WL123) That is, the restoration of identity, bat now as a differentiated identity, is what Hegel calls "the negation of the negation". Each new determination of Being, involving an increasing multiplicity of inner determination, threatens the original unity or identity of Being. It thus requires a further determination which reorganises the set of concepts which are threatening to lose their coherence. The source of this threat lies in the very nature of concepts, in the fact that they are defined in relation to other concepts. The other has to be reintegrated anew at each step, but also threatens to break out anew at each step. It is this process which Hegel describes in the final chapter of the *Logic* "The Absolute Idea" in which he discusses and sums up his dialectical method.

The first negation is not any negation, or any other: "It is not, therefore, the Other of a term to which it is indifferent, for thus it would be neither an Other, nor a reference nor a relation; it is the Other in itself, the Other of an Other. It thus includes its own Other, and so is contradiction, or the posited dialectical of itself" (SL II 477). It is not a 'negation' like 'The Mind is no elephant' (cf EL 306), but rather of the type "blue is not green", in which one is defining value by distinguishing it from another colour. That is the negation occurs within the context of a relationship, the fact that blue and green are both colours. It is the making explicit of a distinction which is already implicitly present, and this making explicit is the first dialectical moment. The second dialectical moment consists in positing the unity which is implicitly contained in the contradiction. Here Hegel makes explicit the relation between the structure of the concept and the structure of the subject. The second negative, the negative of the negative which we have reached, is this transcendence of the contradiction, but no more the activity [40] of an external reflection than the contradiction is: it is the innermost and most objective moment of Life and Spirit by virtue of which a subject is "personal and free" (SL II 477-8)

This achieved unity of opposites cannot be thought of as a static identity: it is self-mediating movement and activity. As a "self-identical whole" any given concept is once more in the same form as the beginning, and can in turn serve as a further beginning. The method can thus be extended into a system, not as a bad infinite progression, but as a totality in which the beginning is preserved in ever greater concreteness, which involves at the same time an ever greater depth of subjectivity, and more and more complexly articulated subject: "The highest and acutest point is simple personality, which by virtue alone of the absolute dialectic which id its nature, equally holds and comprehends everything within itself because it perfectly liberates itself, - becoming simplicity which is first immediacy and universality" (SL II 483).

The relation between negation of negation and subject is of course referred to frequently, in more and more developed forms, throughout the *Logic*, beginning with the first introduction of the negation of the negation in the discussion of 'Etwas':

> The negative of the negative, as Something, is only the beginning of the subject and the Being-in-Self is quite indeterminate. It next determines itself as being-for-self and so on, until finally as Notion it receives the concrete intensity of the subject. The negative unity with self is the basis of all these determinations; though here the first negation (negation in general) must carefully be distinguished from the second, the negation of negation, which is concrete and absolute negativity, while the first is only abstract negativity (SL I 188) [41]

Thus Hegel describes the structure of the concept in terms of the key categories negation, opposition, contradiction, and negation of the negation.[264] The specific meaning of a given concept within a system of concepts is given it by determining it negatively in relation to the other concepts, which are its "opposites". But this means that its meaning nevertheless still includes its negative relation of opposition to these concepts, and in this sense it is a contradiction which contains its other within itself. Since it is not simply dissolved by this contradiction, or coexistence of opposites, it has to be understood as their negative unity; as the coexistence of opposites

264 Hegel's *idealism*, in Turner's rendition, consists in this: he dissolves all reality into *thinking*; - and in *politics* he's quietistic, hence not much good - say - in situations of manifold injustice, exploitation, repression. (The rationalism/empiricism dualism coming from the Russell/Strawson/Taylor direction, merges smoothly with the romanticised 'humanist' Marxism of Sartre, both culminating in a *rejection* of 'dialectics' in Hegel.) 'Scientifically unsound, politically unreliable' is the verdict, also in Turner. This very *Anglo* view is mirrored, uncannily, in the dialectical/mechanical materialism controversies in Russia during the thirties - Negt! xxxxxxx

(or of distinctions) which retain their distinctness within the unity. It is thus the negation of the original negation, where this negation of the negation is understood notas the mere removal of the original opposition, but as the maintenance of it in existence, as a stabilised opposition which constitutes the complex meaning of the concept. The knowing subject must be able to hold the various elements of the concept together as one concept. As the ontological foundation of the unity of the concept it must have this same structure; it must be the negation of the negation as the negative unity of opposed elements.

Absolute Idealism

In the "Subjective Logic" Hegel explores this structure further. Here he shows that the concept is:

a) the unity of Universality and Particularity in Individuality;

b) the explicit formulation of this unity in judgement;

c) the development of the various aspects of the judgement in the syllogism. This account makes explicit the characteristic of any concept as a systematic interconnection of other concepts.

In the context of Hegel's system it has further implications. In terms of the primacy of knowledge, a final synthesis is achieved in the form of the genuine infinity in which the other becomes completely integrated with and transparent to the subject. This is expressed in the form of a [42] syllogism which no longer takes the form of an original in which two quite separate terms are mediated by a third term, since such an argument retains an element of contingency in it. It is, rather, a syllogism which involves the simple explication of what is contained in the genus. It is no longer subjective, in the sense of being related only to the subject's knowledge, but gives adequate expression to the nature of the Object:

> Consequently the result is an immediacy which has emerged through the transcendence of mediation, a Being which is equally identical with mediation, and is the Notion which has constructed itself oat of and in its otherness. Hence this Being is a Thing which is in and for itself, or Objectivity (SL II 342)

Knowledge achieves objectivity when it understands the process of the object as a transparently necessary process. But this is the same thing as saying that it understands the process of the object as its own process, as the self-determining idea positing itself as real and existent. This is Hegel's version of the Ontological Proof. The subject he describes here is Kant's intellectus archetypus, an intellect which does not proceed discursively

from particular to universal, but deductively from universal to particular, and for whom, therefore, the universe is transparent. Hegel can only reach this position because he has carefully excluded that which can only be meant, not said, from consideration, since this, in its very resistance to conceptualisation, would necessarily remain opaque. But, once he has done this, he is able to avoid Kant‘s absolute ontological gulf between sensible and intelligible world. The laws of nature and the laws of reason can be directly equated, and the empirical subject becomes an historically constitutive element in the self-development of the noumenal subject, or intellectus archetypus. The dialectical account of the subject makes it possible to historicise both the individual subject and the intellectus archetypus. This enables Hegel to give a content to Kant‘s Categorical Imperative, which he criticises as essentially empty, by arguing that the “substance of ethical reality” is an historical product of reason (see eg. Ph M 453), in the sense that it already exists as a highly developed complex of responsibilities and rights which take the realities of the situation into account. Leaving aside the weakness of the grounds for absolute idealism, the problem with the system is its incapacity to deal [43] adequately with contingency. On the one hand the world, as the product of the intellectus archetypus, has a completely rational structure, and hence necessarily develops as it does. On the other hand, Hegel has to allow at all levels for what Taylor calls “interstitial contingency” (Taylor 260) Hegel insists that he is not claiming to be able to deduce the necessary existence and nature of his pen. He attempts to integrate interstitial contingency by arguing that “Error or other-being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result” (EL 352)

Interstitial contingency occurs in nature and in society. But the problem is that once one has admitted any form of contingency, the problem arises of criteria for distinguishing between what in any given situation is contingent and what is rational and necessary. Hegel asserts that “Within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the End has been really received. The consummation of the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem: yet unaccomplished” (EL351/2) Yet the illusion, like any belief, must have consequences for the way in which we act, and therefore for the world which we help to create by our actions. Thus removing the illusions must also involve changing the world. And Hegel would not deny this; his political and ethical positions are not stoical or quietistic; they are only reformist, rather than revolutionary. This State, as outlined in The Philosophy of Right is not a mere reflec-

tion of the existing Prussian Monarchy; it is a reformed and rationalised version of it.

Even in his earlier writings he believed that reformist political practice must be tied to, and an expression of, the objective spirit of the time, that is, it must be tied to the consciousness of the people and be institutionally with the people. The task of the philosopher is to articulate the objective spirit, as a guide to the political leadership. If the leadership fails to carry out the necessary reform, revolution occurs as a 'natural force' which cannot be channelled by theory, and which has a purely negative content.

Even this modest reformism, however, is significantly distanced from what is, and thus raises the question of criteria for criticising what is. One may accept the criticism of Kant for failing to anchor his Kingdom. of Ends sufficiently firmly within the historical reality of a particular society. But absolute idealism by identifying thought and being, at the same time theoretically removes that distance between thought and being which we need to be [44] able to understand if we are to act rightly.

However, even if we reject the identity of thought and being, this does not mean that Hegel is not dealing with important problems in his attempt to explicate the nature of the concept and of the subject. When Hegel insists that the proposition "The swan is black" enunciates the contradictory assertion "the individual is a universal" he is pointing to the following question: How can I "know" (or be conscious of etc) this individual swan sailing on the lake before me as being related in certain ways to thunderclouds, darkness, panthers and the anarchist flag - none of which are to be seen before me, or are even consciously present to me in any way? A subject is "identical with itself" in quite a different way from the way in which a table might conceivably be said to be "identical with itself". And this is revealed, inter alia, in the subject's capacity to hold together the vastly complex set of relations contained in the judgement "The swan is black".

Kant revealed the element of synthesis according to a rule as an essential moment in the process of the subject. Hegel's main additional contribution is to bring out the element of distinction or negativity which is the logical complement of synthesis, and to give an initial account of the relation between the two elements by the use of the concept of "negation of the negation".

Apart from this, Hegel and Kant each express one essential element for a "materialist" theory of knowledge. Against Kant's scepticism about the possibility of knowledge of the being in itself, Hegel is a realist for whom the relation of knowledge is, finally, a direct relation to the actual being which I know. This is part of the meaning of "identity" in the assertions of

the identity of thought and being. Against Hegel‘s absolute idealism which finally dissolves the finite being, Kant is a realist who insists on the ultimate “otherness” of the thing. When I look at this pen, from a reasonable distance and in a good light, I am seeing the pen; my ‘percept’ is in some sense identical with the pen. But when I attempt to describe the pen, I can never exhaust it fully. My conceptual knowledge is of the pen, but it is not identical with the pen. Kant denies the identity of my ‘percept’ with the pen as it is in itself. In his eagerness to restore this identity; Hegel asserts the identity of my conceptual knowledge with the pen. [45]

Hegel‘s account of the structure of the subject cannot be assumed to be unmarked by the idealist context in which it occurs. A ‘materialist’ theory of knowledge, therefore, would have to redescribe the dialectic of the subject within the context of an adequate account of the relation between conceptual knowledge, and consciousness as a direct relation to an independent object.

Analogous considerations apply to Hegel‘s historical dialectic. The structure of the dialectic is derived from the account of the subject, and then applied to history through the identification of individual subject with the “intellectus archetypus” as absolute subject unfolding itself in history. The persuasiveness at least some parts of Hegel‘s actual account of an historical dialectic stems the fact that he is often dealing with the genesis and development of systems of thought, which necessarily do have the structure of a concept. Thus the attempt to found a “materialist” dialectic of history and of society is faced with two alternatives. It must either give the dialectic a new foundation quite independent of the concept and of the subject, or it must show that it is possible to treat either the whole or some aspects of social reality having the structure of a concept or of a subject. This would necessarily involve some account of the element of “intersubjectivity” in social reality: an account of the way in which social reality is constituted in the interrelation of subjects.[265] [46]

265 If one overlays Turner here onto the Russian debates of the time, then he‘s closer to Deborin than to Bucharin, in the sense that ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ are ‘one’. It doesn‘t mean in the least that it‘s not capable of delivering an empirically convincing analysis of current globalised capitalism - it really *is* in crisis - but this is then immediately fused with the interests of the ‘world proletariat’, for whom Cronin maintains he‘s speaking. Refuting Cronin is more difficult than it seems. It‘s not just that the fusing of the empirical and the gnostic isolates it from non-believers with the crudely polemic formula that the critics are all ‘white capitalists’. In it there lurks something deeper, namely that which to this day could motivate another look at the *Grundrisse*. Academic and corporate Economics understands itself as a *science*, but unlike the medical profession, economists do not have an *ethics* body that controls what the putative science is

Marx, Engels, Lenin and the Dialectics of Nature

The classic statement of the relation between Marx‘s dialectic and that of Hegel is found in the Preface to the second edition of *Capital*:

> Although in Hegel‘s hands dialectic underwent a mystification, this does not obviate the fact that he was the first to expand the general form of its movement in a comprehensive and fully conscious way. In Hegel‘s writings, dialectic stands on its head. You must turn it right way up again if you want to discover the rational kernel that is hidden away within the wrappings of mystification. (*Capital* p. 873.)

The metaphor of the Hegelian dialectic being ‘upside down’ (or perhaps ‘turned inside out’ see Fulda) is repeated a number of times by Engels (e.g. MEW XX A.0.23 - trans Feuer 86-7, Selected Correspondence 439), as is the assertion that only Hegel (apart from Aristotle) has made a thorough study of the dialectic (e.g. MEW XX DN 330).

Clearly, then, Marx and Engels place considerable reliance on Hegel. But the meaning of the metaphor of inversion, in its various forms, is not at all clear. Neither Marx nor Engels ever sets out to give a complete materialist reinterpretation of Hegel‘s *Logic*. The exact intention of Engels’ occasional writings on the dialectic remain unclear. Firstly, the notion of ‘dialectics’ contained therein is ambiguous. Secondly, Engels’ method of argument is questionable.

In *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels states that

> Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials, increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring cycle, but goes through a real historical evolution. (Feuer 84).

This passage contains what I shall describe as the ‘weak’ definition of dialectics: the (unexceptionable) idea that nature goes through a real historical evolution. This raises the question of how this weak definition might be related to a ‘strong’ definition including some or all of the features of Hegel‘s

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used *for*. The economists that see their duty to be that of public intellectuals warning of what needs to be done to avert the next meltdown (e.g. why Glass-Stegall is/was so vital) are few and far between. Most see no problem at all in personal and/or corporate greed. Though even that doesn‘t get to the core of it all, which is that the same social Darwinism that on the *Continent* did so much damage is alive and well - and taught in every “Economics I”.

logic. Secondly, the passage contains the suggestion that the dialectic can be proved by the scientific investigation of nature. This raises the methodological problem as to how the dialectic might be 'proved'. At times Engels seems to repeat the implication that this is a task for natural science, developing the dialectic out of nature, rather than building it into nature (e.g. MEW XX: A D 12, DN 334). But at other points he suggests that this is a task for philosophy; [47] scientists can be tripped up and led astray by their acceptance of outmoded "metaphysical" conceptions, and it is the task of philosophy to criticise and replace these conceptions (e.g. DN 330 and 480). But the problem of how philosophy is to provide laws of pure thought for this purpose is not discussed. In the event, the method Engels actually uses seems to involve the listing of examples of the various laws of the dialectic. In the *Dialectics of Nature* he writes that

> I have taken the liberty of bringing forward natural processes and natural laws as *demonstrative examples* (beweisende Exempel) of my general theoretical view. (DN 329-30)

In the *Dialectics of Nature* he gives a "strong" definition of dialectic as follows:

> The laws of dialectic are nothing other than the most general laws ... of the historical development of nature and of human society, as well as of thought itself. Essentially they may be reduced to three:
> The law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa.
> The law of the interpenetration of opposites.
> The law of the negation of the negation. (DN 348)[266]

He does not explain why he chooses just these three laws, nor does he attempt to explain the relationship between these laws, excusing himself from this task on the grounds that he is not preparing a handbook of the dialectic but only trying to show that dialectical laws actually are laws of development of nature and hence valid for natural science. In pursuit of this task Engels lists a variety of examples of the operation of each of these laws. Leaving aside the question of the status of examples in philosophical argument, there are also problems about the nature of the examples themselves. In discussing the change of quantity into quality and vice versa, Engels provides no clear criteria as to what is to count as quantitative change and what is to count as qualitative change. If one looks at his examples closely they turn out to be quite varied in nature. For example in the case of water the quantitative change is a change in temperature which is in

266 This section of Turner's argument is taken straight from Sartre.

turn a measure of the amount of heat present in the water. In the case of the carbon compound series, on the other hand, we do not move from CH 202 to C2 H402 by the addition of more CH 202, that is by quantitative increase in CH 202. Instead we require the quantitative addition of qualitatively specific and distinct elements. Also it seems evident that the change in state of H2O from solid to liquid to gas is a qualitative change in a different sense from that in which the change from CH 202 to C2 H402 is a qualitative change. Similarly, in discussing the interpenetration of opposites and the idea of [48] contradiction,[267] Engels doesn't state clearly what is to count as opposite and what is to count as contradiction, and in his examples it is clear that, say, the relation between the positive and negative poles of a magnet is very different from the relation between heredity and adaptation in the process of evolution. In Engels' mathematical examples it is not clear why they should be considered contradictory at all. In other cases, it is not clear why Engels should think that the examples he presents involves logical contradiction rather than real opposition. For example, if we concentrate for a moment on the question of life considered as involving a contradiction because it involves both being itself and being another in the sense of being a process of exchange of matter with its environment, we can see that Engels is pointing to an interesting phenomenon: the dependence of an organism on its environment, in terms of which the organism is both a separate entity with its own boundary, but also only possible through an interchange with the environment which lies beyond that boundary. For example, part of the definition of a rabbit is that it is a vegetarian, and this involves reference to one aspect of its mode of interaction with its environment. But within a materialist context this reference to the environment in terms of which the rabbit is defined does not seem to involve a logical contradiction. For Hegel, as I've attempted to show, the relation between the rabbit and the carrot here is contradictory only in the sense that in defining the rabbit as a carrot eater I have to hold together in my mind two distinct concepts *in their distinctness*. The question of how to manage to do this is an interesting question but it has nothing to do with real rabbits and carrots. Here, as Colletti has cogently argued, if we are dealing with opposition at

267 It's worth contrasting here *Habermas's* position on this. Turner mentions him, there's no question that this would have been a major topic of discussion between us if he'd made it to Germany. So what *are* the implications of that doctrine of 'stances' for the 'real world'? (Habermas had taken that doctrine almost directly from Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures of the Dialectic*, esp. chap. 1, "The Crisis of Reason". Which Turner would have worked through, in his years in Paris.) Sartre is supposed to say somewhere that it was *Merleau-Ponty* who had converted him to Marxism, so it makes sense to consult the *latter's* views on 'dialectics'.

all we are dealing with a real opposition which, far from contradicting the law of identity, is directly dependent on it; the rabbit can only eat the carrot if it‘s a real independent carrot.

Similar objections apply to the various examples of negation and negation of the negation which Engels gives. In ‘Elucidation’ he writes:

> The kind of negation is here determined first by the general then by the specific nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also transcend (Wieder aufheben) the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? In accordance with the specific nature of each individual case each kind of thing thus has its own specific way of being negated in order for something to develop out of it, and the same applies to each kind of image or concept. (AD 132) [49]

But once Engels admits that I must so arrange it that the first negation makes the second negation possible, then there is no automatic evolutionary sequence leading ever onwards and upwards; it is always possible that any particular negation may make a further ‘positive’ negation impossible. But then all that is left is the fact that if something “positive” comes into being it must have done so by developing out of something else which in turn developed out of something else; this seems finally to reduce to the tautology that “it is a general law of evolution that evolution can occur”.

Engels’ own account of the status of this law is odd. He writes

> it goes without saying that I say nothing about the specific process of development which, for example, the barleycorn undergoes from germination until the death of the fruitbearing plant, when I say that it is the negation of the negation. (AD 131).

This oddity also emerges from Engels’ defence of Marx against two criticisms of Dühring. In both cases Dühring criticises Marx for allegedly using one of the general laws of the dialectic to prove that some historical process must occur. Engels’ response is the same in each case. He asserts that Marx did not use the dialectical law to prove anything; instead, after having shown by other means why the result would occur, he merely mentioned in passing that this was an example of the particular law of the dialectic, or a proof of the law. In the second case Engels writes

> insofar, therefore, as Marx designates the occurrence as negation of the negation, he does not thereby intend to prove its historical necessity. On the contrary, after he has demonstrated that in fact the process has in part already occurred, and in part must still occur, he describes it as a process which fulfils itself according to a specific dialectical law. That is all. (A.D 125)

That is the dialectical laws are not used to prove anything; they are only brought in after something has been 'historically proved', or, as Engels says earlier, after 'historical economic proof'. What the function of these laws is if they cannot be used as part of the process of predicting further occurrences, or explaining occurrences, or proving the necessity of certain consequences following certain initial actions, is not at all clear. But the fact that Engels is consistent with himself on this point is indicated by the fact that none of the three laws of the dialectic is referred to or used in the sections of *Anti-Düring* dealing with society, nor, as far as I can ascertain, in such important works as *The Origins of the Family* or the *Peasant Wars in Germany*. Engels then goes on to argue that the dialectic is not an instrument of proof but is rather a method for the discovery [50] of new results "for progress from the known to the unknown" (AD 125) But Engels here gives no account of how the three laws of the dialectic might be used as part of a method of investigation. On the one hand, he might be referring to dialectics in a weak sense, in the form of an injunction always to look for interconnection and interdependencies between apparently discrete phenomena. On the other hand, he might be suggesting that it is possible to formulate the three laws into a more rigorous set of methodological principles. However, he does not carry out this task, or explain how it might be carried out.

Thus it is possible to distinguish a weak definition of dialectics, which is both unexceptionable and perhaps not very interesting, from a strong definition which proffers a theory of specific laws of dialectical thought, but which neither defines with sufficient precision what these laws mean, nor specifies what function they are supposed to perform, nor provides any justification for accepting them.

Lenin, the other major figure in the development of orthodox dialectical materialism, adds nothing to Engels' work insofar as the question of dialectics is concerned. In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* he scarcely discusses dialectics, and does not refer to any of the laws of dialectical thought as discussed in *Anti-Düring* and the *Dialectics of Nature*. To the extent that he does use the term dialectics, it is in a very weak sense with reference to the idea that knowledge is relative rather than absolute, in that we can never be sure of achieving finally accurate knowledge of the nature of reality. Added to this is the idea of a non-dogmatic view of the nature of matter. In his posthumously published *Philosophical Notebooks* he does discuss dialectics in greater detail but is very reliant on Hegel. Here he takes the idea of the 'unity of opposites' as a key to the dialectic. Unfortunately, like Engels, he fails to specify what would constitute an 'opposite' and what

would constitute a 'unity' of opposites. Thus he tends to move between a weak definition in terms of "the universal, all-sided vital connection of everything with everything and the reflection of this connection ... in human concepts" (Vol.38 146): and various stronger definitions which specify various aspects of this universal connectedness. The most important aspect of Lenin's strong definition is the idea of 'self-movement'. In the 'Note on Dialectics' he writes:

> The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their [51] spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle of opposites' (Vol 360.)

This statement raises problems apart from that of what is meant by 'opposite'! It is not clear what the unit is of whose 'self-movement' we are speaking. It is not clear in what sense 'self-movement' is related to 'unity of opposites'. Nor is it clear why opposites should struggle, rather than complement one another, or, as Paul Gregory suggests, love one another (see *In search of Dialectics*). But what is clear is Lenin's absolute dependence on Hegel in these notes. He accepts that Hegel's dialectic is an account of the structure of the world, and merely repeats Marx's metaphor about standing Hegel on his feet, without recognising the relation between Hegel's dialectic and the structure of the concept and the subject.

The obverse of the acceptance of the dialectic of nature is a failure to investigate the dialectic of the subject. Engels rejects the question as to how it is that human ideas and principles might correspond with nature. He suggests that such a question

> Comes from the fact that 'consciousness' and 'thought' are taken quite naturalistically as something given and as opposed from the beginning to being and nature. Then one must find it highly remarkable that consciousness and nature, thought and being, the laws of thought and the laws of nature agree so precisely. If one however, asks further, what thought and consciousness are, and from whence they come, one finds that they are the product of the human brain, and that humans are themselves a product of nature which has developed in and with its environment; from which it is self-evident, that the products of the human brain, which are in the last instance also natural products, do not contradict but rather express the rest of the complex of nature. (AD 33)

In the *Dialectics of Nature* he uses a similar argument to support the contention that the main result of Hegel's philosophy, the unity of thought and being, despite its idealist form, is incontrovertible (see DN 529). But Engels himself provides the answer to the claim that a thought, because it is

a product of nature must therefore correspond to nature, in a later joking aside, in reference to Dühring‘s claim to be speaking of any rational being:

> When I say: human knowledge, I do not say it with the intention of offending the inhabitants of other planets, whom I do not have the honour of knowing, but only because animals also know, but in no way sovereignly. The dog knows his God in his master, while this master may be the greatest lout. (AD.79)

The dog‘s ‘knowledge’ is also a natural product: but it does not [52] correspond with nature. So what is it that distinguishes human knowledge, with its at least potential sovereign validity, from the dog‘s knowledge?

This question is linked with the question of freedom. Here again Engels accepts Hegel‘s formulation:

> Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the appreciation of necessity. “Necessity is blind only *insofar as it is not understood*” (Engels’ emphasis Enc Logic para 147 zusatz) Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental life of men themselves - two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought, but not in reality. Freedom of the will, therefore, means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge of the subject. (A..D.106 - trans Feuer p.279).

Once again the question arises here of to what extent one can abstract a particular idea from its Hegelian context and then attempt to apply it in quite a different context. For the very paragraph from which Engels’ quotation from Hegel is taken, clearly indicates its rootedness in Hegel‘s idealism, and also within his particular interpretation of Christianity. Hegel begins:

> The theory however which regards the world as determined through necessity and the belief in a divine providence are by no means mutually excluding points of view. The intellectual principle underlying the idea of divine providence will hereafter be shown to be the notion. But the notion is the truth of necessity, which it contains in suspension in itself; just as, conversely, [53] necessity is the notion implicit. Necessity is blind only so long as it is not understood. (E.L. 268/9)

For Hegel, what is necessary is not so through its antecedents, but only through itself: “We thus hold it to be simple self-relation, in which all dependence on something else is removed.” (268) This can only be the case in a teleological process, in which the end is the cause which necessitates the process. The end is, in our everyday experience, not implicitly present, and in this sense “necessity is blind”. But when we come to recognise the world

as the self-expression of the notion, or as the intellectus archetypus rationally creating itself, then we recognise it as no longer blind; it is as it is because it is rational.

> In his difference from God, man, with his own private opinion and will, follows the call of caprice and arbitrary humour, and thus often finds his acts turn out something quite different from what he had meant or willed. But God knows what he wills, is determined in his eternal will neither by accident from within nor from without, and what He wills He also accomplishes, irresistibly. (EL 269)

It is this relation between the irrational caprice of man and the rational necessity with which God acts with which Hegel is concerned when he says that necessity is no longer blind when understood. The proposition depends, further, on the ultimate relation between self and God, or between myself as subject and the notion as subject. In discussing this, Hegel contrasts the Greek concept of destiny with the Christian concept of consolation. He argues that the Greeks could accept destiny because for them personal subjectivity had acquired no great significance. When subjectivity appears it does so in two forms: as private interest and inclination, in necessary rebellion against the course of the world; or it appears as an understanding of the infinite world of subjectivity in terms of which

> that consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact that God himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity so that, inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity, our particular personality too is recognised not merely as something to be solely and simply nullified, but as at the same time something to be preserved. (E.L.270)

That is, I am finally a part of that infinite subject who rationally wills the world, and it is in understanding this that I can overcome the sense of bondage to an external necessity. The consequence of such a position is, in practical terms, rather quietistic: [54]

> A man who lives in dispeace with himself and his lot, commits much that is perverse and amiss, for no other reason than because of the false opinion that he is wronged by others. (EL 271)

In what way can Hegel here be “placed on his feet”? One could, of course, develop a ‘weak’ but also trivial, interpretation of what Engels means as implied by the last sentence quoted above: freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge of the subject. The more you understand the world, the more you can control what it does to you; hence the steam engine is “a gigantic and liberating revolution” (A.D.106 Feuer 279) In one sense this is trivial. In another

sense, as Timpanano points out, it is unacceptable as a definition of freedom insofar as it

> denies the importance of the meaning of freedom as the absence of painful constraint and the presence of all those conditions which ensure the happiness of the individual. (Temp. 106)

But, beyond this, it is not all that Engels means. For he refers not only to the laws of external nature, but also to "the laws which govern the bodily and mental life of man themselves". And this brings us back to the problem of the dog's 'knowledge' of his master as "God". If my knowledge is a natural product, governed by natural laws, in what sense can I claim that it is knowledge, while the dog's belief is delusion? Engels links freedom with knowledge and hence implicitly with reason. We may accept, say, that a syllogism worked out in my head is a 'natural product'. But in what sense is it a natural product; is it a natural product in the same sense that a blade of grass is? Hegel could answer this question in the affirmative, because both blade of grass and syllogism have the rational structure of the concept. But can Engels? The problem of knowledge is intimately linked to the problem of freedom, but not in the way in which Engels supposes. As we have seen, in particular in discussing Kant, both freedom and the possibility of knowledge are linked to the idea of autonomy, as opposed to heteronomy. Engels, by subjecting the inner workings of the mind to 'natural laws' of the same type, and in the same way, as external nature is so subjected, seems to be making the mind irrecuperably heteronomous.

This is connected with the question of "materialism". In the above analysis we have seen that, for Engels, there is an external world existing quite independently of the subject, but [55] in his main published philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin gives an account of the epistemology of dialectical materialism which can, I think, be summarised in the following four propositions:

1) An external world exists independent of our consciousness or knowledge of it.

2) The nature of this external world is knowable, in that our senses give us copies of it in our minds.

3) Our images of the external world are only relatively exact: absolute accuracy occurs, if at all, only at the end of long process of correction.

4) The criterion (or the most important criterion) of the accuracy of our images is practice. The main problem of this approach is that it retains the empiricist idea that the mind works with images, rather than with rules.

Lenin is clearly aware that these four propositions are not a final resolution[268] of all epistemological problems, and in particular he is aware that the exact relation between mind and matter still needs to be worked out. Although the materialist theory of knowledge is that "Matter is primary, and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development" (69), Lenin insists that "It is, of course, utterly absurd to say that materialism has ever maintained that consciousness is 'less' real (than matter and motion") (290), and he criticises Dietzgen for claiming that thought is "material". He agrees with Dietzgen, rather where the latter speaks of a "relative and not excessive" difference between matter and mind (See p. 251); it must remain possible to make the epistemological contrast between mind and matter, but this contrast must not be made "excessive, exaggerated, metaphysical" (253).

The exact nature of the relationship, and in particular the problem of how the mind can mirror this world is unresolved:

> ... There still remains to be investigated and reinvestigated how matter, apparently entirely devoid of sensation, is related to matter which, though composed of the same atoms (or electrons) is yet endowed with a well-defined faculty of sensation. Materialism clearly formulates the as yet unsolved problem and thereby stimulates the attempt to solve it, to undertake further experimental investigations. (39)

That is, Lenin's materialism is 'dialectical' (39) in the sense that it doesn't insist on reduction of everything to a 'mechanical' model of matter in motion [56] but permits "some other, immeasurably more complex, picture of the world of moving matter" (290), a picture which permits irreducibly distinct levels of the organisation of "matter". Our understanding of the nature of "matter" will change as our knowledge penetrates deeper, and we are still a long way from achieving that understanding which would permit us to understand sensation.

From the above it seems to me to be possible to derive a 'weak' definition of 'materialist' epistemology, in terms of which it a) justifies 'naive realism' negatively, by arguing that there are contradictions in the various sceptical positions; and b) asserts simply that the problem of how it is that naive realism can be correct remains to be solved. On the other hand there is a 'strong' definition which is reductionist in character, insofar as it implies that that specificity of human consciousness which enable it to 'mirror' reality has no further implication for an understanding of human real-

268 typo: "final solution".

ity, and that we can safely treat human reality as a part of nature, just like any other part. But in either definition the relation between 'mind' and 'world' remains inadequately explicated. In order to bring out some of the problems involved, I will now discuss the contrasting views of two contemporary Marxist writers, Timpanaro and Colletti.

In his book *On Materialism* Timpanaro provides the following definition of materialism, which seems to me to be a variant of the 'strong' definition:

> By materialism we understand above all acknowledgement of the priority of nature over 'mind'; or if you like, of the physical level over the biological level, and of the biological level over the socio-economic and cultural level: both in the sense of chronological priority (the very long time which supervened before life appeared on earth, and between the origin of life and the origin of man) and in the sense of the conditioning which nature still exercises on man and will continue to exercise at least for the foreseeable future. Cognitively, therefore, the materialist maintains that experience cannot be reduced either to a production of reality by a subject (however such production is conceived) or to a reciprocal implication of subject and object. We cannot, in other words, deny or evade the element of passivity in experience: the external situation which we do not create but which imposes itself upon us. Nor can we in any way reabsorb this external datum by making it a mere negative moment in the activity of the subject, or by making both the subject and the object mere moments, distinguishable only in abstraction, of a single effective reality constituted by experience. [57]
>
> This emphasis on the passive element in experience certainly does not claim to be a theory of knowledge - something which in any case can be constructed only by experimental research on the physiology of the brain and the sense organs, and not by merely conceptual or philosophical exercises. But it is the preliminary condition for any theory of knowledge which is not content with verbalistic and illusory solutions. (Timp. 34)

The term 'priority' is unfortunately a little vague. But the last two sentences do bring out clearly the idea that understanding the nature of 'the mind' is to be taken as an entirely 'scientific' problem, involving no specifically philosophical questions. Timpanaro follows the same lines in his discussion of the notion of free-will, where he rejects the idea that the choice of ends is a 'free' choice, in the sense of being determined by anything other than all of the preceding history of the individual, including his heredity:

> The something more that man possesses in relation to animals is a greater capacity to foresee and order means in relation to an end and greater understanding in the determination of the end, but it is not a greater measure of 'free will' in choosing between various ends. (105)

Thus for Timparano the conscious human being is a thing among other things, placed squarely within the determining network of natural laws.

For Colletti, on the other hand, the issue is much less clear-cut. He recognises that there are important insights contained within Hegel‘s account of the nature of the subject and of reason:

> Reason is a totality. This is what Hegel saw clearly. But since this ‘totality’ is also nothing but reason, it is clear that, in addition to being itself, this totality must also be intellect; in addition to totality it must also be only ‘one of the two’; and that, in short, thought in addition to being the unity of thought and being in thought, must also be a function of a reality external to itself. (Colletti: *Marxism and Hegel*, p.35)

Colletti clarifies what he understands by reason as ‘totality’ in a later discussion of Marx‘s concept of man as a ‘generic natural being’; that is, as a being whose species characteristic is his lack of specificity, or his capacity through thought, in some sense to identify himself with what is contained in any specific being, and what is common or generic to all things. This point is elaborated on in a very interesting discussion of the work of two Renaissance thinkers, Pico della Mirandola and Bovillus, who develop the theme of the ‘nothingness’ or non-substantiality of [58] man in thought:

> Inasmuch as man is thought, he is both everything and nothing; everything in that he is what is GENERAL AND COMMON to all things, in all natural, living species; nothing in that this generality which is the universal, or thought, is none of the particular species contained within it. (Col 233).

But, on the other hand, man is also a ‘natural being’, a part of reality, and as such his thought is not the totality, but is a relation to a quite independent other; it is Kant‘s “Verstand” (‘intellect’ or ‘understanding’) as well as Hegel‘s “Vernunft”. Colletti also formulates this problem in terms of the relation between on the one hand, Hegel‘s idea of dialectical contradiction, as constitutive of reason, or of the subject as embodying reason, and, on the other hand, ‘non-contradiction’’as the real externality of material beings one to another, and the real externality of thought to being. The problem for philosophy then becomes “to rethink in an organic fashion the meaning of non-contradictory or material determinacy, and that of dialectical contradiction or reason” (Co1.104). Colletti himself does not make a detailed attempt at such an “organic rethinking”. Nor, as he points out, did Marx develop the notion of “generic natural being” into a fully-fledged theory. Colletti argues that this is because it became absorbed into his theory of “social relations of production”, in terms of which “production” as man‘s specific mode of relating to the objective otherness of non-human species,

is shown to be at the same time a way of relating "socially" to other humans; "i.e. a way of communicating to other men his needs and aims by means of objectivity" (246) Production as a relation to objectivity (one of two) is a social relation of communication (totality) and social relations of communication take place within the relation to objectivity.

But however one formulates it, this gives rise to a transcendental question. What must human reality be in order to be both rational-social and other-related productive? To put it another way, if this account is to be justified, we still need once again to go over the ground traversed by Hegel in his account of the subject, but now within the context of the relation of the subject to an absolute other. If we can do this in a way which makes sense, we will then be in a position to give an account not only of the structure of the history of an individual subject, but we will also be able to investigate the question of the nature and history of a "social" subject, in order to see to what extent we can treat history as more than a mere concatenation of events. [59]

In the above discussion I have tried to point to various inadequacies in the theoretical discussion of materialism and dialectics in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. in particular I have tried to show that they offer no serious justification for the claim that there are general dialectical laws which apply to nature and society alike. But this does not exclude the possibility that there are certain specific domains in which the dialectic can be applied, and that Marx may have in fact done this in practice without having given it an entirely adequate theoretical foundation. Colletti has argued that in much 'Marxist' writing there is a confusion between 'contradiction' and 'real opposition'. The relationship of 'real opposition' characteristic of things in the world depends on a notion of identity as described by ordinary formal logic. The dialectical notion of contradiction, on the other hand, involves at the same time a unity of opposites, in the sense described earlier in the discussion of Hegel. Now Colletti argues that this idea of dialectical contradiction is in fact used by Marx in the analysis of Capital, and this, he argues, is because although capitalism appears as a system of relations between things, it is not really so: the elements of capitalism

> have been made as real as things, while still not being things: they are, in short, a product of alienation, they are entities which are unreal in themselves and yet have been reified. (Colletti NLR 26)

That is, the elements, and the system have an ontological status somewhere between that of 'things' and that of the 'unreal', or the merely thought, being related in various ways to each of these domains. It would therefore be

by understanding this peculiar ontological status of entities such as the capitalist system that we could begin to say whether and in what way it might be possible to use the dialectic (in some strong sense) in our account of such systems.

Marx himself was aware of this. He began *Capital* with an account of the nature of the 'commodity', in which he shows that the market situation is nothing but a set of relationships between people. It has, as it were, no independent ontological status. Nevertheless, it appears to be a set of relationships between objects, governed by natural laws which operate in the same constraining way as do other natural laws of thing-behaviour. Why is this? Marx writes:

> Only such products can become commodities with regard to each other as result from different kinds of labour, each kind being carried on independently and for the account of private individuals.

More precisely, commodity production is production on the basis of private property, by separate individuals. [60]

Instead of the division of labour being mediated by direct contact between these individuals, they come into contact only via the market. It is therefore the separation of individuals through the institution of private property which gives the market and the laws of the market their apparently independent status.

> A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour, because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves but between the products of their labour ... It is a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. This I call the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. (Cap 42)

Marx introduces the concept "fetishism" to describe the status of the laws of political economy. They are not 'natural' laws, but only appear as such in the contrast of human separation. But in this context they do act as independent laws and impose real constraint on human behaviour. This introduces a kind of determinism into human history. The process whereby 'the market' becomes an independent entity is part of what Marx describes as "alienation". What he is suggesting, therefore, is that it is under conditions of alienation that men experience social structures as 'external facticities' and are conditioned by the laws which describe the social structures and

their patterns of change. The development of capitalist society, which Marx considers in the rest of *Capital*, he sees occurring not as the result of a set of inexorable external laws, but rather as the result of laws which depend for their continued operation on people continuing to fetishise them. He writes:

> The life process of society, this meaning the material process of production, will not lose its veil of mystery until it becomes a process carried on by a free association of producers, under their conscious and purposive control. (Cap 54)

- that is, the laws will only operate as long as men are ignorant of their roots.

However, Marx does not give an account of the possibility of the production of such fetishised entities, nor give any systematic account of their nature. But such an account is required if we are to fully understand how to deal with these entities. [61]

We may approach the problem from another angle through a consideration of the question of identity and the nature of "wholes". I have attempted to show that a crucial step in the move to absolute idealism is made by Hegel when he analyses the notion of identity in terms of relation to self (not A, but A = A) and includes this idea of relation to self in his definition of 'Being'. This is also the basis for his treatment of a 'whole' as a self-moving unity of opposites. Lenin quotes as "the core of Hegelianism" (and with approval) the following passage:

> Something, therefore, is living only insofar as it contains contradiction, and is that force which can both comprehend and endure contradiction. But if an existent something cannot in its positive determination also encroach on its negative, cannot hold fast the one in the other, and contain contradiction within itself, then it is not living unity or ground, but perishes in contradiction. (Lenin Vol.138 p.141, SLII 68)

In his introduction to the *Grundrisse*, Nikolaus argues that the essence of Marx's method is "to grasp *wholes as contradictions" (Grundrisse* 31)

Ollman, in *Alienation*, elaborates on this approach using the notion of 'internal relations', and defines 'Identity' as

> the relation between mutually dependent aspects of a whole before differences are noted. The aspects, as yet unnamed because unspecified, are identical in containing through their internal relations with each other the same whole. (Preface to 2nd Edition, reprinted in *Radical Philosophy* 13, p.19).

Ollman believes, with Lenin, in "the universal, allsided vital connection of everything with everything" (Lenin Vol 38 p.146); he is thus willing to

treat the real world as a ‘whole’ which “admits as many totalities (structured wholes) as there are take-off points for analysis” (p.19) Although he distinguishes ‘dialectical and materialist’ conception of whole from Hegel‘s ‘formalist’ conception on the ground that the latter attributes an identity to the whole independent of its parts, while the former views the whole as the structured interdependence of its relational parts, it is nevertheless evident that his account of the structure of such a whole is derived from Hegel‘s.

Hegel‘s notion of ‘whole’ is based on his account of the identity of a subject. The world, and the things in the world, have the same structure because for him substance is subject. But from a materialist point of view this equation cannot automatically be made. Hegel must be seen as using terms such as ‘identity’ and ‘whole’ in a special technical sense. This raises the question [62] as to the criteria for identifying an ‘entity’ which corresponds to Hegel‘s concept of a ‘whole’ and which can therefore be described or investigated ‘dialectically’. In our ordinary usage a rock, a clock, a rabbit, a human subject, an ecosystem, a society and the universe might each be described as a ‘whole’. But a more thorough analysis might well reveal that not all of these ‘wholes’ are self-related identical wholes in the Hegelian sense, and/or dialectical sense. This is why it is necessary to begin from the beginning again to give an account of the identity of the nature of the subject which takes Hegel’ s account of the structure of the concept into consideration but situates it within a framework which recognises the irreducible ‘ otherness’ of the thing, from this perspective. On the basis of such an account it will then be possible to determine more precisely the kind of ‘whole’ to which the dialectic is applicable, and to answer the question as to whether there are ‘social wholes’ which need to be investigated dialectically. [63]

Sartre‘s materialist dialectics

In a recent interview Sartre has given the following account of his concern in EN. It was

> to give a philosophical foundation to realism. Something which is, in my opinion, possible today, and which I have tried to do all my life. The question was: how to give man both his autonomy and his reality among real objects while avoiding idealism and without falling into a mechanical materialism? I posed the problem in these terms because I was ignorant of dialectical materialism, but I must say that this enabled me, later, to assign certain limits to dialectical materialism - by validating the historical dialectic while rejecting a dialectic of nature which

> would reduce man, like any thing, to a simple product of physical laws. (*Situations* IX p. 104/5)

Being and Nothingness was not written to contribute to a debate within a 'Marxist' framework, and perhaps this is why very few 'Marxists' have understood it. But it was written specifically against idealism, in an attempt to provide an alternative phenomenological or descriptive ontology which would not start from the identity of subject and substance.

Sartre starts B.N. with the assertion that "Modern thought has realised considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it." (BN XiV). I am not quite sure what he means by 'modern thought' here, but his position is explicitly opposed to Kant's noumenon and is, at this point, compatible with Hegel's insistence that appearance does not conceal essence. For Sartre, "the appearance does not hide the essence"; it reveals it insofar as the essence is "the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series (of appearances)" (BN XLvi) That is, when I look at the cup, I see the cup; that which 'appears' to me is not distinct from the actual cup. But to say that it is a cup, and not a mirage, is to go beyond the particular 'appearance' to a series of possible appearances, a series which is effectively infinite, but is at the same time determined according to a rule.

> What appears in fact is only an aspect of the object, and the object is altogether in that aspect and altogether outside of it. It is altogether *within*, in that it manifests itself in that aspect; it shows itself as the structure of the appearance, which is at the same time the principle of the series. It is altogether outside, for the-series itself will never appear nor can it appear. (BN xlvii) [64]

Now, insofar as the 'appearance' does not refer to a 'being' distinct from and concealed by the appearance, we need to enquire as to the nature of the being of the appearance or of the phenomenon. We can talk about 'being', take being as the theme of our reflection, and in this case there is a phenomenon of being. But this is not the same as the being of the phenomenon. It is not as though 'being' were a specific quality or aspect of certain objects, which could be focussed upon and become phenomenon. The being of the object is not something which is revealed by an investigation of the object; rather "Being is simply the condition of all revelation" (BN xlix) We must distinguish between a "phenomenon of being" which can be "determined in concepts", and that being of the phenomenon which escapes conceptualisations because it is the transphenomenality of the phenomenon; its 'thereness' as extending beyond its immediate appearance. Sartre is saying here that that merely 'meant' distinction between being and nothingness is

fundamental; that what distinguishes what is from what is not is not an additional (conceptualisible) quality or characteristic, but our unsayable experience of its thereness as something which goes beyond any one appearance. Its status is different from that of the 'essence' of the thing, as the principle of the series of appearances, because the essence can be progressively uncovered, while

> being accompanies all the appearances of an object. It is not different in each of these appearances. (CS and KS 120)

The alternate hypothesis is that the 'being' of the appearance is nothing but its appearing; that is, that to be is to be perceived. But this does not avoid the problem of transphenomenality: the being of the perceiver cannot on its turn consist in its being perceived, otherwise the whole thing dissolves. Thus we must at the very least refer to the dimension of transphenomenality in the subject, which Sartre calls consciousness. The fundamental objection to the theoretical primacy of knowledge is that it dissolves itself. To know something involves being conscious that one knows it. But this consciousness must not in its turn be taken as a kind of knowledge. If we say that "to know is to know that one knows", then this definition applies also to the first 'know' in the definition itself, and it expands infinitely. Taking Kant's example of counting, Sartre points out that I am thematically conscious of the objects which I am counting, but at the same time what makes what I am doing counting, that is, what constitutes the rule-bound unity of my action, and gives the last number the meaning of a total, is precisely my [65] my consciousness that I am counting the objects, rather than pointing to them while chanting an incantation. But while counting I do not have to keep repeating 'I am counting'; this is a secondary, reflective consciousness, which depends entirely on the fact of the pre-reflecting consciousness. While knowledge is necessarily distanced from its object, this pre-reflective consciousness is an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself' (BN liii) it is that consciousness is, not what it does; or it is "the only mode of existence for a consciousness of something" (BN liv) Any act, any process of conceptualisation, any attitude, presumes as a condition of its continuation (hence of its unity), the underlying consciousness that it is this act, this concept, this attitude, rather than another one. Although I must be conscious of what I am doing, I need not know what I am doing, in the sense of being able to conceptualise it (c.f. Ryle's distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'). Pre-reflective consciousness is logically prior to and independent of conceptual knowledge.

But the condition for pre-reflective consciousness to constitute the unity of any act, is that consciousness be autonomous and contentless. It must be autonomous for the reason that external intervention destroys the unity of the act. If I find myself saying one, two, three, four, eng, glumph, I should no longer be counting; my act would have dissolved into a broken sequence beyond my control. It must be contentless because to place a thing "in" consciousness, like a foreign body in a container, would be to give consciousness itself the opacity of that thing, by making it impossible to disentangle itself from the thing; consciousness must be transparent to itself. This means that it is conscious of something which is outside and other than it.

This transparency of consciousness is distinguished from the self transparency of Hegel's absolute mind knowing itself in that that is a mediated transparency, an end product as the final dissolution of all otherness. But consciousness must be transparent in the above sense from the beginning, for it requires from the beginning an immediate and total certainty; to count is to be conscious that I am counting; it is not to hypothesise on a basis of the consideration of various probabilities, that I may be counting (cf CS and KS 119 124). But if I have to wait until the totality of knowledge is achieved until I can be certainly conscious that I am counting, then knowledge itself can never begin. [66]

It is because consciousness is necessarily transparent that it cannot be the foundation of the thing perceived:

> Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. This is what we call the ontological proof. (BN lxi)

Thus Sartre concludes that there are two radically different forms of being; the being of the pre-reflective cogito which, as an immediate relation of the self to itself is 'being-for-itself', and the being of the phenomenon. The being of the phenomenon is nothing but otherness. It is 'inherence in itself without the least distance', it is 'not a connection with itself. It is itself', or 'being is in itself'. But Sartre is anxious to make it clear that these statements must not be taken in the sense of Hegel's A = A, as an identity which is already implicitly a difference. He writes

> But if being is in itself, this means that it does not refer to itself as self-consciousness does. It is this self. It is itself so completely that the perpetual reflection which constitutes the self is dissolved in an identity. That is why being is at the bottom beyond the self. (BN lxv).

For Hegel, the thing is a subject because it is identical in the sense of being equal to itself. For Sartre, the being is not a self because it contains no such relation. The identity which characterizes it is the identity if analytic judgements, not the dialectical identity of the unity of opposites. Finally, Being-in-itself merely is. It is neither possible nor necessary; this is the consequence of its otherness or opacity.

Being-for-itself, on the other hand, is presence to itself, "the outline of duality", "an internal opposition"; "In other words, the dimension of being of the whole of consciousness is opposition" (CS & KS 126-127). This is Hegel's notion of identity, but for Sartre it is the mode of one specific type of being, consciousness. It is what Sartre sometimes describes in a technical sense as 'existence'; "Existence is distance from itself, separateness. It is not coincidence with itself but is for-itself". (CS and KS 114)

Thus in the Introduction to *Being and Nothingness* Sartre rejects the primacy of (conceptual) knowledge, by showing that it is self-contradictory, and that the possibility of knowledge, as of any other mode of human behaviour, presumes consciousness as its pre-conceptual transphenomenal foundation. Further, consciousness itself cannot be the foundation of the being of the phenomenon, since this would contradict its own preconditions, autonomy and [67] and transparency. Hence consciousness itself depends on another being as the transphenomenality of the appearance. This otherness is presupposed by consciousness, it is not a 'known' other which, by being known, is, in Hegel's term, no longer other. It remains other, and can be described only as being-in-itself, once more not in Hegel's sense of implicit self-relation, but in the sense of a complete opacity which contains within it no opposition. As such, it is also purely contingent; there is no room within it for that structure of logical conceptual necessity which Hegel discovers in being as relation to self. These two elements, irreducible otherness and contingency, define Sartre's philosophy as materialist. But it is not a reductionist or a mechanical materialism, because it establishes, over against being-in-itself, a second type of being, being-for-itself, which is characterised by a different mode of identity from being-in-itself; identity which contains within it the moment of negativity or opposition.

Being and Nothingness, then, is an investigation of the nature of these two types of being, and of their interrelation; in particular, of the nature of consciousness and of its dependence on being-in-itself, insofar as "consciousness is a being, such that in its being, its being is in question insofar as this being implies a being other than itself" (BN lxii) It may thus be read as an attempt to give a new account of consciousness as dialectical identity

within the context of materialism, which is the necessary prerequisite for an investigation of the possibility of a materialist dialectic.[269]

For Hegel, Kant‘s idea of freedom as rational autonomy becomes the identity of freedom with necessity in the self-creation of absolute mind. Both were concerned initially with the idea of freedom not as the ability to get what one chooses, but as the ability to determine one‘s own ends, but for Hegel this is finally identified with also achieving ends, insofar as substance is reduced to the one infinite subject. Engels misunderstands the identification of freedom and necessity by interpreting freedom as knowledge of necessity and hence as the ability to manipulate natural laws in order to achieve one‘s ends. Sartre is once more concerned with the Kant-Hegel notion of freedom; that is, with exploring the relation between the presupposition for the possibility of knowledge and freedom as the ability to determine one‘s own ends.

This method may be briefly described as an alternating sequence of phenomenological descriptions and transcendental arguments. [68] After having given a description of questioning as a fundamental attitude to the world, which reveals the dimension of ‘nothingness’ in the question, he asks the transcendental question “What must man be in his being in order that through him nothingness may come to being?” (BN 24) The attempt to answer this question is then clarified and illustrated by a new phenomenological description, which in turn provides the basis for a further transcendental question. The crucial advantage of this approach is that he is thereby able to begin without presupposition about the nature of perception, as Kant explicitly did, and as Hegel, as I have tried to show, implicitly did. The notion of ‘phenomenon’ with which he begins does not have the status of an empirical sense-datum. He does not begin by asking whether, on the basis of discrete sense-data, we are justified in postulating an external world of a certain shape and kind. He is concerned, rather, to demonstrate the immediate ontological dependence of consciousness on a being other than itself, and to do this by showing that this is implied by the nature of any conscious activity.

Essentially his argument expands on Kant‘s recognition that knowledge implies a temporally extended point of view which always transcends the immediate given in order to relate it to what is not given. But while for Kant this involves the imagination in a process of ‘representing’ the past manifold so as to permit synthesis, Sartre makes consciousness itself temporal:

269 No Heidegger, Gadamer, Horkheimer und Adorno, Ebelling, Blumenberg, Henrich, Theunissen, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan.

> It is not because I 'represent' my past that it exists. But it is because I am my past that it enters into the world and it is in terms of its being-in-the world that I can, by applying a particular psychological process, represent it to myself. (BN 115-16)

Consciousness is thus a movement from past to future, and it must be self-consciousness in order to safeguard the unity of the movement of transcendence. The act of transcendence is in turn made possible by that distance from self which characterises self-consciousness, and which Sartre calls 'nothingness'. Freedom is that combination of transcendence and self-consciousness which involves the possibility of consciousness placing itself, and its own actions, in question. Just as, in counting, I have to make myself count, in the sense of carrying through a project which constitutes the unity of my act of counting, so, in other situations I have to make myself be what I am. In Sartre's example "the waiter in the café cannot be immediately a café waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell or the glass is a glass" (BN 59) In the fact that he has to 'make himself be' or 'play at being' a waiter [69] lies the possibility of ceasing to be a waiter, or, at least, of re-evaluating waiterhood by changing from a willing into an unwilling waiter. This process is temporally articulated as a project from an irremediable past towards an open future. The two elements, the irremediability (I took on this job, and I cannot avoid having taken it on) and the openness (I can change the significance of the fact that I took it on; it can be the beginning of a career, a mistake, or perhaps the introduction to trade union activity) is united in Sartre's aphorism "Consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is". It is its past which it is no longer, and it is not its future by which it defines what it is. For Satre freedom is absolute in the sense that the ontological structure of consciousness is to be always at a distance from itself, but the constraint of the for-itself is equally absolute, since "the for-itself is sustained by a perpetual contingency for which it assumes the responsibility and which it assimilates without ever being able to suppress it. This perpetually evanescent contingency of the in-itself haunts the for-itself and reattaches it to being-in-itself." (BN 82-3) This is what Sartre describes as facticity. Terms such as 'nothingness' and 'lack' which Sartre uses to describe the for-itself are designed precisely to bring out the weight of the facticity. In the relation of knowledge

> it is the in-itself in person which is the concrete pole in its plenitude, and the for-itself is nothing other than the emptiness in which the in-itself is detached. The known is not; he is not apprehensible. He is nothing other than that which brings it about that there is a being there on the part of the known - a presence - for by itself the known is neither present nor absent, it simply is. (BN 177)

This is a materialist and realist position which insists that the object as known is not in any way different from the object 'in-itself'. But it is not a 'reflection' in Lenin's sense, because it is not an image. It is a direct relation to the thing, but a relation from a perspective, and Sartre tries to show how the main categories of empirical knowledge derive from the fact that

> there is a this because I am not yet my future negations and because I am no longer my past negations. (BN 182)

For this reason the in-itself dissolves into a plurality of 'this's', which are quite untouched by my negation, and hence are related externally to one another. Space and Time, each being one and yet infinitely divisible, are the appearance of the in-itself, in the context of limitation from a perspective. Quality is an abstraction as a particular 'profile' of the this through which it appears to me. [70]

Potentiality and instrumentality are involved in the fact that the for-itself transcends the this towards a future and another this, and the fact that it does this in the context of its own projects. Thus although in one sense knowledge is of being as it is, in another sense the world as we experience it is organised in categories which are a function of the fact that consciousness is present to being from a particular perspective an d in the context of a project. On the one hand the world is a human world, or, even more specifically my world. This is because the things in the world are necessarily evaluated or given significance by the nature of my projects. As projection towards an open future the for-itself is necessarily value-creating. But, equally, the for-itself is normally engaged in its projects, in what Sartre calls "the spirit ot seriousness:" It is not reflecting on its projects, but is simply carrying them through. In this situation "the meaning which my freedom has given to the world I apprehend as coming from the world, and as constituting my obligation". (BN 39-40) Moreover, since my project is a way of structuring and organising the world, and since in the spirit of seriousness I am entirely absorbed in this world, this world is

> the transcendent image of what I am ... My clothing (a uniform or a lounge suit, a soft or a starched shirt) whether neglected or cared for, carefully chosen or ordinary, my furniture, the street on which I live, the city in which I reside, the books with which I surround myself, the recreation which I enjoy, everything which is mine (that is, finally, the world of which I am perpetually conscious, at least by way of a meaning implied by the object which I look at or use) all this informs me of my choice, that is, of my being. (BN 463)

But all this is dependent for its meaning on my project: it has no meaning in itself. It has a structure: this tree is on the hill, rather than in the valley. But this structure only becomes a system of meanings, and therefore only contains significance for action, in terms of an evaluating project. This relation between a resisting world with its own coefficient of adversity and the evaluating project is described by Sartre using the concept 'situation'. This situation includes my place, my past, my environment, my fellows and my death. I am always present to the world in a particular place, from a particular past, within a particular social and physical environment, which includes a certain available set of techniques, and also, of course, in the light of the certainty of my own death. These are all, in various ways, limitations on my freedom to get what I want, but Sartre is concerned [71] to show that each nevertheless derives its significance within my situation from my own project, and my project is a free project; rather than one which is the result of my 'essence', understood as a set of necessary behaviour patterns. Ontologically, freedom is an absolute; consciousness is necessarily autonomous and transparent. But, on the one hand, freedom becomes lost in the 'spirit of seriousness' which attributes value to the in-itself directly and, on the other hand, freedom has to be understood in relation to the weight of facticity. Moreover, there is an interrelation between these two. One element of facticity is the social environment from which I acquire techniques, including language as a technique for clarifying and describing the world, and intellectual techniques of various kinds. The for-itself, as presence to self, is the permanent possibility of reflection, in that the for-itself can make its own project and values the theme of its attention, and thereby bring them into question. But the project and values constitute a 'very complex symbolic structure' (BN 567), and the task of actually changing pre-reflective consciousness of this structure into knowledge requires 'instruments and techniques' to 'permit analysis and conceptualisation' (BN 571).

It seems to me that Sartre does not clearly bring out the implications of this, but that it does make possible a distinction within the for-itself between freedom as implicit structure and freedom as historically realised in a fully selfconscious reflection. In the light of this, I think it is possible to make the following comparisons between Sartre and Hegel.

1) For Hegel the otherness of being is finally overcome and absorbed within the good infinity of the intellectus archetypus. For Sartre, being-in-itself only constitutes a world insofar as it is traversed by the projects of the for-itself. Thus the world is a system of meanings and values. But it nevertheless retains its absolute otherness within this context. The 'phenomenon of being' which Sartre attempts to describe in 'Nausea' is

always a possible experience. Thus although the world is mediated through a system of meaning which has the structure of a Hegelian concept, it is not reducible to this structure, and so is not subject to a dialectical logic.
2) Similarly, Sartre‘s for-itself, like Hegel‘s subject, is an absolutely free self-creation, but while Hegel‘s subject is a closed totality, Sartre‘s for-itself necessarily remains what he calls a ‘detotalised totality’. Both it and its values remain contingent, because dependent on its other, it can never become the foundation of [72] its own being, an in-itself-for-itself, or God. But, as a being which nevertheless ‘is what it is not and is not what it is’ it has the dialectical identity of a unity of opposites.
3) The implicit freedom of the for-itself may become a fully reflective, self-conscious freedom, and this depends both on the moral experience of the individual and also on the extent to which language and the techniques of analysis are developed within the historical evolution of society. But this possible historical evolution of freedom is not the necessary working out of a set of logical contradictions borne in the unique subject of all history. In a tantalisingly brief discussion at the end of his lecture on “Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self” Sartre says that from his point of view, “the reflective act is an initiative, and not a moment in a philosophical dialectic”, and asserts that “there is no necessity for transition from one to another” (CS and KS 136) This may underestimate the possibility of uncovering some kind of dialectic in the development of techniques, but it does bring out clearly the idea that the application of the techniques of reflection must be seen as an originative and creative act, rather than as the unfolding of an inner necessity.
4) For Hegel the other person is a constitutive moment in the development of full self-consciousness. But full self-consciousness itself is a dissolution of all otherness. It assumes an end point at which I know the other and myself in exactly the same way, at which point particularity is dissolved in common will and common knowledge. For Sartre, neither my relation to myself nor my relation to the other can be reduced to knowledge and become universal and equivalent to one another. There is an ‘ontological separation’ between consciousness. The Other is encountered as a contingent facticity.
These four points constitute, it seems to me, at least the basis for a materialist transformation of the philosophical advances made by Kant and Hegel. It is on the basis of this materialist critique of Kant and Hegel in *Being and Nothingness* that Sartre is able to approach the problem of founding the dialectic in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. The distinction between the two types of being lays the foundation for the delimitation of the

applicability of types of reason, while the account of the individual subject as a detotalised totality contingently related to other similar individuals makes it possible to develop a concept of a social dialectic which does not carry the deterministic implication given it by Hegel. [73]

In the preface to the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* Sartre defines a type of reason as "an ordering of our thoughts" which "reproduces or constitutes the order of being" (RD 10). He goes on to say,

> the goal of my research will therefore be to establish whether the positivist reason of the natural sciences is in fact the reason which we find in the development of anthropology, or whether the knowledge and the comprehension of man by man implies not only specific methods but a new Reason, that is to say a new relation between thought and its object. (RD 10)

The "positivist reason of the natural sciences" he describes as "analytic reason", and his question is, whether the categories of analytic reason are adequate to deal with human reality. A type of reason, then, is a particular way of ordering our thoughts, or a set of rules or categories in terms of which we may distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate ways of ordering our thoughts. The way of ordering thoughts acquires its normative status as reason from the fact that it is related in a specific way to the order of being; as Sartre expresses it in a lapidary phrase: "Reason is a certain relation of knowledge and being" (RD 10). In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre has shown that there are two types of being. There can be no science of Being-in-itself as such, yet that world which is made to "be there" by the presence of consciousness to being shares the fundamental contingency of Being-in-itself. It is both a synthetic totality and also "a purely additive collection of all the thises" (BN 18). When revealed from a particular perspective, the indifference of being shows itself as the spatial arrangement of determinate objects. Space is neutral, and within space objects are related to one another externally. Quantity is this exteriority of objects to one another. Change appears as the replacement of one state of affairs by another, and time thus, appears as a succession of instants, as "universal time" quite distinct from the ekstatic temporalisation of Being-for-itself. The natural sciences study this purely additive collection of all the thises. They treat things, quite legitimately, as independent entities, quantifiable and moving in neutral space and time, and attempt to make satisfactory descriptive generalisations concerning their relationships.

The categories of analytic reason, being the categories of externality, are not adequate to Being-for-itself, which is what it is not and is not what it is.

Sartre‘s aim, then, is to give an account of the type of “reason” needed to deal with such a being, and to establish its limits. [74]

Being and Nothingness is, in spite of the many concrete descriptions, a work written at a very high level of abstraction. It is an attempt to describe certain fundamental ontological structures, rather than to give a full account of human reality. I think many of the misunderstandings of the work come from a failure to situate it at its proper level of abstraction, and that Sartre himself was in some of his earlier writing sometimes guilty of moving too hastily from this level of abstraction to attempt to interpret the concrete. The Critique assumes the account of these fundamental structures, but attempts to work out their implications at a lower level of abstraction. Sartre objects that dialectical materialism fails adequately to take account of the fact that “Thought is both being and knowledge of being” (RD122) It tends therefore to turn into a dogmatic materialism,

> giving man a constituted reason, that is, making of thought a form of behaviour rigorously conditioned by the world (which it is), while omitting to tell us that it is also knowledge of the world. (RD 127).

This can only be accounted for by means of the kind of description already given of consciousness, and this is the only possible foundation of the dialectics, since the various ‘laws’ of the dialectic are comprehensible in terms of totalisation, which is the structure of consciousness. In individual praxis the relations of exteriority which characterise things are taken up and transmuted within a unified field which gets its significance from my project, the way in which I totalise it.

> Action is itself the negating transcendence of contradiction, the determination of a present totalisation in the name of a future totality, and the real effective working of matter. (CDR80)

It involves the interiorisation of exteriority and the re-exteriorisation of interiority, through which the individual‘s project makes the external environment into a practical value-laden totality. Individual praxis is thus a dialectical totalisation. But the problem is, to what extent, if any, can we treat not individual praxis but social ensembles as ‘totalisation in progress’?

Sartre‘s fundamental concern is to bring out fully the implication of the basic ontological separation of human individuals for each kind of ensemble. He therefore begins his account with a more thorough analysis of the relation to the other. The other signifies in so far as he gives values to the world which I can recognise as his values. My relation to him is reciprocal, because, since we both unify the same material world we integrate one an-

other as independent creators of value in our respective systems [75] or 'worlds'. But this reciprocity is not itself a totality:

> Thus each lives in the absolute interiority of a relationship without unity. This concrete certainty is the mutual adaptation in separation, the existence of a relationship with a double focus which he can never grasp in its totality. This disunion in solidarity comes from an excess rather than from a lack; it is in fact produced by the existence of two rigorously equivalent synthetic unifications. (RD 194)

The possibility of further totalisation would dissolve at this point if it were not for the fact that our reciprocal actions leave traces in the world, and these traces can be understood as objective meanings by a person standing outside our original reciprocal relationship. This person Sartre calls the Third. Thus matter mediates between people, and worked matter, as the objectification of this process of mediation is the basis for a totalisation by a Third who reanimates the objectified meanings. Now the significance of this is that each individual is both I, Other and Third. From this there can arise a system of totalisation which, however, because it is always via each in the status of Third, is always mediated, never direct.

Matter mediates between people, but not as matter, rather, as a system of meanings which has to be reanimated by individual praxis, but, once it is so reanimated, can function as a coercive facticity. This Sartre calls the "practico-inerte". It is possible for an individual in this situation to identify with some object in such a way that his activity no longer derives directly from his own need but rather "is induced in him, from outside, by worked matter, as the practical exigence of the inanimate object." (RD 252) The capitalist identifies with the factory and works to conserve and develop it, rather than using it for the satisfaction of his own needs. Thus the relation of producer to product is inverted; this inversion is, however, only possible because the meanings objectified in matter do not act directly, but only insofar as they are reintegrated into a human meaning system. This inverted meaning is that 'interest' which is the fundamental category of liberal economic theory. The relation of 'interests' involves the practical communication of individuals "through the antagonisms or compatibilities of the matter which represents them" (RD 263)

The totalisation of my reciprocal relation to the Other occurs through the Third, and thus the significance of this totalisation for me will depend on the nature of my relation to the Third. This relation may vary from complete separation to complete [76] cooperation. Separation here also functions as a relation, since it is never an absolute separation, but is always a

separation in the face of a common material world. Insofar as self, Other and Third are all totalising the same material world, the final result will be a jointly produced result, and this is recognised by each in his praxis. Thus each depends on the other, but has no control over what the other does: "each one waits for the act of the other, and each makes himself the impotence of the other in so far as the other is his impotence" (RD 325). The relationship here is what Sartre calls a 'series'. It is characteristic of the series that all actions are necessarily alienated and rebound upon the actor in an unrecognisable form.

The milieu of interest and the series, which is, of course, the milieu of capitalism as a fetishised system (although not exclusively of capitalism) is the milieu of the experience of necessity, in which human behaviour is trapped by the exigencies of worked matter and by serial impotence. It is what Sartre calls the level of the 'anti-dialectic', insofar as it appears to be governed purely by the laws of exteriority (analytical reason), as in bourgeois economic theory. But it can only be comprehended in relation to the constituting dialectic of individual praxis and its deviation in the field of the practico-inerte, which transforms human praxis into

> praxis without an author, transcending the given towards rigid ends, whose hidden meaning is counter-finality. (RD 235 CDR 166)

Serial praxis, based on separation, may be contrasted with group praxis, based on coordination. The problem is, however, that the group can never become a genuine 'hyper-organism', or a genuine totality. It always remains based on the Self - Other - Third structure, and is therefore threatened either with disintegration or with ossification as a result of the measures which it takes to prevent disintegration. Sartre gives his account of the structure of the group as an historical account of the genesis of the purest group, the 'fused group', and then of its progressive degeneration back into the series. However, this is not to be understood as an inevitable historical process. It is merely designed to reveal the various structures of the group in a coherent manner.

The specific characteristic of the group is that, within it, other's act no longer distorts the meaning of my act but is, rather, complementary to it. In the fused group this complementarity is effectively spontaneous. It is a situation of 'common sovereignty' in which my membership of the group is part of the structure of my action, but as a free invention rather than as an external imposition. [77] Sartre gives the example of the first days of the French Revolution in which the crowd organises itself into an effective unity in the face of the external threat. In this situation, common to many

revolutionary ‘days’ and to many strikes, there is no formally authorised leadership, but, rather, individual ‘leaders’ emerge and are immediately reabsorbed in a process in which each recognises in the others his own motives and actions. In a slightly more structured group, such as a (good) football team, the process is more clearly visible. At any given moment the player who has the ball serves as the ‘Regulating Third’ for the others, as they adjust their positions according to his, and he totalises the field for the group. This is a system of ‘circulating sovereignty’ in which the power of the ball player is not exerted externally, but is nothing but the way in which he integrates himself with the group.

The fused group functions as a group because of a common understanding of the situation on the basis of which each individual knows how to act. This common understanding may be the result of prior planning and training (the football team) or it may be a sudden common reaction to, for example, a common situation of oppression the fragility of which is for some reason suddenly revealed. But the common understanding does not overcome the fundamental separation of the members of the group. The group makes use of these relations of exteriority in making itself into a ‘mechanical system’ which acts on the world. But the group praxis remains a ‘constituted dialectic’, dependent on the ‘constituting dialectic’ of the individual praxis. That is, it has no independent ontological status. The ‘otherness’ of each individual has to be integrated into the group, but remains also as a permanent threat to its unity. In a group more permanent than the revolutionary crowd this requires differentiation and specialisation of function, which in turn requires the concentration of sovereignty as a specific function in the form of authority. In ideal circumstances, “as a member of a living organisation I understand that the Other is a practical and signifying invention of ”we-the-same" (RD. 475). But at the other end of the scale each individual is no longer “quasi-sovereign”, but is concerned only with his or her particular function in a hierarchy, rather than with the ends of the group as such, and the institutionalised authority can only fight this implicit serialisation by the use of coercive techniques of various kinds: the group has reached the ultimate stage of bureaucratisation.

The significance of Sartre‘s extremely rich description of the various forms of group (reduced here from 400 to 1 pages) is [78] twofold. Firstly, insofar as

> Every organisation with reciprocity of oaths is a first beginning (of humanity) because it is always a conquest of man as common freedom over seriality (RD453 n 1),

the analysis brings out clearly the ontologically rooted and hence permanent 'political' problems which will exist even in the realm of freedom. Freedom as group praxis is no automatic result of the ending of economic exploitation. The struggle against serialisation is permanent, and this requires careful reflection on the question of political organisations and institutions in a socialist society.

Secondly, in analysing any given society or section of society one must take account of the probable simultaneous existence of series and of groups of different kinds in complex interaction. In particular one cannot without more ado treat a class as though it has the structure of a fused group:

> Class manifests simultaneously as an institutionalised apparatus, as a (serial or organised) ensemble of direct action groups, and as a collective which receives its status from the field of the pratico-inerte (through and by its relations of production with other classes) and its universal schema of practical unification from the groups which form ceaselessly on its surface. (RD 649)

This raises the question of the dialectical intelligibility of the notions of class and class struggle. Even if one were to show the existence of a relation of exploitation between two classes, whereby some of the product of the one is acquired by the other, it might still be possible to interpret this relation as the automatic result of the working of the economic system. This would be exploitation as a process. To speak of class *struggle* is to speak not of a process but of praxis rooted in some way in a consciousness of class and of class interests. It involves treating a class as in some sense a totality, rather than as having the merely external and additive unity of a collection of things. In order to do this one must be able to show that there is a praxis of oppression on the part of the dominant class, and that this praxis is rooted in an understanding of class interest. This praxis of oppression would in turn be the basis for the intelligibility of praxis of resistance to oppression embodying an understanding of the relation between the praxis of oppression and the process of exploitation.

But this praxis of oppression, as *class* behaviour, cannot be interpreted initially as the praxis of a fused group. There is [79] no conspiracy to oppress. Instead there is what may be described as a process of serial oppression, in which each individual capitalist, rather than acting consciously to 'oppress the working class' acts as other, and on the basis of the exigencies of his 'interest', in such a way as to perpetuate that condition of atomisation and dependence through which the workers are exploited:

> To lower costs is to decrease the number of his workers. In other words, it is directly against the future unemployed that he buys his machines; not, as it is said, 'without caring what happens to them' (RD 697).

The everyday praxis of the individual capitalist embodies an understanding of the worker as "the enemy", and this shows itself in the use of the machine against the worker, and in routine action, varying with the possibilities of the situation, designed to maintain the workers in a state of serial impotence by preventing or inhibiting organisations. This understanding constitutes what Sartre calls "the objective spirit of the class" (RD 721). It is not a single articulated theory, but rather "the general schema of a situated understanding" (RD 715), or "a milieu for the circulation of meanings" (RD 721). It is not a rationalisation, in the sense of a secondary phenomenon designed to conceal or distort the reality of oppression as the primary phenomenon. It is, in fact, largely implicit, and to the extent that it becomes explicit it is as a thematisation of taken-for-granted action. Praxis is project, or the embodiment of values; the values and meanings are constitutive of the praxis, rather than separate from it. It is, then, the objective spirit of the class which provides the fundamental unity of the class praxis of oppression, and which ensures that an apparently serial action will have the desired result - at least in the short term since one can conceive of situations in which the historically created objective spirit of the ruling class is such as to produce a type and level of oppression which finally produces revolt.

In the face of this praxis of oppression the resistance of the dominant class appears firstly as purely serial, and, secondly, as the more or less conscious process whereby the members of the class acquires a consciousness of class, through the growth and activity of various kinds of group within the context of the common material condition which constitutes the practico-inerte being of the class. This must in turn be expressed in a general 'objective spirit' of the class which is not a developed class consciousness but a much broader system of meanings. This, like the objective spirit of the ruling class, is an historical product [80] and will therefore necessarily differ from society to society. Thus one cannot apply a universal schema, except in the very broadest sense, but must instead decipher a different system of meanings in each case.

The actual result of this class struggle is, however, necessarily something other than that which is consciously intended by any of the participants. At the end of the *Critique* Sartre raises the question of the intelligibility of this

> complex phenomenon which has to be described as a praxis-process and which sets classes in opposition to one another as circular totalisations of institutions, groups and series (CDR 806).

In general terms, the praxis of struggle involves a reciprocal intelligibility for each as

> the comprehension of his object being (insofar as it exists for the Other and threatens to enclose him one day in the Other) through his practical existence as a subject. (CDR 814)

But this formal comprehension of each by the other in the struggle is not necessarily the same as the comprehension of the result, which always embodies the partial failure of each side, and so necessarily is a mutilated and truncated meaning. Sartre here states only that

> History is intelligible if the different practices which can be found and located at a given moment of the historical temporalisation finally appear as partially totalising and as connected and merged in their very oppositions and diversities by an intelligible totalisation from which there is no appeal. (CDR 817).

He leaves the investigation of the possibility of such an intelligibility to a second volume, which is unfinished and unpublished.

The idea of an intelligible totalisation "from which there is no appeal" is very obscure. It is, however, clear from what has gone before that we are not dealing with a Hegelian dialectic which is a self-transparent logical process, or with the simplified Marxist dialectic in which the classless society is the inevitable and necessary result of the class conflict. We are dealing, rather, with a praxis which "by definition has ignorance and error as basic structures" (CDR 811), and with a complex which includes within itself the level of the anti-dialectic. Thus Sartre's argument here has to be interpreted in the light of his earlier account of the regressive-progressive method. The regressive moment, undertaken in the published volume of CDR, is the investigation of the fundamental structures of society, while the progressive moment is the attempt to understand how these structures are lived in the actual historical project. The "intelligibility" here is not a deductive intelligibility which [81] shows how event B logically followed from event A, but rather a dialectical intelligibility which grasps the free invention of a praxis producing event B out of situation A. It is thus always an ex post facto understanding, but the possibility of such an understanding is identical with the possibility of freely creating B in an intelligent response to situation A. Sartre is therefore saying here that at best we may act intelli-

gently on the basis of a more rather than less complete grasp of the situation, an that we may understand an historical result as the creation of human praxis acting within a system of meaning and with a margin of ignorance and error which may themselves be understood, but that finally we are dealing with a "totalisation without a totaliser" which does not have the immediate self-transparency of an individual praxis. In Sartre's own terms, it is an intellection, not a comprehension. (see CDR 74-76)

History is a combination of the constituting dialectic of individual praxis, the anti-dialectic of the pratico-inerte and serial impotence, and the constituted dialectic of common praxis. The level of the anti-dialectic is characterised by relations of exteriority, and so can be described using the concept of identity of analytic reason. But it cannot be understood by analytic reason, because it is that inverted fetishised reality referred to by Colletti. It is a system of human meanings which has taken on thing-like form. As such it can be understood finally only in relation to the constituting dialectic, but as the deviation and loss of this praxis. It is in this sense that it is the level of necessity, and the 'laws' which govern its operation have the status of 'natural' laws. Because praxis is always interiorisation as well as exteriorisation, each actor is necessarily, as he acts, engaged in the attempt to decipher his or her historical situation. Sartre's argument seems to me to be that this is not a necessarily vain project, because the elements of intelligibility are there, but that the hope that when this is achieved it will be possible to dissolve every element of necessity and turn history into a (Hegelian) dialectic of a free subject is vain. The reasons are, firstly, that the condition for serialisation persist under any circumstances, and so all otherness can never be dissolved, and, secondly, that at any given time the fact that history is being made serially, and on the basis of a pratico-inerte reality which includes even language and ideology, is likely to continually overrun the intelligibility that we are able to wrest from it. This is not a 'pessimistic' or quietistic conclusion; history is still ontological, [82] rooted in individual praxis, and this gives us the promise of freedom as a real historical possibility. But it does have implications for political action; at the very least it must place in question the triumphalist view that "history is on our side". [83]

Some Problems

i) In a 1975 interview, Sartre said that

> I think in fact that a theory of freedom which does not explain at the same time what alienations are, to what extent freedom can be manipulated, deflected, turned against itself, could cruelly deceive somebody who does not understand what it implies, and who believes that freedom is everywhere. But if one reads carefully what I have written, I do not believe that one can make such a mistake. (*Situations* X. p.223)

This is I think correct, but I think that it is also true that the gap between consciousness as presence-to-self and reflection as liberating knowledge of self has widened, as Sartre has tried to show the implications for the abstract structure of the for-itself of its embeddedness in a concrete reality.

This emerges, for example, in Sartre's discussion of objective spirit in his study of Flaubert (*l'Idiot de la Famille III* 41-58). He defines objective spirit as "Culture as pratico-inerte" (P44), and contrasts it with the origin of culture in "lived actual work, in so far as, by definition, it transcends nature and retains it within itself" (44) as interiorisation of the exterior and reexteriorisation of the interior. This transcendence is an understanding of the environment, of the tool used, and of the human relations involved in the mode of production concerned. But this lived understanding as part of the structure of praxis Sartre describes as

> an intuitive, implicit and non-verbal knowing, a certain direct and totalising but wordless comprehension. At this level the whole thought is given, but it does not posit itself for itself and thus finally in its extreme compression, escapes verbal elaboration. (45)

This pratico-theoretical knowing is however the foundation for a 'superstructure' in which it becomes systematically elaborated. In this process

> reflection isolates in the totality of praxis the moment of theory, which has never existed alone but only as a practical mediation determined by the goal itself. It is then that it has recourse to language. This, on the one hand, isolates and transforms into a finite product the knowing which existed implicitly in the act of the worker. It gives names and hardens, in the forms of definite structures, all the elements which interpenetrated in the cultural revelation of work ... Named, al thereby perpetuated these pieces of the real, becoming pieces of knowledge, are thereby falsified. (45)

This explicit and elaborated, but falsified knowledge is developed into ideologies. The original "wild and immediate thought", which [84] which is necessarily accompanied by a non-positional consciousness of itself, is a continually changing supple adaptation. But once it is verbalised as a system of values and an ideology it takes on a more rigid form because "

language is matter ... written words are stones" (47) It is the passive systems of thought which constitute the objective spirit. As pratico-inerte it imposes itself on human individual subjects as a series of imperatives. Living thought is in a continual state of tension with this objective mind. Its original interiority, as "translucid presence of the whole to the parts and the parts to the whole" (49) has been broken by the opacity of this materialised culture. But the objective mind, in its turn only exists as spirit, rather than as a mere collection of things, through the activity of individuals.

There are two problems here. Firstly, there is the question of the nature of the 'lived'. It has the essential structure of consciousness as described in *Being and Nothingness*: non-positional consciousness of self and a certain translucidity. On the other hand, elsewhere Sartre also contrasts the lived with the earlier account of consciousness, not as a rejection, but as a deepening:

> The introduction of the notion of the lived represents an attempt to conserve that 'presence to self' which appears to me to be indispensable to the existence of any psychic fact, a presence which is at the same time so opaque, so blind to itself, that it is also 'absence from self'. The lived is always, simultaneously, present to itself and absent from itself. (*Situations* 1X p.112)

Some psychic facts at least, while being the object of a 'comprehension' cannot be named or known (connu). This seems to place in question the possibility of reflection, insofar as reflection is tied to language. Further, and this is the second problem, it is not clear to me whether Sartre is saying that language necessarily falsifies the lived, or only that it has the potentiality for doing so. To the extent that Sartre certainly does envisage the working class achieving a class consciousness which dissolves bourgeois ideology (see p.46 and also *Situations* V111 414/417) it would appear that he finally intends the latter. But he is stressing the difficulty of a task which, although it is ultimately possible because of the foundation of the objective spirit in individual praxis, is nevertheless made extremely difficult by the necessity of trying to articulate a new consciousness in a language which denies that consciousness. [85]

A thorough explanation of the way in which Sartre deals with the relation between the lived, language and ideology, would require a much more thorough and careful reading of the study of Flaubert than I have yet been able to give it. It seems to me that it would also be very useful to compare the position of Sartre here with Habermas's *Knowledge and Human Interests*, in which he develops the notion of ordinary language as

> the articulation of a life context, which represents an individual meaning, which cannot be wholly grasped in general categories. (KHI 173)

and uses this to develop an account of distorted communication on both the individual and the social level. Sartre does suggest, following Lacan, that

> the presence of certain structures of language account for the unconscious ... as a counter-finality of language (de la parole). (*Situations* 97).

Habermas writes that

> Today the problem of language has taken the place of the traditional problematic of consciousness: the transcendental critique of language replaces that of consciousness. (LSW 220).

Against this, however, Sartre would argue that language is ontologically rooted in consciousness, and if that language as a system of meaning is made possible by the dialectical, self-reflective structure of consciousness. Nevertheless, the relation between the two seems to constitute a fundamental problem, which is certainly not fully resolved by either writer.

2) The problem in Kant‘s ethical theory was that, while he could show the relation between knowledge, reason and freedom, he had to simply place this set of concepts over against the heteronomy of the natural world, and could give no account of how the move from empirical heteronomy to transcendental autonomy might be possible. Hegel‘s dialectic of consciousness was, inter alia, an attempt to solve this problem by showing that what divides the heteronomous from the autonomous not so much an ontological fissure as the relation between the implicit and the explicit. Freedom is therefore the necessary result of the working out of the contradiction contained in the original heteronomous state-being-in-itself. Sartre‘s materialist transformation of Hegel, while retaining a suggestion of the implicit versus the explicit in consciousness, takes away the necessity of the dialectical transition. The transition becomes finally a choice: freedom is chosen, rather than produced by an historical dialectic. Yet there does seem to be a problem here. Is the choice of freedom entirely unmotivated, or is it possible to give some account of why one might or even should choose freedom? In the discussion at the end of Sartre‘s lecture on “Knowledge of Self and Consciousness of Self”, the question is asked: “How is this [86] transition made from prereflective experience to the reflective cogito?” (p.133) Sartre replies that the reflective act is an initiative, not a moment in a philosophical dialectic, and goes on to speak of a morality of revolution, rather than a morality of progress. (p.142) In a recent discussion “On a raison de

se revolter" Sartre also places great stress on the moment of choice in political action; there is a free decision that the situation is unbearable, rather than a pre-determined threshold at which revolt inevitably occurs:

> To the extent that the moment of revolt is new in relation to the preceding given, and cannot be explained by a determinism, the facts determine other facts, but cannot account for revolt, that is, for the passage to value and to the evaluation 'that is not just'. (140)

All this raises moral problems on two different levels. Firstly, there is the question of one's own choice: if one decides to 'choose freedom', to attempt to live on the level of pure reflection or autonomy, is there anything which justifies such a choice, not of course in the sense of showing that it is necessary, but in the sense of at least making it comprehensible? Why not live in the immediate, or in bad faith, or in impure reflection? Secondly, what does it mean to choose freedom *for other people*? What justifies such a choice, and what justifies action flowing from such a choice? Of course, insofar as my freedom requires the freedom of other people, requires the dissolution of ideologies and of serial impotence, the choice of freedom for myself implies the choice of freedom for others. But this argument in itself is self-defeating; what happens if others do not want to be free? Sartre's work certainly contains many accounts of motives for not wanting to be free. At the same time, of course, *Being and Nothingness* can be taken as an account of the necessary failure of the attempt to avoid one's freedom. There is always the suggestion in Sartre's work of a tension between a fundamental experience of freedom and all those phenomena connected with its avoidance or repression.

> Freedom pre-exists in individuals, in the sense that it appears from the beginning as exploited and alienated, but that each, in his very alienation ... grasps his freedom as a deflected affirmation of his sovereignty. (On a raison de se revolter, 140).

Thus although one may well not be able to show a Hegelian dialectic leading inevitably to freedom, it may be possible, by exploring this tension, to establish a meaningful distinction between true and false consciousness, to understand the eruption of freedom into our alienated reality, and finally to provide moral criteria for [87] evaluating political action. Habermas's discussions of the practical knowledge-constitutive interest in reflection should be compared with Sartre here.

3) Aside from the question of moral criteria for political action, Sartre's work seems to me to have important implications for political strategy and

for the nature of political institutions. Hegel used the idea of Objective Mind to justify reformist political policies which continually adjust political institutions to the changing values embodied in Objective Mind as an historical process. In an important sense Marx remains within this framework. He links the question of political change to the development of consciousness, but he differs from Hegel in trying to show how consciousness is related to mode of production, and how the whole complex is likely to develop in the light of certain fundamental contradictions within the capitalist mode of production. He is opposed to the voluntarist or jacobin activities which Hegel describes in the *Phenomenology of Mind* (599-610) in which each faction tries to construct the world anew by imposing its own will as universal will, without being rooted in the actual life of the society. Lenin‘s idea of the vanguard party, although in principle designed merely to facilitate, through its possession of science, the development of revolutionary class consciousness, tends towards jacobinism, and in its Stalinist form theoretically substitutes the party‘s science for the consciousness of the working class. Sartre‘s analysis of the exceedingly complex relation between individual praxis, the pratico-inerte, series and groups lays the foundation for a much more thorough investigation of this problem. In particular, Sartre‘s notion of sovereignty (which I have not dealt with explicitly here) can be used in the analysis of political strategy and of political institutions under socialism. Sartre himself, after flirting with the idea of the vanguard party, has since decisively rejected it. The party has no legitimacy apart from any legitimacy which it achieves in action:

> it is for this reason that one cannot conceive of the real representatives of the proletariat in periods of waiting or in a dictatorship of the Stalinist type. (quoted in Burnier: *Les Existenialistes et la Politique* (96) see also *On a raison ...* passim). The party can in fact become that “group in the process of petrification (which), by its very inertia (can) be an obstacle to the dissolution of seriality in the collective” (RD640)[270]

Of course, all these remarks require detailed elaboration. The point that I wish to make here is that Sartre [88] offers us a set of conceptual tools which can be used to analyse the complexity of real historical situations, which can help us to distinguish between historically contingent and onto-

270 Turner‘s *Heidegger*-moment. This is the point at which he casts in his lot with *African* socialism, in which he becomes a party-ideologue, from intellectual to *identity-politician*. That in Europe it‘s exactly this enthusiastic partisanship for *class-war* that motivated the entire generation trying to get out from under Stalinism doesn‘t stop Turner from ‘doing a Lukács’. The question is: why does this pass him by? Why does he miss this?

logically necessary problems of relation between people and, finally, can therefore also help us to think about the problems of a socialist society in which the historically contingent sources of conflict embodied in capitalism have been removed.

4) Sartre‘s distinction between constitutive dialectic, anti-dialectic and constituted dialectic enables us to account for both the success and the limitations of a “positivist” method in the social sciences, and in particular in economics. The level of the anti-dialectic, as serial, is in itself regulated by the principle of exteriority, and so can be described using “analytic reason”. However, although analytic reason can *describe* the movement of the pratico-inert object, it cannot grasp its nature, and so cannot fully understand the possibility of a change in the object, since the possibility for such a change is based on the object‘s ontological dependence on individual praxis. Analytical reason cannot, therefore, understand how and to what extent the anti-dialectic can be dissolved by the constituted dialectic of group praxis. Further, although the level of the anti-dialectic is, considered in itself, subject to principles of exteriority, it is nevertheless, as pratico-inerte, a system of meanings. As such, it too can be considered by dialectical reason. This resolves the problem, which worries Colletti, as to how Marx can be both a (“scientific”) political economist and also a (“Philosophical”) critic of political economy who shows that political economy deals with an alienated upside-down reality (see Colletti, NLR 22, 29).

In general, the utility of Sartre‘s approach to the dialectic seems to me to be that, by showing that human meaning systems are mediated by matter and that matter is at the same time mediated by human meaning systems, he is able to provide a foundation for an approach to different societies which can both recognise the specificity of each society, and at the same time root each society within its material context. The alternatives are either a determinism which considers any given society as a variant produced by fixed and universal human attitudes (e.g Homo oeconomicus); or an idealism which treats each society as though it were in fact the product of its own [89] legitimating ideology, without attempting to account for the ideology itself.

But the question still remains: what precisely is meant by “dialectics” here? Have we returned to a “weak” definition in terms of an injunction always to look for interconnections? Or is it possible to formulate some stronger definition? We have certainly got away from the idea that dialectics is the insistence that everything is connected with everything else. To this extent it is possible to give a more precise definition of dialectical rea-

son: it involves the search, not for *any* kind of connection, but for certain specific kinds of connection between pratico-inerte social phenomena, individual praxis, and mediating matter.

This approach to dialectics does not seem to require a whole new Logic along Hegelian lines. But it does operate with a special notion of identity, which in turn would seem to allow for a notion of contradiction distinct both from real opposition and from the essentially self-annulling contradiction of formal logic. Consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is. It contains within itself the tension between its past and its future, and is the perpetual overcoming of this tension. As such it is the basis for the coexistence of contradictory values or injunctions which, instead of simply cancelling one another out, are worked through and perhaps resolved in time. The pratico-inerte, as an embodied meaning system imposing exigencies on human praxis may therefore similarly contain within it contradictory exigencies which coexist in a state of tension:

> The moment of *exigency* as inert, imposed finality makes it possible to conceive of the kind of negativity known as *objective contradiction*. (CDR 193).

Here one exigency may be logically implied by another, but may be at the same time incompatible with it.

We can take Marx‘s account of capitalist crisis as rooted in the separation of the mutually dependent elements commodity and money as an example of such contradiction. In discussing this, Colletti argues that

> from Marx‘s perspective, contradiction is the *specific* feature of capitalism, the characteristic or quality which singles it out not only with respect to all other forms of society, but with respect to all other cosmic phenomena. (NLR 26-7).

I think it is more accurate to say that contradictions of this kind characterise any pratico-inerte reality. For example [90] in his study of the domestic mode of production, Meillassoux shows that the system of control over women, as the means of reproduction, by the elders contains within it a contradiction, in that the successful exercise of this power tends to enlarge the community to such an extent as to threaten to undermine the elders’ power. Women are no longer scarce, and are theoretically available within the community. This contradiction sets up tensions which may be resolved by segmentation, or which may be at least partially contained by the existence and further development of an ideology of authority and kinship, which may, under certain circumstances, provide the basis for a dialectical transformation of the node of social organisation, producing a class society dominated by a particular lineage, but still legitimised in terms of

mythological kinship (see *Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux* pp.75, 127-30). At the end of the process, at least, the system would seem to be an up-side-down reality, a fetishised system of meanings and social relations which is no longer transparent to the members, but dominates them as an external facticity. [91]

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Red plot on Cape farm alleged

Daily News Correspondent

JOHANNESBURG, Monday. AN APPLE farm in the Cape is where four former student leaders and a university lecturer are alleged to have planned to promote the policies of the banned South African Communist Party.

Charles Nupen (25), Karel Tip (30), Glen Moss (23), Edward Webster (33) and Paul Cedric de Beer (23) are to face charges under the Suppression of Communism Act when they appear in the Johannesburg Regional Court on April 1.

In a 10-page indictment released by the State it is alleged that the men attended a student seminar at the Elgin Apple Farm hostel near Grabow in 1973, where plans were formulated for the organisation of a campaign for the release of "political prisoners". Including Walter Sisulu, Abraham Fischer and Nelson Mandela.

The indictment lists 10 offences allegedly committed by the men between October 1973 and August 1974.

The five are accused of associating themselves with the banned African National Congress and the SA Communist Party.

Other allegations are that the five men intended to indoctrinate pupils at English private schools. In furtherance of the conspiracy, they organised mass meetings addressed by prominent people including Mrs Helen Joseph, Dr Cedric Phatudi and Mr Rene de Villiers, PRP MP for Parktown.

The accused were arrested in December last year have been released on bail of R7 000 and have twice appeared in court.

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The half world of the banned

By GARTH VERDAL

"BEING banned is rather like being half on holiday and half dead because, although time is meaningless, people are always offering their condolences."

This is the impression of Miss Pat Townsend, graduate student at the University of Natal, who shares a house in Bellair with banned political science lecturer, Dr. Rick Turner.

Three weeks ago yesterday he and seven Nusas leaders were banned for five years.

Barred from normal contact, communication and activity, five years' worth of days stretch endlessly ahead. Their successful psychological adjustment to this chilling fact is the key to survival. And the problem of carrying on, as far as is allowed, a normal daily life is its practical companion.

The time parallel with the gaoled man crossing off the days on his cell wall might seem over dramatic but for the banned, 21 days out of more than 1 800 is more than a mathematical proportion. Three weeks have been overcome and this is the essence of banned life.

"Rick is buoyant, uncowed, has no intention of running away from the country of his birth and is continuing with his academic work be reading and ranging over new fields now that his deadline is five years away," said Miss Townsend.

And her words rang true when I spoke to Dr. Turner yesterday in his book-filled house in Bellair which he shares with six other people, most of them teachers.

Relaxed and unemotional, Dr. Turner spoke about his feelings during the last three weeks and the practical and psychological problems of being banned. He was articulate and cheerful and it did seem that he has made the essential adjustment to a way of life which can only be described as living death.

In terms of his banning order he can only see one person at a time and the extent of its prohibitions have rendered sterile his role as a teacher, though he can still read them and this has banished him even from working in his academic field in private."

Miss Townsend said that in spite of the fact that Dr. Turner's academic life was in a state of paralysed limbo he was not prepared to vegetate on the beach, particularly as the University of Natal was still paying his salary.

She said that there was a grim viability in his circumstances, in the sense that he had the time to devote to wide-ranging academic study. "As an academic, his role is limited by his inability to publish and teach but there is no doubt that in five years' time his knowledge will be vastly expanded."

Watching Dr. Turner as I spoke to him while our photographer worked through the doorway from an adjoining room, I was impressed by his positive attitude to the intellectual and social prison which incarcerated him with the stroke of a ministerial pen three weeks ago. But while there was no apparent bitterness, nor any railling about his lot, life in a straitjacket of this kind has a double edge.

Banning is a form of solitary confinement but with a tempting taste of freedom and, like South Africa's other banned people, Dr. Turner lives in a schizophrenic situation in which he is of society but cannot be part of it.

Miss Townsend said that one of the most encouraging developments since the bannings had been the fact that the University of Natal was continuing to pay Dr. Turner.

"A major threat for academics and consequently for academic freedom in South Africa has been the fear that in speaking out they might be banned and would then lose their jobs. The University has helped lessen this threat and has given academic freedom a boost," she said.

VACUUM

Banned from the Durban campus of the University of Natal, where he has been a political science lecturer since 1970, as well as from all educational institutions in the country, he can no longer impart nor publish his knowledge.

Dr. Turner, who is 31 years old, was born in Cape Town, where he obtained a B.A. in Philosophy and a B.A. Honours. By the time he was 25 he had a Doctorate from the University of Paris and since then he has lectured at the universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch.

"We have estimated that Rick has about 1 000 books in his room of which he has read about half, so he has 500 books for five years — that should help fill in the vacuum," said Miss Townsend.

That works out to approximately two books a week and it is an indication of the relevance of time in the half-alive world of the banned. The very fact that there are no normal deadlines, means that, unless the daily void is filled in an absorbing way, life could become a meaningless and devouring haze.

Miss Townsend said that Dr. Turner's academic escape hatch had been back into philosophy and sociology.

"A literal interpretation of his banning order means that he cannot even make notes from books on politics — al-

Apartheid-Gegner erschossen

DURBAN / FRANKFURT A. M., 8. Januar (Reuter/FR). In der Türe seines Hauses in der südafrikanischen Hafenstadt Durban wurde in der Nacht zum Sonntag der prominente Apartheid-Gegner Richard Turner erschossen. Der 36jährige Turner war Dozent für politische Wissenschaft an der Universität von Natal. Die Regierung hatte gegen ihn 1973 ein Lehrverbot (und Hausarrest) verhängt, das im Februar abgelaufen wäre. Wie die FR erfuhr, hatte Turner vor einem Jahr ein Stipendium der angesehenen Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung erhalten, von der südafrikanischen Regierung aber keine Ausreisegenehmigung in die Bundesrepublik erhalten.

DN 27/1/76

'Liberty' reminded him of communism

Daily News Correspondent

JOHANNESBURG, Tuesday.

CROSS - EXAMINATION of Professor Andrew Murray, a State witness in the Nusas trial, ended here yesterday with a reminder that students had been urged to work for change in South Africa — and a joke.

Appearing in the Johannesburg Regional Court on a charge of furthering the aims of Communism, alternatively of the ANC, were Glenn Moss (23), Charles Nupen (26), Edward Webster (33), Cedric de Beer (23) and Karel Tip (30).

At a previous hearing, Professor Murray said he saw analogies between Marxist attitudes and papers by Moss, Webster, Nupen and Tip relating to a 1973 Nusas seminar.

Questioned by Mr A. Chaskalson SC (defending), the professor agreed the papers were based on an analysis consistent with both Communist and non-Communist views.

But, he said, coming from a Left wing organisation such as Nusas it was likely to be Communist.

This, said Mr Chaskalson, was reminiscent of the story of the Russian gentleman which had been told to the professor when he testified at the treason trial.

"On seeing the statue of Liberty for the first time, the Russian remarked: 'That reminds me of Communism.'

"Why?", he was asked.

"'Because,' he replied, 'everything reminds me of Communism'."

Earlier Professor Murray had also said the four papers paid considerable attention to "infiltration into campuses." This had the flavour of Communist "front policy."

Asked what he meant, the professor said Nusas committees would arrange meetings at which they would gradually propagate their ideas.

Mr Chaskalson said students were already on campuses, where they belonged, and could not "infiltrate" a campus.

Nusas executives were not on the campus, Professor Murray replied and there had been complaints that they brought outside ideas on to the campus.

Mr Chaskalson said all the Nusas leaders were registered students and in the case of the accused each — except Webster, a university lecturer — was a full-time student.

Professor Murray agreed that many notable people had urged students to explore, to question and to be concerned with the position of Blacks in society and do something about it.