Source: The Sentry – full report below. See also details of the RSF’s export of Sudan’s gold to the UAE

قرأ التقرير باللغة العربية

A team of businessmen with ties to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia set up a network of companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) including jewelers, an interior design business, and a management consultancy.

While seven of the firms have already been publicly identified and sanctioned, The Sentry has identified five key individuals behind the corporate structures, as well as hitherto unreported entities they have set up, that merit further scrutiny and investigation.

One of these individuals, Mazin Fadlalla, previously bought hundreds of Toyotas for the RSF to convert to “technicals,” pickup trucks with mounted machine guns. The involvement of Fadlalla and others in four Dubai-based gold companies provides a glimpse into the conflict gold supply chain: smuggled out of western Sudan, imported into the UAE, and then sold on to international markets.

In the years before the war in Sudan began in 2023, the RSF and its leaders diversified their business interests into a wide array of economic sectors. As the war has progressed, however, the militia has become more reliant on a narrower business model, with gold mining playing a vital role. Within that model, the RSF needs corporate vehicles and banks to turn smuggled gold into hard currency. Revealing the identities of the men behind these companies will enable banks, gold refineries, and governments to investigate and, if merited, halt future transactions in which Fadlalla and others are involved.

Recommendations

European Union, United States, and United Kingdom

Sanctions authorities should investigate Mazin Gamareldin Mohamed Fadlalla and his companies, including Aoun Commercial Brokers, and, if appropriate, designate them for sanctions under the Sudan country or other appropriate programs. It is unclear whether Fadlalla currently provides support to the RSF, but there are reasonable grounds to suspect that he has supported the RSF’s operations in the recent past. First, in 2019, he helped buy hundreds of Toyota vehicles commonly used by the militia—a procurement effort that was carried out through Tradive General Trading, which was exposed in the media that same year as being a front for the RSF. Fadlalla was also the shareholder of three companies that were subsequently sanctioned for their links to the RSF: Tradive, GSK Advanced Business, and Al Jil Alqadem General Trading. Finally, Fadlalla owned a significant stake in Aoun, which sold car parts to GSK Advanced Business just before the war broke out in 2023.

Sanctions authorities should investigate companies with active business licenses that have Ahmed Hashim Hamad El Basher, Naser Helal Abdulla Helal Al Hammadi, or Essa Mohammed Rashed Saif Al Marri listed as either a director or a shareholder in order to ascertain whether the RSF exercises any control over these entities or if they are owned or controlled by sanctioned persons. Given Hashim, Alhammadi, and Almarri’s past links to RSF-supporting companies, there are grounds to investigate the companies they run. Hashim denies any current involvement with the RSF. However, in the past he was linked to GSK Advanced Business, and he is a current shareholder in Aoun Commercial Brokers. While Almarri is a frequent nominee director and shareholder for a range of clients, his status as owner of Tradive and Al Zumoroud and Al Yaqoot Gold & Jewellers Trading, both of which were subsequently sanctioned for their links to the RSF, and his role as co-owner of several companies with Fadlalla mean that his presence on the board of an entity is a risk factor that may indicate RSF links. Alhammadi owned Capital Tap Holding and its related companies for several years until January 2024. During that period, his firms had a close commercial relationship with RSF-linked companies such as Al Junaid and GSK Advanced Business.

Sanctions authorities in the EU, US, and UK should review their current designations related to RSF individuals and entities and consider whether there are any gaps in sanctioning between jurisdictions that should be addressed to ensure maximum impact.

Banks and commercial counterparts in the gold supply chain

Banks should conduct enhanced due diligence when handling transactions for companies set up by Fadlalla, Hashim, Alhammadi, or Almarri to guard against the possibility that the RSF may be involved in these companies via proxy directors.

Banks and companies in the gold supply chain should conduct enhanced due diligence when handling transactions involving Fadlalla, Hashim, Alhammadi, and Almarri to ascertain whether they are providing material support to the RSF or any sanctioned person and whether the RSF or any sanctioned person still exercises any control over entities related to them.

The RSF’s Business Network in the UAEDownload

Know more? The Sentry is still researching the RSF’s financial networks. If you have more information, please share securely via https://thesentry.org/shareinfo/

$24M Property Safe Haven in Dubai Linked to the RSF

April 2026

Download the full alert

قرأ التقرير باللغة العربية

A network of family members, sanctioned individuals, and entities linked to the leadership of Sudan’s brutal Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia owns a $24 million real estate portfolio in Dubai consisting of over 20 properties. The RSF is commanded by Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa (‘Hemedti’) and his two brothers, Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo Musa and Algoney Hamdan Dagalo Musa, all of whom have been sanctioned. Leaked real estate records reveal that several of these properties, along with additional rental properties, are located within the same gated community in Dubai. The findings suggest that, in addition to reportedly supporting the militia with weapons and mercenaries, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provides a safe haven for the RSF leadership’s family and wealth.

The Sentry reviewed multiple sources of information, including phone records and passport data, to ascertain the family connections of the Dagalo brothers. When the Dagalo family was reached for comment, the persons identified as related to the Dagalo brothers did not deny their familial relationship. Ownership of property by Dagalo family members, standing alone, does not constitute or imply wrongdoing.

Conclusion

The total value of the property portfolio owned by family members, Prodigious, and the sanctioned individuals is approximately $24 million, not including additional rental holdings.

These properties shed further light on the RSF’s relationship with the UAE. While the UAE adamantly denies supporting the RSF, this investigation is the fourth alert by The Sentry that reveals the intricate connections between the Dagalo family, the RSF, and the UAE. The first publication detailed how RSF front companies operated out of Dubai. The second revealed that the Emirati businessman supplying Colombian mercenaries to train the RSF is the business partner of the UAE’s most senior bureaucrat. The third uncovered the role played by Prodigious, a UAE-registered firm, in managing property associated with the RSF leadership. Investigations by others have found that the UAE supplies weapons and drones to the RSF, while smuggled gold flows in the other direction. Emirati support for the RSF stems from the very top, including ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and his brothers, Shiekh Mansour and Sheikh Tahnoun, according to the New York Times.

RSF properties in Dubai
This is the second part of our series. Read part one here.

As described in more detail in The Sentry’s third report, there is substantial evidence that Dubai’s property market continues to demonstrate significant strategic deficiencies and—despite being removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list” in 2024—has not effectively enforced applicable laws, examined real estate holdings of politically exposed persons (PEPs), or extradited individuals accused of significant crimes, including charges related to state capture, government fraud, and narcotics trafficking.

Recommendations

Sanctions. Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services is already blocked in the US under the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s 50% rule, as the US has previously sanctioned the company’s sole owner, Abo Zer Abdelnabi Habiballa Ahmmed. However, US authorities should specifically identify Prodigious as a blocked entity and add the company to the Specially Designated Nationals & Blocked Persons list for clarity and maximum effectiveness. Authorities in the European Union, United Kingdom, and other jurisdictions should investigate and, if appropriate, sanction Prodigious and its sole owner Abo Zer Abdelnabi Habiballa Ahmmed.  

Enhanced due diligence. In all jurisdictions, and especially in the UAE, financial institutions, real estate professionals, and lawyers should conduct enhanced due diligence on customers and transactions potentially involving members of the Dagalo family, Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services, and individuals sanctioned based on activity related to the RSF. These institutions and persons should in particular investigate any payments to or from Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services, in case the payments breach US sanctions imposed on Hemedti in 2025.

Investigating real estate transactions in the UAE. Law enforcement agencies should investigate all properties bought by Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services, the Dagalo family, individuals and entities sanctioned based on activity related to the RSF, and other related PEPs to verify the source of funds.

Increased FATF evaluations of real estate. FATF members should focus on real estate during the upcoming 2026 mutual evaluation of the UAE’s progress on enforcement of money laundering and terrorist financing laws. If further progress in this area is not observed, then FATF should place the UAE back on the grey list.

Dagalo Family response

Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed response

Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed supporting documents

Answers to further questions:  https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28079327-answers-to-further-questions/