Recent speculation regarding a potential war in Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea is growing, though immediate conflict seems unlikely. The Ethiopian government lacks military resources for another front, and Tigray’s leadership isn’t incentivized to initiate war. International pressure discourages renewed conflict, making a return to a “no war, no peace” status quo more plausible.

Source: Addis Standard by Rene Lefort

Addis Abeba – In recent weeks, speculation about an imminent war in Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea has multiplied. Many argue that another large-scale conflict is inevitable. While future escalation cannot be ruled out entirely, a full-blown war in the immediate term remains unlikely.

First, the Ethiopian government simply lacks the military bandwidth to open another front in the north. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is already stretched thin in Amhara and Oromia, where it doesn’t succeed to re-establish control even with the support of local militias. Launching an additional campaign to capture Assab – or and even more go further into Eritrea to try to topple Issayas, which would afterwards need to sustain an armed occupation of at least part of Eritrea – would be militarily thoughtless. Even during the 2000 conflict, when Ethiopia was almost peaceful and held air superiority, it failed to seize Assab. It’s hard to believe that Abiy Ahmed and the military brass around him could ignore the huge risk of engaging in such an ill-fated adventure.

Meanwhile, the Tigray leadership, often portrayed as a potential spoiler, is neither positioned nor incentivized to start a new war. If, as critics claim, those in power in Mekelle are driven by self-interest and economic survival, war would only sabotage that opportunity. For sure, thanks to the wars, members of the Tigray’s elite, and their counterparts in Oromya and Amhara region, gain fabulous profits through predation in “fiefdoms” they forcibly rule. But this would remain profitable only with a minimum of communication between them. War would cause such chaos that this would no longer be the case.

Militarily, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) have reportedly shrunk to around 50,000–60,000 troops – according to Tsadkan, some say even less – far from a “formidable, 274,000-strong regional army », as asserted by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot and Alex de Waal. There is also no evidence they are still willing to fight. And crucially, public appetite for renewed conflict in Tigray is nearly non-existent.

One of the arguments used to suggest that the TPLF/Debretsion might nevertheless go to war against Addis is that they would have no other means of securing the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement—particularly regarding the return of IDPs. However, it’s important to consider the political capital they derive from their status as victims of Pretoria incomplete implementation. Waging war would undermine that legitimacy.

All three key actors – Abiy, Debretsion, and Isaias – are under significant scrutiny from global stakeholders, including the U.S., EU, and Gulf powers.”

Commonly, it’s said that arguments as rational as above were in place in 2020 and that nevertheless the war erupted. But it was based on a symmetric miscalculation. Abiy underestimated the surge of a Tigrayan popular resistance. The TPLF believed that by taking the Northern Command and with the desertion of the Tigrayans soldiers, ENDF would dash. It didn’t foresee Eritrea’s involvement too. The war ended with no winner or loser. My guess is that all the Ethiopian actors have this in mind.

The only actor who might benefit from launching a war is Isaias because it would inevitably lead to the disintegration of Ethiopia—which has always been Isaias’s obsession.

But even this possibility is checked by a powerful external factor: the absolute need for international support. All three key actors – Abiy, Debretsion, and Isaias – are under significant scrutiny from global stakeholders, including the U.S., EU, and Gulf powers. Beyond the Horn, these actors are keenly aware that renewed war would destabilize the entire Red Sea corridor.

For Abiy, attracting foreign investment and external aid is central to his domestic political narrative, but also as a main source of predation for the ruling elite behind him. For Isaias, being shunned once again as a regional pariah holds real consequences. Look at the warm messages’ exchange between Trump and Issayas. “Further fueling instability is the rival meddling of leading Middle Eastern powers, with the United Arab Emirates supporting Ethiopia and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey leaning toward Eritrea », say Mulugata/De Waal. But would they go as far as risking losing their ongoing bet if a war would be launched, which would turn the whole Horn into total chaos? Finally, and probably the most important, beyond Trump’s unpredictability, he hates the war.

The message from outside actors to this trio is crystal clear: no one wants a northern Horn war. And their determination is so strong that even an “incident” like Badme couldn’t be enough to spark full-blown conflict.

In essence, I believe external pressure outweighs the megalomania and recklessness of Abiy and Isaias. The most plausible scenario, then, is not renewed full scale conflict, but rather a grudging return to the “no war, no peace” status quo with Eritrea, and an uneasy stalemate where the Pretoria Agreement remains in limbo. It is an unsatisfying and fragile perspective, but it is still preferable to the catastrophic alternative. AS

Editor’s Note: The author of this opinion piece, René Lefort, has been an observer of Ethiopian politics since the 1970s. He is widely recognized for his in-depth analysis of political events in the country and is a frequent contributor to esteemed publications such as Open Democracy, Libération, Le Monde, Le Monde diplomatique, and Le Nouvel Observateur, where he writes on issues concerning Sub-Saharan Africa.