By Gebrehiwot Maru, Tigray People’s Liberation Front

Date: 11 May 2026

Truth Sacrificed for Political Capitulation: Getachew Reda’s Revisionist Narrative

This piece is a response to the disinforming and deeply revisionist narrative recently published by Getachew Reda in The Africa Report, titled “Ethiopia: Tigray is Being Led to the Brink.” In truth, the article scarcely merits serious engagement, as it is riddled with distortions, deliberate omissions, and political deflections aimed at rewriting the history of the genocidal war on Tigray.

Nevertheless, remaining silent would risk allowing disinformation to masquerade as truth, particularly for readers who lack firsthand knowledge of the systematic atrocities, political conspiracies, and the premeditated, coordinated genocidal war that devastated Tigray, inflicted unimaginable suffering upon its people, and continues to deepen their pain and hardship to this day.

Getachew Reda’s article is not a sober reflection on the tragedy that befell Tigray. It is a calculated political revisionism designed to sanitize the role of Abiy Ahmed’s government, shift blame onto the victims of genocide, and rehabilitate himself politically at the expense of truth, justice, and the suffering people of Tigray.

The False Narrative About the Origins of the War

At the heart of Getachew’s argument lies a deeply dishonest premise: that the genocidal war against Tigray was essentially triggered because the TPLF conducted the 2020 regional election. This framing is not merely absurd. It is morally and politically outrageous. Getachew Reda deliberately erases the long chain of calculated provocations, political sabotage, economic strangulation, military encirclement, hate propaganda, and coordinated preparations for war orchestrated by Abiy Ahmed’s government long before Tigray held its regional election.

The genocidal war did not emerge in a vacuum. The campaign against TPLF and the  people of Tigray began shortly after Abiy Ahmed assumed power and systematically undermined the multinational federal arrangement, targeted Tigrayan officials and military officers, orchestrated defamation campaigns against Tigray and Tigrayans, demonized Tigrayans through state media propaganda, weaponized state institutions, and openly sought to isolate and weaken Tigray politically, economically, and militarily. To reduce such a vast, state-orchestrated campaign of war and destruction to the simplistic claim that “the TPLF defied the federal government by holding elections” is not analysis — it is historical falsification.

Even more troubling is Getachew Reda’s effort to recast the war as to supposed “miscalculations” by the TPLF. This framing effectively shifts responsibility onto the victims, implying that those subjected to genocide are somehow culpable for the violence inflicted upon them because they did not acquiesce to political submission and relinquishing their self-rule rights. That line of reasoning is deeply flawed and dangerous, as it mirrors longstanding justifications used to rationalize collective punishment and state-sponsored atrocities against marginalized populations.

Getachew Reda claims that Tigray is being “led back to the brink.” In reality, manypeople in Tigray would argue the opposite: Tigray is desperately searching for viable political and strategic alternatives to escape what they perceive as the tightening political trap engineered by Abiy Ahmed’s government.

Sanitizing the Architects of the War

Getachew Reda acknowledges in the article that hundreds of thousands were killed, millions displaced, and Tigray devastated. Yet he conspicuously refrains from naming the principal architect of these atrocities—Abiy Ahmed. He also sidesteps any serious engagement with the documented realities of the war, including systematic massacres, the use of starvation as a weapon, mass sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, and the prolonged siege imposed on Tigray. Instead, he directs the bulk of his critique toward blaming Debretsion Gebremichael while effectively sanitizing the actions and responsibilities of those who led and executed the genocidal war.

That omission is not accidental; it reflects a clear political positioning. Today, Getachew Reda appears less concerned with the security and survival of Tigray than with maintaining his alignment with Abiy Ahmed and weakening internal political rivals within Tigray. As a result, the article reads less like an objective analysis and more like a political narrative that ultimately serves the interests of Abiy Ahmed’s government.

Silence on the Failure to Implement the Pretoria Agreement

If Getachew Reda were genuinely committed to peace for the people of Tigray and the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, where was his sustained outrage when its core provisions were systematically ignored? Why did he remain largely muted instead of confronting the crisis at its source? Where were his consistent public demands and political pressure on Abiy Ahmed regarding:

● the return of millions of internally displaced Tigrayans?

● the failure to restore Tigray’s constitutionally recognized territories?

● the absence of accountability for genocide and war crimes?

● the obstruction of humanitarian recovery and reconstruction?

● the ongoing militarization and security threats surrounding Tigray?

Instead of confronting these realities with clarity and resolve, Getachew Reda spent much of his tenure engaged in efforts that deepened internal fractures within the TPLF and weakened its political cohesion. Meanwhile, he remained restrained as millions of displaced people continued to endure severe hardship in dire and degrading conditions. Entire families languished in displacement camps, even as he now lectures others on “public interest” and “responsibility.”

Contradictions and Hypocrisy on Militarization

Getachew Reda’s hypocrisy and inconsistency become even more striking when addressing the question of militarization. Getachew Reda condemns efforts by Debretsion Gebremichael and his group to prepare for self-defense, while remaining notably silent on the sustained military buildup by the Ethiopian government under Abiy Ahmed around Tigray—developments widely viewed as escalating tensions and raising fears of renewed large-scale conflict.

This selective framing raises fundamental questions. How can the heavy militarization and encirclement of Tigray by federal forces be interpreted as an expression of peace? And how can support for armed actors operating against Tigray be reconciled with the obligations of the Pretoria Agreement or with genuine confidence-building measures?

By applying scrutiny in one direction while overlooking the other, Getachew Reda’s arguments risk distorting realities on the ground and obscuring the full spectrum of security threats facing Tigray.

Accountability, Evidence, and the Erosion of Historical Memory

It is critically necessary to raise serious questions about Getachew Reda’s actions following his assumption of power as Tigray’s interim administration president. Instead of centering truth, accountability, and justice for victims, he facilitated the removal and disposal of massive remnants of the genocidal war—including burned vehicles, destroyed tanks, and missile debris—materials widely regarded as critical evidence of the scale, intensity, and nature of the atrocities committed against Tigray.

Equally troubling are concerns regarding Getachew Reda’s role in the transfer of individuals alleged to be responsible for genocide, serious war crimes, and crimes against humanity to federal custody, reportedly carried out under opaque and untransparent circumstances. If accurately represented, such actions reflect a disturbing pattern of betrayal and a governance in which political expediency was placed above justice, accountability, and due process.

Taken together, these developments point to a deeply consequential and troubling trajectory: not only the weakening of accountability mechanisms, but also the potential erosion of historical memory and the physical traces of a devastating war. For many survivors, such actions cannot be dismissed as routine administrative decisions. Rather, they are perceived as a profound betrayal—one that risks compounding the suffering of victims by obscuring truth, undermining evidence, and weakening the foundations of future justice and reconciliation.

The Absence of Moral Authority

Does Getachew Reda have the moral standing to accuse or condemn the TPLF over the Pretoria Agreement’s failure? The answer is, no. Getachew Reda lacks the moral standing to condemn the TPLF while aligning with or speaking in defense of Abiy Ahmed, without fully accounting for his own political role, decisions, contradictions, and responsibilities. Moral standing is not derived from public prominence, rhetorical positioning, or shifting political alignment. It rests instead on consistency of principle, a clear moral compass, accountability for one’s actions, honesty, and an unwavering commitment to the interests and lived suffering of the people one claims to represent.

A person who participated in the leadership structure during one of the darkest periods in Tigray’s history cannot selectively distance himself from responsibility when it becomes politically convenient. One cannot benefit from the legacy, sacrifices, and collective struggle of a movement for years, only to later present oneself as morally superior while ignoring one’s own involvement in the very decisions and failures now being criticized.

True moral credibility requires humility, self-reflection, and accountability—not political opportunism. Before attempting to judge others, Getachew Reda must first confront serious questions about his own conduct, political alliances, decisions, and reversals. Without that level of honesty, his accusations risk appearing less like genuine concern for Tigray and more like an effort to rewrite history and deflect responsibility.

Misrepresenting the Failure of the Pretoria Agreement

Getachew Reda’s attempt to portray the TPLF as the sole obstacle to peace collapses under even minimal scrutiny. The failure and erosion of the Pretoria Agreement cannot credibly be reduced to internal political disagreements within Tigray. Even if one were to accept an iota of his argument, Getachew Reda and his faction themselves would bear significant responsibility for deepening those divisions and weakening Tigray’s internal cohesion during a highly fragile post-war period.

In reality, the Pretoria Agreement was fundamentally undermined by Abiy Ahmed’s lack of genuine political willingness and commitment to fully implement. Instead of directly confronting these failures, Getachew Reda aligned himself politically with the federal government, while directing disproportionate energy toward attacking and discrediting the TPLF. Rather than prioritizing accountability, territorial restoration, the return of displaced populations, and the security of Tigray, Getachew and his followers remained consumed with fake campaigns aimed at shifting blame onto the TPLF. They direct far more anger toward Debretsion Gebremichael than toward those who invaded, starved, bombed, and devastated Tigray.

Political Frustration and Opposition to TPLF’s Government Reinstatement

Getachew Reda’s article reads less like a true political assessment and more like an expression of frustration and resentment. At the center of that frustration appears to be the TPLF’s decision to reinstate its pre-war governing structure after concluding that no credible alternative remained under the prevailing circumstances.

The decision to restore the pre-war government structure—representatives of the people—did not emerge in a political vacuum. For over three years, the TPLF and the people of Tigray have repeatedly called for the genuine and full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, yet key provisions of the agreement remain unfulfilled.

While the agreement succeeded in silencing open warfare, many argue that the conflict has persisted in less visible but equally devastating forms: prolonged displacement, deaths linked to starvation and lack of medical care, continued territorial occupation, economic suffocation, persistent insecurity, and the ongoing weakening of Tigray’s institutional and strategic political position.

From this perspective, Abiy Ahmed has been pursuing his devastation scheme through political and administrative means, objectives that were not fully achieved through military force during the war itself. Against that backdrop, Getachew Reda characterizes the TPLF’s actions as illegitimate, rather than engaging substantively with the underlying grievances and structural failures that contributed to TPLF’s decision.

Another issue that deserves attention is his criticism, which is tied to the TPLF’s rejection of the unilateral extension and appointment process involving General Tadesse Werede by the federal government. Getachew Reda has tried to frame this issue in a way that obscures a broader political reality and risks misleading both domestic and international audiences. The core issue is not the question of accepting or rejecting an individual appointment. Rather, it reflects a fundamental concern about the broader normalization of an indefinite interim administrative structure that operates without a clear political settlement, without full legitimacy, without the complete implementation of the provisions of the Pretoria agreement, and which has repeatedly and miserably failed to produce results of any kind. 

Nonetheless, Getachew Reda and his followers have become invested in preserving this prolonged status quo because it aligns with their political calculations and relationship with Addis Ababa, even as ordinary Tigrayans continue to bear the social, economic, and humanitarian consequences of unresolved conflict.

Tigray’s Search for Alternatives, Not War

Tigrayans are not alarmed because they “love war.” They are alarmed because they remember the consequences of ignoring clear warning signs before November 2020.

Getachew Reda claims that Tigray is being “led back to the brink.” Many people in Tigray would argue the opposite: Tigray is desperately searching for viable political and strategic alternatives to escape what the people perceive as the tightening political trap engineered by Abiy Ahmed’s government.

The growing frustration inside Tigray is not driven by an irrational desire for confrontation. It stems from the lived reality that Abiy Ahmed’s government has shown little genuine political willingness to fully implement and fulfill the core promises of the Pretoria Agreement. Millions remain displaced, constitutionally recognized territories remain under occupation, accountability for atrocities remains absent, and Tigray continues to face severe political, economic, and security pressures. Under such conditions, many people no longer view the current status quo as a sustainable path toward peace, justice, or recovery.

For the people in Tigray, seeking alternatives is not about rejecting peace; it is about refusing to accept a peace process that, in practice, has failed to deliver justice, security, territorial restoration, or meaningful guarantees for survival.

What Getachew Reda characterizes as recklessness, the people on the ground interpret as an effort to reclaim political agency and prevent Tigray from remaining indefinitely trapped in a weakened and vulnerable position. The central issue is not a desire to return to war, but a growing fear that the current trajectory is normalizing permanent instability, prolonged suffering, and gradual political subjugation.

In short, Getachew Reda’s article reflects an effort to demonstrate loyalty to Abiy Ahmed by selectively reframing events and repositioning himself within the prevailing political landscape. However, no amount of rhetorical revision can obscure the central historical reality: the war on Tigray was not merely the outcome of an electoral defiance. It was the result of a premeditated plot and coordinated war planned out over time.

What is at stake, therefore, is not only the interpretation of the past but the direction of Tigray’s present and future. The trajectory associated with figures such as Getachew Reda is as aligning with a framework in which Tigray remains constrained under an externally managed interim arrangement, shaped largely by the interests and strategic calculations of Abiy Ahmed’s government. From this perspective, the concern is that such an arrangement risk normalizing continued political subordination and institutional fragility.  

In this sense, the debate is not narrowly about the TPLF’s decision to restore the pre-war government structure, but about a far more consequential question: whether Tigray is being guided toward a durable political settlement grounded in justice and self-determination, or pushed into a prolonged interim arrangement that entrenches vulnerability, sustains instability, and reproduces the very conditions of devastation created by the war.