An analysis of conflict, humanitarian crisis, and the challenge of sustainable peace.
By Samson Lebassi
Introduction
On 15 July 2026, Ethiopia’s long-awaited National Dialogue Conference opened in Addis Ababa. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed presented it as a historic opportunity to move the country beyond decades of political confrontation and toward consultation, reconciliation, and national consensus. Yet the conference convened amid circumstances that sharply contradicted its stated purpose.
Tigray, one of Ethiopia’s regional states and the epicentre of the devastating 2020–2022 war, was effectively excluded from meaningful participation while facing a prolonged humanitarian and economic blockade. At the same time, the region’s healthcare system was approaching collapse, budget transfers and fuel supplies remained suspended, internal divisions within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) persisted, and reports continued to emerge of growing cooperation between TPLF hardliners, Eritrea, and the Amhara Fano movement. Against this backdrop, the International Crisis Group has described the evolving relationship among Addis Ababa, Mekelle, and Asmara as a “powder keg” that could ignite with little or no warning.
It was within this volatile political and humanitarian environment that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s remarks about Nigeria’s Biafra war drew widespread attention. Although brief, the reference resonated far beyond its immediate context, particularly among Tigrayans who continue to assess official statements through the lived experience of one of Africa’s deadliest recent conflicts.
The Biafra Reference: More Than a Historical Analogy
On the eve of the National Dialogue, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed hosted former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the African Union’s chief mediator of the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement. According to the Prime Minister’s Office, Obasanjo reflected on lessons from the Biafra and the subsequent efforts, presenting them as experiences from which Ethiopia could draw in its own pursuit of peace.
Viewed in isolation, the reference could be understood as an appeal for reconciliation. For many Tigrayans, however, the comparison carried a profoundly different meaning.
The Biafra war is remembered not primarily for reconciliation but for one of the twentieth century’s most devastating humanitarian catastrophes. The federal blockade imposed during the conflict contributed to mass starvation that claimed the lives of an estimated one to two million people, most of them civilians, including hundreds of thousands of children. Consequently, invoking Biafra during a national dialogue intended to promote “inclusion and trust” inevitably generated deep concern among communities that had themselves recently endured siege and humanitarian deprivation.
Those concerns cannot be separated from Ethiopia’s recent history. During the 2020–2022 Tigray war, the federal government imposed a comprehensive siege that severely restricted food, medicine, fuel, banking services, telecommunications, electricity, commercial trade, and humanitarian access. Numerous international organizations, including the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and humanitarian agencies, documented the devastating consequences of these restrictions for the civilian population in Tigray.
For many observers, therefore, comparisons between Biafra and Tigray extend beyond historical symbolism. They reflect the conclusion that the methods employed during the war bore significant similarities to the blockade strategy associated with the Biafra conflict. Against that background, Prime Minister Abiy’s reference is widely interpreted in Tigray not as a neutral historical observation but as a political message directed at a population that has already experienced siege, widespread suffering, and mass atrocities. Rather than fostering confidence in the National Dialogue, the remark has reinforced longstanding fears, deepened mistrust, and raised renewed questions about the federal government’s intentions toward Tigray.
A Region Under Blockade
Independent reporting and accounts from Tigray’s Interim Administration describe a systematic tightening of humanitarian and economic restrictions throughout late 2025 and into 2026. Although federal authorities publicly denied imposing a deliberate blockade, the combined impact of fuel shortages, suspended budget transfers, disruptions to essential services, and recurring access restrictions has deepened the region’s post-war humanitarian crisis.
Fuel shortages have been particularly severe. Tigray historically received 12–15 million litres of fuel and diesel each month, but supply fell to approximately 850,000 litres by late 2025 before being cut off entirely in January 2026. While federal officials maintain that fuel distribution continues as part of normal nationwide operations, regional authorities argue that the suspension has crippled healthcare, transportation, commerce, and humanitarian operations.
The consequences have been felt across essential public services. In March 2026, Tigray’s Bureau of Health warned that the regional health system was nearing operational collapse because of fuel shortages and interrupted pharmaceutical supplies, threatening both routine and emergency care, including at Mekelle Referral Hospital.
The financial crisis has been equally severe. According to Addis Fortune, the suspension of federal budget transfers left more than 141,000 public servants, including over 46,000 teachers, without salaries. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain in overcrowded camps with limited food and basic services (Human Rights Watch) .In June 2026, displaced communities staged a three-day protest in Mekelle demanding the safe and voluntary return of Tigrayans to their homes, particularly in Western Tigray.
The region’s isolation has been further compounded by repeated suspensions of commercial flights amid military buildups along Tigray’s borders. Reflecting these developments, Refugees International warned that conditions are “beginning to dangerously resemble the humanitarian blockade we saw enacted in Tigray during the last war,” citing the combined impact of federal funding restrictions and declining international humanitarian assistance.
Human Rights Violations and the Closing of Civic Space
The humanitarian crisis has unfolded alongside continuing human rights abuses and a shrinking civic space. According to HRW’s World Report 2026 and other independent investigations, many of the rights concerns that characterized the Tigray war remain unresolved despite the Pretoria Peace Agreement.
Human Rights Watch has documented continued sexual violence by Eritrean forces in occupied areas of Tigray. In Western Tigray, an April 2026 investigation found that authorities continued to arbitrarily detain ethnic Tigrayans while imposing discriminatory restrictions on their movement, employment, and access to identity documents.
Human rights concerns are not limited to the federal government. In June 2026, the TPLF-led regional administration introduced a proclamation imposing compulsory military conscription, with penalties ranging from heavy fines to, in some cases, the death penalty for resistance or desertion, alongside a crackdown on independent journalists. Human Rights Watch urged the regional authorities to withdraw the law, warning that it “bears similarities to Eritrea’s abusive national service system.”
The deterioration of civic space has also been evident nationally. Ethiopia’s ranking in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index fell from 141st to 145th, while Human Rights Watch documented an intensified crackdown on independent media ahead of the 2026 elections, including the permanent suspension of two Deutsche Welle journalists by the Ethiopian Media Authority.
Human Rights Watch has also reported the arbitrary detention of healthcare workers protesting poor wages and working conditions, as well as human rights defenders documenting ongoing abuses. Together, these developments underscore the widening gap between Ethiopia’s commitment to national dialogue and the realities facing journalists, civil society, human rights defenders, and affected communities.
Shifting Alliances and the Path Toward Renewed War
The internal politics of Tigray have fractured since 2024, splitting the TPLF and complicating any unified negotiating position. The faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael ousted the federally appointed interim administration and has pursued an increasingly open relationship with Eritrea, a rapprochement analyst have dubbed “Tsimdo” (alliance, in Tigrinya). Reported contacts date back to informal 2024 border meetings and a 2024 Dubai channel, evolving into open engagement between Eritrean officials and TPLF representatives by mid-2025.
This is a striking reversal given the brutality Eritrean forces inflicted on Tigray during 2020–2022. Analysts describe it as a transactional “enemy-of-my-enemy” pact rather than genuine reconciliation: Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, who has for decades relied on cultivating Ethiopian opposition movements to unsettle Addis Ababa, is simultaneously reported to be deepening support for the Amhara Fano insurgency, creating a scenario in which Eritrea maintains leverage over multiple, otherwise opposed, Ethiopian factions at once. Reporting has also linked coordination among TPLF-aligned factions, Fano, and Eritrea to a staging ground in Sudan, amid Sudan’s own civil war.
Meanwhile, the federal government has moved thousands of troops to Tigray’s borders, declared a state of maximum military alert, and recalled discharged officers to active duty. Clashes between federal forces and Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) around Tselemti in Western Tigray in late January 2026, followed by drone strikes attributed to the Ethiopian military, prompted by international human rights organizations to warn that Ethiopia stood “on the brink” of renewed large-scale conflict.
Peace Requires More Than Dialogue
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reference to Nigeria’s civil war cannot be viewed in isolation from Ethiopia’s recent history. During the 2020–2022 Tigray war, his government imposed a comprehensive siege on Tigray that cut off food, medicine, fuel, banking, telecommunications, electricity, and humanitarian assistance—measures that numerous human rights organizations and humanitarian agencies warned had catastrophic consequences for civilians. Against that backdrop, many Tigrayans do not perceive the reference to Biafra as an innocent historical analogy or a lesson in reconciliation. Rather, it is widely understood as a political message that recalls one of history’s most infamous examples of starvation used as a weapon of war. For a population that has already endured siege, mass atrocities, and humanitarian catastrophe, such a reference reinforces fear, deepens mistrust, and raises profound concerns about the federal government’s intentions toward Tigray.
More fundamentally, Ethiopia today exhibits many of the warning signs that have preceded previous national catastrophes: a deep crisis of trust between the federal government and Tigray, unresolved territorial disputes, continuing human rights abuses, widespread humanitarian suffering, fractured political leadership, shifting regional alliances, and renewed military mobilization. Recent clashes between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopian federal forces around Shererina in Western Tigray, near the Sudan border, underscore that these dangers are no longer hypothetical. Instead, they suggest that localized confrontations could escalate into a broader conflict if left unchecked.
History should serve as a warning, not as a blueprint. Ethiopia’s National Dialogue cannot achieve lasting reconciliation while significant portions of the country remain excluded, humanitarian restrictions persist, and the underlying political and territorial disputes remain unresolved. Durable peace requires more than dialogue; it demands the full implementation of the Pretoria Peace Agreement, unrestricted humanitarian access, accountability for abuses committed by all parties, respect for fundamental human rights, and an inclusive political process capable of rebuilding trust among Ethiopia’s diverse communities.
Ethiopia still has an opportunity to prevent another devastating war, but that opportunity is rapidly narrowing. Without meaningful action to address the root causes of the crisis, the warning signs visible today, including renewed armed confrontations in Western Tigray, risk evolving into a wider conflict with consequences extending far beyond Ethiopia’s borders.
Professional Profile:
The author is a former academic at Ethiopian universities and is currently a business leader working for a major multinational company, with business leadership experience in Europe, East Africa, and Southern Africa. In parallel, he is a human-rights advocate and a paying member of several human-rights organisations, including Amnesty International.
The views expressed in this article are strictly personal and do not, in any way, represent the views of the company for which the author works or any organisation of which he is a member. The author can be reached at samson.h.lebassi@gmail.com