On one thing both the Somali Isamist group, al-Shabaab and the Kenyan authorities agree:  al-Shabaab is behind the Westgate atrocity.

Al-Shabab proudly claimed responsibility for Saturday’s attack. “The Mujahideen entered #Westgate Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall, fighting the #Kenyan Kuffar inside their own turf,” Al Shabab’s press office said in one tweet.

But there are reasons to be at least a little sceptical about the veracity of the assertion. It is all too convenient for Kenya to put the blame for the atrocity on a foreign based group, rather than look for home-grown movements. Meanwhile, the British press has been obsessed with the possible role of a 29 year old woman, Samantha Lewthwaite.

Relatively little attention has been taken of at least as plausible a threat which is posed by a Kenyan movement known as al-Hijra, which grew out of the Nairobi Muslim Youth Centre. Below is a report by CNN pointing to al-Hijra as well as the relevant portions of two major UN reports.

Critically, the report to the UN Security Council in July 2013 warned that: Al Hijra is striving to regain the initiative, in part through its fighters in Somalia returning to conduct new and more complex operations…”

But first – a short timeline.

Timeline of Kenyan Islamic radicalisation

  • Working from Sudan (until his expulsion in 1996) Osama bin Laden established al-Qaeda cells across East Africa, including Kenya.  Its members acquired safe houses, opened business fronts and married into the local Muslim community, which makes up nearly 30% of Kenya’s population.
  • 7th August 1998: car bombs were simultaneously detonated outside the United States embassies in Nairobi and the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam.  The explosions left 224 people dead and about 5,000 wounded.
  • Attacks in Kenya continue: 28th November 2002 two suicide bombers attacked the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in the coastal resort of Mombasa.
  • 2006 – Union of Islamic Courts driven out of the Somali capital by Mogadishu by Ethiopia – al-Shabaab take up the fight
  • African Union brings in troops – al-Shabaab responds by bombing a sports club in the Ugandan capital Kampala in July 2010, leaving 74 dead.
  • October 2011 – Kenyan invasion of Somalia: Jubaland – al-Shabaab promises revenge
  • May 2012 – Kismayo finally falls to Kenyan forces after heavy fighting – the buffer state of Jubaland is declared along the Kenyan border
  • July 2013 Report for the UN Security Council Report warns: “Al Hijra is striving to regain the initiative, in part through its fighters in Somalia returning to conduct new and more complex operations and through strengthening its ties to other groups in the region.”

Some initial conclusions

  1. Al-Shabaab on the decline in Somalia: driven out of Mogadishu, losing towns & divided among itself. It needs a ‘spectacular’ attack to regain its credibility.
  2. It is important to recall that al-Shabaab is part of the al-Qaeda movement, with strong links to al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsular, the Magreb and other groups like Boko-Haram in Nigeria, as well as Kenyan groups like al-Hijra and the Tanzanian Ansar Muslim Youth Centre as well as al-Shabaab affiliates in Rwanda and Burundi.
  3. If al-Shabaab is increasingly international, so is the front opposing them. There are reports of Israeli, British and American security and special forces in Nairobi.
  4. The Westgate attack is likely to cement ties between the Kenyan leadership and the West. The Kenyan Deputy President, William Ruto, has already been allowed to leave the Hague, where he was attending his trial at the International Criminal Court, to return to Nairobi.

CNN points to al-Hijra

CNN was the first international news-organisation to highlight al-Hijra’s possible role in the Westgate attack.

In a well-argued analysis CNN said:

“Nairobi is vulnerable to Al-Shabaab attacks not least because of the large Somali community, many of them refugees from the country’s long-running clan warfare, that lives in the Eastleigh district. Known as “little Mogadishu,” Eastleigh is now home to an estimated 250,000 Somalis. And Al-Shabaab is well established there, raising money, finding recruits and setting up safe houses.

Al-Shabaab also has an ally in the militant Kenyan group al Hijra, formerly the Muslim Youth Center, which has a strong presence in Eastleigh and in the coastal city of Mombasa. Investigators will be examining whether al Hijra played a role in the attack on the Westgate mall. Kenyan al Hijra militants are suspected to have been responsible for several of the small-scale terrorist attacks that have hit the country.

This is a worrying trend, analysts say. While Al-Shabaab’s Somali fighters are not used to operating abroad, non-Somali East Africans have been training with the group in southern Somalia. Al Hijra is the most potent outgrowth of that training. Founded in an Eastleigh mosque in 2008, al Hijra took advantage of growing radicalization among a minority of Kenya’s 4.3 million Muslims to build a significant presence in Nairobi and Mombasa. Investigators established the group had close links to the attacks in Kampala in July 2010. According to the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, most of the operatives who conspired in the attack were Kenyan and close to al Hijra leaders.

A crackdown against al Hijra by Kenyan authorities, helped by the United States, has weakened the group. According to a 2013 United Nations report, “Al Hijra members were plagued by unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous ‘catch and release’ arrest raids and operational disruptions.” But al Hijra is far from defeated. According to the U.N. report, it has established links with Al-Shabaab affiliates elsewhere in East Africa and is enlisting the services of fighters returning from Somalia “to conduct new and more complex operations.” Its leadership has become closer to al Qaeda through figures such as Abubakar Shariff Ahmed, known as “Makaburi,” who is said to favor large-scale attacks in Kenya in support of Al-Shabaab.”

What UN reports have said about al-Hijra

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia

“The merger between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in 2012 appears largely symbolic. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a regional and international threat through its affiliates. Notably, in Kenya, Al Hijra (formerly the Muslim Youth Centre) and its financier, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee, have suffered setbacks from disruptions of Al Hijra’s operations by international and regional security services, as well as unexplained killings and disappearances of its members. However, Al Hijra is striving to regain the initiative, in part through its fighters in Somalia returning to conduct new and more complex operations and through strengthening its ties to other groups in the region. In this context, the self-styled Al-Qaida affiliate, Abubakar Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi”, designated for targeted measures by the Committee in August 2012, is increasingly asserting his influence over Al Hijra.”

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2013): Somalia

[Note: there is a much fuller, secret annex on al-Hijra which is noted, but not provided in the UN report.]

“The merger between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in 2012 appears largely symbolic. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a regional and international threat through its affiliates. Notably, in Kenya, Al Hijra (formerly the Muslim Youth Centre) and its financier, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee, have suffered setbacks from disruptions of Al Hijra’s operations by international and regional security services, as well as unexplained killings and disappearances of its members. However, Al Hijra is striving to regain the initiative, in part through its fighters in Somalia returning to conduct new and more complex operations and through strengthening its ties to other groups in the region. In this context, the self-styled Al-Qaida affiliate, Abubakar Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi”, designated for targeted measures by the Committee in August 2012, is increasingly asserting his influence over Al Hijra.”

“Since the previous report of the Monitoring Group (S/2012/544), issued in July 2012, Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre, has suffered significant setbacks, as has its ally Al-Shabaab. The setbacks experienced by Al Hijra have impeded the threat capacity of Al-Shabaab in East Africa and affected the strategic-operational link between the two groups. While Al-Shabaab experienced military reverses in Somalia, across the border in Kenya, Al Hijra members were plagued by unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous “catch and release” arrest raids and operational disruptions under the “Al-Shabaab/East Africa Al-Qaida Disruption Initiative”. For instance, on 27 August 2012, the ideological leader of Al Hijra, Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed, was inexplicably killed in Mombasa, Kenya, a month after the Committee designated him for targeted measures. In addition, active Al Hijra members who have disappeared include one of its “Amirs”, Sylvester Opiyo (a.k.a. “Musa Osodo”), in May 2012 and senior figures such as Jeremiah Onyango Okumu and Steven Mwanzia Osaka (a.k.a. “Duda Black” and “Duda Brown”, respectively) in June 2012.”

“Despite the setbacks, Al Hijra, like Al-Shabaab, is striving to remain a credible threat to peace and security both in Somalia and outside. As an operational priority, it is strengthening its ties to the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in the United Republic of Tanzania as part of Al-Shabaab’s broader external campaign. It is also establishing strong logistical links to Al-Shabaab affiliates in Rwanda and
Burundi.”

“The lingering influence and leadership of Ahmad Iman, also Al-Shabaab’s representative for Kenya, inspired a wave of attacks by grenade and improvised explosive device across Kenya, mostly against the local population. While this approach has had marginal success, both Al-Shabaab and Ahmad Iman have repeatedly called from Somalia for sustained attacks in the region and particularly in Kenya.”

“Probably owing to its limited success and the rather kinetic approach to counter-terrorism taken by the Kenyan security services, Al Hijra, in partnership with the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in the United Republic of Tanzania, has sought operational direction and guidance since the latter part of 2012 from individuals with former ties to Al-Qaida in East Africa and self-styled Al-Qaida affiliates,
including Abubakar Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi” and United Kingdom national Jermaine John Grant. “Makaburi” has exerted a growing influence over Al Hijra and is determined to redirect the group’s resources and manpower from hitting “soft targets” to conducting complex, large-scale attacks in Kenya on behalf and in support of Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, Jermaine John Grant, confined in prison, has effectively provided assistance, albeit remotely, to ongoing plots involving both Al Hijra and “Makaburi”.”

“Over the years, Al Hijra in Kenya and its Somalia-based fighters have proven adept at mobilizing resources for Al-Shabaab activities in Somalia and the region. As detailed previously by the Monitoring Group, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee has played a clandestine role and continues to provide financial support to Al Hijra, particularly its fighters returning from Somalia to Kenya.”