Published on June 19, 2026 Source: Africa Report
By Eyob Tilahun Abera, former lecturer at Debre Tabor University, a doctoral candidate at Mekelle University, and a freelance writer.
Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country and long considered a cornerstone of stability and anchor state in the Horn of Africa, appears to be entering a new and increasingly uncertain phase of war. Since the outbreak of the Tigray war, which subsequently spread to neighbouring regions, the country has become defined by a growing web of overlapping crises, armed insurgencies, and strained regional relations.
From political promises to permanent crisis
Following the Pretoria Agreement, which formally ended hostilities temporarily in Tigray, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed shifted its military focus mainly to the Amhara region. Since then, Amhara has faced a deepening and more complex crisis characterised by significant loss of life, large-scale displacement, severe human rights abuses, and worsening economic decline.
READ MOREEthiopia: The unravelling of Abiy Ahmed, from peace prize to prosperity gospel
The political capital that once propelled Abiy to power has largely been depleted. Instead of rebuilding consensus through dialogue, the regime has increasingly relied on militarised actions and detentions. This approach has achieved little in tackling the root causes of conflict. Instead, it has intensified grievances, war and driven the country further into instability.
The predefined and largely symbolic election held on 1 June amid an ongoing war did not serve to renew the government’s legitimacy. Rather, it exhausted what remained of that legitimacy and further complicated the country’s already fraught circumstances.
Emergence of a multi-front conflict
One of the latest developments in Ethiopia’s security landscape is the shift from a relatively contained civil war to a war involving multiple actors. Although the Pretoria Agreement ended active fighting in Tigray, it did not tackle the deeper political and structural causes of instability. Instead of subsiding, violence has relocated geographically and expanded, becoming more widespread, relentless, and heavily dependent on drone strikes.
In the Amhara region and the Wollega districts of Oromia, the Amhara Fano National Movement continues to challenge the regime, becoming more coordinated and reducing the government’s control.
The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) remains resilient in Oromia despite years of military campaigns. Meanwhile, Tigray’s fragile political settlement shows signs of collapsing, increasing the risk of a renewed broader conflict as hostilities are already reignited, and the government has carried out drone strikes in Tigray and encircled the region. Nowhere can be considered safe, as armed conflict has engulfed virtually the entire territory.
Sudan’s ongoing civil war has further complicated Ethiopia’s security. The conflict has led to arms flows and weakened border governance
The main risk of this phase is simultaneity. Even without a formal alliance, multiple active insurgencies can exert combined pressure on state institutions. Recent developments suggest increasing political and strategic alignment among various anti-government groups.
Whether such cooperation develops into coordinated action remains uncertain, but the mere possibility adds a new layer of complexity to Ethiopia’s security environment. Since such alliances have been discussed, it appears the government is highly distressed; the consequence is evident.
As security pressures increase across various fronts, government forces risk becoming overstretched. Administrative authority weakens, governance becomes more uneven, and the state’s capacity to project power diminishes. The regime is therefore faced not only with isolated insurgencies but also with a connected and mutually reinforcing pattern of instability that is becoming increasingly difficult to contain.
Regional tensions and strategic exposure
This internal fragmentation is unfolding within an already volatile regional environment. Relations with Eritrea, once transformed by the 2018 rapprochement, have deteriorated amid renewed mistrust, particularly following Abiy’s controversial pursuit of Red Sea access.
Ethiopia is at a critical juncture, increasingly characterised by overlapping wars with the threat of a wider war looming
Sudan’s ongoing civil war has further complicated Ethiopia’s security. The conflict has led to arms flows and weakened border governance along Ethiopia’s western frontier. Allegations of Ethiopia’s proxy involvement in Sudan’s war, linked to supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), have added another layer of geopolitical risk to an already fragile regional landscape.
Relations with Somalia have also experienced recurring tensions, particularly following Ethiopia’s involvement with Somaliland and disputes over maritime access and sovereignty. Although diplomatic efforts have prevented direct escalation, underlying disagreements remain unresolved and continue to threaten long-term regional stability.
Consequently, Ethiopia’s internal conflicts can no longer be seen in isolation. They are increasingly part of a broader regional security context where neighbouring states can influence domestic developments through diplomacy, security partnerships, and political alignment.
Political settlement and protracted instability
The key question is whether Abiy’s government can pursue a truly inclusive political process capable of rebuilding national consensus through a broad-based transitional government and accountability measures, restoring public confidence. He should address the roots of conflict, or whether the government will continue to rely on military solutions, as the Derg regime did.
Ethiopia is at a critical juncture, increasingly characterised by overlapping wars with the threat of a wider war looming. As the distinction between domestic insurgencies and regional geopolitics blurs, it is potentially leading to the fall of Abiy Ahmed’s government.
Martin Plaut 