The United States did all it could to dissuade Kenya from attempting to establish a buffer state inside Somalia, to halt al Shabaab. In a series of meetings detailed in cables in the Wikileaks archive, Senior American diplomats told the Kenyans they could not support the project, which had luke-warm support from Uganda and Ethiopia. At the end of this summary are all the Wikileaks cables.
The aim of the Jubaland project – as detailed in the US embassy cables – was to halt the threat Kenya believed it faced from radical Islam, as propagated by the Somali movement, al-Shabaab. Kenya’s military was training and equipping a force of Somalis whose mission was to enter Somalia and drive al-Shabaab away from the Kenyan border. In 2009 and 2010 the Kenyan government did all it could to get the Americans to back the strategy. Kenyan Foreign Minister, Moses Wetangula, warned the American ambassador that prominent ethnic Somali politicians, including the Deputy Speaker were strong al-Shabaab supporters. The Kenyans wanted the force to seize the port of Kismayo, which provides al-Shabaab with much of its income. Prime Minister, Raila Oginga is reported to have argued that instability in Somalia is causing instability in Kenya. The Kenyan government could “no longer afford to sit on the sidelines,” he argued.
The Jubaland initiative, co-ordinated by the Prime Minister’s office, but jointly chaired with President Kibaki aimed to train 3,000 fighters, but in the event found that only 2,000 were available. The Kenyans estimated they would be up against between 1000 and 1,500 Islamist fighters in the Juba area. Attempts to persuade the Americans appear to have reached a climax during the African Union summit in Addis Ababa in February 2010. A high level delegation led by the Foreign Minister Wetangula met with the Assistant Secretary of State, Johnnie Carson. Acknowledging that the Jubaland plan was risky, the Kenyan foreign minister argued the aim was not to create a rival to Somalia’s Transitional government. The Kenyans promised they were not attempting to establish a Kenyan controlled fiefdom and gave an assurance that there would not be a single Kenyan boot on Somali soil. But despite Mr Wetangula reportedly “imploring” Mr Carson to consider assisting the plan, he made little headway. The American said he was worried the plan could backfire laid out his concerns. These ranged from the impact the incursion might have on the stability of the region to questioning the Kenyans about their plans if their forces were defeated. In the end Mr Carsons maintained deep reservations about the Jubaland initiative, but promised to “look into the feasibility of a US team going to Kenya to review the technical details of the Kenyan plan.”
Neither Uganda nor Ethiopia were won over. Uganda’s President Museveni described the Kenyan military as a career army and questioned their ability to sustain what he called “bush fighters.” Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told the Americans he was not enthusiastic about the Kenyan proposal, but had plans in place to limit any destabilisation of his country if the initiative did not succeed. There the Wikileaks cables end.
Since 2010 Kenya’s Jubaland project has continued despite American reservations. In March 2011 two forces, armed, trained and backed by the Kenyans crossed into Somalia. One was led by the former Somali Defence Minister, (Mohamed Abdi Mohammed) best known as ‘Gandhi’ and a force which had fallen out with al-Shabaab, the Raas-kambooni, (led by Sheikh Ahmed Madoobe.) They took the border town of Dobley on the 4th of April this year. Since then an Ethiopian backed force has taken an area of Somalia bordering on its territory in the Gedo region. This is as far as the plan to create a buffer state in southern Somalia has gone. The port of Kismayo is still in the hands of al-Shabaab and the aim of securing Kenya’s northern border remains a distant objective.
Below are the cables from Wikileaks showing how the USA tried to dissuade Kenya from intervening in Somalia.
[Note: footnotes have been added to the cables]
10074
“215691”,”7/8/2009 15:50″,”09NAIROBI1444″,”Embassy Nairobi”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,””,”VZCZCXRO0764
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PTER, PMAR, SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – JUBA RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WANTS TO
COORDINATE WITH THE TFG
Classified By: Pol Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) On July 7 we met with Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) parliamentarian and Juba Resistance Movement
(JRM) leader Mohammed Amin Osman. (Note:The JRM is a loose
alliance of local leaders in the Jubas who advocate for the
creation of a local Jubaland administration and claim to be
able to galvanize various subclan militia against the
al-Shabaab. End note.) Osman, a useful, long-time Somalia
Unit and USAID contact, briefed us on JRM\’s efforts to
organize a military force to challenge al-Shabaab and the Ras
Kamboni group. (Note: The Ras Kamboni group, led by Hassan
al-Turki, is allied with Hisbul-Islam and working to
overthrow the TFG. End note.) Osman explained that
dissatisfaction with Muslim extremists was rising in Middle
and Lower Juba regions, prompting several clan militia
commanders to volunteer to fight al-Shabaab. We will report
the commanders names and their clans when available.
2. (C) Osman said the JRM and TFG leaders, including Defense
Minister Ghandi, Finance Minister Sheikh Hassan, and late
Security Minister Omar Hashi have discussed military
coordination in the past, but those talks had broken down
over the TFG\’s efforts to appoint TFG administrations in the
Jubas and TFG interest in bringing Ras Kamboni commander
Ibrahim Shukri into the government. (Note: The JRM political
agenda includes forming popularly chosen administrations. TFG
efforts to install administrators from Mogadishu, some of
whom have worked closely with Ethiopia in the past, were a
clear source of frustration for Osman. He was skeptical
about working with Shukri, even though Shukri is reportedly
willing to defect from the Ras Kamboni group and challenge
al-Shabaab with his powerful Darood/Mohamed Zubeir militia.
The Mohamed Zubeir are currently the most militarily powerful
subclan in the region. End Note). Nonetheless, the JRM
believes cooperation with the TFG is necessary to defeat
al-Shabaab. He said he is asking the AU, the UN Political
Office for Somalia, the Kenyan government, the UK High
Commission and Post to press the TFG to coordinate with the
JRM.
3. (C) Oman told us JRM allied militias had successfully
sparred with al-Shabaab in recent months, costing al-Shabaab
influence in the regions\’ rural areas and causing al-Shabaab
to seek a truce. Osman said JRM military commanders have
small 30-40-man standing militias but clan leaders can
deliver hundreds more when needed.
4. (C) Comment: We will continue to gather information on
the JRM, its capabilities, goals, and its relations with the
TFG and other leaders willing to confront al-Shabaab in the
Jubas. End Comment.
SLUTZ
10075
“217439”,”7/21/2009 8:46″,”09NAIROBI1552″,”Embassy Nairobi”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,””,”VZCZCXRO2221
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, PINR, PTER, SOCI, SO, ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – MANEUVERING TOWARD JUBALAND
Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).
1. (C) Summary. In early-mid July momentum for the formation
of a Jubaland State appeared to be increasing as political,
clan, and military players in the region began to shift
alliances and maneuver for political positions. Our contacts
tell us multiple Juba factions, to include would-be Ras
Kamboni defectors, are tentatively working together toward
the creation of a Jubaland State under the TFG, but tensions
remain over who would ultimately lead Jubaland. (Note: The
Ras Kamboni group, led by Hassan al-Turki has been working to
overthrow the TFG.) We are encouraging various Juba leaders
to continue political negotiations amongst themselves as well
as dialogue with the TFG. End summary.
2. (C) Our contacts close to Ras Kamboni commander Aden
Madobe, tell us Darod/Ogaden TFG Minister of Defense Ghandi
recently told Madobe to \”mobilize the Ogaden\”. Madobe\’s
representatives have also had contact with the TFG Finance
Minister. [1](Note: The Darod/Ogaden is currently the most
powerful subclan in Lower Juba. The Darod/Marehan power base
remains Gedo region, or \”Middle Juba\”. The Darod/Majerteen
have increasingly become smaller players in the region after
former President Abudulli Yusuf\’s failed attempts to install
a Darod/Majerteen-dominated administration there. End note.)
Madobe in recent months has moved further away from Ras
Kamboni commander Hassan al-Turki and our contacts tell us
al-Turki and al-Shabaab forces clashed with Madobe\’s forces
in Afmadow in mid-July. According to our contacts, Madobe is
willing to work with other Ogaden leaders, including his
fellow Ras Kamboni commander, Ibrahim Shukri to defeat
al-Shabaab, marginalize al-Turki and work toward a Jubaland
linked to the TFG. Madobe reportedly called NGOs in the area
last week and said they could operate freely in the areas he
controls.
3. (C) Contacts close to Shukri tell us Shukri is willing to
work with Madobe to resist al-Shabaab and sideline al-Turki.
Shukri last month spoke to TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke and
our contacts tell us Shukri has formed alliances with some
Darod/Marehan leaders. Shukri is reportedly seeking wider
negotiations with Darod leaders due, in part, to pressure
from local elders. Our contacts indicate Shukri is willing to
negotiate with Juba Resistance Movement (JRM) Chairman
Mohammed Amin and other Darod leaders. Amin, during
conversations with PolOffs, has expressed uneasy willingness
to cooperate with Madobe and Shukri. A contact close to
Shukri opined it is important for Darod negotiations and
discussions with the TFG to move forward to contain Madobe
and Shukri\’s power.
4. (C) According to a son of the Ogaden Suldan, Darod leaders
in mid-July were having ongoing discussions in Nairobi about
the prospects for Jubaland. Other contacts told us 90 Darod
leaders, to include representatives from various Darod
sub-clans and some Darod MPs, met in Nairobi to discuss a
Jubaland administration. The attendees reportedly agreed to
the general principle of a Jubaland State under the TFG.
However, the question of Gedo region and the Marehan remained
a major point of tension. Several of our contacts tell us one
solution being broadly considered is a Jubaland State with
two regions, Middle Juba and Lower Juba. Middle Juba, in this
scenario, would be predominately Marehan and Lower Juba would
be primarily Ogaden and Majerteen. Our contacts, however,
indicate the Ogaden and Majerteen would insist on the
presidency of a united Jubaland. (Note: Darod/Marehan control
over Gedo is unlikely to appease long-time Marehan warlord
Barre Hirale who has long held ambitions to control the
Lower Juba town of Kismayo. End note.)
5. (C) Comment: The growing pushback against al-Shabaab and
al-Turki is a positive development in the Juba regions. Our
contacts tell us al-Turki, sensing declining support among
his subclan, is moving closer to al-Shabaab, which in turn is
exacerbating tensions between al-Turki and Madobe. We are
encouraging political negotiations among Madobe, Shukri,
Amin, and other players in Lower Juba and encouraging them to
continue dialogue with the TFG. However, many challenges
remain for a would-be Jubaland State. While Barre Hirale
would probably be unable to defeat a unified, Ogaden-led
Lower Jubaland, he would almost certainly fail to abandon his
claims on Kismayo and would most likely seek Ethiopian
NAIROBI 00001552 002 OF 002
assistance in confronting his Ogaden rivals. Furthermore,
Madobe and Shukri\’s possible willingness to work with the TFG
and negotiate with other leaders in the Jubas could shift as
quickly as the ever-shifting Somali political sands.
ABELL
10075
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MOPS, MARR, PINR, SOCI, SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – LOWER JUBA FORCES STEPPING UP
ANTI-SHABAAB EFFORTS; JUBALAND STEERING COMMITTEE FORMS
REF: A. NAIROBI 1552
B. NAIROBI 1444
Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,
d).
1. (C) Summary. In late July anti-Shabaab forces in Lower
Juba were preparing for stepped up attacks against al-Shabaab
militia, most likely encouraged by support from regional
business leaders and an evolving Ogaden-clan led Jubaland
administration. These developments follow reports from
numerous contacts that Ras Kamboni commanders and Ogaden clan
heavyweights Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri in early-mid
July had joined with other Juba leaders and were maneuvering
to defeat al-Shabaab, marginalize Ras Kamboni leader Hassan
al-Turki, and work toward the formation of a Jubaland state
(ref a). (Note: The Ras Kamboni group, under the leadership
of al-Turki, has been working to overthrow the TFG. Our
contacts tell us al-Turki, sensing declining support among
his Ogaden subclan, is moving closer to al-Shabaab. End
Note.) While some TFG leaders appear supportive of
developments in Lower Juba, others are clearly more
skeptical. We are encouraging various Juba leaders to work
together to confront al-Shabaab and to continue dialogue with
the TFG. End summary.
2. (C) Our contacts, to include TFG Minister of Defense
Ghandi, tell us skirmishes have begun between Ras Kamboni
commanders and al-Shabaab forces in Lower Juba. Ras Kamboni
forces in recent days reportedly overpowered al-Shabaab
militia en route to Afmadow. Additionally, al-Shabaab
dismissed its deputy DC in Kismayo following intensified
disputes between Ras Kamboni and al-Shabaab leaders. Our
contacts among political, military, and financial players in
Lower Juba tell us stepped up fighting between anti-Shabaab
forces and al-Shabaab militia in Lower Juba will most likely
occur over the next week to ten days.
3. (S) The Darod/Ogaden Suldan and al-Turki\’s son-in-law told
us Darod leaders, following ongoing discussions regarding the
establishment of a Jubaland administration (ref a), on July
25th established a 27 person Steering Committee for the Lower
Juba region. (Note Al-Turki\’s son-in-law is a prominent
Ogaden businessman and appears to view al-Turki as a threat
to his interests. End Note.) Leaders from most Darod
subclans, supporters of Madobe and Shukri, and Juba
Resistance Movement (JRM) Chairman Mohamed Amin (ref b)
reportedly participated in the meeting. Our contacts tell us
deliberations over positions within the Steering Committee
are ongoing. During meetings with Somalia Unit PolOff in
Dubai on July 24 Chairman of Somalia Telcom Mohamed Sheikh, a
major Ogaden business figure and former financier of the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), expressed interest in using
his influence to encourage military and political leaders in
Lower Juba to link their efforts to the TFG. The next day
Mohamed Sheikh told us he had begun communication with TFG
Ministers of Defense and Finance in an effort to garner TFG
support for Lower Juba developments. (Note: Somalia Telcom is
also often referred to as Olympic Telcom and is reportedly
the second largest telecom operation in Somalia. Mohamed
Sheikh is from the same clan as TFG Defense Minister Ghandi
and likely has business ties to TFG Finance Minister Sharif
Hassan. End Note.)
4. (C) TFG Minister of Defense Ghandi on July 28 told us
Madobe and Shukri had \”flipped\” and were willing to support
the TFG. However, other TFG officials have expressed greater
skepticism regarding Madobe\’s willingness to move far enough
away from al-Turki. During a UN forum in Nairobi on July 29,
TFG Minister of National Security Abdullahi Mohammed Ali said
the TFG is supportive of recent ground-level efforts in
Galgaduud, Hiraan, and Gedo, notably leaving out the Lower
Juba region.
5. (C) Comment. The growing pushback against al-Shabaab and
al-Turki is a positive development in Lower Juba. We are
encouraging Juba leaders to work together to confront
al-Shabaab and to continue dialogue with the TFG. However,
many challenges confront a would-be Jubaland state, to
include the question of Gedo (ref a). Additionally, Juba
leaders primarily appear to be seeking support from fellow
Ogaden TFG figures. Many within the TFG remain skeptical of
NAIROBI 00001648 002 OF 002
apparent Ras-Kamboni defectors Madobe and Shukri, who have a
track record of shifting alliances quickly.
SLUTZ
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“220500”,”8/12/2009 17:04″,”09NAIROBI1710″,”Embassy Nairobi”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”09NAIROBI1648″,”VZCZCXRO1157
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2019
TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PTER, SOCI, SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: MADOBE PREPARING JUBA OFFENSIVE; GEDO
ISSUE UNRESOLVED
REF: NAIROBI 1648
NAIROBI 00001710 001.3 OF 002
Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b,d
).
1. (C) Summary: Darod/Ogaden clan heavyweight Ahmed Madobe, [2]
in coordination with TFG officials, appears to be stepping up
efforts to take Kismayo and consolidate control of Lower
Juba. (Note: Hassan al-Turki is the nominal head of the Ras
Kamboni group, which has been working to overthrow the TFG.
In recent months Turki\’s top commanders Ibrahim Shukri and
Madobe have worked behind the scenes to marginalize al-Turki
and move against al-Shabaab. End Note.) Our contacts tell us
TFG Minister of Defense, the TFG Minister of Finance, and the
Prime Minister are aware of and support Madobe\’s plans.
Madobe has been appointed head of an evolving Lower Juba
entity, which is locally administered and has links to the
TFG. Shukri has been appointed head of internal affairs. The
appointments of Madobe and Shukri grew out of recent
meetings in Juba and Nairobi between their supporters and
predominantly Darod/Kabalah clan leaders and MPs (reftel).
Our contacts report that many Marehan figures in Gedo, to
include long-time warlord Barre Hirale, appear uninterested
in cooperating with Lower Juba to form a Jubaland entity
unless they are in charge. End summary.
Madobe Prepares for \”War\” with Al-Shabaab
—————————————–
2. (C) A close ally of Ahmed Madobe on August 12 told us that
he had just returned from meeting Madobe at the Kenyan
border. Madobe held a meeting in Dhoble on August 13, during
which he reportedly assured NGOs and humanitarian
organizations that they could operate in areas under his
control. After the meeting Madobe told our contact that he
intended to return to Kismayo and was preparing for war with
al-Shabaab. Madobe said he recently traveled to Mogadishu to
encourage his allies to take part in a Kismayo offensive. An
Ogaden business figure close to Madobe, Mohamed Sheikh, on
August 12 told us that Madobe said the focus should be on
Kismayo. After Kismayo was under his control, consideration
would be given to Gedo Region. Mohamed Shiekh told us that
Madobe does not intend to push beyond lower Juba. Sheikh
had just been in Mogadishu, where he met with the TFG
Ministers of Defense and Finance and the Prime Minister, who
all supported Madobe\’s plans. Shukri told the Minister of
Defense that Madobe\’s plan was the kind of initiative that
\”he would fund.\” In Mohamed Sheikh\’s view, Darod/Kabalah
subclans were behind the evolving Lower Juba administration
and would add currently inactive militia to the fight. (Note:
Mohamed Sheikh is the chairman of Somalia\’s second largest
telecom company. End note.)
3. (C) Our contacts tell us that Madobe has been appointed
head of an evolving Lower Juba entity, which is locally
administered and has links to the TFG while Ibrahim Shukri
has been appointed head of the entity\’s internal affairs.
Madobe\’s role is essentially military and Shukri\’s is
administrative. The appointments grew out of recent
meetings in Juba and Nairobi between the supporters of Madobe
and Shukri and predominantly-Darod/Kabalah clan leaders and
MPs. In mid-July a 27-person Steering Committee was formed
for Jubaland, but our contacts say that arguments continue
over who will occupy key positions (reftel). (Note: Madobe
appears to both head the Ras Kamboni organization and an
emerging Jubaland administration. Al-Turki is described as
aging, marginalized within his Ogaden/Mohamed Zubeyr subclan,
and increasingly loyal to al-Shabaab. Other contacts
involved in the mid-July meetings tell us there was support
for Madobe among the Darod/Kabalah leaders. End note.)
The Question of Gedo and the Marehan
————————————-
4. (C) Darod/Kabalah contacts on August 12 told us there is
disagreement between the Darod/Marehan clan in Gedo region
about joining Lower Juba representatives to form a Jubaland.
The most influential Marehan leaders in Gedo, to include
long-time warlord Barre Hirale, appear uninterested in
cooperating with Lower Juba to form a Jubaland unless they
are in charge. Other Juba contacts report some Marehan
support the idea, but they are the less influential and not
NAIROBI 00001710 002.5 OF 002
well-armed members of the subclan. Many Darod leaders from
Juba and Gedo reportedly agree on the general principle of a
Jubaland state subordinate to the TFG, but remain divided
over who will control Jubaland and the port of Kismayo. One
option being considered is a Jubaland state with two regions,
Middle Juba and Lower Juba. Middle Juba, in this scenario,
would be predominantly Marehan and Lower Juba would be
primarily Ogaden and Majerteen. Our contacts, however,
indicate the Ogaden and Majerteen would insist on the
presidency of a united Jubaland. Mohamed Sheikh said it is
widely believed in Lower Juba that Ethiopia intends to
support the Marehan\’s claims on Kismayo because Addis Ababa
would be threatened by an Ogaden-led Lower Juba
administration. (Note: The Ogaden is currently the most
powerful subclan within the Darod/Kabalah in Lower Juba. The
Darod/Kabalah also contains the Majerteen subclan. The
Darod/Marehan power base remains Gedo region, or \”Middle
Juba.\” End note.)
Comment
——-
5. (C) The emerging alternative to an al-Turki-led al-Shabaab
in Lower Juba is a positive development. Madobe, Shukri, and
their allies represent the most powerful subclan in Lower
Juba. While there are certainly interests which are not
represented in Lower Juba by the emerging Jubaland
administration, there are probably not competing groups,
aside from al-Shabaab, in Lower Juba which would pose a
serious threat to Madobe and Shukri\’s forces. The
Darod/Marehan power base is in Gedo and it is unlikely
Marehan leaders would be able to move down the valley and
confront Madobe and Shukri\’s forces without significant
support from Ethiopia. While there appears to be increasing
momentum behind an evolving Lower Juba administration that
includes Madobe and Shukri, it appears clear that a Jubaland
that includes Gedo region is far from a reality. We believe
that the Marehan in Gedo will most likely view Ogaden
military action in Lower Juba as a threat if it moves beyond
Lower Juba\’s borders. Similarly, Marehan efforts to
militarily or politically lay claim to Kismayo will likely be
strongly resisted by Madobe, Shukri, and their predominantly
Darod/Ogaden allies. Finally, Madobe and Shukri\’s possible
willingness to work with the TFG and negotiate with other
leaders in the Jubas could shift as quickly as the
ever-shifting Somali political sands.
RANNEBERGER
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: MARR, PGOV, MOPS, PINR, SOCI, SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – JUBA OFFENSIVE MOVING FORWARD; POWERFUL
INTERESTS PROBABLY WORKING TO UNDERCUT OGADEN CLAN
REF: A. A) NAIROBI 1648
B. B) NAIROBI 1552
C. C) IIR 6 854 0327 09
Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,
d).
1. (C) Summary A TFG-backed Juba offensive, aimed at pushing
al-Shabaab out of Kismayo, appears to be moving forward, but
competing Ethiopian and/or Marehan clan interests could
complicate matters. TFG Minister of Defense \”Gandi\” reports
that the TFG is in contact with local players in Juba,
including Ras Kamboni leaders Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim
Shukri, in an effort to reconcile differences and obtain
their cooperation. \”Gandi\” said President Sharif fully
supports the plan, which remains closely held within the TFG.
The force in Lower Juba will consist of Darod/Kabalah clan
militia but will not include Darod/Marehan militia from the
Gedo region. Madobe appears willing to cooperate with the TFG
if Lower Juba\’s autonomy would be assured. \”Gandi\” told us
that the TFG is in negotiations with the Government of Kenya
over support for the plan. Several of our Lower Juba contacts
tell us they think some Marehan leaders are attempting to
confuse the Kenyans by telling them that the Marehan have
agreed to cooperate with those in Lower Juba in order to take
Kismayo. End summary.
\”Gandi\’s\” Plan
————–
2. (C) During an August 15 conversation with the Somalia
Unit, TFG Minister of Defense \”Gandi\” confirmed TFG
involvement in an evolving Darod/Kabalah/Obsame plan to take
Kismayo and consolidate control of Lower Juba (refs a,b).
\”Gandi\” said the TFG in March began to talk to local players
in Juba, to include Ras Kamboni leaders Ahmed Madobe and
Ibrahim Shukri, in an effort to reconcile differences and
obtain their cooperation. \”Gandi\” said that President Sharif
fully supports the plan, and that it remains closely held
within the TFG. \”Gandi\” said the offensive must take place
before mid-October in order to take advantage of current
weather conditions that complicate al-Shabaab\’s efforts to
re-supply through the port of Kismayo. The force in Lower
Juba will consist of Darod/Kabalah clan militia but will not
include Darod/Marehan militia from the Gedo region. Gandi
said Marehan involvement in the effort to take Kismayo would
be \”horrible\” and stated firmly \”the Marehan can not go to
Kismayo.\” Ogaden militia, in cooperation with Marehan militia
leaders, might go to Gedo to assist Marehan militia against
al-Shabaab in that region, but \”Gandi\” said this would be a
last resort because of the long-standing tensions between the
two Darod subclans. \”Gandi\” said Ethiopian-backed Marehan
proxy Barre Hirale and Darod/Kabalah/Harti/Majerteen warlord
General Morgan are not involved in the TFG\’s plan in Gedo or
Lower Juba. \”Gandi\” said he had full confidence in Shukri\’s
commitment to the TFG but described Madobe as a \”complex\” but
militarily necessary participant. \”Gandi\” said that the TFG
is in negotiations with the Kenyans regarding support for the
plan. He declared that \”the Kenyans are ready to help us,\”
but said the plan would move forward with or without Kenyan
support (ref c). \”Gandi\” hoped that AMISOM might be able to
provide artillery or aerial support to the offensive.
Madobe\’s Version of Events Reveals
Ogaden-Centric Agenda
———————————-
3. (C) On August 12 Somalia Unit PolOff met Abdi Ali Raghe, a
close contact and kinsman of Ahmed Madobe, who had just
returned from spending several days with Madobe in the Lower
Juba town of Dhobley. Raghe relayed to Poloff Madobe\’s
version of recent events. Approximately six months before
Madobe\’s late-March return to Lower Juba, Ras Kamboni leader
Hassan al-Turki orchestrated a power-sharing arrangement for
the Kismayo port between al-Shabaab and Ras Kamboni/Hisbul
Islam. (Note: Madobe was Governor of Kismayo under the
Council of Islamic Courts CIC) and was captured and
imprisoned by Ethiopian forces when the CIC fled Kismayo in
2006. He was released from jail after President Sharif
interceded on his behalf during his maiden visit to Addis
Ababa. Madobe was appointed an MP in Somalia\’s expanded
Parliament in January 2009. He resigned as MP in April 2009
and remained in Lower Juba. End note.) Turki had placed
non-Ogaden al-Shabaab in primary leadership positions in
Kismayo, forcing Ogaden-clan Ras Kamboni leaders into deputy
positions. This suggested to Madobe that Turki\’s primary
NAIROBI 00001732 002 OF 003
allegiance was to al-Shabaab. The Kismayo port agreement
called for revenues to be divided, with 30% going to
al-Shabaab, 30% to a joint Ras Kamboni/al-Shabaab
administration, 30% to Ras Kamboni, and 10% to the Anole
group. (Note: The Anole group is a faction of Hisbul Islam
comprised of Darod/Kabalah/Harti militia. End Note.) Ras
Kamboni in the end, however, received only about 2% of the
revenues over the following months and, as a result, Ogaden
clansmen defected to al-Shabaab.
4. (C) When Madobe returned to Lower Juba in late-March he
was welcomed by Ogaden clan leaders. At that time,
al-Shabaab began a campaign to persuade Turki that Madobe
could not be trusted. Al-Shabaab urged Turki not to let
Madobe join the Ras Kamboni leadership for three months,
arguing that he may have been influenced by Ethiopia while in
captivity. For their part, Ogaden clan elders told Madobe he
must put clan interests before relations with al-Shabaab.
Madobe subsequently traveled to Kismayo to begin to mobilize
support among the subclans. In order to counter al-Shabaab\’s
accusations against him as he worked to mobilize Ogaden
support, Madobe resigned from the TFG. When al-Shabaab in
Kismayo began to take the \”converted\” Ras Kamboni militia to
Mogadishu to participate in the May offensive, Madobe\’s
Ogaden clan complained that al-Shabaab was using Ogaden
militia to ensure safe passage to Mogadishu, then was
abandoning them once there. Madobe believed their grievances
presented a good opportunity to convince his former militia
in Mogadishu to return to Lower Juba for an attack on
Kismayo. Madobe claimed that as many as 80% of his supporters
have returned to Lower Juba from Mogadishu. After a one month
meeting in Afmadow, Ras Kamboni restructured and appointed
Madobe its head and Shukri as head of internal affairs.
Madobe, Shukri and their allied militias claim to control
Afmadow (including Dhobley), Badadee, and west Jilib, and are
now in a position to defeat al-Shabaab in Kismayo, Jimaame,
and east Jilib.
5. (C) Madobe reportedly wants to push al-Shabaab out and win
leadership of an autonomous Lower Juba linked to the TFG.
According to Raghe, Madobe said he does not think the TFG
understands Madobe\’s decision to go to Mogadishu, even though
Madobe assured \”Gandi\” he did not go to Mogadishu to fight
the TFG. Raghe told us Madobe would accept a minister
position within the TFG, but would demand control of a
semi-autonomous Jubaland administration if he stayed in the
region after delivering Kismayo. Madobe said he does not want
to publicly announce his intention to join or support the
government too soon because it would give al-Shabaab
propaganda material, but told Raghe that Darod/Kabalah clan
militia will support his plan to do so once the port is taken
and the clan imperative met.
Evolving Jubaland Administration
Retains Cautious View Of Madobe
———————————–
6. (C) On August 12 Darod/Kabalah clan leaders who had been
working toward a would-be Jubaland administration met with
PolOff and added nuance to earlier statements about their
relationship with Madobe (refs a,b). They said their goal is
a regional administration, linked to the TFG. They were
willing to have Madobe at its head if he was successful in
taking Kismayo. (Note: In earlier comments the same contacts
indicated to us that Madobe had already been appointed leader
of the evolving Jubaland Administration. End note.) The
Darod/Kabalah leaders said the day Madobe captures Kismayo he
will have to announce that he is part of and/or supports the
TFG or he will loose clan support. Ogaden leaders reportedly
believe that Ogaden-led control of Kismayo will translate
into greater Ogaden representation in the TFG at the
ministerial level and that political negotiations regarding a
greater Jubaland to include Gedo should for now remain
unaddressed.
Growing Concern Over Ethiopian-Backed
Marehan Involvement
————————————–
7. (C) \”Gandi\” told us he is worried that Ethiopia is giving
ammunition and support to Barre Hirale\’s troops. He said he
views recent meetings in Nairobi between General Morgan,
Barre Hirale, Ali Gedi and others as dangerous. \”Gandi\” urged
us to explain to Ethiopia that the TFG, like Ethiopia, wishes
to counter and defeat al-Shabaab. \”Gandi\” worried that
Ethiopian meddling could undercut the Kismayo offensive.
NAIROBI 00001732 003 OF 003
8. (C) Several of our contacts in Lower Juba tell us they
think that some Marehan leaders are attempting to confuse the
Kenyans by telling them that the Marehan have agreed to
cooperate with the Lower Juba players in an effort to take
Kismayo. (Note: A Marehan push toward Kismayo would almost
certainly be strongly rejected by Madobe, Shukri, and the
Darod/Kabalah clan base of Lower Juba, sparking intra-Darod
warfare in the Jubas. End note.)
Comment
——-
9. (C) The Juba Offensive described by \”Gandi,\” despite
obvious differences in emphasis and motivation, appears to
have in common with Madobe\’s initiative an understanding that
any push into Kismayo should be predominantly Ogaden-led.
\”Gandi\’s\” plan and reports from Juba contacts close to Madobe
and Shukri have much in common with Kenya\’s plans to support
a Juba offensive (ref c). The Kenyan plan, however, contains
the added element of an Ethiopian-backed Ahlu Sunnah Wal
Jama\’a push into Baidoa that would be designed to draw
al-Shabaab out of Lower Juba and Gedo. This would be
followed by a Marehan pushback against al-Shabaab in Gedo
(ref c). That part of the plan does not appear to be in
conflict with the Lower Juba initiative. However, it appears
increasingly likely that Ethiopia is backing Darod/Marehan
proxies as insurance against an Ogaden-led Lower Juba.
Against this backdrop, it seems likely that parties
representing Marehan and/or Ethiopian interests are
presenting the Kenyans, who we believe have a limited
understanding of clan dynamics in Juba, with misinformation
about the likelihood of Marehan/Ogaden cooperation in an
effort to take control of Kismayo.
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, MOPS, PINR, SOCI, EAID, SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – NEWLY-ENERGIZED TFG BUILDS BRIDGES IN
EFFORT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AL-SHABAAB WEAKNESS
REF: A. NAIROBI 1698
B. NAIROBI 1732
C. NAIROBI 1655
D. NAIROBI 1735
E. NAIROBI 1638
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger; reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: The Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
appears to be newly energized following President Sharif\’s
August 6 meeting with the Secretary (septel) and months of
drift in the wake of an extended al-Shabaab offensive in
Mogadishu that began May 7. Recent developments: an
apparent drop-off in funding for al-Shabaab, TFG success in
bringing at least some of the Abgal into its fold, more
productive TFG – Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama\’a (ASWJ) cooperation, a
budding relationship with the Puntland leadership, increased
al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam defections, coupled with gains on
regional battlefields could together create conditions for
the TFG to dramatically increase its sway in Somalia. Any
one or all of these positive developments could easily be
reversed, however, which would leave the TFG isolated and
vulnerable, much as it was before its patient outreach
efforts to ASWJ, the Puntland Administration, the Abgal, and
others began to bear fruit. I believe that intensive,
well-targeted, real-time USG support for the TFG at this
critical potential turning point is necessary if the
government of Sheikh Sharif is to capitalize on this rare
constellation of positive developments. Our general
recommendations follow in para 17. Septel will provide more
detailed suggestions on steps we could take. End summary.
2. (C) As reported ref a, an August 6 meeting with the
Secretary has energized TFG President Sharif. Since the
meeting, he has re-shuffled his Cabinet (ref d), prevailed on
his Prime Minister to cement ties with President \”Faroole\” in
Puntland, mended fences with his Abgal co-clan members (ref
b), and provided funding to northern Galgaduud ASWJ factions.
3. (C) This burst of activity is in stark contrast to the
lack of direction that followed the three months of on-again,
off-again battles with al-Shabaab in Mogadishu that began May
7. That seesaw fighting often saw ragtag TFG troops in full
flight, and only AMISOM standing between them and complete
al-Shabaab control of Mogadishu. AMISOM\’s aggressive
intercession on behalf of the TFG during the last major round
of fighting appeared to have convinced al-Shabaab that it
could not remove the TFG as long as AMISOM remained in
Mogadishu. President Sharif has used the comparative lull
that followed to build bridges to potential allies and
re-configure his government.
Contacts with Puntland
———————-
4. (C) Although we had pressed the TFG to establish strong
ties with the Puntland Authority from the day Sheikh Sharif
became President, it had been reluctant to make the necessary
overtures. Puntland President \”Faroole\’s\” often-stated
unhappiness with President Sharif\’s selection of Sharmarke as
Prime Minister, and the lack of consultations with \”Faroole\”
that preceded the appointment of Darod clan members to the
expanded Parliament in January were responsible for the TFG –
Puntland rift. (Note: Sharmarke and \”Faroole\” are of the
same major clan, and \”Faroole\” believed he at a minimum
should have been consulted before President Sharif made his
choice of Prime Minister. The fact that President Sharif had
come to power at the expense of his Darod predecessor
Abdullahi Yusuf made consultation even more important in
\”Faroole\’s\” view. End note.)
5. (C) On May 15, our intercession resulted in a TFG Prime
Minister Sharmarke and Puntland President \”Faroole\” dinner in
Nairobi. That positive meeting never crystallized
cooperation between the TFG and the Puntland Administration,
however, and in the intervening months it appeared as if
Puntland might be charting a path toward greater autonomy,
like Somaliland. Just in advance of the August 7 meeting
with the Secretary, and more concentratedly since, President
Sharif pressed a reluctant Prime Minister Sharmarke to travel
to Puntland. A flurry of telephone calls during the week of
August 10 seems to have set the stage for Sharmarke\’s August
17 departure for Galkayo. (Note: The PM is scheduled to
remain in Puntland until August 20. Accompanying him is a
virtually all-Harti delegation that includes the Ministers of
Land and Air Transport, Industry, Post and
NAIROBI 00001771 002 OF 004
Telecommunications, Trade, Diaspora, and Constitutional
Affairs. End note.) The visit so far has resulted in an
invitation for President Sharif to visit Puntland from
President \”Faroole.\” The TFG\’s hope is that contacts will
ultimately produce military, security, and other forms of
cooperation that will improve its chances against its enemies.
Bringing in the Abgal
———————
6. (C) President Sharif\’s more conservative Islamic
credentials and his determination to form a trans-clan
government had caused him to ignore his own clan, the Abgal,
both in assembling his Cabinet and in courting possible
allies for his government. (Note: Sharif until the August 17
re-shuffle (ref d) was the only Abgal in his sprawling,
37-minister Cabinet. End note.) One by-product of Sharif\’s
refusal to work actively with the Abgal was the humiliating
loss of Mogadishu Abgal districts to al-Shabaab during
fighting that began May 7. The Abgal districts of Medina,
Karaan, and Abdi Aziz fell, as local Abgal clan militias
refused to defend their turf on behalf of the TFG.
7. (C) At the urging of Ambassador to Kenya Mohammad Ali Nur
\”Americo,\” himself an Abgal, Sheikh Sharif has dramatically
increased outreach to his clan. Since the beginning of
August, he has met key Abgal leaders at Villa Somalia, and on
August 7, the President presided at an all-afternoon session
with key Mudulood representatives in Nairobi. (Note: The
Mudulood comprise the Abgal, Isse, Wadalan, Hilife, and
Hawadle sub-clans. End note.) Negotiations with the Abgal
have resulted in representatives of two key Abgal sub-clans
being brought into the government. Abdirahman Omar Osman
\”Engineer Yarisow\” (Hawiye/Abgal/Wadubhan) has been slotted
for a newly-created Ministry of Treasury and Dahir Gelle
(Hawiye/Abgal/Waesle) steps in behind Farhan Ali Mohamud
(Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Duduble) as Minister of Information.
8. (C) Sheikh Sharif\’s outreach to the Abgal has quickly
borne fruit. We have been told by Abgal/Waesle contacts in
south Galgaduud that Waesle elder Sheikh Ahmed recruited a
significant number of clan militiamen who pushed al-Shabaab
out of the south Galgaduud town of Galcad on August 11 – 12.
The TFG chartered an aircraft to airlift 17 of the most
seriously wounded Waesle to a Mogadishu hospital in order to
reinforce government engagement. The TFG is now working
strenuously to transport ammunition to the Waesle in order to
repulse an expected al-Shabaab counterattack. We believe
that the ammunition will be airlifted to Galcad at TFG
expense on August 20.
Reaching Out To Juba
——————–
9. (C) Former TFG Minister of Defense \”Gandi\” in recent weeks
has stepped up efforts to implement a TFG-backed Juba
offensive, aimed at pushing al-Shabaab out of Kismayo and
creating links between an evolving Juba administration and
the TFG (ref b). \”Gandi\” reports that the TFG is in contact
with local players in Juba, including Ogaden clan
heavyweights Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri, in an effort to
reconcile differences and obtain their cooperation. \”Gandi\”
said President Sharif and Prime Minister Sharmarke fully
support the plan, which remains closely held within the TFG.
10. (C) \”Gandi\’s\” efforts take place against the backdrop of
recent meetings in Juba and Nairobi between supporters of
Madobe and Shukri and predominantly-Darod/Kabalah clan
leaders and MPs. Their goal is a regional Jubaland
administration, linked to the TFG. Our contacts tell us a
27-person Steering Committee has been formed for Jubaland,
but arguments remain over who will fill key positions.
\”Gandi\” told us he has full confidence in Shukri\’s commitment
to the TFG but described Madobe as a \”complex\” but militarily
necessary participant. Darod/Kabalah leaders told us the day
Madobe captures Kismayo he will have to announce that he is
part of and/or supports the TFG or he will lose clan support.
Ogaden leaders reportedly believe that Ogaden-led control of
Kismayo will translate into greater Ogaden representation in
the TFG at the ministerial level and that political
negotiations regarding a greater Jubaland to include Gedo
should for now remain unaddressed. Although formidable
challenges remain for a would-be Jubaland administration,
such as whether or not Gedo region should be included, TFG
efforts to gain support of key players in Lower Juba and
willingness to consider support for the creation of a
NAIROBI 00001771 003 OF 004
Jubaland state are positive developments. (Note:The TFG
Charter and Djibouti process outcomes call for forward
movement on decentralization but the TFG had in the past
shown little willingness to link to regional administrations.
End note.)
TFG – ASWJ Cooperation
———————-
11. (C) The TFG has stepped gingerly into cooperation with
Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama\’a (ASWJ). Initially, it feared that
ASWJ\’s battlefield successes and political aspirations in the
central regions and ASWJ\’s suspicions of Sheikh Sharif\’s
alleged \”wahabiist\” leanings meant that ASWJ was determined
to supplant the TFG at the center of the Djibouti process.
ASWJ, which in initial conversations with USG officials and
the TFG was alleging that its victories over al-Shabaab
entitled it to the TFG presidency, did little to dispel TFG
fears. ASWJ military setbacks and persistent overtures by
the TFG produced a June 21 signed TFG – ASWJ agreement which,
gradually, has produced real cooperation.
Success in Hiraan
—————–
12. (C) TFG Minister of National Security \”Sanbaloshi\”
(Hawadle) and other TFG officials since late July have
remained in close contact with leaders in Beledweyne and
elsewhere in the Hiraan region to ensure that the gains of
July 26 were not reversed. They have stepped up cooperation
with Ethiopian-backed ASWJ forces in the region (ref c).
(Note: According to President Sharif, the TFG has provided
financial support to the tune of $100,000 to ASWJ-Hiraan.
End note.) TFG-aligned forces on July 26 managed to take
control of Beledweyne town in Hiraan region. Police General
Mukhtar Hussein Afrah (Hawiye/Hawadle) led a successful push
into Beledweyne\’s western half on July 26, where Islamists
reportedly had held sway. On August 20, al-Shabaab-initiated
fighting for the control of Beletweyne resumed. We believe
that with the assistance of nearby ENDF troops, TFG-aligned
forces should retain control of the town. As of August 19
TFG-aligned forces from Beledweyne were closing on the town
of Bulaburde, where there was reportedly fierce fighting on
August 20. Another by-product of increased TFG assertiveness
in Hiraan region has been Hisbul Islam (HI) defections.
During the weekend of August 14, an estimated 53 armed HI
soldiers and three commanders defected to the TFG. There
have also been defections in Mogadishu, many of them from
al-Shabaab.
Advances in Gedo
—————-
13. (C) The strategic town of Luq in Gedo region on August 19
fell to pro-TFG forces a few days after the border town of
Beled Hawa was taken by joint TFG-ASWJ forces in the region.
Our contacts tell us that five TFG MPs as well as Bay,
Bakool, and Gedo governors worked together with local
Rahanweyn and Marehan clan militia to push Hisbul Islam out
of Luq. On August 17 TFG troops from Dolow worked with
Rahanweyn and Marehan clan-based ASWJ forces to consolidate
control of Beled Hawa. While both Luq and Beled Hawa have
since been surrendered to Hisbul Islam, their brief seizure
by pro-TFG forces have shown that Hisbul Islam is vulnerable
in Gedo.
Renewed Engagement
With the Media
——————
14. (C) The TFG appears to have redoubled its efforts to
engage effectively with the media to promote TFG policy
goals. The Foreign Minister reacted quickly and
comprehensively to the August 13 killings of five Pakistani
nationals in Puntland. On August 16, the newly-launched TFG
website covered a press conference at which a TFG spokesman
lauded ASWJ,s weekend victories in Galgadud region, a
positive step in promoting TFG – ASWJ cooperation. These and
other examples mark a noticeably improved media outreach
effort by the TFG. Not coincidentally, Post sent two media
advisors to Mogadishu from July 23 – August 3 to work with
TFG public affairs personnel and institutions. The advisors
spent much of the time coaching the TFG,s personnel in
subjects like identifying priority issues for media attention
and coordinating public outreach among TFG entities. TFG
officials, to include the President and Prime Minster, were
NAIROBI 00001771 004 OF 004
very supportive of the assessors and have indicated that they
are eager to maintain the momentum resulting from the visit
and U.S.-associated continued engagement. In the August 18
Cabinet re-shuffle, President Sharif removed his Minister of
Information, who he believed was under-performing.
Cabinet Re-shuffle
——————
15. (C) Although far from perfect (septel), a sweeping
cabinet re-shuffle (ref d) has re-shuffled ministers who have
been either off-message, ineffective, or AWOL during the
TFG\’s tenure. Although some ministers who are equally liable
to charges of not actively advancing the TFG\’s agenda remain
in place, the shake-up could put them on notice that they
must perform if they are to keep their jobs. Sheikh Sharif\’s
dramatic decision to re-shuffle the deck went against the
advice of some who believed that sweeping changes should not
be attempted when the government was under stress, and is
further evidence of the President\’s new determination to make
progress.
Parliament Shake-Up
——————-
16. (C) The TFG\’s determination to purge underperformers has
hit the Parliament as well. On July 27, following a speech
by Sheikh Sharif, five AWOL MPs were expelled from Parliament
and a further forty-nine warned that they must return to
Mogadishu and participate in the plenaries or face a similar
fate (ref e). Among those expelled in the first tranche were
several persistent critics of the TFG. Although the 54 MPs
cited are a minority of the estimated 125 MPs who are almost
permanently absent, the warnings and expulsions are evidence
of the TFG\’s intention to force MPs to take their
responsibilities seriously. (Note: At present, there are 548
deputies in the transitional Parliament. On the day of the
July 27 session, 301 of the estimated 350 MPs in Mogadishu
attended the plenary. End note.)
Recommendations and Comment
—————————
17. (C) With its recent burst of activity, the TFG is
attempting with some success to capitalize on positive
developments in the regions. It still faces an uphill
struggle, which could be complicated by an announced Hisbul
Islam/al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive, but its prospects are
significantly better than they were just a few short weeks
ago. USG support, if provided rapidly and appropriately
calibrated to TFG needs, could greatly enhance the TFG\’s
chances. In order to aid the TFG\’s efforts to take advantage
of this opportunity, I recommend that PKO monies currently
available be spent, where possible, for civil affairs efforts
that could show the TFG delivering services to Somalis in
territories it controls. Where possible, the TFG\’s Price
Waterhouse Cooper mechanism should be used in effecting these
transactions. Key TFG ministries should urgently be provided
with advisors, preferably from the Somali diaspora, in order
to help them rapidly build capacity and discharge their
functions. We believe that robust youth employment programs
in areas controlled by the TFG would go a long way over the
short term in building good will and attracting potential
defectors. Rapidly re-starting local administration
capacity-building programs is also essential. Micro-lending
or micro-grant programs in areas under TFG control could
further increase goodwill toward the government and aid local
economies. A small grants or self-help-like program could
pay outsize dividends in Somalia\’s impoverished regions. If
the TFG succeeds in establishing stable control over the
central regions, recognition of the government should be
considered. Septel will provide more detailed
recommendations for consideration.
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PTER, SO, AE, QA
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – PRESIDENT SHARIF ON THE GULF,
AL-SHABAAB, AND US RELATIONS
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4(b,d).
——-
Summary
——-
1. (C) On September 2, Ambassador Ranneberger and the
Mission\’s Somalia Unit met with Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and
four TFG ministers in Nairobi. Sharif said on his visit to
Qatar and Dubai he made progress toward achieving his goal of
ensuring Qatar\’s neutrality on relations with certain
extremists. The UAE government pledged to support the TFG
and Sharif asked for U.S. help in securing this assistance.
Sharif discussed distinct groups within al-Shabaab, including
some with links to al-Qaida and described his efforts to
neutralize the terrorist group by drawing away certain
individuals. He said that al-Shabaab is losing strength as
most Somalis now question its legitimacy. The TFG President
discussed outreach to the regions and the difficulties of
mounting a coordinated operation to route al-Shabaab
(developments in the Juba region will be reported septel).
Sharif reported that the Prime Minister\’s trip to Puntland
renewed engagement and the TFG is talking with Somaliland
about common security concerns. Sharif said the cabinet
reshuffle yielded mixed results and intimated that he might
reduce the cabinet\’s size and recruit ministers with greater
capacity. Sharif said that, following up on his meeting with
the Secretary, he hopes for a more robust U.S.-Somalia
partnership, including an additional tranche of funds to
support the security sector. He told the Ambassador he plans
to lay out his priorities for U.S.-Somalia engagement in New
York and Washington at the end of September when he attends
the U.N. General Assembly. End Summary.
——————————-
Productive Visit to Gulf States
——————————-
2. (C) The Ambassador met with Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in
Nairobi on September 2. The TFG President was en route to
Mogadishu after visiting Qatar and Dubai. President Sharif
appeared confident and was in excellent spirits. Also in
attendance was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, newly appointed Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ahmed Jama Ali Jangeli, Minister of Land and
Air Transportation Mohamed Abdi Mohamed \”Gandi,\” and Somali
Ambassador to Kenya Mohamed Ali Nur. The delegation returned
to Mogadishu the morning of September 3.
3. (C) Sharif told the Ambassador that his visit to Qatar
and UAE was \”productive\” and that he met with Qatari
leadership to secure their neutrality. \”They want us to
engage in talks with al-Shabaab, but produced no coherent
proposals to that effect,\” Sharif said of Qatar. The
President did not say if he and the Qataris had discussed an
outstanding Arab League pledge of funds. He asserted that
Qatar is not fully aware of the situation in Somalia and the
negative role Hassan Dahir Aweys has played, but that after
the discussions, Qatar has a better appreciation.
4. (C) Sharif said he would possibly engage in talks with
elements of al-Shabaab, but only within a broader context of
outreach to all Somalis. The President insisted that any
negotiations must occur within Somalia, not outside the
country. While Sharif doubted Qatar could \”deliver\” Aweys or
key members of al-Shabaab, he is planning to send a technical
team back to Qatar to assess the specific proposals they have
in mind. Sharif said that one cannot always accomplish a
goal in the first or even second round of talks and seemed
hopeful that he could still gain Arab League support without
the strings of reconciliation with extremists. Sharif also
clarified that he would not talk with terrorists or the worst
extremist elements of al-Shabaab.
5. (C) Sharif emphasized the excellent meetings he held in
Dubai with representatives of the Somali diaspora and
business community. He told the Ambassador that he had
productive meetings with UAE officials who confirmed their
support for the TFG. The UAE government pledged its
assistance and Sharif said he believes the UAE will honor its
NAIROBI 00001860 002 OF 003
pledges. He asked the Ambassador to ensure that the United
States use its close relationship with the UAE to follow up
on these pledges of support. We noted our earlier efforts to
persuade delinquent Brussels pldging conference donors to
come through for the TFG, and promised to keep up the
pressure.
——————————–
Al-Shabaab: Fracturing the Group
By Targeting Distinct Elements
——————————–
6. (C) In response to the Ambassador\’s question about
pulling support away from al-Shabaab, Sharif described a
definite distinction among its discrete groups. Sharif said
that some within the most committed al-Shabaab have foreign
training and links with al-Qaida. While this is the smallest
group within al-Shabaab, many are from Afghanistan and other
foreign countries. In contrast, he said most of the native
Somali Shabaab supporters have been pulled in \”by emotion\” or
economic reasons – they have no other options to sustain
them. He said there are others who genuinely question the
legitimacy of the government and have real concerns about the
direction the country is taking. Sharif said these latter
groups are being targeted by the TFG to pull them from
al-Shabaab and that many are now questioning the legitimacy
of the extremist group. Sharif said the ideological, \”real\”
al-Shabaab from abroad have foreign ideas and will never be
swayed by negotiations. The TFG President said that others
could potentially be included in discussions and their needs
addressed.
——————-
Regional Engagement
——————-
7. (C) President Sharif said that Prime Minister Omar
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke,s visit to Puntland \”changed our
relationship with Puntland.\” Sharif thanked the Ambassador
for U.S. efforts to encourage both sides to come together.
Sharif said he plans to visit the region personally after the
end of Ramadan. The Ambassador replied that we will continue
pushing Puntland to improve its cooperation with the TFG.
Sharif told the Ambassador the TFG has also initiated
behind-the-scenes talks with Somaliland on security-related
issues. He said the conflict with al-Shabaab requires a
coordinated effort with the understanding that no single
regional entity would be able to confront the onslaught of
al-Shabaab on its own.
8. (C) The TFG strategy to confront al-Shabaab is to create
a coordinated, multi-region, cross-clan front against
al-Shabaab. The President said peace-building efforts by
ministers from the regions were the TFG,s first step. To
that end, the late Security Minister Omar Hashi was murdered
rallying the people of Hiran. When the Ambassador asked
Sharif about developments in Jubaland, the TFG President
turned to Former Defense Minister, now Transport Minister
Mohamed \”Gandi\” to reply. Gandi remains charged with
building reconciliation and engineering an anti-Shabaab
effort in Gedo and Lower Juba, per septel. President Sharif
said the TFG is sending teams of TFG officials from Ethiopia
through both the Gedo and Galguduud regions to assess the
current condition of resources and heighten coordination on
the ground. President Sharif said only simultaneous actions
in all regions will succeed against al-Shabaab.
——————–
Cabinet Shift Yields
Mixed Results
——————–
9. (C) On the recent cabinet reshuffle, President Sharif
expressed slight frustration with the results. He said that
he and PM Sharmarke made the move partially to preempt clans
from developing feelings of ownership over specific
portfolios, and to soothe certain clans\’ feelings of
dissatisfaction at being excluded from the cabinet (Note:
Sharif appointed two Abgal to ministries, likely as a sop to
that clan.) However, he and the Prime Minister have found
that the various clans remain dissatisfied. Sharif noted
that it is his job to help the Prime Minister in constituting
NAIROBI 00001860 003 OF 003
an effective cabinet. He mused that since a larger cabinet
still evoked such clan unhappiness, he and the Prime Minister
might as well reduce the size of cabinet, keeping only the
most effective ministers.
———————–
Cementing the Bilateral
Relationship
———————–
10. (C) President Sharif said he wants to arrive in New York
for the United General Assembly (UNGA) on/about September 21.
He said he hopes his meeting with the Secretary will yield
increased assistance from the United States, including funds
for the security services. Sharif made a specific and strong
appeal for another urgent tranche of funds to help sustain
TFG troops and support security operations. The Ambassador
assured Sharif that we were working to get the funds to him
expeditiously. The Ambassador said that, in addition to
continued U.S. security sector support, together we should
intensify planning so that, as the TFG expands its authority,
the U.S. and TFG can work together to show results to the
Somali people.
11. (C) While in the United States for UNGA, Sharif said he
wants to define more clearly the U.S.-Somalia relationship,
meeting with as many U.S. officials as possible, and possibly
going to Washington for meetings with the USG, Congress, and
others. Sharif also mentioned that he would like to travel
to key areas of the U.S. to meet with the Somali diaspora.
He told us it is time to show the Somali people some tangible
results on the ground from our bilateral relationship. The
United States\’ investment in Somalia now will yield Somali
gratitude and a strong relationship in the future, he
asserted.
12. (C) Sharif emphasized that his presentation in New York
will focus on priority sectors: security, humanitarian, and
ministerial capacity building in order to provide services.
In addition, the TFG is cognizant of the need to focus on
transitional tasks over the coming two years – a challenge
given the security situation. Sharif said that the
challenges are great as Somalia was literally re-building
from the ground up. President Sharif agreed with us that his
UNGA delegation should be composed of his best people with
detailed plans of needs and objectives.
——-
Comment
——-
13. (C) With a possibly weakened al-Shabaab, a lull in
fighting in Mogadishu, and fresh from a trip to the Gulf,
President Sharif was confident and upbeat. He articulated
TFG priorities in a clear, coherent way. In a positive sign,
Sharif demonstrated that he has delegated important tasks to
his ministers, especially outreach to the regions. If Sharif
does indeed travel to Puntland, it could signal a new chapter
in their relationship. The Ambassador encouraged the TFG
President to come to New York with a detailed plan of action.
In the interim, it is important that we provide an
additional tranche of financial support through the
PricewaterhouseCoopers accountability mechanism.
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SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, EAID, PTER, SO, KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – TFG PRESIDENT ON RECRUITMENT IN KENYA
AND POLITICAL OUTREACH
REF: A. NAIROBI 1244
B. NAIROBI 2169
C. NAIROBI 2141
D. NAIROBI 1795
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).
1. (C) Summary: TFG President Sheikh Sharif met with the
Ambassador and Somalia Unit as he ended his travels to Saudia
Arabia, the United States and Libya. President Sharif told
us he recognized the need for a vigorous political strategy
to complement his security forces\’ efforts to seize the
initiative in Mogadishu and the regions. He repeated an
oft-heard pledge to reach out especially to Ahlu Sunna Wal
Jamma. We expressed concern about reports the TFG is
recruiting refugees from northeast Kenya, as part of a larger
TFG-Kenyan plan to challenge al-Shabaab in the Juba region.
The President promised to investigate and end the practice if
it is occurring. The media spotlight on the recruitment may
sap Kenyan and TFG willingness to continue with the
recruitment. End Summary.
2. (SBU) The Ambassador and emboffs met with Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed, Foreign Minister Ali Jama Jangeli, Finance Minister
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden on October 16. Sharif and his
delegation were returning from what he termed a \”great
opportunity\” to meet U.S. officials and the Somali diaspora
in Washington, New York, Minneapolis and Chicago.
3. (C) Turning immediately to the security situation,
Sharif said he sees this as a moment of opportunity and
clarity. The Islamists are divided and feuding with each
other. At the same time, it is clear the TFG security forces
need leadership, training, equipment, facilities, including
courts, and salaries to meet the challenges facing them. The
President said he wanted to complement the security strategy
with political outreach, including to anti-Shabaab Islamic
group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma (ASWJ). The government would
implement its June 2009 mutual support agreement with ASWJ,
he said (reftel A).
4. (C) The Ambassador told President Sheikh Sharif we were
disturbed by reports young Somalis were being recruited from
northeast Kenya, including from the Dadaab refugee camp, to
join anti-Shabaab forces in Somalia\’s Juba region (reftels B,
C). The Ambassador noted we were not supporting the Kenyan
\”Jubaland\” initiative. Sharif said he was also concerned
about recruitment in Kenya. Kenya-TFG planning for a Juba
offensive had never envisioned recruiting Somali refugees and
migrants from Kenya. \”No one should be recruited from the
camps, and we will correct it if it happened,\” President
Sharif said. Note: It is unlikely the TFG and Kenya will
find large numbers of credible forces inside Lower Juba that
are not already engaged in the fight for Kismayo. While
Ogadeni clan leader and Hizbul Islam commander Ahmed
Madobe,s efforts to purge al-Shabaab from Kismayo may not be
successful, we think a push to take Kismayo that does not
include Madobe,s Darod/Kabalah alliance would almost
certainly fail and could spark intra-Darod conflict, likely
to strengthen al-Shabaab. End Note.
5. (C) President Sharif stated that the original plan,
which called for Kenya to train TFG-appointed liaison
officers to help organize resistance to Shabaab in Juba, was
still a good one. In order to right the effort, the
President said he would transfer responsibility for the plan
from Minister of Transport Mohamed Abdi \”Gandi\” to Minister
of Defense Abdullah Boss Ahmed. President Sharif said that
he was not fully confident that Madobe would join the
government if he succeeded in pushing Shabaab from Juba. In
any case, Madobe was showing himself to be a warlord
bargaining for power, the president said.
6. (C) President Sharif said his political agenda included
outreach to the regions and to the non-violent opposition.
On this issue, he said he hoped to take up the Rwandan
president\’s recent offer to host influential Somalis for
discussions on how Rwanda had reconciled itself from the
genocide. He also said he hoped to \”reorganize\” the
government, but didn\’t indicate when. He pledged to continue
NAIROBI 00002203 002 OF 002
official visits to the semi-autonomous Puntland region, and
to implement an agreement signed between the TFG and Puntland
administration in September (ref D).
7. (C) Comment: We were struck by President Sharif\’s
unequivocal pledge to honor the TFG\’s June agreement with
ASWJ. The TFG\’s previous promises to support ASWJ have gone
partially or wholly unfulfilled. ASWJ\’s influence in the
regions continues to grow, and ASWJ leaders still ask us to
persuade the TFG to cooperate with them. With regard to
Juba, the media attention on recruitment around Dadaab could
very well sap Kenya\’s willingness to continue hosting the
reportedly large numbers of Somali refugees/migrants while
they train for some now-undefined future action in Juba.
Coupled with Sharif\’s expression of doubt about Ahmed
Madobe\’s bona fides, it seems increasingly unlikely any TFG
recruits would be sent to aid Madobe, who is the most
significant challenger to al-Shabaab. End Comment.
RANNEBERGER
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, EAID, EPET, SO, UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON\’S MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MUSEVENI
REF: A. KAMPALA 01055
B. KAMPALA 00979
C. KAMPALA 01196
D. KAMPALA 01271
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Aaron Sampson for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(C) Summary: President Museveni urged the African Union
mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to go on the offensive, said the
Lord\’s Resistance Army (LRA) was \”finished\”, and expressed
support for revitalizing the Tripartite Plus process during a
meeting with Assistant Secretary Carson and other senior USG
officials on October 24. Museveni acknowledged the crucial
importance of free, fair and peaceful presidential elections
in February 2011, and dismissed concerns about the partiality
of Uganda\’s Electoral Commission and the need for electoral
reform. Museveni also discussed Uganda\’s relations with
Southern Sudan, promised to \”discourage\” the author of
legislation that would criminalize homosexuality from moving
forward with the bill, and assured the Assistant Secretary
that Uganda would use its impending oil revenues wisely. End
Summary.
————————————
Somalia and AMISOM: Let\’s Get Moving
————————————
2. (SBU) President Museveni met with Assistant Secretary
Carson, Ambassador Lanier, Africa Command Commander General
Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Huddleston, and
USAID/Uganda Director Eckerson for two and a half hours on
October 24 in Entebbe. Also present were Minister of Defense
Crispus Kiyonga, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sam Kutesa,
acting Minister of Finance Ruth Nankabirwa, Chief of Defense
Forces General Nyakairima Aronda, and MFA Permanent Secretary
Ambassador James Mugume.
3. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson delivered a letter from
President Obama expressing condolences for the September 17
attack on AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu that killed
several Ugandan soldiers, praised Uganda as central to the
survival of Somalia\’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG),
and assured President Museveni of continued U.S. support for
Uganda\’s contribution to AMISOM. Assistant Secretary Carson
said the U.S. is encouraging TFG President Sheikh Sharif to
make the TFG more inclusive, more focused on service
delivery, and better able to amplify its message to the
Somali people. The U.S. is also pressing other countries to
provide troops and financial support to the TFG and AMISOM,
and is leaning on Qatar to curb assistance to Eritrea.
4. (C) President Museveni said Uganda remains fully committed
to the mission in Somalia, but that AMISOM\’s presence does
not equal a solution, and the status quo cannot continue
indefinitely. He warned that prolonged paralysis will
undermine confidence in the TFG and said AMISOM should either
\”move forward or get out.\” To this end, Museveni recommended
increased funding and equipment for both the TFG and AMISOM
to push extremists out of Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and any
town with an airstrip or a seaport. He said Uganda was ready
to provide additional forces to AMISOM, and expressed
confidence that with additional manpower AMISOM could push
extremists into the \”bush.\” Museveni also said the TFG
should articulate an electoral time-line as a means of
boosting confidence in the government and providing a
political mechanism for resolving internal conflict.
5. (C) Museveni praised TFG President Sheikh Sharif –
observing that he is young, flexible, willing to engage in
dialogue without precondition, and is easier to work with
than his predecessor – but said Sheikh Sharif needs a
political movement to build an army around. Museveni was
unaware of Kenyan plans to create a buffer zone in Jubaland,
and agreed that this is a non-starter with the potential to
further balkanize Somalia and upset Ethiopia. The President
attributed the Jubaland idea to Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi
and said Qadhafi would like to break up Somalia.
——————-
The LRA is Finished
——————-
6. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson praised Uganda\’s pursuit of
the LRA through the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Central African Republic (CAR). He encouraged Uganda to
accelerate development in northern Uganda, noting that the
other side of military action against the LRA is developing
KAMPALA 00001276 002 OF 003
the north to stave off the emergence of any successors to
Joseph Kony. Proclaiming that the LRA is \”finished,\”
Museveni said the LRA cannot return to Uganda and that the
Ugandan military (UPDF) will soon finish the job if it is
allowed to continue operations in the DRC and CAR. Museveni
assured Assistant Secretary Carson that northern Uganda will
recover and rebound from decades of war and instability.
—————
Tripartite Plus
—————
7. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson commended Uganda\’s
continued rapprochement with neighboring Rwanda. He
recommended revitalizing the Tripartite Plus process to bring
together leaders from DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and key
observer partners like the U.S. and the EU to discuss
regional stability, security, economic integration, and
development for the Great Lakes region. He noted that
Special Advisor Wolpe is traveling to Uganda in November to
discuss Tripartite Plus and expressed hope that Wolpe would
be able to meet with Foreign Minister Kutesa. Museveni said
Uganda and Rwanda have resolved previous differences over the
DRC, and agreed that revitalizing tripartite plus is a good
idea. He said Uganda\’s relations with Rwanda and the DRC are
good, but that when they meet Uganda does not discuss
anything beyond its specific bilateral relationships with
these Great Lakes neighbors. There is therefore a demand for
a reinvigorated Tripartite Plus process.
————–
2011 Elections
————–
8. (C) Turning to the February 2011 presidential elections,
Assistant Secretary Carson stressed the importance of free,
open, and transparent elections. He urged President Museveni
to give the opposition political space and open the electoral
process to outside observers to ensure local and
international credibility. Museveni claimed the opposition
already enjoys ample political space but, just like
\”terrorists in Somalia,\” has no agenda and therefore no
ability to attract support. Referring to the closure of
radio stations and suspension of journalists following the
deadly September 10-12 riots in Kampala (ref. A), Museveni
said Uganda has 132 radio stations and seven television
stations, and that Ugandans are free to hold political
meetings at anytime and anywhere. He said the only electoral
reform needed before 2011 is the computerization of the
national voter registry to eliminate double registrations
entered by the opposition.
9. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson said that an impartial
Electoral Commission representative of the interests of the
nation is critical. Museveni described the Electoral
Commission Chairman as \”very unpolitical\” and said only two
commission members were previously affiliated with political
parties and one of these belonged to the opposition. He
allowed, however, that there is a proposal to add additional
members to the Commission. NOTE: Several members of Uganda\’s
partisan Electoral Commission have overt ties to the ruling
NRM party (ref. B). Opposition parties are demanding a new
Electoral Commission as a prerequisite for participation in
the 2011 election (ref. C). END NOTE.
—–
Sudan
—–
10. (C) Museveni asked the U.S. to pressure Khartoum to
implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and warned
that \”a lot of problems\” will result if the CPA fails.
Describing himself as a \”victim\” of Sudan, Museveni said
Sudan\’s \”nomadic\” search for new mediators is an avoidance
tactic and invited Special Envoy Gration to visit Uganda. He
also recommended Gration liaise closely with the Chairman of
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
Assistant Secretary Carson promised to relay this information
to Gration. He also briefed Museveni on our new Sudan
strategy paper and our commitment to the CPA. Museveni said
Uganda is providing Southern Sudan with limited assistance,
to include some military and police training, but that
Southern Sudanese civil servants lack the capacity to
effectively run a state and require urgent administrative and
judicial training.
———————–
Anti-Homosexuality Bill
KAMPALA 00001276 003 OF 003
———————–
11. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Carson also raised the issue of
\”anti-homosexuality\” legislation recently tabled in
Parliament. The draft bill, which is not sponsored by the
Ugandan government, criminalizes homosexuality with proposed
sentences ranging from imprisonment to, in some cases, death
(ref. D). Recognizing that homosexuality is a difficult
topic for Ugandans, Assistant Secretary Carson said the issue
attracts a great deal of international attention and that
passing this legislation will result in condemnation for
Uganda.
12 (SBU) Apparently unaware of the proposed legislation,
Museveni said Uganda is \”not interested in a war with
homosexuals\” and asked who was responsible for drafting the
\”anti-homosexuality\” bill. When informed of the author by
acting Finance Minister Nankabirwa, Museveni exclaimed: \”But
that\’s a member of our party! We shall discourage him. It
will divert us.\” Museveni explained that Ugandans used to
ignore homosexuality, blamed the legislation on western
\”advocacy\” groups who call homosexuality a human right, and
asked how Uganda should respond to the homosexual recruitment
of young people. Assistant Secretary Carson noted that
sexual exploitation of minors – whether hetero or homosexual
in nature – was morally reprehensible and should be
criminalized. Museveni agreed that criminalizing
homosexuality between consenting adults \”is going too far\”
and said Uganda should instead focus on protecting children
from sexual exploitation.
————————–
Oil: Uganda is Not Nigeria
————————–
13. (C) After closing the meeting and presiding over the
ceremonial signing a $245 million USAID assistance package,
Museveni invited the entire delegation back into the
Presidency to discuss Uganda\’s newfound oil reserves.
Museveni said there is no chance of oil becoming a curse for
Uganda because Uganda will use impending oil revenues in five
carefully defined areas: (1) to develop durable renewable
energy sources such as hydroelectric power; (2) to
rehabilitate rail lines; (3) to support higher education; (4)
to spur high tech scientific research; and (5) to improve
Uganda\’s road network.
——-
Comment
——-
14. (C) Museveni was engaged and animated throughout the two
and a half hour discussion, particularly when it came to
military and economic matters. He repeatedly said that
AMISOM needs to move forward, but stressed Uganda\’s
commitment to the mission and willingness to provide
increased assistance. Museveni was surprisingly out of touch
on key political issues. He was unaware of the highly
publicized \”anti-homosexuality\” bill, but provided positive
direction once apprised of the details by the acting Minister
of Finance and the Assistant Secretary. His dismissal of
criticism of the Electoral Commission as much ado about
nothing is less reassuring, as is his continued insistence
that computerizing voter registries to remove ghost voters
allegedly introduced by the opposition is the only electoral
reform necessary for 2011.
LANIER
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RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE”,”S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001280
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, MCAP, SO, UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON\’S MEETING WITH
SOMALIA TFG PRESIDENT
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Aaron Sampson for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: Somalia\’s Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) President Sheikh Sharif said AMISOM must retaliate
against extremists or risk losing popular support in
Mogadishu, and asked the U.S. to pressure Egypt, the European
Union, and others to honor commitments to support the TFG.
He added that the TFG is trying to take advantage of
infighting between al Shabaab and Hizbul al Islam but is in
desperate need of financial support to strengthen its
political and military effectiveness. President Sharif
discussed Kenyan plans to create a \”buffer zone\” in Jubaland,
and Assistant Secretary Carson cautioned him against the
recruitment of Somali soldiers from the Dadaab refugee camp
in northeast Kenya. The Assistant Secretary said the U.S.
stands behind President Sharif and will continue to support
the TFG both directly and through Burundi and Uganda. He
also promised to follow up on Egyptian and European Union
pledges of support for the TFG. End Summary.
————
TFG Security
————
2. (S) TFG President Sheikh Sharif, Foreign Minister Ali Jama
Jangali, State Minister for Presidential Affairs Hassan
Moalin Mohamud Ali, and Somali Ambassador to Uganda Sayid
Ahmed Sheikh Dahir met with Assistant Secretary Carson,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Huddleston, and
Ambassador Lanier on October 24. TFG leaders had traveled to
Kampala to attend the October 19-23 African Union Special
Summit for Refugees, Returnees, and Internally Displaced
Persons (septel). Referring to the deadly September 17
attack on AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu and the October 22
attempt to target his aircraft as it departed Mogadishu for
Kampala, President Sharif said he does not believe that al
Shabaab has someone inside the TFG. He noted that the runway
in Mogadishu is open, making it impossible to conceal
movements of his airplane.
——————————————
Taking Advantage of Extremists\’ Infighting
——————————————
3. (S) Sharif said fighting between al Shabaab and Hizbul al
Islam has given the TFG breathing room to rebuild the Somali
army, and that the TFG is taking advantage of this by sending
some officers for additional training. The TFG is also
considering replacing some military commanders with more
effective officers. Fighting between extremists has boosted
the TFG\’s image among the Somali people by showing that
extremists have no agenda beyond fighting, killing, and
slaughtering civilians, and has enabled the TFG to attract
new supporters. The TFG is also making inroads within Hizbul
al Islam, which Sharif said is not as ideologically extreme
as al Shabaab.
——————————————
TFG Political Effectiveness: We Need Money
——————————————
4. (S) Assistant Secretary Carson encouraged President Sharif
to expand the inclusiveness of his government across clan,
sub-clan, and regional lines to bring in as many moderate and
thoughtful voices as possible. Assistant Secretary Carson
also encouraged the TFG to continue to push its message of
peace, stability, moderation and the creation of a new
Somalia, and said the U.S. is moving forward with plans to
amplify the TFG\’s voice by supporting a TFG radio station in
Mogadishu. He stressed the importance of delivering services
to the Somali people, and urged the President to look for
ways to provide services such as health care, schools, and
books in areas under TFG control. The Assistant Secretary
said the U.S. stands ready to provide books, teaching
materials, and/or health clinic supplies.
5. (S) President Sharif said the TFG has made great strides
in spreading its message and is trying to decentralize
government to give local people greater and more direct
control. To this end, the TFG plans to replace unqualified
local administrators with new \”decent\” officials capable of
leading local governments. Sharif described local government
officials in Mogadishu as \”incapable of running a city.\” He
said the TFG is also reaching out to Puntland, that his Prime
Minister recently visited Puntland, and that the TFG will
KAMPALA 00001280 002 OF 003
soon invite Puntland officials to Mogadishu in the hope of
working cooperatively. Sharif acknowledged rumors of an
impending cabinet reshuffle, but said his main focus is
addressing the challenges of local administration and the
reorganization of security forces. He said that Somali
forces need refresher training as his forces often act more
like militias due to prolonged service in combat zones. A
battalion of 600 troops is currently training in Djibouti.
Another 700 troops are receiving training in Uganda.
6. (S) Describing the TFG as in \”great financial stress,\”
President Sharif said the TFG owes USD 700,000 in medical
bills in Nairobi, that TFG soldiers had not been paid for
four months, and that there is no money for the salaries of
Parliamentarians or some Ministers. Foreign Affairs Minister
Jangali added that the TFG is counting on a European Union
promise of budget support. He said the TFG needs about USD
9-10 million per month and that the EU is prepared to provide
USD 6 million. The remainder will come from within Somalia,
although the security situation renders it difficult to raise
money domestically. Jangali asked the U.S. to speak to the
EU about the proposed budget support, and said that the TFG
is missing immediate opportunities to obtain the support of
the Somali people, the international community, and other
African governments due to lack of funds. Assistant
Secretary Carson said the U.S. would follow up with the EU
and its foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, through our
Mission in Brussels this week.
——————————————— –
TFG Military Effectiveness: We Need More Money
——————————————— –
7. (S) President Sharif expressed confidence that with
additional equipment the Somali army would prevail over
poorly armed enemy forces. He urged the international
community to support AMISOM and the TFG in tandem so that the
two forces could work together. Sharif described the
difference in capabilities between AMISOM and the TFG as huge
and said that, in comparison, the TFG has but a fraction of
what AMISOM possesses. He said the TFG wants to go on the
offensive in cities it controls but cannot due to lack of
capability. He warned that the relatively equal strength
levels of the TFG and enemy forces only prolonged the
suffering of the Somali people and, if ignored, would
exacerbate the situation.
—————————-
Public Perceptions of AMISOM
—————————-
8. (S) President Sharif said the Somali public supports
AMISOM and acknowledged with gratitude that AMISOM forces
have suffered casualties to save Somalia. He said
catastrophe would follow were AMISOM to suddenly withdraw.
He also warned that AMISOM and the international community
need to find a way for AMISOM to respond to enemy
provocation. Sharif reported that the AU\’s Commissioner for
Peace and Security had told him that AMISOM\’s mandate allows
it to attack enemy enclaves, and that AMISOM troops have
recently begun retaliating – a move supported by the TFG.
Sharif said if AMISOM doesn\’t retaliate, the enemy will claim
that AMISOM cannot protect civilians. He said the local
population would welcome an offensive by AMISOM. President
Sharif also reported that both Burundi and Uganda are willing
to increase their assistance to AMISOM but need logistical
support to do so.
——————————————–
International Assistance: Promises, Promises
——————————————–
9. (S) Assistant Secretary Carson asked President Sharif if
the TFG has received assistance from Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
other Gulf or Middle Eastern states, or the Arab League.
Sharif said some governments have made promises but so far
nothing has materialized. He asked the U.S. to pressure
other governments to live up to their commitments. Foreign
Minister Jangali said Italy is one of the few countries that
has fulfilled its promise to the TFG. Assistant Secretary
Carson said the U.S. has and will continue to pressure states
that have promised to support the TFG to honor these
commitments. He promised to take up this issue with Egypt\’s
senior leadership and the Arab League while in Cairo this
week, and urged the TFG to continue to push partners to live
up to their commitments.
KAMPALA 00001280 003 OF 003
————————
Kenya, Egypt and Eritrea
————————
10. (S) President Sharif said he shared U.S. concerns about
Kenyan plans to create a buffer Jubaland force. He described
the introduction of any forces outside of TFG control as an
unwelcome development. He also agreed that recruitment of
potential TFG soldiers should not occur within the UN\’s
Dadaab refugee camp in northeast Kenya as this would
politicize refugee camps and undermine the UN\’s ability to
manage them. Sharif said he has already spoken to the
relevant people to ensure no recruitment occurs within the
camp.
11. (S) Assistant Secretary Carson said he was going to Cairo
via Nairobi and asked Sharif if the Egyptians are playing a
useful role, or doing things that were unhelpful. Sharif
said Egypt\’s support is crucial for the TFG and that it is
difficult for him to say definitively whether Egypt is
playing a constructive role. He expressed concern about a
recent exchange of visitors between Egypt and Eritrea. He
said he spoke with the Egyptian Minister of Social Affairs
during the October 19-23 AU Summit in Kampala and expressed a
desire to visit Cairo to discuss these issues. Sharif said
the TFG needs U.S. support vis-a-vis Egypt.
12. (S) President Sharif raised reports of the capture of two
Eritrean operatives along the Somali-Kenyan border. He said
these individuals are now in Kenya and suggested taking
advantage of this development to promote sanctions against
Eritrea and convince those still sympathetic to Eritrea that
the Eritreans are indeed involved in \”dirty business\” in
Somalia. Assistant Secretary Carson said the U.S. is aware
of just one Eritrean in Kenyan custody but said he would
raise this issue in Nairobi.
———————-
Continued U.S. Support
———————-
13. (S) Assistant Secretary Carson assured President Sharif
that the U.S. stands behind the TFG. He said the U.S. will
continue to provide support both directly and through Uganda
and Burundi. The Assistant Secretary also said the U.S.
would follow up with Egypt, the Arab League, and the EU
regarding specific promises of support, and will continue to
pressure states to honor their commitments to the TFG.
LANIER
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN PM CONSIDERING PRO-ACTIVE OPTIONS ON
ERITREA, SUPPORTS KENYA\’S JUBALAND INITIATIVE
ADDIS ABAB 00002817 001.4 OF 004
Classified By: CDA Roger Meece for reasons 1.4 b/d.
1. (C) SUMMARY. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told visiting
AF/DAS Wycoff and CDA on November 19 that he wanted to give
the USG a \”heads up\” that Ethiopia was considering actively
supporting armed Eritrean opposition groups if the
international community fails to take action to isolate
Asmara. Wycoff questioned providing such support, noting the
USG,s interest in regional stability. On Somalia, Meles said
the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has recently informed Kenya
of its support in principle for Kenya\’s Jubaland initiative
and has agreed to share relevant intelligence. On Ethiopia\’s
forthcoming elections, Meles pledged that the rule-of-law
would be the bedrock that both assures free and fair
elections and deals with any groups that seek to undermined
the process. He complained that Diaspora money has too much
influence in determining the relative strengths of opposition
parties, although he added that implementation of a law
restricting foreign funding of NGOs would allow for
exceptions on a case-by-case basis. When asked, he justified
the continued imprisonment of opposition leader Bertukan
Midekessa as necessary to demonstrate that Ethiopia has no
\”twilight zone\” between the legal and the illegal. After
expressing understanding for the ramifications of further
inaction, Meles said he would look into apparent GoE-imposed
obstacles to delivery of U.S. military equipment and supplies
as well as re-examine the GoE,s stance on Leahy vetting
requirements.
2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED. Wycoff agreed that Eritrea has
shown no signs of changing its behavior but suggested that
the broadening discussion of sanctions, including Ambassador
Rice\’s personal involvement at USUN, has caught the attention
of Eritrean President Isaias. Wycoff added that the USG has
worked to undercut support for Eritrea, including his own
visits to Gulf countries to enlist their support in such
activities as well as their active support for Somalia\’s
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). He said the U.S. is
opposed to Kenya\’s so-called Jubaland initiative, given the
complexities of Somalia. Our concern is that efforts to
implement such an initiative would backfire causing even
greater instability. On the elections, he said the USG
recognizes the signing of a preamble to an electoral code of
Conduct as a valuable step and would be looking now to the
orderly registration of political parties and individual
candidates. He also advocated that all parties, including
the government, should work to create an environment that was
conducive to the participation in the elections process by
all other parties. He said the U.S. views the role of civil
society as crucial to democracy and that it was natural for
the USG to promote the role of non-governmental organizations
in Ethiopia. The Charge noted that DAS Wycoff,s visit was
intended as a signal of USG intent to follow up substantively
on the November 5 bilateral talks in Washington to intensify
U.S.-Ethiopia relations on several fronts. He also told
Meles of his forthcoming departure from Post. Wycoff held an
on-the-record press conference with domestic and
international press, where he highlighted the comprehensive
nature of the bilateral agenda and USG concerns about the
reduction of political space and the importance of a free and
fair elections process in Ethiopia. END SUMMARY.
3. (SBU) Visiting AF/DAS Karl Wycoff and CDA Meece met with
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for 90 minutes on
November 19. Meles was joined by Chief of Cabinet Birhanu
Adelu. The USG was also represented by pol/econ counselor
and deputy counselor.
Ethiopia Looking at More Pro-Active Options on Eritrea
——————————————— ———
4. (C) Prime Minister Meles raised Eritrean misbehavior
several times. He said Ethiopia is convinced that Eritrea
realizes it cannot destabilize Ethiopia before the latter\’s
May 2010 elections and so has decided to target its
destabilization efforts for the period just after the
elections. (NOTE: The 2005 Ethiopian elections themselves
were relatively calm, but post-election tensions stemming
from vote-counting disputes triggered violence and widespread
government reprisals. END NOTE.) He said Ethiopia\’s response
to Asmara\’s efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, Somalia and,
more recently, Djibouti and Yemen has been almost exclusively
passive but added that he wanted to give us a \”heads up that
we are looking at options.\” He said, \”We would be happy to
stand down if developments outside the area obviate the need
to become more pro-active.\”
5. (C) Making clear what international community actions
ADDIS ABAB 00002817 002.4 OF 004
would persuade Ethiopia to stand down, Meles expressed
particular disappointment that the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) has not taken action to impose a sanctions
regime on Eritrea. He urged the U.S. to redouble sanctions
efforts and especially to reconsider targeting remittances as
what he called a \”key instrument\” for pressuring Asmara.
Citing as examples his own Amcit, ethnic-Eritrean cousins, he
said, \”If the U.S. were to insist that paying taxes to Asmara
is a felony, it would be easier for them to resist the tax.
The Diaspora could say, \’We can\’t pay you.\’\”
6. (C) DAS Wycoff questioned providing support to Eritrean
anti-government armed groups, noting the USG,s interest in
regional stability. Wycoff agreed there is no evidence that
Eritrea has showed improvement in its behavior, although he
added that President Isaias had recently undertaken something
of a charm offensive targeted at European diplomats, a
possible indication that he may be considering options.
Wycoff assured Meles that the U.S. remains committed to
achieving a UNSC sanctions regime against Asmara and
continues to broaden the discussion beyond the P3 and Uganda
with a hard push by USUN. He said the USG was also expanding
efforts to undercut support for Asmara, noting for example he
been sent on a trip to Cairo, Riyadh, Jeddah and other cities
both to promote efforts to undercut flows of support to
Asmara but also to seek concrete support for Somalia\’s TFG.
He said he has observed that some EU member states, formerly
more supportive of Eritrea, have come to accept that Eritrea
is playing a seriously negative role in the region and that
the UK now believes that Eritrea has become a significant
threat to its own domestic security.
7. (C) Pressed by Wycoff to describe the \”pro-active\”
measures being considered, Meles said one option would be to
directly support opposition groups that are capable of
sending \”armed propaganda units\” into Eritrea Meles said
that the groups with the most capability to operate inside
Eritrea are those \”that you don\’t like from the lowlands,
like the Keru\” who he said would be \”much better able to
survive in Eritrea.\” (NOTE. The Keru are a primarily Muslim
ethnic group most of whose members live in Eritrea, although
a minority live in Ethiopia. END NOTE.)
Somalia: Ethiopia Offers Kenya Support on Jubaland Policy
——————————————— ————
8. (C) PM Meles revealed that the GoE recently held meetings
with Kenyan officials regarding Kenya\’s Jubaland initiative
involving the training in Kenya of ethic Somalis to return to
Somalia\’s south in order to fight Al-Shabab. He said that he
understood that A/S Carson had pressed Kenya to brief
Ethiopia on this Kenyan initiative after it had been broached
with the USG. Meles stated his thanks to the A/S for his
role in ensuring that Ethiopia was consulted on this
sensitive issue. He said the GoE had offered support in
principle for the initiative and had offered to share
relevant information, especially in connection with the
vetting of ethnic Ogaden recruits. Wycoff stated
unequivocally that the USG thought this initiative was a bad
one and that it held more risk of worsening Somalia,s
stability than helping. Wycoff also noted that Kenya had
little experience in executing such initiatives. Meles
agreed with Wycoff\’s concern that Kenya has no history of
successfully implementing this kind of program and has shown
no evidence of the political will necessary to sustain the
initiative, especially in the complex constellation of clans
found in southern Somalia. Wycoff said the USG finds it more
likely that the initiative would backfire and has expressed
this concern at multiple levels of the Kenyan government.
Meles said he shares this concern and added another — Kenya
seems to have the money to launch the initiative but not to
sustain it, a concern he said he had felt it prudent not to
express to the Kenyans. Nevertheless, he is impressed that
Kenya has done a good deal of groundwork to prepare the
initiative and said frankly that Ethiopia wants to ensure
that the Ogaden National Liberation Front does not benefit
from the training, an eventuality he feels Ethiopian
involvement could help obviate.
9. (C) DAS Wycoff made clear that the U.S. does not consider
Kenya\’s initiative to be productive at this point and intends
to stay away from it. He urged Meles to consider that the
TFG has achieved some tenuous viability because it is to a
large extent home-grown rather than imposed from outside
Somalia. Meles countered that the TFG must move forward or
it will sooner or later move backwards. He said many
observers are alleging that TFG President Sharif is a Wahhabi
Muslim, but he has decided Sharif deserves the benefit of the
ADDIS ABAB 00002817 003.3 OF 004
doubt. Less personally, he believes the Kenyan initiative
presents a pragmatic opportunity to support the TFG and he
intends to embrace it because the alternatives to the TFG —
Al-Shabab, Hisb al-Islam, etc. — are much worse. As a
bottom line, he said he believes the Kenyan program could
weaken extremists in Somalia.
10. (C) Meles said the TFG\’s primary problem is lack of cash
in that the $400 million pledged by donors in Brussels and
elsewhere is being used to finance NGOs in the region instead
of paying TFG troops. He complained that neither the Saudis
nor the Gulf States are giving money. He said the U.S. alone
is directly financing the TFG and is keeping it afloat. Some
internationals, he continued, want to start the Djibouti
Process over again — a sentiment he understands given the
waste of resources committed by the previous TFG president
but dismisses as counterproductive today. He said the TFG is
developing a budget and that IGAD intends to help raise the
funds needed. He urged the U.S. to push other donors to make
direct contributions as we have done. Wycoff noted that the
USG has also pressed the TFG to develop a budget, transparent
budget process, and focus on developing a capability to
govern, including providing services.
11. (C) Wycoff acknowledged that Ethiopia will have a role to
play in Somalia, including in facilitating a TFG-Al Sunna Wal
Jamma alliance (ASWJ), but urged Meles to play its role with
discretion in order to avoid Ethiopian involvement serving as
a recruiting tool for Al-Shabab. Wycoff added that the U.S.
is also urging the TFG to form a strategic alliance with
ASWJ.
Rule of Law to Deal with Those Who Would \”Discredit the
Process\”
—————————————-
12. (C) Wycoff acknowledged that U.S. and Ethiopian officials
had held \”fulsome discussions\” in Washington on November 5-6
and characterized his visit as a clear signal that the USG
would follow up aggressively across the full range of
bilateral issues. He said he would be meeting with key
actors in the Ethiopian electoral process — including the
National Election Board of Ethiopia, the minister of
communication, and opposition party leaders — and would urge
them all to facilitate full engagement in the process.
Wycoff noted that it was incumbent on all parties to create
an atmosphere that was conducive to participation in the
elections by all other parties. Wycoff praised the signing
by four major political parties, including Meles\’ ruling
EPRDF, of a preamble to an electoral code of conduct as a
positive step, adding that the U.S. would be very attentive
during the imminent \”crunch time\” for the legal registration
of political parties and individual candidates. He told
Meles the U.S. views the role of civil society as very
important to the democratization process and expressed
concern about recent Ethiopian legislation that would limit
the capacity of Ethiopian civil society groups that receive
foreign funding to engage in political advocacy and conflict
mitigation.
13. (C) Meles straightforwardly defended the legislation,
saying Ethiopia also welcomes the role of civil society but
suggesting that Ethiopia defines it a bit differently than
does the U.S. He said civil society groups should be
domestic and should be funded domestically, from the members
of the groups themselves and other Ethiopian citizens. He
added, however, that once the ongoing re-registration process
concludes for domestically funded groups, waivers from the
new law\’s funding restrictions will be considered for other
groups on a case-by-case basis. Wycoff replied that the U.S.
would be watching this registration process closely and urged
Meles to consider a flow of money between the American people
and the people of African nations, including Ethiopia, to be
a natural consequence of the role of civil society and
relations between our peoples.
14. (C) Meles pointedly criticized the Ethiopian Diaspora,
especially its U.S. members, for launching \”a massive
campaign to ostracize opposition parties who take part in the
process.\” Obviously referring to the continuous involvement
in the code of conduct talks of the opposition \”All Ethiopian
Unity Party,\” Meles said, \”One party changing its view
doesn\’t mean there aren\’t tougher nuts to crack.\” He said,
\”We will assume that all political parties participating in
the elections are doing so legally, but the rule-of-law will
apply and those parties looking only to discredit the process
will be addressed.\”
ADDIS ABAB 00002817 004.2 OF 004
15. (C) Wycoff raised the continued imprisonment of
opposition leader Bertukan Midekessa, and Meles replied at
length. Recounting the familiar history that Bertukan had
joined in a group request for pardon after convictions
stemming from the violent aftermath of the 2005 elections,
Meles characterized her later disavowing of the pardon
request as an attempt \”to prove there is room in Ethiopia to
operate in a twilight zone between the legal and the illegal,
and we had to prove her wrong.\” He said he had \”expressed
frustration\” with European Union representatives recently
because, in his view, they insist on reacting in just the way
Bertukan wants rather than persuading her that she need not
be in prison.
Meles Open to Expediting Military Supplies,
Less Helpful on Leahy Vetting
——————————————–
16. (C) Wycoff announced that AFRICOM Commanding General Ward
and DASD Huddleston would soon be arriving in Ethiopia in
follow-up to the November 5 talks and suggested that the U.S.
would like to dispense with two problems, apparently of a
procedural or technical nature, before those visits. Wycoff
explained the nonwaivable Leahy Vetting requirements that
must be met before the U.S. can provide training or equipment
to foreign militaries, assured Meles there is no U.S. attempt
to direct equipment to particular individuals or units, and
said there nevertheless seems to be a reluctance on the part
of the GoE to allow that vetting. Charge Meece explained
that shipments of military equipment were backlogged in
Djibouti because the names of Ethiopian National Defense
Force (ENDF) officers to whom the equipment would be
delivered had not been submitted to the USG for Leahy
vetting. Meece described the second problem as another
backlog in Djibouti, this time involving a cement shipment,
destined for a DOD project in the Ethiopian town of Arba
Minch, that is languishing for lack of Ethiopian paperwork.
17. (C) Meles said he would investigate the Leahy vetting
obstruction, but added that the problem is likely that
Ethiopia sees the DOD/ENDF cooperation as institutional
rather than personal and may be further compounded by the
fact that the equipment is likely not assigned by the ENDF to
particular units. He asked whether the equipment could be
transferred to a second unit, after being delivered to a
first, at ENDF discretion. Wycoff replied that vetting
requirements, once met, might not preclude such transfers but
would have to be addressed on the basis of each specific
case. He was aware of cases where such equipment transfers
had been approved in other countries.
18. (C) On the Arba Minch issue, Meles said, \”We\’ll see if we
can find a shortcut.\” (Note: On November 20, Meles advisor
Birhanuto called CDA to suggest that the embassy submit a
note verbal on the matter directly to the minister of
finance, bypassing the ministry of foreign affairs, and said
that the problem should then be solved. End Note.)
19. (C) CDA Meece ended the meeting by assuring Meles that
the U.S. hopes to intensify relations with Ethiopia on
several fronts relating to defense, elections, intelligence,
and more. He also announced his own forthcoming departure
from Post. Wycoff noted that the gap in having a permanent
Ambassador in Addis was purely a matter of assigning the best
possible person to the job and should not be perceived as a
political signal of any kind.
20. (SBU) Wycoff held an on-the-record press conference with
domestic and international press, where he highlighted the
comprehensive nature of the bilateral agenda and USG concerns
about the reduction of political space and the importance of
a free and fair elections process in Ethiopia.
21. (SBU) DAS Wycoff cleared on this message.
MEECE
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FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
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INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001389
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/10
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, PTER, KE, SO, ET, DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN MINISTER STRONGLY BACKS TFG AT
IGAD MINISTERIAL
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum strongly backed
the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in both remarks
made at the December 7 – 8 Djibouti IGAD ministerial, and in a
December 7 meeting with AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff.
Seyoum urged strong USG leadership on Somalia. He criticized
France for temporizing on sanctions against Eritrea. The Ethiopian
Foreign Minister enthusiastically welcomed the TFG\’s 2010 budget,
especially its strategy for funding about twenty percent of it from
its comparatively meager revenues. The GoE, Seyoum said, had
delivered a \”tough\” message to Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama\’a, telling it
that there would be no Ethiopian support if it did not cooperate
with the TFG. German-sponsored TFG police training was underway.
Seyoum said that the GoE would train its tranche of 800 TFG police
in counterinsurgency tactics. End summary.
——————————————— ———————-
—
Seyoum Scores French Wobbling on Eritrea Sanctions
——————————————— ———————-
—
2. (C) Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin opened a long, very
positive meeting on the margins of the December 7 – 8 Djibouti IGAD
ministerial with AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Karl Wycoff by
stressing the need for USG leadership on Somalia. He criticized
what he characterized as France\’s willingness to \”appease
al-Shabaab\” in an effort to free its remaining hostage in Mogadishu
by refusing to support sanctions against Eritrea. Eritrean
President Isaias, Seyoum said, was a master at exploiting such
opportunities to stay afloat, and it had to stop. Wycoff noted
that the U.S. would continue to push for the strongest possible
UNSC resolution.
——————————————— ———————-
———————————–
FM Says IGAD Will Form Ministerial Committee to Solicit Funds for
the TFG
——————————————— ———————-
———————————-
3. (C) While acknowledging that \”no country can throw its money
into a black hole,\” Seyoum urged strong international community
financial support for the TFG. The government is weak, he said. It
needed not just benchmarks, but help in reaching those benchmarks.
Wycoff noted that the U.S. was working with its partners to try to
strengthen the capacity of the TFG and stressed that transparency
and accountability were key to garnering donor support and
beginning the process of developing capacity to govern.
4. (C) The FORMIN said that IGAD planned to do what it could to
help the TFG. Seyoum and his colleagues in IGAD had discussed the
creation of a \”small ministerial committee\” that would \”sensitize
selected capitals\” to the TFG\’s needs. Seyoum had been heartened
by the TFG\’s 2010 budget, which had been presented by TFG Deputy
Prime Minister Sharif Hassan at the December 7 session of the IGAD
ministerial. He maintained that the TFG\’s intent to finance twenty
percent of its annual budget from its meager port and airport
revenues was a gesture of good faith, and he thought that perhaps
supplemental funds could be provided by members of the League of
Arab States.
5. (C) DAS Wycoff reviewed examples of USG leadership in working
towards Somalia\’s stability, including support for the Djibouti
Peace Process (DPP), AMISOM and the TFG. He noted that USG support
for the TFG in the security area, included budget support,
ammunition, and support to training of TFG combatants. He also
noted that it was equally important to focus on the DPP and the
effort to broaden the base of support for the TFG and find a
DJIBOUTI 00001389 002 OF 003
political approach that would stabilize Somalia. He noted for
instance that the USG was pushing the TFG to do better on the
public diplomacy and outreach front to the Somali people and had
provided material support to this effort. He reiterated that the
USG had been a strong and consistent proponent of transparency and
accountability for the TFG, noting that this was important in its
own right but also key to promoting donor support to the TFG.
Implementation of the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) financial
mechanism was crucial in this regard. Wycoff noted USG engagement
in this area and our efforts to promote use of the PWC mechanism,
Wycoff also reiterated his belief that it was important that
Ethiopia keep as low a profile as possible in Somalia.
——————————————— ———————-
———–
Ethiopia Alleges It Pushes ASWJ Cooperation with the TFG
——————————————— ———————-
———–
6. (C) Wycoff reiterated USG support for the DPP and the need for
the international community to support and promote Somali-led
efforts to accomplish political reconciliation and focus on the
political aspects of stabilizing Somalia in parallel with the
security track of building TFG military capability. The Ethiopian
Foreign Minister reviewed for DAS Wycoff the latest GoE dealings
with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama\’a (ASWJ). ASWJ, he said had pushed
recently for an \”arms-length\” relationship with the TFG and had
openly hoped that the TFG \”would go away.\” The Ethiopian
government, Seyoum said, then told ASWJ that it would not
cooperate, if ASWJ did not cooperate with the TFG. ASWJ would
receive GoE support only if it cooperated fully with the TFG and,
eventually, joined the government. Seyoum believed that those in
the ASWJ diaspora were \”attempting to manipulate ASWJ on the
ground.\” Seyoum believed that a decision to back the TFG would be
taken by ASWJ at the one-year anniversary commemoration of its
decision to fight al-Shabaab. If there is an agreement to back the
TFG, the GoE, Seyoum said, would proceed with plans to train 400
ASWJ fighters in Ethiopia.
——————————————— —————
German-Sponsored Police Training Underway
——————————————— —————
7. (C) According to Seyoum, the German-sponsored training of 800
TFG police was underway in northeastern Ethiopia. He believed that
recruits would be sent to the same site from Somalia\’s Hiraan
Region, as well. The training will be low-key, Seyoum said, and
would last approximately six months, although the recruits could
return earlier, if necessary. In addition to standard police
training, the recruits would receive counterinsurgency training in
order to prepare them for the environment they would encounter in
Somalia. These and similar training efforts were the most that the
GoE was willing to do at this point. There would be no further
armed incursions, and Seyoum could not imagine a set of
circumstances that would \”bring us in\” to Somalia. Wycoff urged
that this training be done to UN standards so that UNDP could
provide salary and other support after the return to Mogadishu,
which was crucial to continued functioning this force in Somalia\’s
difficult environment. Seyoum confirmed that Ethipian intended to
keep a low provide in Somalia.
——————————————— ———————-
—-
Ethiopia Skeptical about Kenya\’s Lower Juba Initiative
——————————————— ———————-
—-
DJIBOUTI 00001389 003 OF 003
8. (C) Wycoff raised the question of Kenya\’s plans for a \”Jubaland
initiative\” and reiterated U.S. opposition to this effort. Seyoum
agreed that the Kenyan government\’s plans to prepare a force for an
invasion of Lower Juba would \”complicate\” matters there. The GOK,
he said, continued to believe it could create a buffer zone.
Trained troops, Seyoum noted, were a double-edged sword; they could
always be turned against Kenya. Seyoum worried that the Kenyan
effort might backfire. In mid-November, he had cautioned Kenyan
President Kibaki to be careful. DAS Wycoff told Seyoum that
Assistant Secretary Carson had told the highest levels of the GOK
that the USG opposed the Kenyan initiative and that we would
continue to press this position.
——————————————— —————-
Djibouti – Eritrea Tension On Ethiopia\’s Radar
——————————————— —————
9. (C) DAS Wycoff noted that the U.S worked to promote stability in
the HOA and opposed cross border activities that would lead to
instability. Seyoum told DAS Wycoff that Ethiopia was watching the
Djibouti – Eritrea border dispute closely. Djibouti was a
\”lifeline\” for Ethiopia, he said, and there are limits to what
Isaias will be allowed to do. Seyoum worried that Eritrea was
preparing Afar pastoralists for use in an effort to de-stabilize
Djibouti. While Ethiopia did not want war, he said, it could not
afford to see its supply route from the port of Djibouti disrupted.
Wycoff repeated U.S. opposition to nefarious cross-border
activities.
————–
Comment
————–
10. (C) Seyoum was as bullish about the TFG, but less critical of
the international community than Kenyan Foreign Minister Wetangula
had been in his meeting with DAS Wycoff (septel). The GoE\’s
initial skepticism about this TFG seems to have evaporated
completely. Earlier efforts to search for a potential alternative
among the ASWJ factions seem to have yielded little for Ethiopia
and, with no obvious alternative on the horizon, the GoE seems to
have decided that the TFG can be made to work if it, and the rest
of the international community, get strongly behind it.
12. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.
SWAN
Raw – Jubaland 2
10082
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FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1117
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA FWD
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SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/10
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, PTER, KE, SO, ET, DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: KENYAN FOREIGN MINISTER PUSHES LOWER JUBA
INITIATIVE
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: During a December 8 meeting on the margins of the
Djibouti IGAD ministerial visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary
Wycoff and Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Wetangula agreed to
continue to work together to promote stability and political
reconciliation in Somalia. DAS Wycoff told Wetangula that the USG
continued to strongly oppose the Kenyan \”Jubaland\” initiative as a
bad idea that would more likely add to Somalia\’s instability than
to help stabilize the country. Wetangula defended GOK plans to
pursue its Jubaland (southern Somalia) initiative, implied that it
was in evolving concept, and offered to facilitate better USG
understanding of Kenya\’s plans. He also urged, as he had in
interventions at the ministerial, international community support
for the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Wycoff
agreed and highlighted the importance of supporting the Djibouti
Peace Process (DPP) and efforts to promote political
reconciliation. When the subject was raised, Wetangula excluded
further expansion of the teeming Dadaab refugee camp in
northeastern Kenya, which he said had received 12,000 refugees in
November. The Foreign Minister took a hard line on Eritrea. He
told DAS Wycoff that he had rebuffed efforts by the visiting
Eritrean Foreign Minister to solicit support for a new Somalia
reconciliation process. The Kenyan government had expelled
Eritrean diplomats that Wetangula thought had played a role in the
mid-September suicide bombing attack on AMISOM in Mogadishu.
Wycoff reviewed USG efforts to engage, both positively and
negatively, with Eritrea, and effect a change in its behavior. End
summary.
——————————————— ——————-
Jubaland Initiative: FM Urges USG Participation
——————————————— ——————-
2. (C) Visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Karl Wycoff opened a
December 8 meeting with Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula on
the margins of the Djibouti IGAD ministerial by recounting USG
support for the DPP and the TFG. He also forcibly underscored USG
concerns about reports that the GOK was recruiting and training an
ethnic Somali force as part of a \”Jubaland\” initiative. DAS Wycoff
told Wetangula that concerns which Assistant Secretary Carson had
expressed to Wetangula and other members of the Kenyan leadership
remained, and he urged Wetangula to re-consider the Kenyan
initiative.
3. (C) Wetangula defended the initiative by noting that it was an
evolving concept and that Kenya had carefully coordinated every
aspect of it with the TFG. He acknowledged that \”some excited
Kenyan military officers\” had \”bungled the earlier phases\” of the
planned operation, but that planning was back on track. The GOK
hoped that the \”strong Jubaland,\” which would result from a
successful, Kenyan-backed effort to defeat al-Shabaab in southern
Somalia, would \”cage in the Hawiye.\” The plan, he said, \”seemed
feasible to the TFG.\” The plan had been difficult to implement,
Wetangula said. Prominent, ethnically Somali Kenyan politicians,
including Kenya\’s Deputy Speaker, were strong al-Shabaab supporters
who saw any effort to weaken al-Shabaab as an \”Ethiopian plot.\”
Wetangula alleged that the ethnically-Somali politicians had worked
behind the scenes to recruit al-Shabaab sympathizers from the
Dadaab refugee camp in order both to spy on and undermine the
planned Kenyan initiative. When Wycoff reemphasized USG
opposition, Wetangula offered to facilitate contact in Nairobi that
would give the USG an understanding of Kenyan planning and that
might reassure the U.S. side that the plan made sense. Wycoff
accepted the offer of further information but noted that USG
concerns remained.
4. (C) Wetangula predicted success for the initiative. Al-Shabaab
was weak, he insisted, recalling that Ethiopian troops had marched
into Mogadishu in December 2006 \”like a hot knife through butter.\”
USG criticism should be accompanied by other ideas, he said, noting
that \”I sincerely believe that good ideas should give way to better
ideas.\” In any event, Wetangula thought that the GOK could \”no
longer afford to sit on the sidelines.\” The prospect of a serious
terrorist attack in Nairobi was increasing every day. Wycoff noted
DJIBOUTI 00001391 002 OF 003
the importance of implementing the DPP and making progress on the
political reconciliation front at the same time that we worked to
improve the TFG\’s security forces.
——————————————— –
TFG Needs More External Support
———————————————
5. (C) At various points in the conversation, Wetangula strongly
supported the TFG but argued, as he had publicly at the December 7
session of the IGAD ministerial, that it was handicapped by
insufficient international community support. He urged that the
USG provide the TFG with \”two or three armored vehicles\” so that
its leadership can safely engage with Somalis around Mogadishu. He
also thought that helicopters would be useful in intimidating
al-Shabaab. Picking up on an assertion which had been frequently
made at the IGAD ministerial, Wetangula alleged that only a tiny
fraction of the Brussels pledges to the TFG had been realized. The
GOK had given the TFG money from time-to-time, but it \”was not
rich.\” Only the West could provide the support needed by the
Somali government. He urged that the USG take the lead in
galvanizing the international community. Wycoff recounted USG
efforts both to provide direct support to the TFG, but also to
encourage its friends and allies to provide material and budget
support. HE also highlighted USG efforts to promote political
reconciliation and negotiations in support of the DPP. Wycoff also
pointed out that the U.S. was the primary provider of support to
AMISOM.
——————————————— ———————-
—————————–
Dadaab: No Possibility That Additional Refugee Camp Could be
Opened
——————————————— ———————-
—————————–
6. (C) In response to a question from DAS Wycoff, Wetangula
emphatically rejected the possibility of opening a fourth refugee
camp at Dadaab, in northeastern Kenya. He asserted that continuing
instability in Somalia had further increased refugee flows: Twelve
thousand refugees had crossed the border in November alone. He
urged that some of the refugees in Dadaab be transferred to the
Kakuma refugee camp, farther from the Somali border. About 12,000
refugees had been moved a few months ago, he said, and the Kenyan
military could be used to facilitate further such transfers. It
would be easier to control and monitor Somali activities at Kakuma,
which was further from the border and \”away from the action.\”
Wetangula told DAS Wycoff that he also believed at one time that
the Dadaab camp could be expanded, but extended discussions at
Kenyan Security Council meetings had since convinced him otherwise.
——————————————— ———————-
—————
Wetangula Alleges Continuing Eritrean Involvement in Somalia
——————————————— ———————-
—————
7. (C) Wetangula recalled for DAS Wycoff recent Kenyan difficulties
with Eritrea. The Eritrean Foreign Minister had just treated him
to \”the usual assertions\” that Eritrea was misunderstood by the
international community. On September 17, three Eritrean diplomats
had transited Kenya en route to Mogadishu, then back to Kenya. The
visits had taken place \”with the full complicity and knowledge\” of
the Eritrean Embassy in Nairobi. The Kenyan authorities had
deported two of the three diplomats, Wetangula said. He was
DJIBOUTI 00001391 003 OF 003
convinced that their travel was linked to the mid-September suicide
bombing attacks on AMISOM in Mogadishu.
8. (C) Wetangula sidestepped DAS Wycoff\’s suggestion that the
Eritrean diplomats\’ activities be publicized by the GOK. He would
continue to talk with EU countries so that they understood the
full, negative role Eritrea plays in the region.
9. (C) Wetangula also asserted that Eritrea continued to lobby
Tanzania and others for the launch of a reconciliation conference
to which Hisbul Islam\’s Hassan Dahir Aweys and others would be
invited. He planned to pressure his Tanzanian counterpart to
reject the idea. DAS Wycoff told Wetangula that the USG had
already urged Dar es Salaam to distance itself from the idea and to
focus its support on the DPP and the TFG.
——————————————— ———————-
———-
Kenya Willing to Expel or Freeze Assets of Somali Spoilers
——————————————— ———————-
———-
10. (C) In addition to Eritrea, Nairobi was home to Somalis and
others who were backing al-Shabaab. Wetangula repeated GOK
willingness to expel \”troublemakers\” from Kenya and/or to freeze
their assets if evidence about their activities were brought to his
attention. When pressed on the importance of the TFG operating in
a transparent and accountable manner, Wetangula agreed that
previous TFGs had been perceived as corrupt and noted that former
TFG Prime Minister Gedi had invested much of his ill-gotten gains
in Nairobi.
————–
Comment
————–
11. (C) During the December 7 – 8 IGAD ministerial, Wetangula
joined his IGAD counterparts in repeatedly backing the TFG and in
alleging that it was lack of international community support, not
TFG inertia, which was responsible for the lack of progress to
date. Wetangula endorsed the TFG\’s 2010 budget, which was
presented by TFG Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan during the
ministerial. He and the other ministers present termed it a great
improvement over the complete lack of financial transparency, or
worse, which had been characteristic of the TFGs of Prime Ministers
Nur \”Adde\” and Gedi. The IGAD ministers\’ unanimous, strong support
for the TFG seemed to visibly boost the TFG Foreign Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister, who were present, and contrasted
significantly with the criticism of Somalia\’s government that had
been the norm at preceding ministerials.
12. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.
SWAN
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN FM ON TFG AND ERITREA DURING WYCOFF VISIT
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2817
B. ADDIS ABABA 2877
C. ADDIS ABABA 2878
D. ADDIS ABABA 2880
E. ADDIS ABABA 2903
Classified By: Classified by CDA TMushingi for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Seyoum Mesfin highlighted to visiting AF/DAS Wycoff the
severe financial crisis facing the TFG, reiterating comments
made by PM Meles. He also noted that Somalia Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) President Sheik Sharif had said
during a recent visit that he would step down if it would
help to stabilize Somalia, implying that the Sharif was
extremely frustrated at his inability to garner needed
domestic and international support. On Eritrea, Seyoum
stated that President Isais would not change, but that
Ethiopia would not try to dissuade Europe or other nations,
including the United States from trying to engage the
Eritrean leader. Seyoum reported that Ethiopia planned to
attend the Sanaa Forum and to voice concern over Iran\’s
possible role in supporting Huthi insurgents in Yemen\’s
northwestern province. Turning to democracy and governance
issues, Seyoum stated that an opposition victory in the 2010
election would be a success for the ruling party because it
had created the institutions to allow such a transfer of
power to take place. Wycoff advocated for an fair elections
process and the creation of an open political environment
that enabled participation in the elections by all parties.
CDA also proposed that a USG-GOE working level group be
formed in Addis to focus on economic reform, investment, and
trade issues. Wycoff and CDA reminded the GoE of the
upcoming high-level military visits and followed up on Leahy
vetting and military supply issues raised with Prime Minister
Meles (Reftel A). End Summary.
2. (SBU) Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs Seyoum Mesfin
met with visiting AF/DAS Karl Wycoff and CDA Meece on
November 19 for 90 minutes. Seyoum was joined by his Chief
of Cabinet Mulugeta Zewdie, Americas Desk officer Tebeje
Berhe Shook and Assistant Spokesman Wahide Belay. The USG
was also represented Pol/Econ Deputy Counselor and Poloff.
TFG\’s Sharif Would Step Down to Stabilize Somalia
——————————————— ——
3. (C) In discussing the Somalia Transitional Federal
Government\’s (TFG) empty coffers, and largely mirroring the
comments Prime Minister Meles had made to DAS and CDA earlier
in the day (Reftel A), FM Seyoum said the TFG had not paid
the salaries of cabinet members or Parliamentarians for five
months, and that many legislators were living outside the
country as a result. He stated that Sheik Sharif had said
during a recent visit to Addis that he would be ready to step
down if it would help to stabilize Somalia. Seyoum added
that when current TFG leaders were in the opposition, at
least the League of Arab States supported them, but now that
they are in the government, there is no financial support
coming in from the Arab States. Wycoff reviewed U.S. efforts
to garner support from partners, including European and Arab
states, especially Gulf countries. On Kenya\’s \”Jubaland
Initiative\” and the recent visit by officials from Kenya\’s
Ministries of Security and Defense, Seyoum echoed points
raised by Prime Minister Meles (Reftel), and reiterated that
Ethiopia and Kenya had agreed to a coordination mechanism for
intelligence sharing and technical assistance. Wycoff
highlighted the U.S., strong opposition to this initiative
and to any cross border operations or interference that could
feed the risk of instability in the Horn.
4. (C) Wycoff noted that the USG had provided unparalleled
assistance to TFG President Sheik Sharif in terms of
diplomatic and direct budget support, training of combatants,
and provision of ammunition, when it was critically needed.
He emphasized that Somalia,s TFG is nested in the Djibouti
Peace Process and that the USG would continue to support that
process and encourage others to do so as well. At the same
time, he said the TFG must show accountability and
transparency in both its receipts and expenditures or else
donors will be unwilling to provide support and the
possibilities for good governance, key to the TFG,s
viability, will be severely reduced. He noted that the U.S.
has provided $500,000 for the Price Waterhouse Coopers
mechanism, but does not yet have the first report back.
ADDIS ABAB 00002905 002 OF 003
Seyoum: Eritrea\’s Isaiah will Not Change
—————————————–
5. (C) Turning to Eritrea, Seyoum responded to DAS Wycoff\’s
mention of a recent Eritrean \”charm offensive\” (probably in
response to the increased pressure being felt from the UNSC
sanctions deliberations) for a visiting EC delegation to
Asmara by saying \”President Isaias will not change. We know
him well. He is the State, the people, and the country.\”
Seyoum said that Ethiopia would not discourage the Europeans
or others from trying to engage the Eritrean leader. He
noted that the Obama Administration was one of the first to
attempt to do so. Seyoum reiterated the point made by Meles
(Reftel A) that Eritrean citizens are being held hostage by
Isais in having to pay a tax to the Eritrean government, and
appealed for the sanction regime being considered by the UN
to target the tax. He said that the draft sanction
resolution presented by the Africa group to the U.N. Security
Council is toothless and that such a diluted resolution would
be meaningless to Isais and that \”he would laugh.\” Wycoff
noted the U.S., intentions to achieve the strongest possible
resolution.
Iran\’s Support for Huthi
Insurgents in Yemen
————————-
6. (C) Seyoum raised Yemen and its issues with Huthi
insurgents in the northwestern area of Yemen, mentioning
Iran\’s possible role in supporting the insurgents. He said
he would be leading a delegation to the Sanaa Forum and
planned to express solidarity with Yemen, as well as send a
clear message to Iran. Seyoum admitted the message might not
mention Iran specifically, but asked that the USG pay
particular attention to this issue.
Opposition Win Would Be Success for Incumbent
——————————————— —
7. (C) DAS Wycoff raised the importance to the USG of human
rights, democratization, and good governance in Ethiopia and
urged that the government help to create conditions that
enabled participation for all political parties in the 2010
parliamentary elections. He noted the importance of working
out mutually acceptable ways to move forward with voter
registration, political campaigns, civic education, and media
access for all parties. Seyoum responded that
democratization is an uphill struggle and that the ruling
party will continue to try to encourage opposition parties to
join the process. He stated that if the opposition were to
win the election, he would consider it a success, because the
ruling party is the one that has \”built the process and
created the ballot and the institution to allow such a
transfer of power to take place.\” He stressed that the
government cannot afford violence.
Proposed Trade and Investment Working Group
———————————————
8. (C) CDA, in a follow-up to the Nov. 5 bilateral meetings
in Washington, proposed forming a USG-GOE working group in
Addis to focus on economic reform, trade, and investment
between the two countries. CDA reiterated the USG\’s desire
that this group remain at a working level in order to promote
idea sharing and brainstorming.
9. (C) CDA related his impending departure, and explained it
was a result of legal restrictions due to his retired status.
Seyoum noted that the Ethiopian Ambassador to the United
States Samuel would also be departing post, and would most
likely be replaced by a second temporary CDA.
Follow-Up on Leahy Vetting and Military Supplies
——————————————— ——
10. (C) DAS Wycoff announced that AFRICOM Commanding General
Ward and DASD Huddleston would visiting, as part of the
follow-up to the November 5 talks. Reiterating the issues
raised in the earlier meeting with PM Meles (Reftel A),
Wycoff explained the nonwaivable Leahy Vetting requirements
that must be met before the U.S. can provide training or
equipment to foreign militaries. He explained that shipments
of military equipment were backlogged in Djibouti because the
names of Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) officers to
whom the equipment would be delivered had not been submitted
to the USG for Leahy vetting. CDA Meece described the second
problem as another backlog in Djibouti, this time involving a
ADDIS ABAB 00002905 003 OF 003
cement shipment, destined for a DOD project in the Ethiopian
town of Arba Minch, that is languishing for lack of Ethiopian
paperwork. Seyoum asked if there had been a Note Verbal on
this issue. He said he would personally contact the Ministry
of Finance and the Prime Minister\’s office to sort the issue
out. (Note: Subsequent to the meeting post sent the
requested Note Verbal to the Ministry of Finance and the
issue was positively resolved.)
11. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.
10082
R 101325Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1114
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA FWD
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001389
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/10
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, PTER, KE, SO, ET, DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN MINISTER STRONGLY BACKS TFG AT
IGAD MINISTERIAL
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum strongly backed
the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in both remarks
made at the December 7 – 8 Djibouti IGAD ministerial, and in a
December 7 meeting with AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff.
Seyoum urged strong USG leadership on Somalia. He criticized
France for temporizing on sanctions against Eritrea. The Ethiopian
Foreign Minister enthusiastically welcomed the TFG\’s 2010 budget,
especially its strategy for funding about twenty percent of it from
its comparatively meager revenues. The GoE, Seyoum said, had
delivered a \”tough\” message to Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama\’a, telling it
that there would be no Ethiopian support if it did not cooperate
with the TFG. German-sponsored TFG police training was underway.
Seyoum said that the GoE would train its tranche of 800 TFG police
in counterinsurgency tactics. End summary.
——————————————— ———————-
—
Seyoum Scores French Wobbling on Eritrea Sanctions
——————————————— ———————-
—
2. (C) Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin opened a long, very
positive meeting on the margins of the December 7 – 8 Djibouti IGAD
ministerial with AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Karl Wycoff by
stressing the need for USG leadership on Somalia. He criticized
what he characterized as France\’s willingness to \”appease
al-Shabaab\” in an effort to free its remaining hostage in Mogadishu
by refusing to support sanctions against Eritrea. Eritrean
President Isaias, Seyoum said, was a master at exploiting such
opportunities to stay afloat, and it had to stop. Wycoff noted
that the U.S. would continue to push for the strongest possible
UNSC resolution.
——————————————— ———————-
———————————–
FM Says IGAD Will Form Ministerial Committee to Solicit Funds for
the TFG
——————————————— ———————-
———————————-
3. (C) While acknowledging that \”no country can throw its money
into a black hole,\” Seyoum urged strong international community
financial support for the TFG. The government is weak, he said. It
needed not just benchmarks, but help in reaching those benchmarks.
Wycoff noted that the U.S. was working with its partners to try to
strengthen the capacity of the TFG and stressed that transparency
and accountability were key to garnering donor support and
beginning the process of developing capacity to govern.
4. (C) The FORMIN said that IGAD planned to do what it could to
help the TFG. Seyoum and his colleagues in IGAD had discussed the
creation of a \”small ministerial committee\” that would \”sensitize
selected capitals\” to the TFG\’s needs. Seyoum had been heartened
by the TFG\’s 2010 budget, which had been presented by TFG Deputy
Prime Minister Sharif Hassan at the December 7 session of the IGAD
ministerial. He maintained that the TFG\’s intent to finance twenty
percent of its annual budget from its meager port and airport
revenues was a gesture of good faith, and he thought that perhaps
supplemental funds could be provided by members of the League of
Arab States.
5. (C) DAS Wycoff reviewed examples of USG leadership in working
towards Somalia\’s stability, including support for the Djibouti
Peace Process (DPP), AMISOM and the TFG. He noted that USG support
for the TFG in the security area, included budget support,
ammunition, and support to training of TFG combatants. He also
noted that it was equally important to focus on the DPP and the
effort to broaden the base of support for the TFG and find a
DJIBOUTI 00001389 002 OF 003
political approach that would stabilize Somalia. He noted for
instance that the USG was pushing the TFG to do better on the
public diplomacy and outreach front to the Somali people and had
provided material support to this effort. He reiterated that the
USG had been a strong and consistent proponent of transparency and
accountability for the TFG, noting that this was important in its
own right but also key to promoting donor support to the TFG.
Implementation of the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) financial
mechanism was crucial in this regard. Wycoff noted USG engagement
in this area and our efforts to promote use of the PWC mechanism,
Wycoff also reiterated his belief that it was important that
Ethiopia keep as low a profile as possible in Somalia.
——————————————— ———————-
———–
Ethiopia Alleges It Pushes ASWJ Cooperation with the TFG
——————————————— ———————-
———–
6. (C) Wycoff reiterated USG support for the DPP and the need for
the international community to support and promote Somali-led
efforts to accomplish political reconciliation and focus on the
political aspects of stabilizing Somalia in parallel with the
security track of building TFG military capability. The Ethiopian
Foreign Minister reviewed for DAS Wycoff the latest GoE dealings
with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama\’a (ASWJ). ASWJ, he said had pushed
recently for an \”arms-length\” relationship with the TFG and had
openly hoped that the TFG \”would go away.\” The Ethiopian
government, Seyoum said, then told ASWJ that it would not
cooperate, if ASWJ did not cooperate with the TFG. ASWJ would
receive GoE support only if it cooperated fully with the TFG and,
eventually, joined the government. Seyoum believed that those in
the ASWJ diaspora were \”attempting to manipulate ASWJ on the
ground.\” Seyoum believed that a decision to back the TFG would be
taken by ASWJ at the one-year anniversary commemoration of its
decision to fight al-Shabaab. If there is an agreement to back the
TFG, the GoE, Seyoum said, would proceed with plans to train 400
ASWJ fighters in Ethiopia.
——————————————— —————
German-Sponsored Police Training Underway
——————————————— —————
7. (C) According to Seyoum, the German-sponsored training of 800
TFG police was underway in northeastern Ethiopia. He believed that
recruits would be sent to the same site from Somalia\’s Hiraan
Region, as well. The training will be low-key, Seyoum said, and
would last approximately six months, although the recruits could
return earlier, if necessary. In addition to standard police
training, the recruits would receive counterinsurgency training in
order to prepare them for the environment they would encounter in
Somalia. These and similar training efforts were the most that the
GoE was willing to do at this point. There would be no further
armed incursions, and Seyoum could not imagine a set of
circumstances that would \”bring us in\” to Somalia. Wycoff urged
that this training be done to UN standards so that UNDP could
provide salary and other support after the return to Mogadishu,
which was crucial to continued functioning this force in Somalia\’s
difficult environment. Seyoum confirmed that Ethipian intended to
keep a low provide in Somalia.
——————————————— ———————-
—-
Ethiopia Skeptical about Kenya\’s Lower Juba Initiative
——————————————— ———————-
—-
DJIBOUTI 00001389 003 OF 003
8. (C) Wycoff raised the question of Kenya\’s plans for a \”Jubaland
initiative\” and reiterated U.S. opposition to this effort. Seyoum
agreed that the Kenyan government\’s plans to prepare a force for an
invasion of Lower Juba would \”complicate\” matters there. The GOK,
he said, continued to believe it could create a buffer zone.
Trained troops, Seyoum noted, were a double-edged sword; they could
always be turned against Kenya. Seyoum worried that the Kenyan
effort might backfire. In mid-November, he had cautioned Kenyan
President Kibaki to be careful. DAS Wycoff told Seyoum that
Assistant Secretary Carson had told the highest levels of the GOK
that the USG opposed the Kenyan initiative and that we would
continue to press this position.
——————————————— —————-
Djibouti – Eritrea Tension On Ethiopia\’s Radar
——————————————— —————
9. (C) DAS Wycoff noted that the U.S worked to promote stability in
the HOA and opposed cross border activities that would lead to
instability. Seyoum told DAS Wycoff that Ethiopia was watching the
Djibouti – Eritrea border dispute closely. Djibouti was a
\”lifeline\” for Ethiopia, he said, and there are limits to what
Isaias will be allowed to do. Seyoum worried that Eritrea was
preparing Afar pastoralists for use in an effort to de-stabilize
Djibouti. While Ethiopia did not want war, he said, it could not
afford to see its supply route from the port of Djibouti disrupted.
Wycoff repeated U.S. opposition to nefarious cross-border
activities.
————–
Comment
————–
10. (C) Seyoum was as bullish about the TFG, but less critical of
the international community than Kenyan Foreign Minister Wetangula
had been in his meeting with DAS Wycoff (septel). The GoE\’s
initial skepticism about this TFG seems to have evaporated
completely. Earlier efforts to search for a potential alternative
among the ASWJ factions seem to have yielded little for Ethiopia
and, with no obvious alternative on the horizon, the GoE seems to
have decided that the TFG can be made to work if it, and the rest
of the international community, get strongly behind it.
12. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.
SWAN
10082
R 101331Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1117
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA FWD
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001391
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/10
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, PTER, KE, SO, ET, DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: KENYAN FOREIGN MINISTER PUSHES LOWER JUBA
INITIATIVE
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: During a December 8 meeting on the margins of the
Djibouti IGAD ministerial visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary
Wycoff and Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Wetangula agreed to
continue to work together to promote stability and political
reconciliation in Somalia. DAS Wycoff told Wetangula that the USG
continued to strongly oppose the Kenyan \”Jubaland\” initiative as a
bad idea that would more likely add to Somalia\’s instability than
to help stabilize the country. Wetangula defended GOK plans to
pursue its Jubaland (southern Somalia) initiative, implied that it
was in evolving concept, and offered to facilitate better USG
understanding of Kenya\’s plans. He also urged, as he had in
interventions at the ministerial, international community support
for the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Wycoff
agreed and highlighted the importance of supporting the Djibouti
Peace Process (DPP) and efforts to promote political
reconciliation. When the subject was raised, Wetangula excluded
further expansion of the teeming Dadaab refugee camp in
northeastern Kenya, which he said had received 12,000 refugees in
November. The Foreign Minister took a hard line on Eritrea. He
told DAS Wycoff that he had rebuffed efforts by the visiting
Eritrean Foreign Minister to solicit support for a new Somalia
reconciliation process. The Kenyan government had expelled
Eritrean diplomats that Wetangula thought had played a role in the
mid-September suicide bombing attack on AMISOM in Mogadishu.
Wycoff reviewed USG efforts to engage, both positively and
negatively, with Eritrea, and effect a change in its behavior. End
summary.
——————————————— ——————-
Jubaland Initiative: FM Urges USG Participation
——————————————— ——————-
2. (C) Visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Karl Wycoff opened a
December 8 meeting with Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula on
the margins of the Djibouti IGAD ministerial by recounting USG
support for the DPP and the TFG. He also forcibly underscored USG
concerns about reports that the GOK was recruiting and training an
ethnic Somali force as part of a \”Jubaland\” initiative. DAS Wycoff
told Wetangula that concerns which Assistant Secretary Carson had
expressed to Wetangula and other members of the Kenyan leadership
remained, and he urged Wetangula to re-consider the Kenyan
initiative.
3. (C) Wetangula defended the initiative by noting that it was an
evolving concept and that Kenya had carefully coordinated every
aspect of it with the TFG. He acknowledged that \”some excited
Kenyan military officers\” had \”bungled the earlier phases\” of the
planned operation, but that planning was back on track. The GOK
hoped that the \”strong Jubaland,\” which would result from a
successful, Kenyan-backed effort to defeat al-Shabaab in southern
Somalia, would \”cage in the Hawiye.\” The plan, he said, \”seemed
feasible to the TFG.\” The plan had been difficult to implement,
Wetangula said. Prominent, ethnically Somali Kenyan politicians,
including Kenya\’s Deputy Speaker, were strong al-Shabaab supporters
who saw any effort to weaken al-Shabaab as an \”Ethiopian plot.\”
Wetangula alleged that the ethnically-Somali politicians had worked
behind the scenes to recruit al-Shabaab sympathizers from the
Dadaab refugee camp in order both to spy on and undermine the
planned Kenyan initiative. When Wycoff reemphasized USG
opposition, Wetangula offered to facilitate contact in Nairobi that
would give the USG an understanding of Kenyan planning and that
might reassure the U.S. side that the plan made sense. Wycoff
accepted the offer of further information but noted that USG
concerns remained.
4. (C) Wetangula predicted success for the initiative. Al-Shabaab
was weak, he insisted, recalling that Ethiopian troops had marched
into Mogadishu in December 2006 \”like a hot knife through butter.\”
USG criticism should be accompanied by other ideas, he said, noting
that \”I sincerely believe that good ideas should give way to better
ideas.\” In any event, Wetangula thought that the GOK could \”no
longer afford to sit on the sidelines.\” The prospect of a serious
terrorist attack in Nairobi was increasing every day. Wycoff noted
DJIBOUTI 00001391 002 OF 003
the importance of implementing the DPP and making progress on the
political reconciliation front at the same time that we worked to
improve the TFG\’s security forces.
——————————————— –
TFG Needs More External Support
———————————————
5. (C) At various points in the conversation, Wetangula strongly
supported the TFG but argued, as he had publicly at the December 7
session of the IGAD ministerial, that it was handicapped by
insufficient international community support. He urged that the
USG provide the TFG with \”two or three armored vehicles\” so that
its leadership can safely engage with Somalis around Mogadishu. He
also thought that helicopters would be useful in intimidating
al-Shabaab. Picking up on an assertion which had been frequently
made at the IGAD ministerial, Wetangula alleged that only a tiny
fraction of the Brussels pledges to the TFG had been realized. The
GOK had given the TFG money from time-to-time, but it \”was not
rich.\” Only the West could provide the support needed by the
Somali government. He urged that the USG take the lead in
galvanizing the international community. Wycoff recounted USG
efforts both to provide direct support to the TFG, but also to
encourage its friends and allies to provide material and budget
support. HE also highlighted USG efforts to promote political
reconciliation and negotiations in support of the DPP. Wycoff also
pointed out that the U.S. was the primary provider of support to
AMISOM.
——————————————— ———————-
—————————–
Dadaab: No Possibility That Additional Refugee Camp Could be
Opened
——————————————— ———————-
—————————–
6. (C) In response to a question from DAS Wycoff, Wetangula
emphatically rejected the possibility of opening a fourth refugee
camp at Dadaab, in northeastern Kenya. He asserted that continuing
instability in Somalia had further increased refugee flows: Twelve
thousand refugees had crossed the border in November alone. He
urged that some of the refugees in Dadaab be transferred to the
Kakuma refugee camp, farther from the Somali border. About 12,000
refugees had been moved a few months ago, he said, and the Kenyan
military could be used to facilitate further such transfers. It
would be easier to control and monitor Somali activities at Kakuma,
which was further from the border and \”away from the action.\”
Wetangula told DAS Wycoff that he also believed at one time that
the Dadaab camp could be expanded, but extended discussions at
Kenyan Security Council meetings had since convinced him otherwise.
——————————————— ———————-
—————
Wetangula Alleges Continuing Eritrean Involvement in Somalia
——————————————— ———————-
—————
7. (C) Wetangula recalled for DAS Wycoff recent Kenyan difficulties
with Eritrea. The Eritrean Foreign Minister had just treated him
to \”the usual assertions\” that Eritrea was misunderstood by the
international community. On September 17, three Eritrean diplomats
had transited Kenya en route to Mogadishu, then back to Kenya. The
visits had taken place \”with the full complicity and knowledge\” of
the Eritrean Embassy in Nairobi. The Kenyan authorities had
deported two of the three diplomats, Wetangula said. He was
DJIBOUTI 00001391 003 OF 003
convinced that their travel was linked to the mid-September suicide
bombing attacks on AMISOM in Mogadishu.
8. (C) Wetangula sidestepped DAS Wycoff\’s suggestion that the
Eritrean diplomats\’ activities be publicized by the GOK. He would
continue to talk with EU countries so that they understood the
full, negative role Eritrea plays in the region.
9. (C) Wetangula also asserted that Eritrea continued to lobby
Tanzania and others for the launch of a reconciliation conference
to which Hisbul Islam\’s Hassan Dahir Aweys and others would be
invited. He planned to pressure his Tanzanian counterpart to
reject the idea. DAS Wycoff told Wetangula that the USG had
already urged Dar es Salaam to distance itself from the idea and to
focus its support on the DPP and the TFG.
——————————————— ———————-
———-
Kenya Willing to Expel or Freeze Assets of Somali Spoilers
——————————————— ———————-
———-
10. (C) In addition to Eritrea, Nairobi was home to Somalis and
others who were backing al-Shabaab. Wetangula repeated GOK
willingness to expel \”troublemakers\” from Kenya and/or to freeze
their assets if evidence about their activities were brought to his
attention. When pressed on the importance of the TFG operating in
a transparent and accountable manner, Wetangula agreed that
previous TFGs had been perceived as corrupt and noted that former
TFG Prime Minister Gedi had invested much of his ill-gotten gains
in Nairobi.
————–
Comment
————–
11. (C) During the December 7 – 8 IGAD ministerial, Wetangula
joined his IGAD counterparts in repeatedly backing the TFG and in
alleging that it was lack of international community support, not
TFG inertia, which was responsible for the lack of progress to
date. Wetangula endorsed the TFG\’s 2010 budget, which was
presented by TFG Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan during the
ministerial. He and the other ministers present termed it a great
improvement over the complete lack of financial transparency, or
worse, which had been characteristic of the TFGs of Prime Ministers
Nur \”Adde\” and Gedi. The IGAD ministers\’ unanimous, strong support
for the TFG seemed to visibly boost the TFG Foreign Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister, who were present, and contrasted
significantly with the criticism of Somalia\’s government that had
been the norm at preceding ministerials.
12. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.
SWAN
10084
P 151604Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4639
INFO RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1530
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000089
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
NAIROBI FOR SOMALIA UNIT
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PSC (JEAN CLARK)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2020
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KTFN, KPKO, SO, UK
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: UK SET TO PUT RESOURCES TO NEW POLICY
REF: 09 LONDON 2435
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C/NF) Summary. Foreign office officials anticipate
receiving ministerial approval on January 18 for a new
resource package for Somalia, which will include GBP 9
million (USD 14.4 million) in new assistance funds and
authorization for creation of a \”shadow embassy\” for Somalia
based in Nairobi. The UK plans to increase its dialogue and
development assistance with Somaliland and Puntland and also
hopes to establish a means of allowing regular visits
throughout Somalia. The UK \”absolutely supports\” sanctions
against al-Shabaab, but wants to make sure it is done right.
The emerging preference in the Foreign Office appears to be
for a humanitarian carve-out through the Somalia Sanction
Monitoring Group\’s mandate, which is up for renewal in March.
On Kenya\’s Jubaland initiative, the Foreign Office remains
pessimistic and would like to consider a joint U.S.-UK
demarche to the Kenyans. At the end January, an Ahlu Sunnah
Wal Jama\’a (ASWJ) delegation will visit London to meet with
Somali Diaspora groups, and the Foreign Office will meet
them. Planning is underway for the EU training mission,
which would train 1,000 individuals in two tranches in Uganda
over 12 months. Potiential obstacles, however, remain:
salaries, command-and-control issues, and logistics. The UK
sees selecting a replacement for UN Special Representative
Ould Abdullah as critical; it will be important to have
someone who is a good manager and who can corral the
international community and donors\’ efforts. If approved,
the UK\’s new resources for Somalia will represent a
significant shift in the UK\’s Somalia policy, especially in a
resource-scarce environment, where funding for many of the
UK\’s programs around the world is being reduced. End summary.
2. (C/NF) The UK Cabinet Sub-Committee on Africa will
consider for final approval on January 18 a new resource
package for the UK\’s new policy focus on Somalia (reftel),
Foreign Office Somalia Unit head Gill Atkinson told Poloff on
January 14. Given previous statements of support, Atkinson
anticipates ministers will approve the proposed package. If
approved, the UK\’s new resources for Somalia will represent a
significant shift in the UK\’s Somalia policy, especially in a
resource-scarce environment, where funding for many of the
UK\’s programs around the world is being reduced.
The New Support Package – Money and People
——————————————
3. (C/NF) The new package will include GBP 9 million (USD
14.4 million) of conflict prevention funding, which Atkinson
anticipates will be used to support AMISOM, the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), the Somaliland and Puntland
authorities, and other development initiatives. Ministers
will also consider creation of a \”shadow embassy\” for
Somalia, to be based in Nairobi. The office will be headed
by a counselor-level UK diplomat and will possibly include
one to two reporting officers, a development assistance
officer from the Department of International Development
(DFID), and a military attache for the Ministry of Defense
(MOD). Additionally, ministers will consider approval of a
proposal that will allow for regular visits to Somalia.
Atkinson noted that the UK Government is still working to
find internal funding for the visits, given that the security
detail requirements will be very expensive.
Jubaland
——–
4. (C/NF) Atkinson said that the Foreign Office can see the
potential attraction for the Kenyans to pursue their Jubaland
initiative, but that the UK does not think it will be
successful. The UK is interested to know if the USG sees
merit in jointly demarching the Kenyans about not pursuing
it. If the Kenyans insist, Atkinson suggested that a
proposal be made to the Kenyans for a long-term
reconciliation process that would result in
military/para-military activities only if needed and in the
context of reconciliation talks. Atkinson said that Baroness
Kinnock, during her on-going visit to Kenya, plans to speak
with both TFG President Sheikh Sharif and the Kenyans about
the Jubaland initiative, mainly to assess where they have
gotten to in their thinking before taking a decision on the
UK position about it. Additionally, the British Embassy in
Ethiopia is making similar inquires with the Ethiopia
LONDON 00000089 002 OF 003
authorities.
Somaliland and Puntland – Supporting Stability
——————————————— –
5. (C/NF) Practically speaking, Atkinson said that the UK
Government had not increased its dialogue with the
authorities in Somaliland and Puntland. She said they hope
to after ministers have approved the new resources.
Additionally, they plan to start development assistance
cooperation with both regional authorities. Atkinson said
the UK wants to \”support stability\” where it is in Somalia.
Meeting with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama\’a (ASWJ)
——————————————
6. (C/NF) An ASWJ delegation will be visiting London at the
end of January for engagement with the Somali Diaspora in the
UK, and Atkinson said the Foreign Office plans to take the
opportunity to meet with the delegation. The main objectives
of the meeting will be to discuss the ASWJ\’s relationship
with the TFG, to learn more about the situation on the
ground, and to hear more about ASWJ\’s forward planning.
Sanctions
———
7. (C/NF) Atkinson said the UK \”absolutely supports\”
sanctions against al-Shabaab, but wants to make sure it gets
done right. DFID is currently undertaking an assessment of
how humanitarian aid is delivered in other places in the
world with similar legal constraints. She explained that
while the UK may be able to live with the \”gray legal space\”
related to delivery of humanitarian aid in al-Shabaab held
areas, it is likely that the UK\’s preference will be for a
humanitarian carve-out. She further said that given the time
constraints on agreeing the AMISOM mandate by the end of the
month, the UK sees the Somalia Sanctions Monitor Group
mandate, which is up for renewal in March, as the appropriate
vehicle for the humanitarian carve-out language, not the
AMISOM mandate (which would conflate sanctions and
peacekeeping issues). She said that the UK has no problem
with going ahead with introduction of the al-Shabaab list
before the March mandate renewal. The Foreign Office
Sanctions Teams subsequently confirmed that the UK
\”definitely\” wants to list al-Shabaab as an organization and
suggested that the monitoring group mandate could be brought
forward for renewal to accommodate the humanitarian carve
out.
EU and Training
—————
8. (C/NF) Atkinson said that planning for the EU training
mission is well under way, with the Spanish-led assessment
trip having occurred in mid-December. While the plans are
still being finalized, it is likely that a small-scale, light
touch mission with training by other African troops will be
proposed. The training will take place in Uganda in two
tranches of 1,000 individuals over 12 months. She predicted
that the potential pitfalls will be around salaries,
command-and-control issues, and logistics. EU High
Representative for Foreign and Defense Policy Cathy Ashton is
interested in seeing the Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP) mission come to fruition, as it will be the first
post-Lisbon treaty force generation and training mission.
According to Atkinson, the UK Government has made a concerted
effort to see Ashton engaged on Somalia, as the EU is already
dedicated so many resources to efforts there. (NOTE: In a
separate discussion with the Foreign Office EU Correspondent,
he suggested that Ashton needed more information on the
proposed operation. END NOTE.) She said there has been some
consideration of appointing an EU Special Representative, but
that no decisions have been made.
UN Appointments
—————
9. (C/NF) On the UN, Atkinson said the replacement of Special
Representative ould Abdullah will be critical; it will be
important to get someone who is a good manager who can deal
corral the international community and donors\’ efforts. The
preference is for an African and/or Muslim. She also
asserted that the UK would like to push the UN to have a more
joined-up approach that would see the various UN family
LONDON 00000089 003 OF 003
agencies based in Nairobi working together better.
Visit London\’s Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
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SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY OTERO\’S MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN
PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI – JANUARY 31, 2010
Classified By: Under Secretary Maria Otero for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (SBU) January 31, 2010; 4:15 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
2. (SBU) Participants:
U.S.
Under Secretary Otero
Assistant Secretary Carson
NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michelle Gavin
PolOff Skye Justice (notetaker)
Ethiopia
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
Special Assistant Gebretensae Gebremichael
Summary
——-
3. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Under Secretary for
Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero his government
placed no restrictions on its citizens\’ democratic and civil
rights, only the right of foreign entities to fund them.
Foreign funding of civil society organizations (CSOs) is
antithetical to democratization, he said, as it makes civil
society leaders accountable to foreign entities rather than
their own members, turning the concept of democratic
accountability on its head. Democracy in Ethiopia must
develop organically, and Ethiopians must organize and fund
themselves and defend their own rights. Meles assured U/S
Otero that Ethiopia\’s upcoming elections will be free, fair,
transparent, and peaceful, and elaborated steps his
government has taken to ensure this. While opposition groups
may resort to violence in an attempt to discredit the
election, the GoE will enforce the recently enacted Electoral
Code of Conduct and its existing election laws without regard
to party affiliation. Meles said he has warned opposition
leaders that the international community will not be able to
save them should they violate Ethiopian law, but rather if
they do so they will face the same fate as opposition leader
Birtukan Midekssa, who will \”vegetate in jail forever.\” The
U.S. delegation noted that Ethiopia\’s forthcoming elections
would be closely watched in the U.S., and urged Meles to
exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition
more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan
Midekssa.
4. (C) Meles said the GoE is not enthusiastic about Kenya\’s
Jubaland initiative, but is sharing intelligence with Kenya
and hoping for success. In the event the initiative is not
successful, the GoE has plans in place to limit the
destabilizing impacts on Ethiopia. On climate change, Meles
said the GoE fully supports the Copenhagen accord, but is
disappointed with signs the U.S. may not support his proposed
panel to monitor international financial contributions under
the accord. Meles made no substantive comment on inquiries
regarding the liberalization of banking and
telecommunications in Ethiopia. End summary.
Foreign Funding of CSOs Antithetical to Democratization
——————————————— ———-
5. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told U/S Otero the
development of a strong democracy and civil society is the
only way Ethiopia can ensure peace and unity among an
ethnically and religiously divided population. He noted that
the Government of Ethiopia\’s (GoE) commitment to democracy is
directly related to stability, adding that for Ethiopia,
\”democratization is a matter of survival.\” Responding to U/S
Otero\’s concern that Ethiopia\’s recently-enacted CSO law
threatened the role of civil society, Meles said while the
GoE welcomes foreign funding of charities, those Ethiopians
who want to engage in political activity should organize and
fund themselves. The leaders of CSOs that receive foreign
funding are not accountable to their organizations, he said,
but rather to the sources of their funding, turning the
concept of democratic accountability on its head. Meles
asserted that Ethiopians were not too poor to organize
themselves and establish their own democratic traditions,
recalling that within his lifetime illiterate peasants and
poor students had overthrown an ancient imperial dynasty.
6. (C) Meles said his country\’s inability to develop a strong
democracy was not due to insufficient understanding of
democratic principles, but rather because Ethiopians had not
ADDIS ABAB 00000163 002 OF 003
internalized those principles. Ethiopia should follow the
example of the U.S. and European countries, he said, where
democracy developed organically and citizens had a stake in
its establishment. When people are committed to democracy
and forced to make sacrifices for it, Meles said, \”they won\’t
let any leader take it away from them.\” But \”when they are
spoon-fed democracy, they will give it up when their source
of funding and encouragement is removed.\” Referencing his
own struggle against the Derg regime, Meles said he and his
compatriots received no foreign funding, but were willing to
sacrifice and die for their cause, and Ethiopians today must
take ownership of their democratic development, be willing to
sacrifice for it, and defend their own rights.
7. (C) Meles drew a clear distinction between Ethiopians\’
democratic and civil rights on the one hand, and the right of
foreign entities to fund those rights on the other. There is
no restriction on Ethiopians\’ rights, he asserted, merely on
foreign funding, adding that the U.S. has similar laws. U/S
Otero countered that while the U.S. does not allow foreign
funding of political campaigns, there is no restriction on
foreign funding of NGOs. Ms. Gavin noted the examples of
foreign support for the abolitionist movement in the U.S. and
for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa as positive
examples of foreign engagement of civil society, and
expressed that aside from the issue of foreign funding, the
ability of local organizations to legally register, operate,
and contribute to democratic discourse was of tantamount
importance.
GoE Will Hold Free and Fair Elections, Despite Opposition
——————————————— ————
8. (C) Meles assured U/S Otero that Ethiopia\’s upcoming
electoral process will be free, fair, transparent, and
peaceful. The GoE has learned from the violence that
followed the 2005 elections, he said, and taken action to
ensure that violence is not repeated. Meles said the
recently signed Electoral Code of Conduct (CoC) was not done
for the benefit of political parties, but for the Ethiopian
people. The people will ultimately judge political actors,
he said, and they must have parameters agreed to by the
parties by which they will judge those actors. After the CoC
was passed, Meles noted, the ruling Ethiopian People\’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) gathered over 1,300 of
its senior leaders to discuss party strategy and train all
leaders on the CoC. The EPRDF knows violations of the CoC by
its members will hurt the party and provide a rallying cry
for the opposition. This message will flow down to all EPRDF
members, he said, so that they know what is expected of them,
and know both the courts and the party will hold them
accountable to the CoC.
9. (C) Meles told U/S Otero he feared a repeat of the 2005
violence, and that many opposition members were not
interested in peaceful elections, but would rather discredit
the electoral process. As such, the EPRDF cannot give them
any excuse to resort to violence. Meles noted that in
addition to opposition political parties, the GoE had
intelligence that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Eritrean President
Isaias Afwerki were all directly or indirectly involved in
plots to discredit the elections. The EPRDF, he said, would
\”let them be\” to show the population that even though their
opponents\’ goal is not peace, the EPRDF will abide by the
law.
10. (C) Meles recalled that in 2005, he had told opposition
leaders in the presence of the diplomatic corps that they
should not believe foreign allies would protect them if they
violated the laws of Ethiopia. Opposition leaders were right
to believe the diplomatic corps would try to protect them, he
said, as evidenced by the statement they issued demanding the
release of opposition politicians upon their arrest in 2005.
Today, Meles said, foreign embassies are inadvertently
conveying the same message, that they will protest the
jailing of opposition leaders and potentially take action
against Ethiopia to secure their release. However, the GoE
has made clear to both opposition and EPRDF leaders that
nothing can protect them except the laws and constitution of
Ethiopia, and the GoE will clamp down on anyone who violates
those laws. \”We will crush them with our full force,\” Meles
said, and \”they will vegetate like Birtukan (Midekssa) in
jail forever.\”
ADDIS ABAB 00000163 003 OF 003
11. (C) In an extended discussion in response to Meles\’
comments, U/S Otero, A/S Carson, and Ms. Gavin noted that
Ethiopia\’s forthcoming elections would be closely watched in
the U.S. and that the GoE\’s treatment of the opposition would
be subject to public criticism by the Ethiopian diaspora and
U.S. political figures. The U.S. delegation urged Meles to
exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition
more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan
Midekssa. A/S Carson stressed the importance of putting
Ethiopia\’s democracy on an upward and positive trajectory,
and not letting it atrophy or slide backward, using the
suffrage and civil rights movements in the U.S. as an
illustration of challenges the U.S. has faced as it improved
its own democratic system. (Note: Three quarters of the
nearly two-hour meeting focused on democracy. End note.)
Ethiopia Not Enthusiastic About Jubaland Initiative
——————————————— ——
12. (C) Meles said he had been briefed extensively regarding
Kenya\’s Jubaland initiative. Because Ethiopia had previously
intervened in Somalia without seeking Kenyan approval, he
said, the GoE would not presume to analyze the Kenyans\’
chances for success in their own intervention. The GoE is
sharing intelligence with Kenya, but Meles expressed a lack
of confidence in Kenya\’s capacity to pull off a tactical
success, which he feared could have negative regional
impacts. The GoE is therefore working to minimize the
likelihood of a spillover effect in Ethiopia\’s Somali
Regional State. Noting that Ethiopia might have
underestimated Kenya, Meles said, \”We are not enthusiastic,
but we are hoping for success.\”
GoE Prepared to Move Forward from Copenhagen
——————————————–
13. (C) U/S Otero urged Meles to sign the Copenhagen accord
on climate change and explained that it is a point of
departure for further discussion and movement forward on the
topic. She noted that while the agreement has its
limitations, it has the international community moving in the
right direction. Meles responded that the GoE supported the
accord in Copenhagen and would support it at the AU Summit.
However, he expressed his disappointment that despite
President Obama\’s personal assurance to him that finances
committed in Copenhagen would be made available, he had
received word from contacts at the UN that the U.S. was not
supportive of Ethiopia\’s proposal for a panel to monitor
financial pledges regarding climate change. Ms. Gavin
assured the Prime Minister that she would look into his
concerns.
No Promises on Liberalizing Telecoms, Banking
———————————————
14. (C) U/S Otero and A/S Carson encouraged Meles to hasten
steps to liberalize the telecommunications and banking
industries in Ethiopia, and highlighted both the micro- and
macroeconomic benefits of liberalization. Meles offered no
substantive response to A/S Carson\’s query whether any
progress had been made toward liberalizing or otherwise
improving telecommunications, joking that Americans\’ concept
of time was much faster than Ethiopians\’. In response to U/S
Otero\’s recognition of the important role of private banks in
microfinance projects that directly benefit the poor, and
assurance that private and state-owned banks could thrive
side-by-side, Meles said he would be happy to discuss the
issue in the future.
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2020
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, PTER, SOCI, KE, SO
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON\’S JANUARY 30, 2010,
MEETING WITH KENYAN FOREIGN MINISTER WETANGULA
Classified By: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson f
or reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: A high-level Kenyan delegation headed by
Foreign Minister Wetangula used a long January 30 meeting on
the margins of the AU Summit to lobby Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs Johnnie Carson\’s support for the GOK\’s
long-incubating Lower Juba initiative. Wetangula, the
Minister of Defense, the Director of the National Security
and Intelligence Services, and the military\’s chief-of-staff
each in turn highlighted the dangers to Kenya emanating from
Somalia and advertised an incursion into Somalia by the
roughly two thousand Somali forces currently being trained by
the GOK as the best solution. The Kenyan delegation assured
A/S Carson that both Somalia\’s Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and the Government of Ethiopia supported
Kenya\’s efforts and insisted that A/S Carson\’s longstanding
concerns about the Kenyan plan had all been addressed.
2. (C) Summary and comment continued: A/S Carson tactfully,
but categorically refused the Kenyan delegation\’s attempts to
enlist USG support for their effort. He worried that the
Lower Juba initiative could be very expensive, that it could
catalyze clan and sub-clan rivalries, that success could
create a rival to the TFG, that the GOK could be unwittingly
providing training to future or current ONLF members, and
that the GOK was not prepared to handle the domestic
repercussions should their effort fail. The January 30
meeting marked Wetangula\’s third attempt to enlist A/S
Carson\’s support and was only the latest in a long-running
campaign by the Kenyan government to win USG agreement to its
initiative. The persistence with which the GOK is courting
the USG suggests, if nothing else, that they have finally
awakened to the implications for Kenya of long-term
instability in Somalia and are attempting belatedly to
address the problem. End comment and summary.
Wetangula Previews GOK\’s Domestic
Achievements Before Discussing the
Lower Juba Initiative
———————————-
3. (C) GOK Foreign Minister Wetangula kicked off a long
January 30 meeting with Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs Johnnie Carson by highlighting Kenya\’s comparative
stability and reporting progress that the GOK has made on its
domestic reform agenda. Wetangula noted that a draft
constitution had been submitted to the committee of experts
and guessed that Parliament would be called back from recess
in order to examine the draft.
4. (C) The constitution would introduce a \”U.S.-type\”
presidential system and would reserve 47 seats in Parliament
for women and 12 seats for members of \”vulnerable groups.\”
Under the draft, cabinet members would not be permitted to
serve as members of Parliament, an upper house of 47 seats
would be created, a five-year election cycle would be
instituted, and there would be judicial reform. Wetangula
recalled that A/S Carson had criticized the GOK\’s tendency to
confuse \”process with progress,\” but insisted that the reform
now underway in Kenya was genuine.
Domestic Progress Threatened by
Continuing Problems in Somalia
——————————-
5. (C) Wetangula contrasted the progress being made on the
domestic agenda with the threat posed to Kenya by continuing
instability in Somalia. He alleged that six – ten thousand
refugees enter Kenya from Somalia each month, pointed to the
over-extended Dadaab refugee camps in northeast Kenya, that
the GOK had intercepted ten attempts to smuggle in
bomb-making materials in the past year, recalled the domestic
unrest triggered by the recent visit of a controversial
Jamaican muslim cleric to Kenya, and forecast repercussions
from Kenya\’s good-faith efforts to meet its obligations under
the memorandum of understanding on piracy as extremely
worrisome.
TFG, Government of Ethiopia
Support Kenyan Initiative
—————————
6. (C) Wetangula alleged that the Somalia Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) had proposed the Jubaland initiative
to Kenya and that the Government of Ethiopia, after some
ADDIS ABAB 00000166 002 OF 003
initial questions, had endorsed it as well. The Kenyan effort
was being coordinated by a team based in Prime Minister
Odinga\’s office, Wetangula said, but the Prime Minister and
President Kibaki co-chair the effort in order to make it
truly bi-partisan. That team had recently met with Prime
Minister Meles for over two hours, Wetangula said, and had
successfully addressed all of the GOE Prime Minister\’s
concerns.
7. (C) While he acknowledged that the TFG had limited
capacity, Wetangula argued that strategic concerns meant that
Kenya had to support it. He briefly reviewed evidence of
Kenyan terrorist trails that led to Somalia, including the
Somali Dane who had been expelled from Kenya at the time of
the Secretary\’s visit in August, then attacked the Danish
cartoonist in December 2009.
A/S Carson\’s Questions About
Kenyan Plan
—————————-
8. (C) A/S Carson reviewed the history of excellent U.S. –
Kenya cooperation and praised the GOK\’s efforts to discharge
its international obligations. The USG shared the GOK\’s
concerns about Somalia and strongly supported the TFG and the
Djibouti peace process. The U.S. was the largest contributor
to AMISOM and was attempting to induce TCCs to contribute
troops to the AU\’s effort.
9. (C) Noting that he had carefully weighed the pros and cons
of the Kenyan proposal, A/S Carson worried that the
initiative could backfire, warning that we did not want to
create situations we cannot control, then highlighted his
concerns:
— the undertaking could be more complicated and much more
expensive than the Kenyans forecast.
— an incursion could trigger clan and sub-clan rivalries
that could worsen matters in Lower Juba.
— if successful, a Lower Juba entity could emerge as a rival
to the TFG.
— it was possible that the GOK could be unwittingly
providing training to present or future members of the ONLF.
— did the GOK have a plan should their troops be defeated?
— was the GOK willing to persevere if their was a negative
outcome?
— what would be the domestic repercussions of a defeat?
— what would be the GOK\’s response if the TFG or the GOE had
a change of heart?
He concluded by suggesting that there shold be more
conventional and convenient ways to accomplish the same end.
Could, for example, the trained Somalis help Kenya to re-take
Kismayo?
10. (C) NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michelle
Gavin praised the GOK\’s willingness not to be passive and to
think through the challenge, rather than allowing pressures
to build. She expressed USG willingness to think through
other strategies with the GOK.
Kenyan Delegation Responds to
USG Skepticism
—————————–
11. (C) In response to A/S Carson\’s questions, Wetangula
insisted that the GOK had simulated the campaign and was
satisfied that all potential stumbling blocks had been
addressed. Minister of Defense Haji highlighted the
financial importance of Kismayo port in Lower Juba to
al-Shabaab, the unpopularity of al-Shabaab, and the inability
of the TFG to combat al-Shabaab in Lower Juba as reasons for
backing the initiative. Creating a Kenyan-controlled fiefdom
in Lower Juba was not part of the Kenyan plan. The GOK faced
a very serious security threat, which had to be addressed.
12. (C) Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff General
Kianga in turn argued that an attack into Lower Juba would
relieve pressure on the TFG in Mogadishu. Resources spent on
the initiative, he said, would do more to improve the TFG\’s
fortunes than money sent to Mogadishu. As to the domestic
reaction, Kianga believed that the GOK would be accused by
its population of irresponsibility if it ignored the threat
posed by al-Shabaab.
13. (C) National Security and Intelligence Service Director
ADDIS ABAB 00000166 003 OF 003
Major-General Gichangi reasoned that it would take time for
the international community and AMISOM to build a capable TFG
security force, but al-Shabaab\’s increasing links with
al-Qaeda argued for action now. Gichangi alleged links
between Pakistan, Yemen, and al-Shabaab in Somalia and noted
that cost to the USG should Somalia become another source of
international terrorism.
14. (C) Gichangi believed that the GOK had done its clan
homework. It was engaged at the grassroots in the Juba area.
It had sponsored a \”major Ogaden clan\” meeting, and a
similar conclave was scheduled with the Marehan the following
week.
15. (C) Wetangula acknowledged that the Kenyan undertaking
was risky. He argued that it would not, however, create a
rival to the TFG, as it was a TFG initiative and there would
not be a single Kenyan boot on the ground in Somalia.
Frequent consultations with the GOE had allayed fears that
work with the Ogaden would inadvertently create problems for
Meles\’s government. Wetangula alleged that the Kenyan effort
was not just military. The GOK was training administrators,
teachers, and nurses, and wanted to ensure that a capable
administration was in place should the initiative succeed.
The GOK would persevere regardless, as it \”had no choice.\”
\”This is a constitutional responsibility,\” Wetangula said.
16. (C) The GOK was not inviting the USG to get involved,
Wetangula concluded, but to support the Kenyan effort. \”The
threat is there,\” Wetangula said, \”We can see it, we can feel
it.\”
17. (C) A/S Carson praised the delegations \”powerful,
thoughtful\” arguments and agreed that the GOK and the USG
share common concerns. The USG was grappling with the
threats posed to the region by developments in Somalia but,
A/S Carson concluded, \”I would be wrong if I suggested
encouragement\” to you. He promised to consult further in
Washington, however. Wetangula concluded by \”imploring\” A/S
Carson to consider assistance. \”I may not have been as
convincing as I should have been,\” he said, but \”the threat
is real.\” After a strong plea by Wetangula A/S Carson said
he would look into the feasability of a U.S. Team going to
Kanya to review the technical details of the Kenyan plan.
However, A/S Carson said he still maintained deep
reservations about the success of Kenya\’s efforts.
Comment
——-
18. (C) The January 30 meeting marked Wetangula\’s third
attempt to win A/S Carson\’s support for the Jubaland
initiative. To do so, he brought a very high-level team to
Addis Ababa, and each of the team members made passionate, if
not always persuasive, arguments for supporting the Kenyan
effort. The persistence of the Kenyan campaign to win
backing for their undertaking suggests, if nothing else, that
they have finally become aware that years of increasing
instability in next-door Somalia have serious implications
for their own country\’s future, and that the problem must
somehow be addressed. The GOK\’s proposed solution continues
to raise more questions than it answers, but the desire of
the GOK to do something about Somalia seems genuine.
Participants
————
19. (U) USG:
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson
NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michelle Gavin
Ambassador to the African Union Michael Battle
Charge d\’Affaires, Embassy Addis Ababa, John Yates
Counselor for Somalia Affairs, Embassy Nairobi, Bob Patterson
(notetaker)
DCM, U.S. Mission to the African Union, Joel Maybury
Government of Kenya:
Minister of Foreign Affairs Moses Wetangula
Minister of Defense Yusuf Haji
Director, NSIS, Major-General Michael Gichangi
Chief of Kenyan General Staff, General Jeremiah Kianga
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SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS
MARIA OTERO\’S JANUARY 31, 2010, MEETING WITH THE TFG
PRESIDENT
Classified By: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson f
or reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary for Democracy and Global
Affairs Maria Otero and Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs Johnnie Carson, in a January 31 meeting with
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Sheikh Sharif
on the margins of the AU Summit underscored continued USG
support but urged Sharif to broaden his government\’s base,
deliver services to the Somali people, and work with AMISOM
to bolster the TFG\’s position on the ground. President Sharif
thanked the USG for its support and, while admitting that
2009 had been a difficult debut year for his government,
noted that the TFG had survived and had even recorded some
modest achievements. Among them, he said, was the re-opening
of the Central Bank of Somalia, expanded broadcasting by
Radio Mogadishu, progress on reform of the armed forces, and,
most recently, a contract to mint a new Somali currency.
2. (C) Summary continued: Sharif indicated that the TFG had
intensified its efforts at outreach. The Minister for
National Security was currently in Galkayo in an effort to
mobilize troops and create a base for upcoming operations.
The Ministers of Telecommunications and Finance were managing
the TFG\’s ongoing efforts to reach out to Ahlu Sunnah Wal
Jama\’a (ASWJ). Sharif predicted that efforts to reform TFG
security forces in Mogadishu, TFG outreach to ASWJ, and
troops trained by Kenya and Ethiopia would coalesce into a
comprehensive effort to push al-Shabaab out of south central
Somalia. Needed, Sharif said, were ammunition, weapons,
medical supplies, and communication equipment.
3. (C) Summary continued: In response to a question from A/S
Carson, Sharif indicated qualified support for Kenya\’s
\”Jubaland initiative.\” He had told the Kenyans that the TFG
did not want to see an effort that would divide Somalia into
two parts or \”create more problems that it solves.\” Sharif
had been told that the estimated two thousand ethnic Somali
troops were being well-trained by Kenya and that more than
the Marehan and Ogaden clans were represented. End summary.
A/S Carson Underlines USG Support, but Urges TFG Action
——————————————— ———-
4. (C) Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria
Otero and Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie
Carson opened a January 31 meeting with TFG President Sheikh
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed on the margins of the AU Summit in Addis
Ababa by reiterating strong USG support for both the TFG and
the AMISOM units that protect the TFG in Mogadishu. A/S
Carson also passed USG condolences on the deaths of three TFG
ministers and of numerous faculty and students of Banadir
University in the December 3, 2009, Mogadishu suicide bombing.
5. (C) While noting that he knew the TFG was already engaged
in regional outreach efforts, A/S Carson urged that the
government more quickly broaden its base, especially with
ASWJ. He urged Sharif to pressure members of Parliament to
expand the reach of the TFG in their home regions. A/S
Carson applauded the TFG\’s success in expanding and improving
broadcasting by Radio Mogadishu and urged the TFG to continue
to enhance its media efforts. The government also had to
deliver services, A/S Carson noted. The funding of health
clinics and of schools was needed in order to build public
support. The USG, A/S Carson noted later in the
conversation, was prepared to put \”dollars in your hands for
service delivery, especially for education and health.\” \”A
government that provides services to its people is respected
and has its peoples\’ support,\” A/S Carson said.
Rallying International Support for the TFG
——————————————
6. (C) A/S Carson indicated that the USG would continue to
support efforts to train TFG troops. He asked Sharif to push
the Europeans to make good on their 2009 Brussels
International Contact Group meeting pledges and reported that
the USG was urging the Arab League to meet its commitments as
well.
7. (C) A/S Carson told Sharif that he had had a good session
with UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn
Pascoe during the AU Summit about how to help the AU meet
AMISOM\’s eight thousand troop ceiling.
ADDIS ABAB 00000167 002 OF 003
Much Learned and Some Modest Successes
During TFG\’s First Year in Office
————————————-
8. (C) Sharif thanked the USG for its support and told A/S
Carson that the USG shared credit for his government\’s modest
successes in 2009. His first year in office had been
\”difficult,\” but the government had learned much and the
stage was set for a more successful second year in office.
Among the TFG\’s successes was that it had survived in the
face of terrorism, lawlessness, inertia, greed, and foreign
meddling.
9. (C) Sharif highlighted other successes: there had been
modest, but positive changes in the TFG\’s leadership; TFG
forces had been trained in neighboring countries, Radio
Mogadishu was making steady progress in the propaganda war;
the Central Bank of Somalia was open and functioning; the
Somali people were convinced that al-Shabaab was not working
in the best interests of the government; and Sudan\’s
agreement to fund the printing of a new Somali shilling would
ultimately allow the TFG to gain control of its currency. In
cooperation with local businessmen, the TFG had made modest
improvements at the Mogadishu port, the Mogadishu airport,
and was in the process of physically buttressing the
parliament building.
10. (C) Sharif reassured A/S Carson that the TFG had a
vigorous strategy for the regions. The TFG\’s Minister of
National Security was currently in Galkayo (Mudug region) in
order to mobilize Somalis and build a base for upcoming
operations against al-Shabaab. TFG military officers were
near el-Bur (Galgaduud region), where they were working with
ASWJ. The Deputy Prime Minister/Finance Minister and the
Minister of Telecommunications were responsible for the TFG\’s
efforts with ASWJ and they were having some success.
11. (C) Sharif said that USG support was needed for the TFG\’s
planned military campaign. An AMISOM-backed TFG offensive in
Mogadishu would be complemented by ASWJ-led efforts in Hiraan
and Galgaduud regions, as well as the entry into battle of
troops currently being trained by Kenya. The TFG needed
ammunition, weapons, medical supplies, and communications
equipment in order to launch its offensive, Sharif said. All
regions had been contacted and were mobilizing elders and
women\’s groups. In addition to weapons and ammunition, local
militias needed food and pocket money. There was a severe
shortage of transport for the troops, as well as of medicine.
Sharif said that he was thinking of visiting the U.S. \”after
the military operations have succeeded.\”
Qualified \”Yes\” on Kenya\’s
Lower Juba Initiative
————————–
12. (C) Sharif offered a qualified \”yes\” when asked if he
supported the GOK\’s Lower Juba initiative. He had told the
GOK that the TFG did not want to see Somalia further divided.
That would create more problems than it would solve, he
added. The GOK had reassured the TFG that it also did not
want to see Somalia divided and that it intended to use the
troops now being trained in Kenya for a national not a
regional mission.
13. (C) Sharif believed that the ethnic Somali troops
currently in Isiolo, Kenya, were receiving good training but
did not have all of the equipment they needed. Sharif thought
that perhaps the USG could assist the Kenyan effort. He
concluded by noting that the enemy the TFG faced was global
and that defeating it should not be on the shoulders of the
TFG alone.
14. (C) A/S Carson hoped that the planned TFG offensive would
be successful. He said that he would confer with the
Ugandans about providing additional material resources. He
urged the TFG to suggest ideas for community support and
service delivery to USAID. USAID Acting Assistant
Administrator for Africa Earl Gast seconded AID\’s willingness
to work with the government in providing community services
and briefly previewed an upcoming contract with IOM that
could support the TFG\’s efforts.
Comment
——-
ADDIS ABAB 00000167 003 OF 003
15. (C) As he has in other, recent meetings, Sharif appeared
self-possessed and confident. His qualified willingness to
support the long-incubated Kenyan Lower Juba initiative at
this meeting was at variance with the skepticism he had
expressed to Somalia Unit in Nairobi about two weeks ago
(septel). At that time, he suggested that the troops in
training at Isiolo did not have broad-based clan
representation and speculated that it might be better to
bring them to Mogadishu and integrate them into existing TFG
security forces. He also in that meeting seemed more
skeptical of the GOK\’s ability to manage a cross-border
offensive.
Participants
————
16. (U) USG:
Undersecretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otiero
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson
NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michhelle Gavin
Ambassador to the African Union Michael Battle
Charge d\’affaires, Embassy Addis Ababa John Yates
USAID Acting Assistant Administrator for Africa Gast
Counselor for Somalia Affairs, Embassy Nairobi Patterson
(notetaker)
Somalia Transitional Federal Government:
President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan
Minister of Telecommunications Abdirizak Osman \”Jirile\”
President\’s Chief-of-Staff, Abdulkareem Jama (interpreter)
Member of Parliament Amina Mursal
YATES
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STATE FOR S/CT AND AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/08
TAGS: MCAP, MARR, PGOV, PREL, PTER, KE, SO
SUBJECT: S/CT AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN AND GOK OFFICIALS DISCUSS
SOMALIA, REGIONAL SECURITY AND BILATERAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
REF: 09 NAIROBI 2203; 09 DJIBOUTI 1391; 10 ADDIS ABABA 0166
CLASSIFIED BY: Samuel A. Madsen, POL EARSI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
————
1. (C) During a one-day visit to Kenya Ambassador-at-Large for
Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin discussed threats from Somalia,
Islamic extremism inside Kenya, border security and Kenya\’s
efforts to aid the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
Amb Benjamin met with George Saitoti, Minister of Interior and
Provincial Administration, and commanders of the Kenyan police and
intelligence services, as well as Brigadier Phillip Kameru Director
of Military Intelligence (DMI). All of the Kenyan officials
emphasized the threat that Kenya faces from Somalia and from
domestic radicalization, praised United States/Kenya
counterterrorism cooperation, and requested additional resources to
confront extremism and criminal activity. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Amb Benjamin met with George Saitoti, Minister of
Interior and Provincial Administration, January 29. Saitoti was
joined by Mathew Iteere, Commissioner of Police, Commandant K.
Mbugua, Administration Police (AP), MG Michael Gichangi, Director
General of the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), and
Nicholas Kamwende, Chief of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU).
The delegation met separately with Brigadier Phillip Kameru,
Director for Military Intelligence (DMI). Accompanying Amb
Benjamin to these meetings were Lee Brudvig, Nairobi Deputy Chief
of Mission, Mark Thompson, S/CT Deputy Coordinator for
Counterterrorism (Operations) , COL Rich Clarke, Joint Special
Operations Command, MAJ Craig Miller, Liaison to S/CT, and Samuel
Madsen, East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative Coordinator.
Matt Thompson, Defense Intelligence Agency Resident Analyst, also
accompanied the group to the meeting with the DMI.
Somalia Concerns
———————–
3. (C) Minister Saitoti noted that Kenya has seen Somalia as a
problem since 1991. The Government of Kenya (GOK) has tried to
help Somalia from time-to-time since then and fully supports the
TFG now. The activities of al-Shabaab inside Somalia are a major
concern for the GOK, particularly given Al Shabaab\’s links to
al-Qaida, foreign fighters and other radicals. An additional
concern is the 5000 to 6000 Somali refugees crossing into Kenya
each month, adding to the more than 360,000 who are already there.
The GOK is particularly worried that at least some of those
entering Kenya are extremists rather than refugees.
4. (C) In a related note, Saitoti said the GOK views the recent
case of the Jamaican extremist Abdullah al-Faisal, who entered
Kenya illegally from Tanzania, as destabilizing public harmony. He
claimed that radicals, including al-Shabaab, were behind violent
demonstrations in protest of al-Fisal\’s arrest.
5. (C) Saitoti also noted that Somali piracy has hurt Kenya. He
claimed proceeds from ransoms paid to Somali pirate syndicates are
being used to purchase expensive commercial and residential
properties in Kenya at inflated prices, thus affecting the Kenyan
economy by distorting the real estate market. In addition,
quantities of small arms and light weapons from Somalia are
entering the black market in Kenya. Saitoti appealed for greater
USG tactical and technical assistance for the Kenyan police, noting
that the ATPU is limited in size and capabilities and \”can\’t be
everywhere.\”
NAIROBI 00000147 002 OF 005
6. (C) Siatoti added that the GOK sees Somalia as a security
problem not just for Kenya but for the entire region. He referred
to the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam and the 2002 attacks on the Israeli owned hotel and airliner
in Mombasa as examples of the terrorist threat coming from Somalia.
The presence of al-Qaida operatives and foreign fighters in Somalia
are causing increased concern. Saitoti lamented that international
peacekeepers left Somalia in the mid 1990s, thus losing the
opportunity to \”resolve the situation\” years ago. He added that
the instability in and threats from Somalia are likely to get worse
if the problem is not resolved now. While the TFG is weak, Saitoti
said he believes they could do better with more help. However, the
international community has not adequately supported the TFG.
Unless the TFG receives increased international support al-Shabaab
is likely to defeat it eventually. Saitoti noted that the GOK has
proposed ways to assist the TFG, most recently with the Jubaland
Initiative (see reftels), which is intended to train and equip a
force of Somalis to drive al-Shabaab fighters from areas near the
Kenyan border (further discussed below).
Confronting Extremism Inside Kenya
——————————————— —
7. (C) Turning to Kenya\’s own concerns regarding religious
extremism, Saitoti stated that al-Shabaab\’s control over most of
southern Somalia reinforces the perception of TFG weakness and
allows al-Shabaab to spread its ideology freely. He noted that
Kenyan youth are susceptible to al-Shabaab propaganda if that
message is not countered. While most Kenyan Muslims and ethnic
Somali Kenyans are loyal citizens and reject extremism, Saitoti
declared there is still a need to show that extremist ideology is
false and wrong, particularly to the youth.
8. (C) Saitoti noted that Kenya faces serious economic
difficulties stemming from violence following the December 2007
presidential elections. Foreign investment and Kenya\’s vital
tourism industry both suffered large declines following the unrest
and recovery has been slow. The economic downturn has led to high
unemployment among youth in all communities. He believes youth are
easily misled by promises of opportunity from extremists. Saitoti
claimed the GOK is implementing youth programs to create jobs. He
did not offer details of specific programs but stated that these
efforts need USG assistance, either directly or through NGOs. He
observed that there is a particular need for micro financing
initiatives to empower youth and reduce the appeal of radical
ideologies.
NSIS Director Alarmed over Civil Society
——————————————— ——–
9. (C) Maj. Gen. Michael Gichangi, Director General of the
National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), noted that the GOK
is concerned by the global rise of radicalization, and fears this
could spread to Kenyans, particularly the growing youth population.
He stated that over the last seven years Kenya has developed a much
more open civil society. He expressed concern, however, that this
greater openness can be exploited by radicals and U.S. efforts to
support an open civil society can potentially \”create space\” for
extremists.
10. (C) Gichangi said the financial aid provided by the United
States and others to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating
in Kenya needs to be carefully monitored and directed in order to
prevent radicals from using these NGOs as covers for extremist
activities. He encouraged the United States to target carefully
its assistance to Kenyan civil society, suggesting that the USG
\”partner\” with the GOK in directing aid to civil society in order
to insure it does not go to radicals. He asked that the Embassy
share information with the GOK regarding which NGOs are currently
NAIROBI 00000147 003 OF 005
receiving assistance and specifically mentioned the Muslim Human
Rights Forum as an NGO he believes to be affiliated with Islamic
extremists. Saitoti endorsed MG Gichangi\’s remarks, noting that
terrorist front organizations operate around the world and the
United States and other donor nations must avoid empowering them.
Law Enforcement and Border Control
——————————————— —-
11. (C) Commissioner of Police Iteere noted that the border area
is made up of an ethnic Somali culture divided by the border. He
praised the aid provided through the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) program but said he needs more, particularly additional
resources such as equipment and vehicles to empower the ATPU. He
also said there is a need for increased resources for border
security, noting that the crossing point where Jamaican extremist
Faisal entered Kenya is not monitored around the clock and lacks
computer based systems for tracking entries and exits. Iteere also
pointed out that Kenya has supported the trial and imprisonment of
Somali pirates but these efforts pose a burden on the GOK.
12. (C) Administration Police (AP) Commandant Mbugua seconded
Iteere\’s appreciation for USG capacity-building assistance,
particularly the recent donation of patrol boats and the efforts by
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border
Protection to help train a new AP border patrol unit. He noted,
however, that the AP\’s border agents still lack basic equipment,
particularly vehicles and aircraft for border monitoring. Mbugua
stated that the international community and USG need to appreciate
that in confronting the problems of Somalia Kenya is dealing with
an international issue. The GOK has done what it can with existing
resources but requires more.
13. (C) Saitoti recommended that the United States and Kenya work
together to develop a joint strategy to address Somalia issues. He
concluded by stating that the GOK is committed to political and
security reforms. The violence that followed the 2007 elections
damaged Kenya\’s tradition of peace and acted as a wake-up call
regarding the need for reform. He said the GOK is committed to the
fundamental reforms now underway, including the new constitution
that has been drafted and is now undergoing the review process.
The Threat from Somalia and al-Shabaab\’s Motivation
——————————————— ———————-
—-
14. (C) Phillip Kameru, Director for Military Intelligence (DMI),
characterized Somalia as Kenya\’s primary foreign threat and noted
that the Kenyan military is working to improve security along the
border. Kameru claimed that the medical school bombing in
Mogadishu had reduced al-Shabaab\’s stature within Somalia, but top
leaders remain firmly committed to their course. There has been
some al-Shabaab recruitment inside Kenya, including at the Dadaab
refugee camp, particularly for local Somali clan militias. Most of
these recruits sign up with al-Shabaab for the pay as opposed to
ideological reasons. Al-Shabaab senior leaders obtain much of
their funds from the port of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab also skims money
and supplies from humanitarian assistance and charges tolls for
trucks carrying humanitarian aid and commercial cargo in areas
under their control.
15. (C) Maritime infiltration of suspected extremists from Somalia
has declined since mid-2009, largely due to increased patrolling by
the Kenyan Navy and Maritime Police Unit. Some infiltrators still
utilize existing smuggling routes. Many of these involve sailing
far out to sea then running straight into Kenyan ports, versus the
traditional infiltration routes through coastal areas.
NAIROBI 00000147 004 OF 005
16. (C) Kameru claimed there are signs of increasing
radicalization among rank-and-file al-Shabaab members, largely as a
result of proselytizing by Whabbists. While many al-Shabaab
fighters are still motivated by money, Kameru believes an
increasing number are fighting for ideological reasons. Al-Shabaab
is also working to indoctrinate the populace in areas under its
control.
17. (C) Kameru added that the DMI sees significant numbers of
Tanzanians, Ugandans and Kenyans among the foreigners fighting
alongside al-Shabaab. Many are Muslim converts who have been
radicalized. He also claimed to have seen evidence of non-Muslim
Nigerians working with al-Shabaab, although possibly not as
fighters. He said al-Shabaab members receive basic military
training from Somali al-Shabaab members and foreigners, but
specialized and advanced training is largely provided by the
foreign fighters.
The Jubaland Initiative
——————————
18. (C) Kameru extensively discussed the Kenyan government\’s
Jubaland Initiative, under which the Kenyan military is training
and equipping a force of Somalis whose mission will be to enter
Somalia and drive al-Shabaab militias away from the areas along the
Kenyan border. He began by stating that al-Shabaab views the
Kenyan government as a threat that it needs to deal with. He added
that the DMI expects al-Shabaab to begin cross border incursions
into Kenya and he claimed to have received reports indicating
al-Shabaab has plans to use improvised explosive devices and
landmines against security personnel and civilian traffic inside
Kenya. Kameru said there are other reports of al-Shabaab
stockpiling weapons in border regions.
19. (C) Kameru said Kenya wants to develop a buffer zone inside
Somalia to prevent al-Shabaab infiltration and incursions. He
claimed that the TFG agrees with the initiative because it wants to
reduce al-Shabaab pressure from the Juba region. In addition, many
in the region reject al-Shabaab\’s ideology and would like to see
them driven out.
20. (C) Kameru noted that the initiative cannot succeed as just a
military operation. A viable political process must be established
as follow-on to the military operations, he said. The force will
need the support of the local population in order to prevent a
prolonged guerrilla campaign. He also stated that, while Kenyan
military trainers are training the force in conventional military
tactics and operations, veteran Somali and TFG personnel are also
providing instruction in unconventional military tactics employed
by al-Shabaab.
21. (C) Kameru stated that the original Jubaland Initiative called
for 3000 trained fighters but only 2000 are now available. These
include 600 police and trained civil administrators to provide
security and government services following the operation. He added
that the DMI estimates al-Shabaab to have about 1000 to 1500
fighters in the Juba area and approximately 6000 nationwide.
According to Kameru, the GOK is also concerned about reports
indicating that al-Shabaab is activating old training camps in the
Juba region. If true this would allow al-Shabaab to mobilize and
train large numbers of additional fighters.
22. (C) Saitoti noted that he was aware of USG skepticism
regarding the Jubaland Initiative. He insisted, however, that
Kenya intends to press forward. He defended the program by
pointing out that Kenya shares a long, poorly defined border with
Somalia and sees a trend toward increasing numbers of Somali
NAIROBI 00000147 005 OF 005
refugees crossing into Kenya. The GOK is seriously concerned by
the possibility that Somali militants may be crossing the border
hidden among the refugees. He noted that the GOK is willing to
consider alternative USG proposals to the Jubaland Initiative.
23. (C) COMMENT: Amb Benjamin\’s interlocutors universally
emphasized that they view al-Shabaab and Somalia as their primary
external security threat and that external threat is interconnected
with the growing menace posed by domestic Islamic extremism. Post
shares these concerns and views Kenya as a vital partner in
regional counterterrorism efforts. However, post believes efforts
intended to counter extremism in Kenya must take place within a
framework of fundamental political, judicial and security sector
reform.
24. (U) Amb Benjamin did not clear this cable.
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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/10
TAGS: PREL, PTER, SO, SU, YM, DJ, ET, KE
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: FOREIGN MINISTER UPDATE ON SOMALIA
CLASSIFIED BY: J. Swan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. During a February 10 meeting with visiting
Director of the National Defense University\’s Africa Center for
Strategic Studies (ACSS) Ambassador William Bellamy, Djiboutian
Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf assessed the current
situation in Somalia with pragmatism, concern, and a hint of
impatience. Despite ongoing international, regional, and
Djiboutian support and advice to the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), Youssouf said, extremist activity was still on
the rise in Somalia, and directly threatened Djiboutian security
and economic interests. He cautioned that if Kenya decided to move
forward with its planned Jubaland initiative, Somalis would be
quick to use such \”interference\” as an excuse to foment unrest in
Nairobi. Djiboutian President Guelleh speaks with TFG President
Sharif nearly every day, Youssouf said, and counsels him to focus
on increasing security in Mogadishu, providing services to the
population, and ramping up public diplomacy efforts to counter
al-Shabaab\’s all-too-effective messaging. Briefly touching on
Sudan, Youssouf said that the Kenyans had asked for an
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) summit on the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement to be convened in two to three weeks\’
time, but said he had no further details. END SUMMARY.
—————————–
SOMALIA AND KENYA
—————————–
2. (C) Current levels of diplomatic and military assistance to the
TFG had not been enough to staunch rising extremist activity in
Somalia, Youssouf said. In addition to the direct threat to
Djibouti\’s economic installations and internal security, extremism
was increasingly endangering Yemen–and now Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula has threatened international shipping through the
Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Ambassador Bellamy noted Kenyans\’ growing
sense of urgency on countering extremist threats emanating from
Somalia. Youssouf said that the GOK\’s cooperation in combating
piracy had \”boomeranged\” back, with ethnic Somalis demonstrating in
Nairobi. Eldoret Airport has become a major point of entry for
goods smuggled from Somalia into Kenya, and could mask movement of
extremist-linked contraband, he added. Youssouf likened his
reaction to Kenya\’s Jubaland initiative to his fears about
Ethiopia\’s imminent involvement in Somalia in 2006. This kind of
\”interference\” can only have negative repercussions for Kenya
itself, he cautioned. Extremists would quickly turn such
intervention into an excuse for undermining Kenya\’s internal
security. On a positive note, Youssouf praised regional
coordination on Somalia policy. With the notable exception of
Eritrea, Somalia\’s Horn of Africa neighbors were much more focused
and coordinated on Somalia questions than they had been in some
years.
——————————————— ———————-
–
DJIBOUTI TO SHARIF: FOCUS ON THE POPULATION
——————————————— ———————-
–
3. (C) President Guelleh, Youssouf said, continued to speak by
telephone with TFG President Sheik Sharif nearly every day.
Guelleh was advising Sharif to focus primarily on security,
services for the population, and public outreach. The TFG needed
to control Mogadishu first, Youssouf stressed, moving beyond Villa
Somalia into other neighborhoods while an AMISOM cordon prevented
al-Shabaab from reinforcing. While dialogue remained important,
the TFG should negotiate from a position of strength, balancing the
carrot and the stick. Youssouf agreed with Ambassador Bellamy that
the TFG had to create momentum in the security arena, and then use
it to begin providing services to the population. He criticized a
recent TFG budget for devoting some 50 percent of resources to
security and another 20-30 percent to salaries, rather than
channeling more to basic services.
4 (C) \”Sustainable security of the government itself will stem from
the security of the population,\” Youssouf stressed. He agreed that
DJIBOUTI 00000165 002 OF 002
there was a danger the TFG could concentrate too much on surviving,
requesting additional troops for its own protection rather to help
start governing. President Sharif was a good leader, Youssouf
assessed, but right now Somalia might need more aggressive
decision-making. President Guelleh had already counseled President
Sharif to focus on governance instead of on keeping peace between
the clans. If Sharif could end his term by finishing the
constitution and securing 80 percent of Mogadishu, it would be a
good accomplishment. If Sharif just tries to mediate between the
clans, Youssouf warned, he could end up achieving
nothing–following in the footsteps of several of his predecessors.
Youssouf said that the TFG was still not doing nearly enough mass
outreach. In the wake of the December 3 Shamo Hotel attack, for
example, the TFG had broadcast only mourning recitations from the
Koran on its radio stations, missing out on a prime opportunity to
communicate to the population how extremist attacks hurt ordinary
Somalis.
——————————————— —
UPCOMING IGAD SUMMIT ON CPA?
——————————————— —
5. (C) In an aside on Sudan, Youssouf said that Kenya had recently
asked that an IGAD summit be convened in some two or three weeks to
discuss the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Youssouf said
that Djibouti had not yet received an invitation to the event with
specific dates. The December 2009 IGAD Ministerial meeting in
Djibouti had called for Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin
and Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa to travel to Khartoum and
Juba on an IGAD mission to consult the CPA signatories, but
Youssouf said that this trip had not occurred.
—————
COMMENT
—————-
6. (C) Along with the ongoing Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute,
Somalia remains the GODJ\’s central security concern. Beyond its
hosting of the Djibouti Process, the GODJ clearly remains committed
to supporting the TFG. In addition to helping train TFG recruits
and planning an AMISOM troop contribution, the GODJ also consults
regularly with the TFG leadership on its strategy. Like other GODJ
officials, Foreign Minister Youssouf has invested deeply in the
TFG\’s success. Yet as an ethnic Afar, his equities in Somalia are
largely professional rather than personal, and he sometimes betrays
exasperation over intractable Somali inter-clan struggles. END
COMMENT.
7. (U) Ambassador Swan and POL/ECONOff Hunter (notetaker) also
participated in this meeting. ACSS Director Ambassador Bellamy did
not have an opportunity to clear this cable before departing post.
SWAN
Raw – Jubaland 3
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2020
TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PREL, AU-1
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: MUSEVENI\’S MUSINGS ON AFRICAN
CONFLICTS, FAMILY VALUES
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Battle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle.
1. (U) January 31, 2010; 5:00 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
2. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Under Secretary Maria Otero
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson
NSC Senior Africa Advisor Michelle Gavin
Special Envoy Scott Gration
Special Advisor Howard Wolpe
Deputy Special Advisor Jim Yellin
USAU Ambassador Michael Battle
USAU Military Advisor Ellington (notetaker)
Uganda
President Yoweri Museveni
Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa
3. (C) Summary. In a free-ranging conversation on the margins
of the African Union (AU) Summit in Addis Ababa, Ugandan
President Museveni told the American delegation that while
the situation in Sudan is worrisome, it is not without hope.
He advised that issues like border demarcation and wealth
distribution be addressed immediately, given the likelihood
of the South becoming independent, and offered regional
assistance in building southern capacity in governance and
development. On Kenya\’s Jubaland Initiative in Southern
Somalia, Museveni questioned Kenya\’s bush-fighting
credentials and the ideological commitment of its Somali
proxies. He advised the West to pay and develop Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) fighters rather than the much more
expensive and less effective options of funding international
peacekeepers and counterpiracy operations. He pledged
continued regional oversight of Burundi\’s peace process as it
approaches elections this year, and promised that no Ugandan
would be executed for homosexual behavior. End Summary.
Sudan: \”I want to see that general . . .\”
—————————————–
4. (C) In a meeting with the USG delegation, Uganda President
Yoweri Museveni discussed a range of regional developments.
On Sudan, he characterized Uganda as a \”lonely frontline
state,\” having been abandoned in its support of the Sudan
People\’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) by Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Museveni thanked General Gration for touching base with him
on Sudan, and welcomed Gration\’s proposed visit to Uganda.
5. (C) Museveni reported that Government of South Sudan
(GOSS) President Salva Kiir is \”worried.\” Museveni indicated
that southern independence was highly likely and advised that
contentious issues like border demarcation and wealth
distribution must be addressed immediately. Museveni
welcomed Gration\’s pledge that the USG will respect and
support the South\’s decision on independence. Whether or not
the referendum results in southern independence, Museveni
said that South Sudan must develop economically. The
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should play
a vital role in South Sudan\’s development, he said, just as
IGAD had birthed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement at
Naivasha. Museveni agreed that South Sudan lacks technical
capacity, but suggested that Uganda and other neighbors have
qualified and underemployed technocrats and bureaucrats who
could help South Sudan govern and develop. Already, Uganda
has many teachers working in South Sudan, said Museveni.
Somalia: Kenya\’s Jubaland Initiative
————————————
6. (U) A/S Carson thanked Museveni for the sacrifices Uganda
continues to make in support of the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), acknowledging that the TFG\’s success is due
in large part to Uganda\’s protection. Carson applauded
Uganda\’s training initiative for TFG troops and committed to
support the deployment of its fourth battalion.
ADDIS ABAB 00000280 002 OF 003
\”Freedom fighters, not employees\”
———————————
7. (C) Responding to Carson\’s question about Kenya\’s proposed
Jubaland Initiative, Museveni acknowledged the operational
value of seizing Kismayo and, more broadly, denying
al-Shabaab\’s access to sea and airports. However, Museveni
questioned the capacity of the Kenyans to manage such an
offensive, as well as the ideological commitment of the
Somali proxy forces. Fighting, said Museveni, is foremost
ideological, especially in a stateless conflict. The Armed
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo face a similar
challenge, said Museveni. Their problem is that they are not
fighting for a cause. Would Somali fighters participating in
the Jubaland Initiative be a liberation movement or an
extension of the Kenyan Army? Museveni characterized the
Kenyan Armed Forces as a \”career army,\” questioning their
liberation credentials and wondering about their ability to
sustain bush fighters. \”Is Kenya used to fighting like this?
Would Kenya be able to provide logistical support to its
Somali allies?\”
8. (C) Carson wondered if Somali fighters sponsored by Kenya
would be loyal to the TFG, or switch allegiances to the Ahlus
Sunnah wal Jammah (ASWJ) or another group. Carson told
Museveni that the Ethiopian government originally had
concerns that a Kenyan-sponsored Somali force might
eventually shift its support to the Oromo National Liberation
Front (ONLF), but that Prime Minister Meles now seemed
comfortable there are control measures to preclude such a
force from meddling in the Ogaden.
Shabaab vs. AMISOM
——————
9. (C) Museveni expressed hope in the fact that almost four
years hence the extremists still have not organized
themselves. Despite all the time and space, the Shabaab\’s
structure and capacity remain weak. They don\’t have deep
roots, said Museveni. They are gunmen only. Carson
countered saying that Shabaab\’s destructive nature had
nonetheless transformed a local problem into a regional and
international one, citing refugee flows, rampant piracy, and
safe haven for violent Islamic extremism. Museveni stated
that this situation is reversible, and that with sufficient
military force al-Shabaab can be driven from the major towns
in south-central Somalia where they would wither in the
countryside.
10. (C) Carson said the USG would continue to help build
AMISOM\’s capacity, and saluted Djibouti\’s recent troop
contribution. He solicited Museveni\’s assistance in getting
more African governments to pledge peacekeepers, and stated
that the USG is encouraging the AU and its partners to raise
AMISOM troop allowances to UN standards.
11. (C) Museveni pushed back saying that the international
community\’s money would be better spent on training and
paying the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) for a year.
It\’s cheaper than the UN, said Museveni. Plus, the Somalis
would eventually develop more ideological commitment to
liberation than would an international force. In the
meantime, the TFG must be able to pay its fighters until they
can galvanize ideologically. \”How much are you spending on
ships which don\’t control piracy?\” Spend that money instead
on developing a SNAF of 20,000 personnel, concentrating on
small unit leadership. Solve the problems on the land and
the piracy issue will go away, said Museveni.
Burundi
——-
13. (C) Wolpe commended Museveni\’s shepherding of the Burundi
peace process over the years, but warned of a void in
international oversight of the peace process with the
dismissal of Head of United Nations Integrated Office in
Burundi (BINUB) Youssef Mahmoud and the withdrawal of the
ADDIS ABAB 00000280 003 OF 003
South African protection mission. Wolpe also identified the
need for a facilitation mechanism should intervention be
required during the election period. Wolpe suggested that
the East African Community (EAC) might be able to partner
with Burundi in establishing such a framework. On the
positive side, Burundian President Nkurunziza wants the
maximum amount of international observers for the elections
as early as he can get them.
14. (U) Museveni admitted that he had not been closely
following events in Burundi, but promised to follow up
saying, \”we\’ll ensure there are no problems.\” Museveni
identified police training as critical in the run-up to the
elections.
African Family Values
———————
15. (U) Carson expressed gratitude that Museveni had tamped
down the tensions surrounding Uganda\’s draft
anti-homosexuality bill. Both Carson and Otero encouraged
Museveni to pursue decriminalization and destigmatization of
homosexuality. Museveni warned outsiders of pushing Africa
too hard on this issue, lest it create another hurricane, and
lectured on African family values. He assured the USG
delegation that nobody in Uganda would be executed for
homosexual behavior, but explained that in the African
context homosexuality is a disorder and not something to be
promoted or celebrated. Don\’t push it, warned Museveni,
\”I\’ll handle it.\”
Comment
——-
16. (U) Museveni was confident, amiable, and entirely lucid,
if not verbose at times. The exchange was quintessentially
Museveni as he wove wit, wisdom, scripture, and at times
gentle chastisement into his analysis of the region\’s
security challenges. Featuring prominently were several of
his standard themes, like the danger of Islamic extremism
penetrating Black Africa and Uganda\’s prominent role as a
frontline state, as well as the critical role of subregional
organizations in addressing problems and lessons in
liberation theology.
17. (U) A/S Carson has cleared this cable.
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/11
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, SU, SO, KE
SUBJECT: ASD Vershbow Visit Highlights Regional Security Issues
CLASSIFIED BY: Mitchell Benedict, Political Counselor, DOS, POL;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: During separate January 26 meetings, Assistant
Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow met with Prime Minister
Raila Odinga, Defense Minister Yussuf Haji, Chief of Defense
Jeremiah Kianga, and Interior Minister George Saitoti. PM Odinga
expressed serious concern over regional instability emanating from
Somalia and emphasized that the international community has not
acted with resolve as needed. The PM was equally concerned about
the potential for Sudanese instability before and after the 2011
referendum. Minister Haji expressed his appreciation for defense
cooperation and offered new details on Kenya\’s proposed \”Jubaland
Initiative\” in Southern Somalia. Kenyan officials expressed
concern over spillover of violence from Somalia and the flow of
Somali refugees into Kenya. END SUMMARY.
USG-KENYA: STRONG PARTNERSHIP
2. (C) ASD Vershbow thanked Prime Minister Odinga and Defense
Minister Haji for Kenya\’s strong partnership with the United
States-including access to facilities, collaboration with the U.S.
to combat terrorism within the Horn of Africa, and Kenya\’s active
role in regional peacekeeping. ASD Vershbow stated that the U.S.
appreciates the grave threat to Kenya\’s security stemming from
instability in Somalia and that we share much of Kenya\’s threat
analysis. Emphasizing the importance of reform and change in Kenya,
the ASD told PM Odinga the U.S. wants to work with Kenya to address
problems emanating from Somalia and Sudan but that in order to be
\”a strong partner of yours, we also need for Kenya to be a strong
country.\” PM Odinga , citing the recent POTUS telephone calls to
Nairobi, expressed confidence that his government will find
solutions to their internal political problems so that cooperation
with the U.S. can continue. He expressed gratitude for U.S.
assistance adding that \”we wait to see more.\” ASD Vershbow assured
PM Odinga that the US is very interested in Kenya\’s success and
wants to see our relationship strengthened.
SOMALIA
3. (C) PM Odinga stated that worsening conditions in Somalia are
of serious concern to Kenya and that instability in Somalia is
causing instability in Kenya. He stated that for humanitarian
reasons the border with Somalia will unofficially remain open
despite the flow of thousands of refugees and arms. He assessed
that allowing the TFG to completely collapse would result in a
grave situation. He stated that should the TFG fall, al-Shabaab
would fill the void. Minister Saitoti said he believes that
current levels of assistance directed to the TFG are inadequate and
that a significant effort should be made to provide more money and
technical assistance. Saitoti urged the ASD to explore ways to
build capacity of the TFG.
4. (C) Minister of Defense Haji explained that the border between
Kenya and Somalia was of significant concern. He stated that Kenya
was deploying additional resources to their eastern border.
Minister Saitoti also expressed particular concern over Kenya\’s
border security. He commented that Kenya was receiving 6,000
refugees monthly and outlined major security, economic and
environmental implications of the flow. Saitoti said that ethnic
Somalis are competing for scarce employment opportunities
throughout Kenya and having a negative impact on the tourism
industry. Saitoti pointed out the environmental degradation
occurring near refugee camps as Kenya\’s forests were being torn
down for use as firewood.
KENYA\’S JUBALAND INITIATIVE
5. (C) Minister Haji and General Kianga made the case for their
proposed Jubaland initiative and asked for our \”understanding and
support.\” Kenya has begun to train up to 2,000 Somalis to be
deployed against al-Shabaab in Lower and Upper Juba. Addressing
U.S. concerns about coordination with the TFG, Kenyan officials
claimed that the TFG had requested the initiative, that political
NAIROBI 00000159 002 OF 003
accommodation between Jubaland and TFG authorities was being worked
out, and that the TFG is now recruiting all fighters. The TFG has
spoken with many voices on the Jubaland initiative. In our most
recent conversation with him, President Sharif provided a qualified
endorsement to Department of State Assistant Secretary Carson on
the margins of the AU Summit on January 31. Post will continue to
monitor closely TFG views on Kenya\’s Jubaland initiative. Kenyan
officials also emphasized their strategic focus on denying
al-Shabaab control of the Kismayo port, a key logistics hub. ASD
Vershbow agreed that training additional TFG forces was important,
but told Ministers Haji and Saitoti that while \”you have our
understanding, you do not yet have our support.\”
6. (C) Minister Saitoti and Minister Haji pointed out that the
international community was assisting both Uganda and Djibouti to
trained TFG forces, but was not willing to assist Kenya. Haji
asserted that \”Kenya deserves to be assisted as Uganda and Djibouti
were assisted.\” Minister Saitoti, sensing no change to U.S.
reluctance to support their Jubaland initiative, noted pointedly
that the United States has as of yet been unable to propose an
alternative strategy to Kenya\’s Jubaland initiative.
EXTREMIST THREATS
7. (C) Both Minister Haji and Minister Saitoti raised concerns
about the increasing presence of foreign fighters in Somalia.
General Kianga believes that Somalia is becoming a \”sanctuary\” for
foreign terrorists. They believe that al-Shabaab is working
closely with AQ and others to increase foreign fighters in the
region. They stated that \”if al-Shabaab is not contained, Kenya
will have a very serious situation to deal with.\”
SUDAN
8. (C) The Kenyan leadership is very concerned about the potential
for instability caused by expected deterioration in relations
between North and South Sudan. PM Odinga reaffirmed that Kenyan
relations with both the North and the South were stable,
highlighting the unresolved North/South border issue as a likely
future friction point. He stated that there needs to be a peaceful
process between the North and South to demarcate the border, and
that countries in the region should urge Sudan to address the
border issue before the upcoming referendum. He also believes that
building governance capacity in South Sudan is critical. He stated
that the North continues to arm itself and that the South needs
military supplies, equipment, and training. ASD Vershbow agreed
there are significant challenges associated with the upcoming
referendum and that the U.S. and Kenya need to work closely to
minimize regional effects. PM Odinga believes that the road ahead
will be rough because he does not see adequate resolve in Khartoum
for a peaceful post-referendum Sudan.
9. (C) Odinga raised the standstill concerning Southern Sudanese
tanks in Kenya. Odinga asserted that the North is heavily armed and
that the South is looking for ways to protect themselves. ASD
Vershbow told Odinga that he was optimistic that a mutually
agreeable solution could be found.
PIRACY
10. (C) PM Odinga and Minister Saitoti briefly discussed Somalia
piracy and its effects on Kenya. PM Odinga mentioned that piracy
money flow has distorted commodity and real estate prices in Kenya,
and that imports and exports premium. Describing mainland Somalia
as a \”reservoir\” for piracy, Odinga emphasized the need to \”plug
the source\” and asserted that piracy should be fought on land,
rather than the high seas. Minister Saitoti stated that Kenya
needs help taking care of Somali pirates in Kenyan prisons.
NAIROBI 00000159 003 OF 003
11. (U) ASD Vershbow cleared this cable.
RANNEBERGER
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SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS: PREL, EAID, KE, XW, ECON, EINV, ENRG, EFIN, PGOV, CH, PINR
SUBJECT: Chinese Engagement in Kenya
REF: 10 STATE 10152
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Walton, Economics Officer, State, Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B), (C), (D)
1. (S/NF) Summary: China\’s engagement in Kenya continues to grow
exponentially. China enjoys a large trade surplus with Kenya;
exports increased by more than 25 percent a year from 2004 to 2008.
The China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) is drilling for oil
in the Isiolo region. China may be a potential partner in the
development of the new mega-port at Lamu. In addition, China is
heavily involved in various infrastructure projects across Kenya
primarily with roads. China is also providing weapons to the GOK
in support of its Somalia policies and increasing their involvement
with the Kenyan National Security and Intelligence Service (NSIS)
by providing telecommunications and computer equipment. Recently,
China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with
the GOK providing new development grants. To date, China and the
U.S. do not collaborate on development projects in Kenya. End
summary.
2. (U) China enjoys a large trade surplus with Kenya, exporting
more than 30 times its imports. For 2008, China exported $917
million of goods to Kenya while China imported $29 million worth of
Kenyan goods. China\’s exports in 2008 grew by 39 percent over 2007
capping the fourth straight year of at least 25 percent export
growth, including a 54 percent increase in 2007 and a 79 percent
increase in 2005. China is now the third largest exporter to Kenya
after the United Arab Emirates, which principally exports oil to
Kenya, and India. In comparison, the U.S. exported $440 million
worth of goods to Kenya in 2008 while importing $343 million worth
of Kenyan goods.
3. (U) The CNOOC is drilling for oil in the Isiolo region of Kenya
(see ref A). The exploratory well will cost $26 million dollars
and drilling will be complete in April 2010. Numerous oil
companies have drilled 31 exploratory wells in Kenya over the last
50 years without success. However, CNOOC is making a credible
effort to find oil in an area geologically similar to Southern
Sudan, with its substantial oil finds. As reported ref A, we had
heard that CNOOC would announce results from the exploratory well
by January 2010; we are now hearing an announcement may come in
April.
4. (U) The GOK is highly interested in developing a major port
complex in Lamu, which has much greater potential as a deep water
port than Mombasa. The GOK originally held discussions with Qatar
over the development of the Lamu port in return for a substantial
allocation of farm land. Negotiations involving development of the
Lamu port reportedly occur inside the \”black box\” of President
Kibaki\’s inner circle at State House. We understand, however, that
talks with Qatar are off, and that the Chinese are in play as a
potential partner for the port development project and associated
regional infrastructure (road and rail infrastructure to Southern
Sudan and Ethiopia, and pipeline infrastructure to Southern Sudan
and Uganda). China\’s interest in the Lamu project is reportedly
linked to the presence of oil in Southern Sudan and Uganda which
could be exported via Lamu as well as the greater export potential
to Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Uganda. The addition of oil from
Isiolo would add additional impetus to China\’s interest in the port
development which is estimated to cost more than $5 billion.
5. (SBU) China is currently developing a number of infrastructure
projects in Kenya. Currently, China Wuyi, Syno Hydro, and China
Overseas Engineering Corporation are working on the Thika Road
project, a major eight lane highway from Nairobi to Thika town.
Another Chinese firm, Shengli Engineering & Consulting Company was
the prime contractor for the Mombasa-City Centre-Gigiri road
upgrade project. In addition, the second phase of a project to
upgrade the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) is being
worked by China National Aero-Technology International Engineering
Company (CATIC). The first phase of the project was completed by
the Chinese company, China Wu Yi. TBEA International, another
Chinese firm, is developing a 120 MW thermal plant in Longonot and
600 MW coal-fired power station in Mombasa as an independent power
producer. TBEA is also undertaking projects that involve
construction of 132 kV lines and sub-stations in the Rift Valley,
Central, Western and Coast provinces. During a recent visit to the
Olkaria geothermal development site in the Rift Valley Province,
Econoff observed that Great Wall Drilling, another Chinese company,
was exploring for geothermal energy. The KenGen Olkaria Geothermal
Development Manager told Econoff that while he would prefer to buy
quality American drills, pipes, and other geothermal-related
products, American companies could not compete with China on price
and price won every time in Kenya.
6. (S/NF) In January 2010, the GOK received from the GOC via CATIC
weapons, ammunition, supplies, and textiles for making uniforms in
support of the GOK\’s Jubaland initiative.
7. (S/NF) As of late August 2009, Telkom Kenya awarded Zhongxing
Telecommunications Equipment Company (ZTE) a contract to provide
landline telephone monitoring equipment to the NSIS. Telkom Kenya
awarded the contract to ZTE after being pressured to do so by the
NSIS Director General Michael Gichangi and the NSIS Director of
Operations Division Joseph Kamau. Gichangi\’s preference for ZTE is
based on kickbacks he received from the company while on a visit to
China. Kamau received monthly payments of over $5000 from ZTE
which were used to pay medical bills.
8. (S/NF) As of September 2008, ZTE was building e-Government
infrastructure on the NSIS headquarters compound. The project
involved a secure network for Kenyan e-Government activities,
including software and computer-based security, and a two-story
complex that would house the entire Kenyan governments\’ network
files. As of early March 2009, Chinese technicians were working on
a project in the basement of the NSIS headquarters. The presence
of the technicians was well known throughout the NSIS and was
causing some concern over the level of cooperation between the NSIS
and its Chinese counterparts.
9. (U) The GOK and GOC recently signed an Economic and Technical
Cooperation Agreement. The agreement provides a $7.3 million grant
from China to Kenya. Of the grant, $150,000 will finance a
computer program for the Ministry of Finance while the remaining
funds can be used by the GOK to fund development projects of their
choice. The agreement also covered Chinese funding of feasibility
studies for the potential development of Lamu port. In addition,
China committed to funding portions of the Northern Corridor road
project, which links Mombasa and Nairobi to Ethiopia and Southern
Sudan, as well as parts of the new Mombasa-Kampala standard gauge
railway. Currently, China\’s Shengli Engineering Construction is
refurbishing The Moi International Sports Complex at Kasarani with
$12.8 million of grant-in-aid money from China. In Early 2009,
China provided a $1 million grant to the GOK for the construction
of a 100 bed hospital in Nairobi. In 2008, the GOK received
approximately $381 million in interest-free and preferential loans,
with $145 million intended for the planned ring roads aimed at
decongesting Nairobi. Since 2008, the GOK has implemented
campaigns to attract investment from the $1 billion China-Africa
Development Fund.
10. (U) China\’s companies working in Kenya tend to import a
substantial number of Chinese workers. This importation of labor
from China tends to limit the number of Kenyans who directly
benefit with wages and knowledge transfer from the projects. The
low Chinese bids on major projects also push local firms out of the
process, especially in infrastructure areas where capacity building
of local firms would be useful. In addition, the Kenya Wildlife
Service (KWS) noticed a marked increase in poaching wherever
Chinese labor camps were located and in fact set up specific
interdiction efforts aimed to reduce poaching (see ref B). KWS
also reports that 90% of the ivory smugglers detained at JKIA are
Chinese nationals.
11. (U) The U.S. mission in Kenya has no current or pending
development partnership arrangements with the GOC or any informal
collaboration at the program or project level. The GOC does not
participate in donor coordination in Kenya. Donors have encouraged
the GOK to bring China into the donor coordination process, but no
progress has been made to date. While we do not recommend it, a
potential area for collaboration could include agricultural
development, a USG strength and an area of Chinese interest in
Africa. However, the GOC does not participate in the multilateral
agricultural donors group in Kenya. The GOC could be invited to
join this donors group, predicated on their willingness to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding ensuring their support of Kenya\’s long
term agriculture strategy. The World Bank recently announced a new
initiative to work in cooperation with Chinese infrastructure
development in Africa. This new effort seems to be aimed at
working with China and African countries to maximize the benefits
of Chinese development aid to the African people.
12. (SBU) Comment: Collaboration between the USG and China in Kenya
should be approached cautiously as there appears to be little
dovetailing of our interests to date. The GOC has been silent on
the implementation of the reform agenda, which we consider
essential to Kenya\’s future stability and prosperity; the GOC turns
a blind eye to the flooding of the Kenyan market with Chinese
counterfeit goods, such as batteries, which directly damage U.S.
market share here; and the GOC has not demonstrated any commitment
to curb ivory poaching. We expect China\’s engagement in Kenya to
continue to grow given Kenya\’s strategic location. If oil or gas
is found in Kenya, this engagement will likely grow even faster.
Kenya\’s leadership may be tempted to move ever closer to China in
an effort to shield itself from Western, and principally U.S.,
pressure to reform. Given the possibility of a backlash by the
Kenyan people against China, perhaps over the issue of imported
Chinese labor or mishandling of natural resources, there may be
benefits to keeping our distance, at least publicly, from China.
RANNEBERGER
US aid for Kenya, Jubaland urged in offensive on pirates
By KEVIN KELLEY
Posted Monday, May 16 2011 at 00:00
The United States should provide judicial aid to Kenya and military aid to the Kenya-supported Jubaland entity inside Somalia as part of a more aggressive response to piracy, a US senator urged last week.
Unless these and additional moves are made, “We will see a huge increase in terrorism from Al Qaeda affiliates that feed off pirate ransoms,” declared Senator Mark Kirk, who also serves as an intelligence officer in the US Naval Reserve.
Kirk’s recommendations coincide with recent warnings by Obama administration officials regarding the worsening plague of piracy in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.
A number of analysts are calling for stepped-up US actions against pirates.
In a report issued following a week-long fact-finding visit to three East African countries, including Somalia, Kirk cites a Kenyan government estimate that about 30 per cent of ransoms paid to Somali pirates are funneled to Al Qaeda and the Somali Islamist group Al Shabaab. That amounts to more than $50 million a year, Kirk says.
Piracy in the waters off the Horn and East Africa is becoming ever more lucrative, Kirk said.
The average ransom paid for a seized ship grew from $1.3 million to $5.4 million in the past three years, with pirates paid a total of $178 million during that period, added the Republican senator from the state of Illinois.
Pirates are currently holding 23 ships and 483 sailors, Kirk said.
His report calls for giving naval commanders the authority to attack pirate “mother ships.”
Kirk also wants US and European forces to blockade three primary pirate ports and shorelines.
He proposes US military assistance to a variety of factions in Somalia, including forces in Jubaland, to capture territory currently controlled by Al Shabaab or by pirates.
Kirk notes that Jubaland, which declared its autonomy in April, “is intended to serve as a buffer state between war-torn central Somalia, Al Shabaab and the Kenyan border.”
Kenya is providing military assistance to Jubaland, he says, but such aid has so far proven ineffective.
Kenya, which is holding 122 suspected or convicted pirates, should be given help to expand its judicial and prison capacity, Kirk says.
“Kenya in particular has expressed concern that it is carrying a heavier burden than others in the region and is not receiving the financial, technical and physical support that it requires from the United States and others in the international community,” Kirk states.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201105090038.html
The Nation (Nairobi)
Kenya: MPs Support Plans to Create a Buffer Zone
Muchiri Karanja
8 May 2011
Nairobi — MPs from North Eastern Province are unanimous in their support for the creation of a buffer zone separating their region from its volatile neighbours.
Instability in the neighbouring Somali, they say, translates to instability in their constituencies.
Mandera Central MP Abdikadir Hussein Mohamed says anything that helps stabilise the neighbouring Somalia is a welcome initiative.
“Whatever they call it, whether Jubaland, or Puntland, whichever set up, so long as it will address the issue of terrorism that is taking root on the (Somali) side, is welcome,” says Mr Mohamed.
Fafi MP Sugow Ahmed Aden says that his constituents, who are hosting a big chunk of the Somali refugees, mostly from the Juba area, look forward to the creation of Jubaland.
“But if the Jubaland initiative backfires, then the refugee crisis might expand, along with the problem of illicit arms,” says Mr Aden. “The initiative will need a lot of support from the Kenyan government and the rest of the world.”
Former Fafi MP Elias Bare Shill agrees. Kenya, he argues, has let other neighbouring countries play big brother in the Somali crisis for too long.
Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, he argues, are already playing active roles in stabilising Somali.
“The Jubaland initiative will be Kenya’s first major attempt to reassert its influence in a country that has posed a major social and security nightmare for the last two decades,” says Mr Shill. “Jubaland will not just help us with security, it will open the trade route between Kismayu and Garissa.”
According to the former MP, Kenya must formulate a clear foreign policy for handling Somalia, if the Jubaland initiative is to succeed.
The plan is for Kenya to support Jubaland in the southwestern most part of Somalia to follow in the footsteps of the breakaway Somaliland and gain autonomy.
The establishment of the semi-autonomous region of Jubaland in Somalia has confirmed reports by the whistle blowing Wiki Leaks website that Kenya had backed the initiative to act as a buffer zone and prevent the entry of refugees and illegal arms into the country.
Residents of North-Eastern Province, like Abdisalan Maalim AbdiRahman from Mandera Town, who is still nursing scars from stray mortar bombs in the most recent fighting across the border, have welcomed the establishment of the semi-autonomous region.
The Ethiopian forces might have routed al Shabaab from the neighbouring Somali town of Bela Hawa, but according to Mr AbdiRahman, this does not guarantee that stray mortars and bullets will stop whistling into Mandera Town.
“As long as there is fighting across the border, we will never know peace in Mandera,” he says.
Should a buffer zone be established, then the al Shabaab guns and mortar will be driven deep inside Somalia, far from the thin borderline that currently separates residents of Mandera from the battlefields of the Somali town of Bela Hawa.
But the plan is facing some opposition from the Ethiopians. According to Wikileaks, the Ethiopians doubt Kenya’s tactical capacity to execute the idea given the strong presence of al Shabaab rebels in Jubaland.
In a cable dated February 2, 2010, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi expressed a lack of confidence on Kenya’s ability to succeed with the plan.
Mr Meles told three high-ranking US officials of “negative regional impacts” in case the initiative fails.
The al Shabaab too is not keen on losing control of Jubaland to a Kenyan-backed government.
Still, the initiative is beginning to take shape. A new regional authority of Jubaland has been formed by members of the local communities.
But there are challenges. Former Somali Defence minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed is yet to be sworn in as the president of Jubaland days after he was named the leader of the semi-autonomous region.
This is because the region’s parliament and Cabinet have not been put in place.
Instead, Mr Mohammed was sworn in as the convener of the Juba initiative, which aspires to fully control the region in Somalia’s southwest.
On Wednesday, a section of Somali elders supportive of the creation of Jubaland said they were planning to petition the president of Somalia’s Transitional Federation Government, Sheikh Shariff Ahmed, to support their initiative.
This was one of the resolutions reached at the end of a major conference held in Nairobi.
Copyright © 2011 The Nation. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com).
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SOMALIA: UK SET TO PUT RESOURCES TO NEW POLICY
Passed to the Telegraph by WikiLeaks
9:03PM GMT 04 Feb 2011
Ref ID: 10LONDON89
Date: 1/15/2010 16:04
Origin: Embassy London
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Destination: 09LONDON2435
Header: VZCZCXRO9672PP RUEHROV RUEHTRODE RUEHLO #0089/01 0151604ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 151604Z JAN 10FM AMEMBASSY LONDONTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4639INFO RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA PRIORITYRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1530RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITYRUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Tags: PREL,PGOV,KTFN,KPKO,SO,UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000089 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E NAIROBI FOR SOMALIA UNIT DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PSC (JEAN CLARK) E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2020 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KTFN, KPKO, SO, UK SUBJECT: SOMALIA: UK SET TO PUT RESOURCES TO NEW POLICY REF: 09 LONDON 2435 Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1.(C/NF) Summary. Foreign office officials anticipate receiving ministerial approval on January 18 for a new resource package for Somalia, which will include GBP 9 million (USD 14.4 million) in new assistance funds and authorization for creation of a “shadow embassy” for Somalia based in Nairobi. The UK plans to increase its dialogue and development assistance with Somaliland and Puntland and also hopes to establish a means of allowing regular visits throughout Somalia. The UK “absolutely supports” sanctions against al-Shabaab, but wants to make sure it is done right. The emerging preference in the Foreign Office appears to be for a humanitarian carve-out through the Somalia Sanction Monitoring Group’s mandate, which is up for renewal in March. On Kenya’s Jubaland initiative, the Foreign Office remains pessimistic and would like to consider a joint U.S.-UK demarche to the Kenyans. At the end January, an Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) delegation will visit London to meet with Somali Diaspora groups, and the Foreign Office will meet them. Planning is underway for the EU training mission, which would train 1,000 individuals in two tranches in Uganda over 12 months. Potiential obstacles, however, remain: salaries, command-and-control issues, and logistics. The UK sees selecting a replacement for UN Special Representative Ould Abdullah as critical; it will be important to have someone who is a good manager and who can corral the international community and donors’ efforts. If approved, the UK’s new resources for Somalia will represent a significant shift in the UK’s Somalia policy, especially in a resource-scarce environment, where funding for many of the UK’s programs around the world is being reduced. End summary.
2.(C/NF) The UK Cabinet Sub-Committee on Africa will consider for final approval on January 18 a new resource package for the UK’s new policy focus on Somalia (reftel), Foreign Office Somalia Unit head Gill Atkinson told Poloff on January 14. Given previous statements of support, Atkinson anticipates ministers will approve the proposed package. If approved, the UK’s new resources for Somalia will represent a significant shift in the UK’s Somalia policy, especially in a resource-scarce environment, where funding for many of the UK’s programs around the world is being reduced.
The New Support Package – Money and People ——————————————
3.(C/NF) The new package will include GBP 9 million (USD 14.4 million) of conflict prevention funding, which Atkinson anticipates will be used to support AMISOM, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Somaliland and Puntland authorities, and other development initiatives. Ministers will also consider creation of a “shadow embassy” for Somalia, to be based in Nairobi. The office will be headed by a counselor-level UK diplomat and will possibly include one to two reporting officers, a development assistance officer from the Department of International Development (DFID), and a military attache for the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Additionally, ministers will consider approval of a proposal that will allow for regular visits to Somalia. Atkinson noted that the UK Government is still working to find internal funding for the visits, given that the security detail requirements will be very expensive.
Jubaland ——–
4.(C/NF) Atkinson said that the Foreign Office can see the potential attraction for the Kenyans to pursue their Jubaland initiative, but that the UK does not think it will be successful. The UK is interested to know if the USG sees merit in jointly demarching the Kenyans about not pursuing it. If the Kenyans insist, Atkinson suggested that a proposal be made to the Kenyans for a long-term reconciliation process that would result in military/para-military activities only if needed and in the context of reconciliation talks. Atkinson said that Baroness Kinnock, during her on-going visit to Kenya, plans to speak with both TFG President Sheikh Sharif and the Kenyans about the Jubaland initiative, mainly to assess where they have gotten to in their thinking before taking a decision on the UK position about it. Additionally, the British Embassy in Ethiopia is making similar inquires with the Ethiopia LONDON 00000089 002 OF 003 authorities.
Somaliland and Puntland – Supporting Stability ——————————————— –
5.(C/NF) Practically speaking, Atkinson said that the UK Government had not increased its dialogue with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland. She said they hope to after ministers have approved the new resources. Additionally, they plan to start development assistance cooperation with both regional authorities. Atkinson said the UK wants to “support stability” where it is in Somalia.
Meeting with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) ——————————————
6.(C/NF) An ASWJ delegation will be visiting London at the end of January for engagement with the Somali Diaspora in the UK, and Atkinson said the Foreign Office plans to take the opportunity to meet with the delegation. The main objectives of the meeting will be to discuss the ASWJ’s relationship with the TFG, to learn more about the situation on the ground, and to hear more about ASWJ’s forward planning.
Sanctions ———
7.(C/NF) Atkinson said the UK “absolutely supports” sanctions against al-Shabaab, but wants to make sure it gets done right. DFID is currently undertaking an assessment of how humanitarian aid is delivered in other places in the world with similar legal constraints. She explained that while the UK may be able to live with the “gray legal space” related to delivery of humanitarian aid in al-Shabaab held areas, it is likely that the UK’s preference will be for a humanitarian carve-out. She further said that given the time constraints on agreeing the AMISOM mandate by the end of the month, the UK sees the Somalia Sanctions Monitor Group mandate, which is up for renewal in March, as the appropriate vehicle for the humanitarian carve-out language, not the AMISOM mandate (which would conflate sanctions and peacekeeping issues). She said that the UK has no problem with going ahead with introduction of the al-Shabaab list before the March mandate renewal. The Foreign Office Sanctions Teams subsequently confirmed that the UK “definitely” wants to list al-Shabaab as an organization and suggested that the monitoring group mandate could be brought forward for renewal to accommodate the humanitarian carve out.
EU and Training —————
8.(C/NF) Atkinson said that planning for the EU training mission is well under way, with the Spanish-led assessment trip having occurred in mid-December. While the plans are still being finalized, it is likely that a small-scale, light touch mission with training by other African troops will be proposed. The training will take place in Uganda in two tranches of 1,000 individuals over 12 months. She predicted that the potential pitfalls will be around salaries, command-and-control issues, and logistics. EU High Representative for Foreign and Defense Policy Cathy Ashton is interested in seeing the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission come to fruition, as it will be the first post-Lisbon treaty force generation and training mission. According to Atkinson, the UK Government has made a concerted effort to see Ashton engaged on Somalia, as the EU is already dedicated so many resources to efforts there. (NOTE: In a separate discussion with the Foreign Office EU Correspondent, he suggested that Ashton needed more information on the proposed operation. END NOTE.) She said there has been some consideration of appointing an EU Special Representative, but that no decisions have been made.
UN Appointments —————
9.(C/NF) On the UN, Atkinson said the replacement of Special Representative ould Abdullah will be critical; it will be important to get someone who is a good manager who can deal corral the international community and donors’ efforts. The preference is for an African and/or Muslim. She also asserted that the UK would like to push the UN to have a more joined-up approach that would see the various UN family LONDON 00000089 003 OF 003 agencies based in Nairobi working together better. Visit London’s Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX ed_Kingdom SUSMAN
SOMALIA – KENYAN FOREIGN MINISTER PULSES INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON SOMALIA
Passed to the Telegraph by WikiLeaks
9:00PM GMT 03 Feb 2011
Ref ID: 09NAIROBI2140
Date: 10/8/2009 15:12
Origin: Embassy Nairobi
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Destination:
Header: VZCZCXRO5857RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRODE RUEHNR #2140/01 2811512ZNY CCCCC ZZHR 081512Z OCT 09FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBITO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1269INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVERHEHNSC/NSC WASHDCRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCRUEKDIA/DIA WASHDCRHMFISS/CJTF HOA
Tags: PREL,MARR,EAID,MOPS,PTER,SO,KE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002140 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019 TAGS: PREL, MARR, EAID, MOPS, PTER, SO, KE SUBJECT: SOMALIA – KENYAN FOREIGN MINISTER PULSES INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON SOMALIA Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson; reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1.(C) Summary: Kenyan Foreign Minister Wetangula on October 8 convened EU representatives and the U.S. for what he said was an informal discussion of Somalia. Wetangula stressed several times that the GOK believed there was no alternative to the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG), but acknowledged that the TFG was weak and not active enough. He urged donor countries to make good on their pledges to Somalia, backed Price Waterhouse Cooper’s agreement with the TFG, and alleged that the September 17 suicide attacks on AMISOM in Mogadishu had Eritrean fingerprints. Wetangula also thought that the international community should be resident in Mogadishu. In the discussion that followed, the British Ambassador pushed a “bottom up/top down” approach to Somalia that would result in a weak central government and much near-independent activity in the regions. In the only off-key moment at the lunch, the Spanish Ambassador announced that the TFG had little prospect of success, and said that Spain early in its EU presidency planned an international conference on Somalia to which it planned to invite all Somali entities, including al-Shabaab. In a brief conversation after the lunch, it was clear that the other EU representatives present (UK, Sweden, Italy, European Commission) were determined to ensure that the Spanish Ambassador’s conference did not come to pass. End summary. — Kenyan Foreign Minister Strongly Backs TFG ———————–
2.(C) Kenyan Foreign Minister Wetangula hosted a lunch on October 8 for selected EU ambassadors, Somalia Unit representative in the absence of Ambassador Ranneberger, and Kenyan MFA Horn of Africa Division representatives. Wetangula opened the lunch by insisting that the TFG, while weak, must not be allowed to fail. Wetangula described al-Shabaab as weak, but still receiving assistance from Eritrea which, he said, had played a role in the September 17 suicide attacks on AMISOM. Wetangula worried repeatedly about Eritrea during the lunch.
3.(C) Wetangula urged that aid be given immediately to the TFG. He mentioned unfulfilled international community financial pledges and suggested that equipment, such as helicopters and armored vehicles, could intimidate a weak al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. Wetangula suggested that GOK personnel could provide training to would-be Somali helicopter pilots. Without describing GOK efforts to assist the TFG, Wetangula highlighted the importance of Somalia’s Lower Juba area and its strategic significance to Kenya. Recent fighting had left the “wrong people” in control of Kismayo, Wetangula said.
4.(C) Wetangula also urged a more active role for Somaliland and Puntland where there was a “semblance of order” in south-central Somalia. He praised Ugandan and Djiboutian efforts to train troops, but worried that there was not a plan for their incorporation into the TFG’s security structures. Wetangula thought that international community efforts would gain credibility and relevance if the international community was presence in Mogadishu. With a nod to the Kenyan Special Envoy for Somalia, who was present, Wetangula said he would be the “first to send” a representative there if a green zone were established.
EU Ambassadors Back Weaker Federal Structures ————————-
5.(C) The British Ambassador seconded much of what Wetangula said, but added that the TFG could do “more to help itself” than it had to date. He mentioned greater outreach to like-minded groups around Somalia as an example, and touted alliance building as superior to military activity. Somalia had been ratcheted up the list of HMG foreign policy priorities, he said, and a close study of past, failed reconciliation efforts had convinced the UK that a successful Somalia would feature a loose federal government and semi-autonomous regions. He thought the international community should engage in a simultaneous “bottom-up/top-down” approach. The Ambassador agreed with Wetangula that Eritrea was “extremely malignant,” and noted he had just cleared on a document that would have an unnamed senior UK official aggressively raise Eritrea’s behavior during a forthcoming visit to Qatar. NAIROBI 00002140 002 OF 002
6.(C) The Italian government seconded a weaker central government, noting that the last strong government, Siad Barre’s, had consequences that continue to complicate efforts at reconciliation today. The GOI, in addition to providing financial assistance to the TFG via the AU, planned to sponsor the training of up to one thousand TFG police under UN auspices, he said.
7.(C) The EU Commission Special Representative described progress made in realizing EU pledges, then worried about the increasing prominence of negative clan dynamics in an already weak TFG. Years of ultimately unsuccessful training efforts, he said, made it imperative that there be the equivalent of a civil service, so that the skills acquired through training would remain in place even if a new TFG were to come to power.
Spanish Ambassador More Critical, Urges Engagement with al-Shabaab ——————————–
8.(C) In the only discordant note of the lunch, the Spanish Ambassador dismissed the TFG as “too weak from the start.” He quoted approvingly disparaging comments allegedly made by Puntland President “Faroole” about the TFG, criticized TFG ministers for spending too little time in Mogadishu, and promised that there would be a new Somalia conference early in the Spanish EU presidency to which al-Shabaab representatives would be invited. The TFG, he said, had failed to enlist al-Shabaab in its efforts. The British Ambassador in particuar took issue with Spain’s alleged intention to invite al-Shabaab to such a conference. He and other EU colleagues (Italy, Sweden, the European Commission) made it clear to Somalia Unit representative after the lunch that the Spanish presidency would be resisted should it attempt to stage such a conference.
Comment ——-
9.(C) Wetangula’s welcome initiative did not break any new ground, and the Foreign Minister offered no information about GOK efforts to assist the TFG in Jubaland, but his repeated comments during the lunch about what he said was continued active Eritrean involvement in Somalia suggested that Eritrea will be very much on the agenda at the next IGAD ministerial. HOZA
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003170175.html
Kenya: Govt Trains Somali Youth
Andrew Teyie
17 March 2010
Nairobi — THE Kenya Government is secretly giving military training to 2,500 Somali youth, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia has concluded.
Kenya has not officially informed the UN Security Council of the training programme and “in a reply dated 23 February 2010 to a Monitoring Group query on this subject, the Government of Kenya denied that it is providing training for Somali troops,” says the UN report.
The report recommends that the UN Security Committee should send a warning letter to Kenya reminding it that is in breach of UN resolutions for “substantive or technical violations of the arms embargo”.
The report warns that the “international dimensions of the Somali conflict are expanding at an accelerated pace. All of Somalia’s neighbours -Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya – are militarily involved in the conflict or plan to become involved in the coming months”.
The report was signed by the UN Monitoring Group chairman Claude Heller and tabled before the UN Security Council on March 10.
“Kenya government officials have publicly acknowledged that it had accepted a request from the Somali Transitional Government to train government police officers but denied any other type of training,” states the report.
“Monitoring Group field investigations have confirmed the existence of a military training programme,” the report states.
“The training programme was initiated early in 2009 at the request of President Sharif and under the auspices of his then Minister of Defence Mohamed Abdi Mohammed ‘Gandhi’.” “Kenya hosted the programme, and Ethiopia has been closely been involved. Approximately 2,500 youths were recruited by clan elders and commissioned agents both from within Somalia (exclusively the Juba valley) and North-eastern Kenya, including the Daadab refugee camps,” states the report.
Dadaab refugee camp is home to nearly 400,000 Somali refugees.
“Two training centres were established, one at the Kenya Wildlife Service training camp at Manyani, the other near Archer’s Post in Isiolo. A total of 36 Somali officers were recruited to assist in the training under the command of General Abdi Mahdi and Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail ‘Fartaag’. The officers completed a one month training in September 2009,” says the UN report.
It adds that most of those recruited were from the Ogaden clan with the Marehan in second place.
“In December 2009, the Kenyan Minister for security, George Saitoti, reportedly confirmed to foreign diplomats the existence of Jubaland policy which is intended to establish a ‘buffer zone’ bordering Kenya in the Juba Valley,” the report states.
The decision by the Kenya government to recruit mainly from the Ogaden resulted in complaints from other clans.
In Kenya, the Ogaden clan have served the government in key positions since independence.
The Ogaden clan primarily lives in the central Ogaden plateau of Ethiopia, the North Eastern Province of Kenya, and the Jubaland region of Southern Somalia. They also inhabit Somalia’s major cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayo.
The Marehan mostly live in Jubaland Gedo and Lower Juba Regions in southwest Somalia, in central Somalia, the Ogaden, and in northeast Kenya. They are considered the most fierce nationalists among the Somali people and have always played key roles in both the Somali uprisings.
The media and NGOs have reported irregularities in the training programme, including recruitment of underage youth, false promises of financial remuneration and recruitment of refugees.
“Independent Monitoring Group investigations, including interviews with trainers and trainees from Manyani, have confirmed all this practices did indeed take place, but the group cannot assess the scale of irregularities,” states the UN report.
The report complains that “cooperation with Somalia’s neighbours was especially disappointing… The governments of Kenya and Ethiopia failed to respond to Monitoring Group requests for information”.
However the report exonerated Kenyan CID that alone “provided valuable assistance”.
According to the UN report, the Somali government owes its survival to the small Amisom force of Ugandan and Burundi soldiers. The troops being trained by Kenya were intended to bolster the government army.
“Despite infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganised and corrupt- a composite of independent militias loyal to senior government officials and military officers, who profit from the business of war and resist their integration under a single command,” states the UN report.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003191005.html
Nairobi Star (Nairobi)
Kenya: Nation Stuck With Somali ‘Mercenaries’
Abdilatif Maalim
19 March 2010
Nairobi — An estimated 2,500 Somali youths trained by Kenya to fight in Somalia are stranded at Archer’s Post in Isiolo, The Star has established.
A report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia which was presented to the UN Security Council indicates the youths, majority of them from the Ogaden clan, started receiving training early last year at the request of President Sheikh Shariff under the auspices of his then Minister of Defence Mohamed Abdi Mohammed “Gandhi”.
“Kenya hosted the programme and Ethiopia has been closely involved.
Approximately 2,500 youths were recruited by clan elders and commissioned agents both from within Somalia (exclusively the Juba Valley) and Northeastern Kenya, including the Daadab refugee camp,” states the UN report.
The Star established that the youths cannot be deployed to Somalia as there was a stalemate between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia about where they would be most useful.
While the Kenyan security forces want to have the youths deployed in the southern Somali regions of Juba and Gedo to create a buffer zone with the militant Al Shabaab, Ethiopia and the Somalia transitional government want them sent to Mogadishu to help repulse the Al Shabaab who have taken control of large parts of the capital.
Somalia President Sheikh Shariff later fell out with his Defence minister Mohamed Ghandi, an Ogadeni, whom he suspected of pushing for the deployment of the youths in Juba and Gedo to not only fight the Al Shabaab but also lay the foundation for the establishment of an Ogaden autonomous region.
Ethiopia’s fears the deployment of the contingent in Ogaden might bolster and give the Ogaden National Liberation Front a launching pad for its attacks against Ethiopia.
The Ogaden clan live in the central Ogaden plateau of Ethiopia, the North Eastern Province of Kenya, and the Jubaland region of Southern Somalia. In Kenya, the Ogadeni have served the government in key positions since independence.
Yesterday Somalia Ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur, confirmed there was a stalemate in the deployment process. He could not comment further “because the issue is sensitive.” “The government of Somalia will very soon address that. I am not an authority on this matter. I can’t talk about it, but I have heard the reports of the former Somali Defence minister meeting with Somali elders in Nairobi on the deployment issue,” said Ali Nur.
The Ministry of Foreign Affair spokesman Egara Kabaji denied the UN report that Kenya was training the youths to support Somalia transitional government. He denied the existence of the such a contingent anywhere in the country, Kabaji said the only training that the government was involved in was in accordance with an agreement between the EU and Kenya in which Kenya offered to train policemen for the Somalia government.
“The last time we trained Somali police officers was in 2006, when we trained 200 VIP protection police officers. But even as we speak there is a plan between Kenya and the EU to train Somali policemen,” said Kabaji.
However, according to the UN report: “In December 2009, the Kenyan Minister for security, George Saitoti, reportedly confirmed to foreign diplomats the existence of Jubaland policy which is intended to establish a ‘buffer zone’ bordering Kenya in the Juba Valley.” Yesterday Parliament’s departmental committee of Foreign Affairs said they will in the next 10 days table a report on the recruitment in the House. Committee chairman Aden Keynan said the matter had serious consequences for security in the region.
“The issue we have been dealing with is about recruitment of the youth which the committee has concluded its investgigations,” said Keynan.
According to the UN report, two training centres were established at the Kenya Wildlife Service training camp at Manyani, and near Archer’s Post in Isiolo.
“A total of 36 Somali officers were recruited to assist in the training under the command of a General Abdi Mahdi and Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail ‘Fartaag’. The officers completed one-month training in September 2009”.
The youths under the command of General Mahdi, a former Somali warlord, were supposed to be deployed on February 16, 2010 immediately after they completed their training.
They have been at the training camps since then waiting for their deployment.
Yesterday security analysts were fearful that if the squad is allowed back into the communities it would pose a grave security risk. A few of the trainees escaped from the camp when they received reports they might be deployed to Mogadishu to fight the Al-Shabaab militants.
One of the Kenyan Somali trainers who sought anonymity told the Star that he and other trainers have not been paid since the programme started last September.
The youths who were each promised a salary of $150 (Sh11,400) a month after recruitment had also not been paid.
Last Tuesday the former Somalia Defence minister Mohamed Ghandi hosted elders from the Marehan and Ogaden clans to brief them on the training and deployment plans. The meeting, held at Chester House, Nairobi, also discussed the possibility of the two clans withdrawing their support to the Somali government.
Sources at the meeting said Ghandi assured the elders that the youths will be deployed in the Gedo and Juba region as he had initially planned when he was still Minister.
Copyright © 2010 Nairobi Star. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com).
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