Source: Huffington Post
Nasrec 2017: Mantashe’s Numbers Hand Pole Position To Dlamini-Zuma
David Mabuza and Mpumalanga is now the undisputed kingmaker.
07/10/2017 08:21 SAST | Updated 6 hours ago
Pieter du Toit Editor-in-Chief, HuffPost South Africa
The numbers don’t seem to add up for Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa in his bid to succeed President Jacob Zuma as leader of the governing ANC. That’s if a first glance at the provincial voting allocations are anything to go by.
And David Mabuza, the ANC strongman in Mpumalanga and its provincial chairperson there, is now the kingmaker. He has recently advanced the candidature of Zweli Mklhize, the ANC’s treasurer general, as a unity candidate.
There has been a surge in voting delegates in Mpumalanga and North West. This is bad news for Ramaphosa.
Gwede Mantashe, the ANC’s secretary general, forwarded the final tally for voting delegates to all nine provincial secretaries on Friday, and it seems to indicate that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, President Zuma’s preferred candidate, to be in a very strong position ahead of the party’s elective conference in December.
According to the letter by Mantashe 4 723 branch delegates will have the right to vote. The calculation is based on one voting delegate per branch that has 100 paid-up members. For every 250 paid-up members extra, branches receive one extra voting delegates. The branch delegates will be joined by representatives from the leagues, who also have voting rights. Provinces’ voting size is based on proportional representation given the number of members in “good standing”, or paid-up.
1. KwaZulu-Natal is still the biggest and most influential voting bloc, with 870 voting delegates for a share of 18,4%. No wonder Zuma is pushing for the provincial executive committee to appeal the ruling which disbanded it.
- There has been a surge in voting delegates in Mpumalanga and North West. This is bad news for Ramaphosa.
- The Eastern Cape has relinquished its position as the second biggest province in the ANC — and that’s even worse news for Ramaphosa.
- Mabuza, Mpumalanga’s premier, is now a kingmaker. His province’s share of voting delegates jumped by 57,6% from 2012, from 467 delegates to 736 delegates and is now the second biggest voting bloc.
- North West, where Supra Mahumapelo holds sway, more than doubled its share of voting delegates, jumping by 130%.
- The erstwhile “premier league” (Free State, North West and Mpumalanga) command 35% of the vote, although Mabuza has since denounced its existence.
- Limpopo, his place of birth, might be ray of light for Ramaphosa. (He has won the endorsement of the provincial chairperson as well as its biggest region.) It will be the fourth largest voting bloc at Nasrec with 13,6% of the voting delegates.
- Dlamini-Zuma’s path to the presidency: She needs KwaZulu-Natal, plus North West, Free State and Mpumalanga.
- Ramaphosa’s path to the presidency: He seemingly has the Eastern Cape, Western and Northern Cape, Gauteng and Limpopo. He needs Mpumalanga.
- Dlamini-Zuma will win if she gets Mpumalanga, even if Limpopo goes to Ramaphosa.
- The leagues (women, youth and veterans) will vote as provinces. Their share has yet to be determined, but all have pledged loyalty to Dlamini-Zuma.
Provincial voting allocations (Mangaung 2012 in brackets):
KwaZulu-Natal 870 (974) 18,4%
Mpumalanga 736 (467) 15,6%
Eastern Cape 648 (676) 13,7%
Limpopo 643 (574) 13,6%
North West 548 (234) 11,4%
Gauteng 508 (500) 10,8%
Free State 409 (324) 8%
Northern Cape 197 (176) 4%
Western Cape 182 (178) 4%
I forwarded your article on Eritrea to several ex-Peace Corps volunteers who spent two years with me there between 1962-64. Naturally, we’ve spent the rest of our lives tracking events in Eritrea more closely than average American citizens. Here is one response out of several that I received of a similar nature:
Hi John, I finally got around to reading the article you forwarded. If there were only some meat in Plaut’s suggestions, we’d all be the better for it. We can only dream. What a shame. Thanks so much for sending… Warmest regards, Gloria
I haven’t discussed her note with her, but I feel that I owe both you and Gloria some thoughts about the “meat” that is missing from your analysis.
First, you proceed from the assumption that the rift between pro-government and anti-government factions within Eritrea can be breached. Our experience over the past 15 years with diaspora Eritreans suggests otherwise. Too many mysterious deaths, imprisonments and ransoms imposed by the Isaias Afeworki government place this impasse in the same category as Ukraine or Kashmir; the camps are irreconcilably opposed to each other. In Eritrea, the only solution is regime change, preferably through another referendum and adoption of a dormant (but excellent) constitution. This will probably not happen until Isaias dies, and even then, more blood is likely to be shed.
Your second assumption is that the similarity between Eritrean and Ethiopian cultures holds out hope for reconciliation. This is an outsider’s perspective; seen from within, Eritrean culture is distinctly different from Ethiopia, primarily due to the democratic institutions dominant in Eritrea during the 1940s and 50s, contrasted with the autocratic regimes imposed on Eritrea by Haile Selassie and the Dergue. For the past half-century, Eritreans have treasured their hard-won independence from Ethiopia; they are not likely exchange it for a more relaxed border policy. Even under Isaias, the Eritrean citizens seem to value education, meritocracy and self-reliance more than Ethiopians, who are steeped in a culture of patronage and feudal loyalties.
Your most persuasive arguments were economic; but again (alas) it is difficult to imagine a scenario where the two countries can become economically inter-dependent. The Europeans and Americans have made Djibouti a viable port for Ethiopian exports, rendering Massawa and Assab (better natural harbors) useless to both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both countries are on the verge of starvation due to regional climate change. The Chinese seem to be ready to stimulate the Ethiopian economy while the U.S. and E.U. are oblivious to the lost opportunities in Africa. Eritrea has few natural resources to exploit. Eritrea’s strongest asset was human capital—cadres of physicians, professors and entrepreneurs who took their earliest chance to emigrate, and now reside in America and Europe, primarily. When Isaias dies, the Eritrean diaspora will surely make a move toward peaceful, democratic regime change. No Western nation seems to be supporting these groups in the present, nor are they doing anything to thwart an illegitimate succession that will surely try to take over Eritrea when Isaias is gone.
I think I speak for my friends when I suggest to you that your interest in Eritrea is appreciated, but unrealistic. During several trips back to Eritrea in the 1990s, each of us found a nation poised on the brink of astounding, positive change. The 2000 border war and Isaias’ mental instability and cruelty ruined all that. Now, the most painful reality to endure is that the potential for Eritrea to become a beacon for Africa still exists…..and no one (outside the Eritrean diaspora) seems to care.
Please continue to write about Eritrea’s ongoing tragedy, but try to ground your observations with logic and evidence. False hopes are worse than no hope at all.
John C. Rude Pasadena, CA