This report by one of the most perceptive analysts of politics in the Horn of Africa – John Young – comes to this pessimistic conclusion:

“Because the opposition was unable to impose its objective of a genuine civil administration and, given the preponderance of the military in the transitional government, it is very unlikely that this government will be able to eliminate the deep and corrupting influences of the NCP and the military in the state and society, much less overcome systemic inequities that have afflicted Sudan since its independence. Unless the civil and armed opposition can overcome the power of the military, the 2019 uprising will suffer the same fate as those of 1964 and 1985, when hopes for a radical transformation of Sudanese society were quashed.”

John Young: “Sudan Uprising: Popular Struggles, Elite Compromises, and Revolution Betrayed”, Small Arms Survey, May 2020.

Executive summary

The National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in Sudan in 1989 as a
result of a coup (it was renamed the National Congress Party, or NCP,
in 1998), and held power under Omar al-Bashir for the next 30 years,
despite widespread opposition, wars in the country’s peripheries, and
the 2011 secession of southern Sudan to form the new state of South
Sudan. In 1999, when NIF foreign policies threatened the continued
existence of the regime, al-Bashir dismissed Hassan al-Turabi, the
author of the party’s Islamist programme; however, a growing economic
crisis led to the implementation of austerity measures after 2011 that
intensified internal opposition, while al-Bashir was unable to
overcome the country’s regional and international isolation.
Concluding that al-Bashir had become a major threat to the survival of
the regime, the head of the National Intelligence and Security Service
(NISS), Salah Gosh, began to plan for his removal with the support of
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt.

A grouping of professional associations, the Sudanese Professionals
Association (SPA), was formed in June 2018 to press for economic
reforms. After youth-led demonstrations in December 2018 in response
to rising bread prices and fuel rationing, in January 2019 the SPA
brought together many of Sudan’s political parties and some armed
groups to form the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). The FFC
committed to removing al-Bashir, establishing a civil administration,
and eliminating the roots of the ruling party in the state and
society. In the wake of continuing demonstrations that included
increasing numbers of people from all corners of the country, on 11
April 2019 the generals jailed al-Bashir and attempted to rule on
their own. But in a turbulent context of continuing resistance, on 3
June the dominant element in the security services, the Rapid Support
Forces (RSF) led by Lt. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (known as
‘Hemeti’), attacked the sit-in outside military headquarters in
Khartoum. The brutality of the attack lost the junta domestic and
international support, and the subsequent FFC-led country-wide strike
made clear that the generals could not rule alone. The FFC was in turn
overawed by the potential violence that the junta could unleash, and
on 17 July 2019 the antagonists reached a power-sharing agreement that
was planned to last for 39 months. The FFC was successful in
displacing al-Bashir, but did not achieve its objective of
establishing a genuine civil administration, and thus the primary
issue that produced the uprising has not been resolved and instability
will likely continue.

Key findings

Similar to uprisings in 1964 and 1985, a major cause of the 2018–19
uprising was an extended period of economic decline and uneven
development that fostered insurgencies in Sudan’s peripheries. The
economic crisis was exacerbated by the cost of combating these
insurgencies, a vastly inflated security sector, endemic corruption,
and US sanctions. The economic crisis and the regime’s attempt to
foster Islamist values served to bring large numbers of youth, notably
including women, onto the streets, in contrast to the uprisings of
1964 and 1985, when trade unions played a leading role.

Divisions developed within the NCP as a result of al-Bashir’s
centralization of power and marginalization of his competitors, which
led NISS chief Salah Gosh and other leaders to conclude that the
regime could only be preserved by removing the president.

With the support of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, the military
expected that, after it had deposed al-Bashir, it could form a
transitional government on its own, but the brutality of the RSF’s
suppression of the sit-in in Khartoum on 3 June 2019 lost the junta
domestic and international legitimacy, and it was compelled to sign a
power-sharing agreement with the FFC on 17 July 2019. Fearing further
attacks on civilians, weakened by internal divisions, and under
international pressure, the FFC accepted an agreement that involved
abandoning its central demand for a civil administration.

Youth made up the core of the uprising, and their challenge to the
junta was mainly manifested in the sit-ins that they organized. But
when the brutal RSF attack on the Khartoum sit-in on 3 June 2019
effectively ended the sit-ins, the youth lost much of their influence
over the FFC, had no say on the political agreements reached between
it and the generals, have no representation in the transitional
government, and cannot be expected to exert much influence during the
39-month transitional period.

This report concludes that because the opposition was unable to impose
its objective of a genuine civil administration and, given the
preponderance of the military in the transitional government, it is
very unlikely that this government will be able to eliminate the deep
and corrupting influences of the NCP and the military in the state and
society, much less overcome systemic inequities that have afflicted
Sudan since its independence. Unless the civil and armed opposition
can overcome the power of the military, the 2019 uprising will suffer
the same fate as those of 1964 and 1985, when hopes for a radical
transformation of Sudanese society were quashed.

https://mailchi.mp/smallarmssurvey/hsba-sudan-uprising?e=2800fd94b6