This article is not published because I agree with it, but because it is worth noting, and remembering
Source: TWT World
- MOHAMMED IBRAHIM SHIRE
- 21 HOURS AGO
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front has executed a series of coercive steps to provoke a conflict at the local, national and regional level to force international powers to intervene.
On November 4, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) launched coordinated attacks on the federal military’s powerful Northern Command headquarters in Mekelle, prompting the Ethiopian government to launch a counter-offensive in TPLF-led Tigray.
Four weeks in, federal troops have “captured” TPLF’s last stronghold, the capital city, Mekelle and the TPLF vowed to fight on, leading many to paint a dire prognosis: that the conflict is transforming into a bloody and protracted war that could spiral into a regional conflagration.
A more in-depth look, however, paints an entirely different picture: that the TPLF is doing everything it can to avoid a long-drawn-out guerrilla insurgency, and instead, is actively lobbying for quick international intervention.
Provocation
A month before the November attack, the TPLF sent a flurry of letters to different foreign heads of state asserting that any dialogue with the federal government needs to be mediated by the international community or witness widespread insecurity.
Since then, the TPLF executed a series of coercive steps to provoke a conflict at the local, national and regional level with the aim to force international powers to intervene. The majority of these steps were rooted in the provocation strategy – an effective ploy often employed by insurgent groups to elicit a repressive overreaction.
First, it successfully provoked the federal government with a surprise attack against its largest military base, which forced the federal government to mount a military offensive against the TPLF. Two days into the conflict, the TPLF leadership sent a letter to the African Union (AU) chair highlighting that “political problems can’t be solved through military means” while imploring urgent international intervention. The AU decided not to intervene, and instead echoed a boilerplate line of “immediate ceasefire” to end the bloodshed.
Second, dismayed by the AU’s inaction and the seeming avoidance of any widespread attacks against Tigrayan civilians by federal forces, the TPLF decided to elicit an overreaction from the Amharas.
Nine days into the conflict, 600 unarmed Amharas were murdered in Mai-Kadra, allegedly by retreating TPLF forces. Violence against civilians is often portrayed as an antecedent of civil war, a cause or both, and eliciting a violent response from Amharas makes strategic sense since Amhara federal troops formed the backbone of the initial military operations. However, in the aftermath of the Mai-Kadra’s massacre, the town’s mayor assured the broader community that “Amhara[s] are not seeking revenge on the Tigrayans”.
More broadly, if this potential scenario played out the way the TPLF planned it, it could have forced an international intervention. Indeed, recognising that ethnic civil wars are usually centred on access to state power and resources, the international community usually prefers to intervene or mediate such conflicts with a preference for autonomy, power-sharing, or some combination of the two as evidenced, for instance, in Angola, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone.
Third, internationalised ethnic conflicts to a large extent, often require an internationalised solution as they tend to be characterised by a high level of violence. Indeed, some scholars find that international mediation tends to be accepted only in the most severe cases of civil wars. In internationalising the brewing conflict and subsequently heightening the conflict, the TPLF tried to draw in neighbouring Eritrea by firing multiple rockets that struck Eritrea’s capital Asmara. Eritrea, however, refused to get dragged in or even signal retaliatory attacks.
TPLF’s plea falls on deaf ears
The beleaguered TPLF has unsuccessfully garnered any support from the international community. Unsurprisingly, this can be attributed to several internal and external factors.
First, since the conflict started in November, the group pushed a near-mythical narrative of “battle-hardened” soldiers that have mastered the art of waging a guerrilla war. Drawing historical references to their successful rebellion against the Derg regime, the TPLF leadership boasted that Tigray is the “graveyard of dictators and aggressors”.
However, whilst the TPLF are battle-hardened and possess a wealth of experience in waging a successful guerrilla insurgency, the factors that made their rebellion against the Derg regime successful no longer exist. Federal forces have already secured the border with Sudan, cutting off the “TPLF from setting up bases there” whilst Eritrea mans any potential outlet to the Red Sea.
Second, the TPLF lacks international sympathy. The United States, UAE, China and other European countries have more or less sided with Ethiopia by only giving out standard diplomatic statements. Sudan was arguably the TPLF’s closest ally but the overthrow of Omar Bashir and the TPLF’s meteoric fall from grace within Ethiopia’s power structures has greatly limited the group’s influence in Khartoum.
Finally, most ethnic civil wars are decided by a military victory rather than negotiated agreements. As a result, attrition is important because the side’s mobilisation pools are separate and can be depleted. More significantly, since each side’s mobilisation base is inherently limited to members of its community, capturing enemy population centres effectively diminishes its mobilisation base. The capture of TPLF’s last stronghold in Mekelle has essentially sapped them from significant popular support – for the time being.
Whilst the TPLF has “vowed” to fight on after being ejected from their most important base in Mekelle, it is unlikely that the group’s rhetoric of a “long conflict” will match their current operational strategy. However, events can go the other way, giving TPLF the necessary impetus to change the tide against them and still precipitate an international intervention.
The group has made repeated claims that innocent Tigrayans are being systematically profiled and marginalised by the Ethiopian state. Already, there have been reports of non-aligned Tigrayans being fired, demoted or suspended for fear of switching loyalty to the TPLF. One pertinent example is the disarmament of 200 Tigrayans from the Ethiopian contingent of the African Union Mission to Somalia.
Moreover, over 40,000 Tigrayan civilians have fled the region since the crisis started. Expectedly, many fear that they will be unfairly targeted on account of their ethnic identity and if these worries are realised with government-tolerated ‘reprisal’ attacks against innocent Tigrayans, it can potentially incentivise resentful and fearful Tigrayans to accept the TPLF’s appeal for broader mobilisation.
Indeed, this level of repressive overreaction is what the TPLF was initially banking on in attracting international intervention and might prove equally useful as a recruitment strategy if it ever decides to switch to full-fledged guerrilla warfare.
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Martin Plaut 
The above article presents TPLF as the provocative actor. However, facts on ground prove otherwise. The establishment of the new central and north western commands along the Tigray southern borders by Abiy Ahmed Ali and the confrontation of Eritrean army on northern Tigray borders before the conflict prove this. Mesfin Hagos ex Eritrean Defense Minister also has an insider info on this.
“… according to sources in the Eritrean capital … these units were expected to be the hammer and the Northern Command the anvil to strike out of existence the TPLF …”
https://eritreahub.org/mesfin-hagos-eritreas-role-in-ethiopias-conflict-and-the-fate-of-eritrean-refugees
I hope this internal war stops soon. The Tigrian civilians have suffered enough in the past. I also hope your analysis is correct and reaches the ears of the government. It has nothing to win by intimidating and terrorizing the civilians in Addis Ababa and else where. If there is any win it will only result the contrary. It is naïve and supped to believe you can win over terrorizing the Tigrians. It will only wake hate and raise a drive to support the TPLF. I am saying this based on the history of the people. Dr Abiy should go out and broadcast to the people of Ethiopia Tigrian population should not be profiled in any ways.
The case of Mai-Kadra massacre – the report by Amnesty has been disproved by Reuters based on interviews of those fleeing the scene. TPLF firing rockets to Eritrea was not to draw it to the war but a response to its involvement. Eritrea has been involved in the war as an architect of its planning and execution and it is evident that its army are in Tigray as we speak disguised under ENDF military uniforms. It is to be noted that Ethiopia had cargo shipped fifteen thousand (15,000) Ethiopian military uniform to Eritrea on 11 Nov 2020.
Believer of Abby-Farmaajo-Afewerki policy of ‘Horn of Africa integration dream’ . He honestly didn’t tell us about Afewrki’s milatary intervention in the Tigray – Ethiopian war.
The issue at hand was and is “a political question/issue/problem” not military. A political problem demands a political solution. I hope the author and other sane minded scholars agree with this argument. In the long warfare history of this country called Ethiopia, the political leaders of the country made gross errors (mistakes) due to mainly arrogance and partly ignorance. They believed the trigger of the gun could solve their internal political problems. In the recent (modern ) history of the country, we could refer to the unethical behavior of Emperor Haile Selassie and Lt/Col Mengistu Haile Mariam. Both failed to grasp the reality and rejected all well intended advices and attempts to look for political solutions.
The current, unelected PM, of the country is no more different. His unrefined political knowledge and experiences in addition to his dependence on Isaias Afeworqi (as his mentor) has created the current military mess. The question was a question of political issues that needed political solutions from the outset. Despite the availability of verified experiences (think of the decades long “civil wars” as currently is understood by Isaias and his lieutenants) Abiy and his Amharic backers and Eritrean advisors failed to face the reality. They are found to be much inferior than Lij Iyasu Michael – who attempted to tackle the problems created by Menelikism. Next, I could refer to the endevours of Takele Woldehawariyat (of the Patriotic Ethiopians). With this goes the more than political rhetoric of the Military Derg (led by Lt/Col Mengistu Haile Mariam) and later even of the political stand as was understood by EDU (now defunct, it had federalism as part of the solution in its political program, Colin legume 1977 at 309).
During the Military Derg regime the question of federalism was raised, early, in the government sponsored daily newsletter “Addis Zemen” in 1975; Proclamation No.236/1983 of March 23/1983 (Institute of Nation Nationalities). This proclamation recognized that ” each Nation and nationality has the right to self determination”. This was supported by a statement of clarification prepared by the Central Committee of COPWE. These were later followed by Proclamation No. 14/1987 of Sept. 18/1987 that divided the country into 5 Autonomous and 24 Administrative regions. The move was a reflection of the internal redrawing of the provinces of the country. Proclamation No. 15/1987 recognized the special historical, political, economic and social features of Eritrea. These were later followed by Proclamation No. 26/1989.
There were people among the Derg who realized the chronic political problem of the country although Lt/Col Mengistu and his cronies were arrogant enough not to purse the smooth way. This same situation, albeit in its worst form, is now reflected in the country. Abiy and his Amharic backers and his mentor Isaias Afeworqi are pushing for Menelikism although this is still contrary to the valid Constitution of FDRE. All of them failed to respect the needs and interests of the various different nations and nationalities of the country. They are happy to incarcerate federalists as if it could serve as the panacea of the problems they themselves are creating. Alas! Menelikism is not a solution for the country. Menelik’s Menelikism was understood to be a buried time bomb just on the morrow of the Adwa war. Menelik had no love for Tigray or the Tigrayans as was clearly reflected in his decree before he mobilized a force against Tigray in collaboration with the Italians in 1890 just a few months after he crowned himself “Emperor of Ethiopia” disregarding the tradition as set forth in “Kibre Negest” and Fitha Negest.
The aspirations of Abiy to be a 7th King of the country after eliminating Tigray and Tigrayans is null and void. No one can eliminate a people let alone to eliminate a region. War can’t be the solution. No one can have a peaceful night to sleep after setting a fire in Tigray and other regions of the country.